Only if you would read D. [N.].15{II,62} in tghose terms.Sylvester wrote:Perhaps an epistemological atomist (for want of a better term), if you subscribe to Kalupahana's description above?
Honesty, damdifino what that is, but I don't think I like it. <<Google>>...{{{reading, reading}}}... I don't think Kalupahana would like it, either, but then I am no expert on Kalupahana.Sylvester wrote:Heaven forbid. Nothing close to ontological atomism, if that was what you thought I was suggesting. More like propositional atomism, a la Vienna Circle.
For myself, I don't know...
Ñāṇa wrote:Monks, when the gods with Indra, with Brahmā and with Pajāpati seek a monk who is thus liberated in mind, they do not find anything of which they could say: “The tathāgata’s consciousness is dependent (nissita) on this.” Why? A tathāgata, I declare, is untraceable (ananuvejja) here and now (diṭṭheva).
In a number of sutta-s (e.g. S iv 119, S iv 186, S iv 189, S iv 199, & M i 270) an arahant’s mind is designated as a “measureless mind” (appamāṇacetasa → being free from any sort of measuring → pamāṇa). Elsewhere it is designated as “unestablished consciousness” (appatiṭṭha viññāṇa).
gabrielbranbury wrote:Since this equanimity goes beyond form I assume feeling does not apply.
I cannot see how one can say dukkha is applicable to an Arahant.
Jadson = "Element wrote:A simile may be appropriate here. A fire has the inherent characteristic of burning. But burning only occurs when an object is placed in the fire, such as a human hand. If a human hand is not placed in the fire, burning will not occur, pain will not occur.
I have been following your discussion. Your interpretion of SN 36.11 above seems to not reconcile with the quote below from MN 38.
“On seeing a form with the eye, he does not lust after it if it is pleasing; he does not dislike it if it is unpleasing. He abides with mindfulness of the body established, with an immeasurable mind, and he understands as it actually is the deliverance of mind and deliverance by wisdom wherein those evil unwholesome states cease without remainder. Having thus abandoned favoring and opposing, whatever feeling he feels, whether pleasant, painful, or neither-painful-nor-pleasant, he does not delight in that feeling, welcome it, or remain holding to it. As he does not do so, delight in feelings ceases in him. With the cessation of his delight comes cessation of clinging; with the cessation of clinging, cessation of being; with the cessation of being, cessation of birth; with the cessation of birth, ageing and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.
278. "All conditioned things are unsatisfactory" — when one sees this with wisdom, one turns away from suffering. This is the path to purification.
Alex123 wrote:As I understand it, what all those suttas say is that what we call an Arahant's mind has no feeling of "I, ME, MINE", an Arahant is not internally being somebody or something. An Arahant cannot be said to personally cling to this, or personally reject that. From a worldling perspective an Arahant is internally almost a non-being.
Ontologically a Self is not found in truth a reality. So all we have is that there are purified 5 aggregates (from asavas) that is conventionally called an Arahant.
Alex123 wrote:So unestablished consciousness doesn't mean 6th Aggregate that survives the demise of 5 aggregates at parinibbana. Rather it is consciousness that is not established by greed,anger or delusion on anything. IMHO.
Ñāṇa wrote:I would suggest that the aggregates are not realities either. They are conceptual designations (paññatti). The entire path employs such designations with no ontological commitment.
The position that 'after death a Tathagata does not exist' is a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views.
Alex123 wrote:5 Aggregates are anicca, dukkha and anatta.
Alex123 wrote:So if a Self or Tathagata isn't found even when 5 aggregates are present, what can be said about when they totally cease?
Alex123 wrote:I hope that you are not trying argue for existence of some self in some indescribable way.
Ñāṇa wrote:Aniccatā, dukkhatā, and anattatā are also nominal designations.
Then the thought occurred to me, 'This Dhamma that I have attained is deep, hard to see, hard to realize, peaceful, refined, beyond the scope of conjecture, subtle, to-be-experienced by the wise. [3] But this generation delights in attachment, is excited by attachment, enjoys attachment. For a generation delighting in attachment, excited by attachment, enjoying attachment, this/that conditionality & dependent co-arising are hard to see. This state, too, is hard to see: the resolution of all fabrications, the relinquishment of all acquisitions, the ending of craving; dispassion; cessation; Unbinding. And if I were to teach the Dhamma and others would not understand me, that would be tiresome for me, troublesome for me.'
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html
Alex123 wrote:Please explain what you have exactly meant by that.
Are you rejecting the states of anicca/dukkha/anatta? I hope not.
Alex123 wrote:Also do you affirm the existence of Tathagata in some indescribable way?
Alex123 wrote:IMHO, some people find the teaching of parinibbana threatening.
That is the pivot around which this whole thing is swirling and the mistake that Alex is making. You and Paul have neatly shown this to be so.Ñāṇa wrote: You, on the other hand, keep trying to classify a tathāgata according to the five aggregates, and then implying that these five aggregates are truly existent things.
tiltbillings wrote:That is the pivot around which this whole thing is swirling and the mistake that Alex is making. You and Paul have neatly shown this to be so.Ñāṇa wrote: You, on the other hand, keep trying to classify a tathāgata according to the five aggregates, and then implying that these five aggregates are truly existent things.
I did not say you were. The problem, as Ñāṇa and Paul have made clear, is how you regard the khandhas.Alex123 wrote:tiltbillings wrote:That is the pivot around which this whole thing is swirling and the mistake that Alex is making. You and Paul have neatly shown this to be so.Ñāṇa wrote: You, on the other hand, keep trying to classify a tathāgata according to the five aggregates, and then implying that these five aggregates are truly existent things.
I am not classifying Tathagata as self existing being.
It is a wrongly put question, as the texts I (and others) have quoted show.Tilt, do you believe that there is something that remains after Parinibbana? Yes or No.
Quote those texts again, and let us look at them carefully. Also, the question is what do mean by "EXISTS?" Ñāṇa has also carefully addressed this issue and you have, in turn, not really addressed to his points.As for 5 aggregates existing, even the Buddha has said them to EXIST (I've provided SN sutta somewhere in this thread).
Alex123 wrote:As for 5 aggregates existing, even the Buddha has said them to EXIST (I've provided SN sutta somewhere in this thread).
Ñāṇa wrote:Alex123 wrote:As for 5 aggregates existing, even the Buddha has said them to EXIST (I've provided SN sutta somewhere in this thread).
Hi Alex,
There is a world of difference between saying "It is" (atthi as found in SN 22.94) and maintaining that "It has true, inherent existence" (sabhāvasiddhi).
All the best,
Geoff
tiltbillings wrote:Quote those texts again, and let us look at them carefully. Also, the question is what do mean by "EXISTS?" Ñāṇa has also carefully addressed this issue and you have, in turn, not really addressed to his points.
Alex quoting SN22,94 sutta wrote:“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists? Form that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists. Feeling that is impermanent … Perception … Volitional constructions … Consciousness that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I
too say that it exists.SN22.94 (2) Flowers BB Trans.
Monks, there is righteous wisdom in the world, as matter is impermanent, unstable, does not stand forever without a change. I too say, it is so.
Monks, there is righteous wisdom in the world, as feelings, perceptions, intentions are impermanent, unstable, not everlasting, changes. I too say, it is so.
Monks, there is righteous wisdom in the world, as consciousness is impermanent, unstable, does not stand forever without change. I too say, it is so.
And what kind of "existence" are talking about here? Also, this is not a stand alone text.Alex123 wrote:tiltbillings wrote:Quote those texts again, and let us look at them carefully. Also, the question is what do mean by "EXISTS?" Ñāṇa has also carefully addressed this issue and you have, in turn, not really addressed to his points.Alex quoting SN22,94 sutta {CDB i 949} wrote:“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists? Form that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists. Feeling that is impermanent … Perception … Volitional constructions … Consciousness that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I
too say that it exists.SN22.94 (2) Flowers BB Trans.
I would only repeat what the texts themselves say. Don't try to put words into my mouth, please.Please forgive me, but it sounds to me as if some are trying to justify some sort of survival, or parinibbana being some form of experience.
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