Virgo wrote:I think this is a problem of understanding. Some people get ancy when they hear that paramattha dhammas have sabhava, or that they actually exist.
No antsyness here, but it is interesting that in an above msg you claim: “Even if I say they are "things", I don't hold that they have a self-nature of some sort.”
But now you seem to hold that they do have a self-nature, sabhava, as I pointed out by referring to Buddhaghosa.
You see, these things are real-- real "things". They actually exist, for a short duration of time and then fall away.
It depends upon what you mean by the word “exists.”
People think that if things "exist" then there must be some self in them or to them. But that is not the case. In fact, it is precisely because things exist for real as individual things that their is anatta, no so self or beings.
, of course, makes no sense, though whatever it is that you might mean could be expressed a bit more skillfully. It may be that what you are saying is that the self-nature (true-nature) of an “existing” thing is its emptiness of a self. But if it is empty of a self, it is certainly empty of any sort of ultimate or absolute existence no matter how brief or how long, given that ultimate or absolute existence is a defining characteristic of a self.
Paramattha dhamams are conditioned dhammas. They only arise by conditions, not by their own will or by any will. They arise and fall because of conditions. Because there are these real parts, there is no real entity.
And a “part” is not an entity? If a part is real, it then is, obviously, an entity.
The "being" is not real ultimately, only conventionally; it is a concept. What is real ultimately is only parts, like nama and rupa. A "chair" does not exist ultimately, only through conventional thought (conventional thought by the by misses the mark and is deluded). What exists are the rupa that arise and fall away, which are all seperate particles, and which we may conceive of as a "chair. The parts are real, but there is not being, person, or "thing". Nevertheless, nama and rupa are real things that exist in the _ultimate_ sense. It is precisely because uncontrollable nama and rupa that arise only by conditions exist and are real that there is no "self".
Nama and rupa are no different from the chair in that they are made up of “parts” and when certain parts are put together in particular ways, we have either nama or rupa, just like the chair or chariot. And the parts themselves would have to be conditioned. If the parts are unconditioned they cannot condition anything. Given that you, Kevin, have not shown that nama and rupa are not in any way ultimately different from a chair (which is made up of conditioned parts), you cannot reasonably argue that a chair is only conventionally real and nama and rupa are somehow ultimately real, given that they have essentially the same conditioned nature.
All citta, cetasikas, rupa, and nibbana are real in the ultimate sense.
But you have not shown that “citta, cetasikas, rupa” are any more real than a chair, all of which are made up of conditioned "parts." (Nibbana is a different animal altogether.)
Again, because these things are real, they make up what we perceive as "wholes", but the "wholes" are only conceptual, and not real in the ultimate sense.
Only half correct. Because we perceive them as wholes, we conceptualize them as existing somehow other than in a conventional sense.
As far as the "things", paramattha dhammas, having a self, they do not because they cannot control or will anything; they only arise by conditions and fall away.
I hope this helps, and is clear.
Having no “self,” there is no need to posit any sort of absolute reality to dhammas of any sort. The reality of paramattha dhammas is no different from that of a conventional “dhamma.”
Positing some sort of absolute existence to paramattha dhammas unnecessarily reifies them. Paramattha is simply a more refined way of talking about the flow of experience. It is not a matter of these things existing or not-existing, the idea of which the Buddha rejected.