Such as?PeterB wrote:I Things arise atemporarily.
PeterB wrote:It seems to me that there is an elememt of papanca that comes in with the concept of temporaility.
Temporality neither explains anything nor is it needed. We project it by convention.
" This arises, that arises" is not sequential , whether speedily or not speedily. Things arise atemporarily.
You will need to be a bit more expansive.PeterB wrote:Ground and field..including time.
cooran wrote:My understanding is that the Buddha taught that arising is sequential, or Dependently Originated:
‘When this is, that comes to be,
With the arising of this, that arises,
When this is not, that does not come to be,
With the cessation of this, this ceases’
Shonin wrote:If the 12-step chain of Dependent Origination represents the mechanism of rebirth, then - given that rebirth is supposedly endless until final Nibbana - why is it a chain at all? Why is it linear rather than being a repeating cycle? And if the answer to that is that really it is a cycle, presented as repeating chain, then why does the end of the chain 'Decay and Death' not neatly join onto the beginning of the chain - 'Ignorance'? Is Ignorance dependent on Decay and Death?
retrofuturist wrote: This helps to explain why there are objections to people calling dependent origination an example of "cause" and "effect", because these words imply mutual exclusion and temporal segregation (e.g. kicking a ball causes the effect of the ball going over the fence)
retrofuturist wrote:I do not recall any suttas where dependent origination is depicted as a cycle or circle. As you suggest, any circular representations (e.g. "wheel of life") would have to ignore that the Buddha did not say that ignorance was dependent upon decay and death.
retrofuturist wrote:Attachment is dependent on ignorance.
The 4NT are correct, just simpler and more concise (and thank Buddha for that!)
Dependent origination provides a more in depth analysis for anyone seeking such a thing.
Shonin wrote:Well, 4NT are very simple and I have verified all but final nibbana in this life. I have also verified that attachment is dependent on Ignorance (although I prefer 'Delusion'). On the other hand, as I've made clear, I can't make sense of DO, nor can I see any other point in the chain that can end the creation of suffering. Why would that be?
The word sankhāra, in all contexts, means 'something that something else depends on', that is to say a determination (determinant). It might be thought that this introduces an unnecessary complication into such passages as
Vayadhammā sankhārā appamādena sampādetha
To disappear is the nature of determinations; strive unremittingly.
Aniccā vata sankhārā uppādavayadhammino
Impermanent indeed are determinations; to arise (appear) and disappear is their nature.(Dīgha ii,3 <D.ii,156&7>).
Why, instead of telling us that things (dhammā) are impermanent and bound to disappear, should the Buddha take us out of our way to let us know that things that things depend on are impermanent and bound to disappear? The answer is that the Dhamma does not set out to explain, but to lead—it is opanayika. This means that the Dhamma is not seeking disinterested intellectual approval, but to provoke an effort of comprehension or insight leading to the abandonment of attavāda and eventually of asmimāna. Its method is therefore necessarily indirect: we can only stop regarding this as 'self' if we see that what this depends on is impermanent. Consider, for example, the Mahāsudassanasuttanta (Dīgha ii,4 <D.ii,169-99>), where the Buddha describes in detail the rich endowments and possessions of King Mahāsudassana, and then finishes:
Pass'Ānanda sabbe te sankhārā atītā niruddhā viparinatā. Evam aniccā kho Ānanda sankhārā, evam addhuvā kho Ānanda sankhārā, yāvañ c'idam Ānanda alam eva sabbasankhāresu nibbinditum, alam virajjitum, alam vimuccitum.
See, Ānanda, how all those determinations have passed, have ceased, have altered. So impermanent, Ānanda, are determinations, so unlasting, Ānanda, are determinations, that this, Ānanda, is enough for weariness of all determinations, enough for dispassion, enough for release.
This is not a simple statement that all those things, being impermanent by nature, are now no more; it is a lever to prize the notion of 'selfhood' out of its firm socket. Those things were sankhārā: they were things on which King Mahāsudassana depended for his very identity; they determined his person as 'King Mahāsudassana', and with their cessation the thought 'I am King Mahāsudassana' came to an end. More formally, those sankhārā were nāmarúpa, the condition for phassa (Dīgha ii,2 <D.ii,62>), upon which sakkāyaditthi depends (cf. Dīgha i,1 <D.i,42-3> together with Citta Samy. 3 <S.iv,287>).
retrofuturist wrote:Whilst you rightly understand that attachment is dependent upon ignorance, until you uproot ignorance by uprooting all perceptions of self, I, me, my and mine etc., the dependent origination sequence will continue to play out. (FYI - as used above, attavāda means "self-view", and asmimāna means the "'I am' conceit")
retrofuturist wrote:pt1 wrote:I'm not sure why he didn't really address the citta to citta scale aspect of the mahavihara account, since I feel this would have been directly related to many of his counter-arguments.
I think he addresses the Mahavihara notion of cittas and their relationship in Section 7 of his note on Paticcasamuppada and this brief note on citta -
http://nanavira.xtreemhost.com/index.ph ... &Itemid=69 . It's worth pointing out that he wasn't interested in detailing everything that he considered to be wrong with the traditional Mahavihara interpretation... I get the impression this is because many of the possible problems would be dissolved simply by abandoning the 3-life-interpretation.
retrofuturist wrote:I agree with you and Blackbird that Nanavira's presentation of dependent origination is purely structural, rather than temporal and suggest this is precisely why he doesn't "address the citta to citta scale aspect of the mahavihara account" other than to raise concerns similar to those made by alex123 at viewtopic.php?f=18&t=4307
The notion of two successive 'moments', A and B, as akālika or non-temporal is a confusion. Either A and B are simultaneous (as e.g. viññāna and nāmarūpa), in which case they are indeed akālika; or B follows A and they are successive (as e.g. the in-&-out-breaths), in which case they are kālika. Even if there is no interval of time between the ending of A and the beginning of B, it remains true that B comes after A, and time is still involved. The source of the confusion is in the contradictory idea of a moment as the smallest possible interval of time—i.e. as absolute shortness of time --, and therefore as no time. Two successive moments are, thus, also no time: 0 + 0 = 0. This is nothing but a mystification: it is like the notion of 'absolute smallness of size' in quantum theory (Dirac, op. cit., pp. 3-4), introduced to compensate for other philosophically unjustifiable assumptions made elsewhere. (Quantum theory, of course, being an elaborate and ingenious rule of thumb, does not require philosophical justification; but ipso facto it provides no foundation for philosophy.) To the idea of a 'moment' as the shortest empirically observable interval of time there is no objection; but this merely marks the threshold below which changes are too small and rapid to be clearly apprehended as discontinuous and are grasped irrationally and ambiguously as a flux. What it does not mark is the boundary between kālika and akālika.
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