Five aggregates of appropriation (upādānakkhandha)

[Akuma]

I thought I recalled an earlier discussion where it was pointed out that the Buddha only uses the aggregate analysis when speaking about non-arahants, and in the case of arahants any analysis is done in terms of sense bases, not aggregates.

Am I recalling correctly? Is there a sutta where the aggregate analysis is applied to an arahant?


Mike

An arahant should attend in an appropriate way to these five clinging- aggregates as inconstant, stressful, a disease

[retrofuturist]

Greetings,

Hmmm... I'll have to investigate precisely what Nanananda meant by the following...

“It is true, Ven. Ñāṇavīra made a start. But I think he went to an extreme in his crit­i­cisms, until his fol­low­ers were drop­ping even the use­ful things. And he failed to make the nec­es­sary dis­tinc­tions between saupādis­esa and anupādis­esa Nib­bāna ele­ments.

Presumably the answer to what the "necessary distinctions" are lies somewhere in the Nibbana Sermons.

Metta,
Retro.

[mikenz66]

I thought I recalled an earlier discussion where it was pointed out that the Buddha only uses the aggregate analysis when speaking about non-arahants, and in the case of arahants any analysis is done in terms of sense bases, not aggregates.

Am I recalling correctly? Is there a sutta where the aggregate analysis is applied to an arahant?


Mike

An arahant should attend in an appropriate way to these five clinging- aggregates as inconstant, stressful, a disease

Thanks Akuma! I must have been misremembering....
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html

"Then which things should an arahant attend to in an appropriate way?"

"An arahant should attend in an appropriate way to these five clinging-aggregates as inconstant, stressful, a disease, a cancer, an arrow, painful, an affliction, alien, a dissolution, an emptiness, not-self. Although, for an arahant, there is nothing further to do, and nothing to add to what has been done, still these things — when developed & pursued — lead both to a pleasant abiding in the here-&-now and to mindfulness & alertness."

Mike

[vinasp]

Hi everyone,

The DO link before "contact" is called "ignorance" in several discourses.

One example is SN 22.81 the Parileyya Sutta:

[Last two sections.]

"Or he doesn't assume form to be the self... but he may have a view such as this: 'This self is the same as the cosmos. This I will be after death, constant, lasting, eternal, not subject to change.' This eternalist view is a fabrication... Or... he may have a view such as this: 'I would not be, neither would there be what is mine. I will not be, neither will there be what is mine.' This annihilationist view is a fabrication... Or... he may be doubtful & uncertain, having come to no conclusion with regard to the true Dhamma. That doubt, uncertainty, & coming-to-no-conclusion is a fabrication.

"What is the cause, what is the origination, what is the birth, what is the coming-into-existence of that fabrication? To an uninstructed, run-of-the-mill person, touched by what is felt born of contact with ignorance, craving arises. That fabrication is born of that. And that fabrication is inconstant, fabricated, dependently co-arisen. That craving... That feeling... That contact... That ignorance is inconstant, fabricated, dependently co-arisen. It is by knowing & seeing in this way that one without delay puts an end to the effluents."

Link: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html

Regards, Vincent.

[tiltbillings]

"Or he doesn't assume form to be the self... but he may have a view such as this: '[/i]This self is the same as the cosmos[/i].

Just as an aside, that certainly is a Upanishadic notion.

[mikenz66]

I gave a link to Thanissaro Bhikkhu's translation above: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html

Here is Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation:
SN 22.122 Silavant Sutta: Virtuous

“But, friend Sāriputta, what are the things that a bhikkhu who is an arahant should carefully attend to?”

“Friend Koṭṭhita, a bhikkhu who is an arahant should carefully attend to these five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent, as suffering, as a disease, as a tumour, as a dart, as misery, as an affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as empty, as nonself. For the arahant, friend, there is nothing further that has to be done and no repetition of what he has already done. [*] However, when these things are developed and cultivated, they lead to a pleasant dwelling in this very life and to mindfulness and clear comprehension.”

BB: Natthi … arahato uttarikaraṇīyaṃ katassa vā paṭicayo. Spk does not comment on this, but Mp IV 165,3-5 (commenting on AN IV 355,24-25, AN 9.3 http://www.metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pit ... ggo-e.html 3. Meghiyasutta) explains: “There is nothing further to be done, because he has done the four tasks imposed by the Four Noble Truths (see SN 56:11 Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn56/sn56.011.harv.html). And no repetition of what he has already done, for the developed path need not be developed again and the abandoned defilements need not be abandoned again.”


Mike

[vinasp]

Hi everyone,

In the DO formula, if the first link, "ignorance" ceases, then all the other
links will cease.

If the link called "six-spheres" is also ignorance, then if it ceases all the
following links will cease, but the first four links will remain.

These first four links are the five aggregates and the "residue".

Regards, Vincent.

[mikenz66]

...treating the aggregates as if they were "things", which in my opinion would be a serious misinterpretation.

I concur.

That's good, since statements such as the following could be mistakenly interpreted as attributing a "thingness" to the khandhas:

Furthermore, if we needed them to function, their cessation could not be observed. Yet...

Suttas such as the following seem to be talking about the arising and ceasing of what we experience (and using the aggregates in this case to classify that experience --- in other cases it is sense bases).

"Furthermore, the monk remains focused on mental qualities in & of themselves with reference to the five clinging-aggregates. And how does he remain focused on mental qualities in & of themselves with reference to the five clinging-aggregates? There is the case where a monk [discerns]: 'Such is form, such its origination, such its disappearance. Such is feeling... Such is perception... Such are fabrications... Such is consciousness, such its origination, such its disappearance.'
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html

I think it would be a serious mistake to think that form, feeling, etc are separate "building blocks". As I quoted earlier:
http://what-buddha-said.net/library/Bud ... tm#khandha

Feeling, perception and mental constructions are only different aspects and functions of a single unit of consciousness. They are to consciousness what redness, softness, sweetness, etc. are to an apple and have as little separate existence as those qualities.

Nyanaponika Thera warns against taking analysis as establishing "parts" in Abhidhamma Studies
[P71 of the PDF at http://buddhanet.net].

By arranging the mental factors in relational
groups a subordinate synthetical element has been
introduced into the mainly analytical Dhammasan-
gani. By so doing, the danger inherent in purely
analytical methods has been avoided. This danger
consists in erroneously taking for genuine separate
entities the “parts” resulting from analysis, instead
of restricting their use to sound practical method
with the purpose of classifying and dissolving com-
posite events wrongly conceived as ultimate uni-
ties. Up to the present time it has been a regular
occurrence in the history of physics, metaphysics
and psychology that when a Whole has been suc-
cessfully dissolved by analysis, the resultant “parts”
themselves come again to be regarded as little
“Wholes”. Early Buddhist schools succumbed to
this danger, for example, the Vaibhasikas, better
known as Sarvàstivàdins, which belong to the so-
called Hinayàna. It was these schools that, accord-
ing to Otto Rosenberg (“Probleme der buddhisti-
schen Philosophie”), have defined Dhammas as
“substantial bearers of their specific exclusive qual-
ities”. They assumed that “the substance of all
things has a permanent existence throughout the
three divisions of time, present, past and future”
and that only the manifestations of these “substan-
tial bearers” were impermanent and subject to change
in the three divisions in time.
...

Mike

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Mike,

That's good, since statements such as the following could be mistakenly interpreted as attributing a "thingness" to the khandhas:

Furthermore, if we needed them to function, their cessation could not be observed. Yet...

As was clearly obvious in the post from which this was quoted - viewtopic.php?f=13&t=12178#p184663 - it was a direct reference to Tilt's statement that "the khandhas are the basis from which we function". You'll have to take it up with him as to whether there he intended to attribute any "thingness" or existence to them.

Metta,
Retro.

[mikenz66]

It was a direct reference to Tilt's statement that "the khandhas are the basis from which we function". You'll have to take it up with him as to whether there he intended to attribute any "thingness" or existence to them.

I have no problem with Tilt's statement, when taken in full context:
http://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.ph ... 78#p184645

The point here is that the khandhas, for the delusional one, are the basis for the misapprehension of reality, giving us: "aggregates of appropriation" The self is - in its various guises -- the add-on to, the misappropriation of, the experience grasped after via the khandhas, keeping in mind that the khandhas are the basis from which we function, either getting lost in delusion or moving towards awakening, which is all probably more than I wanted to say.

Since he's clearly not talking about aggregates as little building blocks (and neither is the Theravada, as Nyanaponika Thera eloquently explains...) but as a way of analysing/breaking down how we take experience to form the "I", "mine", etc, concepts.


Mike

[tiltbillings]

As was clearly obvious in the post from which this was quoted - http://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.ph ... 78#p184663 - it was a direct reference to Tilt's statement that "the khandhas are the basis from which we function". You'll have to take it up with him as to whether there he intended to attribute any "thingness" or existence to them.

Thingness? Existence? When have I ever advocated thingness or some sort of real existence?

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Tilt,

I didn't say you had.

Mike was just packaging my reference to your words as if they were originally mine. So, if he was going to suggest that "the following could be mistakenly interpreted as attributing a thingness to the khandhas" he should take that up with you, not me.

That's all. It's not my discussion to have.

Metta,
Retro.

[Ron-The-Elder]

tiltbillings: "or

"are they instead empty appropriations?"

The first makes no sense, and the second has been dealt with already in my msg above and the quote (SN III 46). Also, the khandhas are simply a way of talking about experience, having no ultimate reality beyond the conditioned nature that characterizes what we experience. "Empty appropriations? Damifino what you mean my this locution. The is no thing appropriating anything."

Don't think anymore discussion is necessary. Your observation says it all.

You are "Da Man!"

[kirk5a]

Okay, everyone, pay attention. Don't let your mind focus on this person or that. Create the feeling that right now you're sitting alone on a mountain or in a forest somewhere, all by yourself. What do you have sitting here right now? Just body and mind, that's all, only these two things. Everything sitting in this physical lump here is "body." "Mind" is what's aware of sense impressions and is thinking in the present. These two things are also called nama and rupa. Nama refers to what has no rupa, or form. All thoughts and sensations, such as feelings, perceptions, thought-fabrications, and consciousness, are nama. They're all formless. When the eye sees forms, those forms are called rupa. The awareness of forms is called nama. Together they're called nama and rupa, or simply body and mind.

~Ajahn Chah
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/thai ... _sure.html

[mikenz66]

Mike was just packaging my reference to your words as if they were originally mine. So, if he was going to suggest that "the following could be mistakenly interpreted as attributing a thingness to the khandhas" he should take that up with you, not me.

That's all. It's not my discussion to have.

And as I said, there was no thingness in Tilt's full quote, only when the phrase was quoted devoid of context...


Mike

[mikenz66]

A quote from In the Buddha's Words, Bhikkhu Bodhi, Page 307, that has some relevance to the OP:

A detailed catechism on the aggregates, treating them from diverse angles, can be found in Text IX, 4(1)(b) [SN 22.82 = MN 109http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.109.than.html].
Because the five aggregates that make up our ordinary experience are the objective domain of clinging (upadana), they are commonly called the the five aggregates subject to clinging (panc'upadanakkhandha).

Clinging to the five aggregates occurs in two principle modes, which we might call appropriation and identification. One either grasps them and takes possession of them, that is one appropriates them; or one uses them as the basis for views about one's self or for conceit ("I am better than, as good as, inferior to others"), that is one identifies with them. As the Nikayas put it, we are prone to think of the aggregates thus: "This is mine, this I am, this is my self"). In this phrase, the notion "This is mine" represents the act of appropriation, a function of craving (tanha). The notions "This I am" and "This is my self" represent two types of identification, the former expressing conceit (mana), the latter views (ditthi).

Mike

[mikenz66]

Further on, In the Buddha's Words, pages 309-311, Bhikkhu Bodhi comments on the difference between analysis of experience according to aggregates and sense bases:

The six internal and external sense bases provide a perspective on the totality of experience different from, but complimentary to, the perspective provided by the aggregates. The six paris of bases are the sense faculties and their corresponding objects, which support the arising of the respective types of consciousness. Because they mediate between consciousness and its objects, the internal sense bases are spken of as "bases for contact" (phassayatana), "contact" (phassa) being the coming together of sense faculty, object, and consciousness.
...
The Nikayas suggest an interesting difference between the treatment given to the aggregates and sense bases. Both serve as the soil where clinging takes root and grows, but while the aggregates are primarily the soil for views about self, the sense bases are primarily the soil for craving. A necessary step in the conquest of craving is therefore restraint of the senses. Monks and nuns in particular must be vigilant in their encounters with desirable and undesirable sense objects. When one is negligent, experience through the senses invariably bceomes a trigger for craving: lust for pleasant objects, aversion towards disagreeable objects (and a craving for pleasent escape routes), and a dull attachment to neutral objects.

Mike

[vinasp]

Hi Tilt,

SN 22.81 said: 'This self is the same as the cosmos."

Tilt said: "Just as an aside, that certainly is a Upanishadic notion."

Very interesting! Thanks for pointing this out, I had not noticed it.

[ Pali: so attaa so loko.]

Is this the only place in the entire five nikaya's where this view is
described?

Regards, Vincent.

[mikenz66]

I believe that wrong view occurs in several places. Here's one:
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html

"He assumes about the view-position — 'This cosmos is the self. [8] After death this I will be constant, permanent, eternal, not subject to change. I will stay just like that for an eternity': 'This is me, this is my self, this is what I am.'

[8] The Pali here reads, so loko so atta. The translation given here follows the interpretation of Nyanaponika Thera in his translation of this discourse. Bhikkhu Bodhi, in his notes to the translation of this discourse in The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, calls this interpretation hypothetical, and instead suggests that this phrase indicates the Sankhya theory of the changeless "person" as opposed to unchanging "nature." However, in his later translation of SN 22.81, which contains an identical passage, he adopts Nyanaponika's interpretation as well.

Mike

[mikenz66]

SN 22.81 Bhikkhu Bodhi Translation

“He may not regard form as self … … or self as in consciousness, but he holds such a view as this: ‘That which is the self is the world; having passed away, that I shall be—permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change.’ [*] That eternalist view is a formation…. When one knows and sees thus, bhikkhus, the immediate destruction of the taints occurs.

BB: This view, which posits the identity of the self and the world (so attā so loko), seems to be derived from the Upaniṣads. Strangely, Spk passes over this view in silence, and Ps (commenting on MN I 135,37 [MN 22, see previous post]) offers only an unilluminating word gloss. For a discussion, see Wijesekera, “An Aspect of Upaniṣadic Ātman and Buddhist ‘Anattā,’” Buddhist and Vedic Studies, pp. 261-63.

MN 22 Bhikku Bodhi Translation

And this standpoint for views, namely, ‘That which is the self is the world; after death I shall be permanent, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change; I shall endure as long as eternity’—this too he regards thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self.ʹ[*]

BB: This is a full-fledged eternalist view arisen on the basis of one of the earlier, more rudimentary types of personality view; here it becomes itself an object of craving, conceit, and the false view of self. This view seems to reflect the philosophy of the Upanishads, which assert the identity of the individual self (ātman) with the universal spirit (brahman), though it is difficult to determine on the basis of the texts whether the Buddha was personally acquainted with the early Upanishads themselves.


Mike