retrofuturist wrote:G
A dhamma with ultimate "thingness" would not be ultimately suñña (empty, void), and this is a valid concern to raise.
Metta,
Retro.
Hi Reto, Pt, all,
I think this is a problem of understanding. Some people get ancy when they hear that paramattha dhammas have sabhava, or that they actually exist. You see, these things are real-- real "things". They actually exist, for a short duration of time and then fall away. People think that if things "exist" then there must be some self in them or to them. But that is not the case. In fact, it is precisely because things exist for real as individual things that their is anatta, no so self or beings. Paramattha dhamams are conditioned dhammas. They only arise by conditions, not by their own will or by any will. They arise and fall because of conditions. Because there are these real parts, there is no real entity. The "being" is not real ultimately, only conventionally; it is a concept. What is real ultimately is only parts, like nama and rupa. A "chair" does not exist ultimately, only through conventional thought (conventional thought by the by misses the mark and is deluded). What exists are the rupa that arise and fall away, which are all seperate particles, and which we may conceive of as a "chair. The parts are real, but there is not being, person, or "thing". Nevertheless, nama and rupa are real things that exist in the _ultimate_ sense. It is precisely because uncontrollable nama and rupa that arise only by conditions exist and are real that there is no "self".
All citta, cetasikas, rupa, and nibbana are real in the ultimate sense. They are paramattha dhammas. They arise solely by conditions, except for nibbana.
Again, because these things are real, they make up what we perceive as "wholes", but the "wholes" are only conceptual, and not real in the ultimate sense.
As far as the "things", paramattha dhammas, having a self, they do not because they cannot control or will anything; they only arise by conditions and fall away.
I hope this helps, and is clear.
*I said earlier that I don't think paramattha have any self-nature, but I was incorrect. What I was getting at was that they are anatta, which is correct. Sabhava is translated as self-nature and ultimate phenomena have sabhava but that simply means that they exist as individual "things" it does not me they have a "self" the way we would think a person or a god has a self (which of course they don't but delusion can think they do). I think translation of subtle concepts can be tricky.
I hope this helps. All the best,
Kevin
P.S. This is in response to you Retro, Tilt, and Pt, as I feel it explains what I am trying to express and addresses all of your queries, including yours Retro about dhammas being sunna. They are sunna, because they are anatta (empty, void of atta or self), wether they exist in an ultimate sense or wether they do not. Sunna that they don't actually exist in an ultimate sense either is a Mahayana concept, not a Theravadin one.