Same citta whose "form" changes?

[Alex123]

Hello all,

If we take a piece clay and make various shapes out of it (ball, square, rectangle, pyramid, etc) it is still the same clay. Even if we split clay in
two parts, the same amount of clay remains. Person can eat with a fork and then stab someone with the same fork. Here the same object has different functions. A same object, lets say red ball can look different under different lighting. In dark room red ball can appear black or brown, in a bright room the same ball can appear red. Strait stick can appear bent in water and appear strait in the air.

What if the same thing is with the Citta? It can take different objects, it can cognize different things but it is still same in the sense of "knowing in first person".

Any comments? How to refute this?

With best wishes,

Alex

[Sam Vara]

Hello all,

If we take a piece clay and make various shapes out of it (ball, square, rectangle, pyramid, etc) it is still the same clay. Even if we split clay in
two parts, the same amount of clay remains. Person can eat with a fork and then stab someone with the same fork. Here the same object has different functions. A same object, lets say red ball can look different under different lighting. In dark room red ball can appear black or brown, in a bright room the same ball can appear red. Strait stick can appear bent in water and appear strait in the air.

What if the same thing is with the Citta? It can take different objects, it can cognize different things but it is still same in the sense of "knowing in first person".

Any comments? How to refute this?

With best wishes,

Alex

I don't think that there is a refutation as such, because if you conceive of cognizing as being logically dependent upon a mysterious something that cognizes, then you have defined yourself into a problem from which there is no escape. If you could see the Citta, it would be something other than the Citta in question; as the Citta would be the bit that was doing the seeing. The same for all the other ways of cognizing, including the necessity for the Citta to be aware of any analysis or reasoning for it even to make sense.

If there is merely cognizing, though, the problem does not arise. The things you list as examples are objects in space and time, and can carry the associations of similarity, difference, and so on; whereas if we knew the Citta like this, we would know whether it was one, two, many, or whatever.

[Alex123]

I don't think that there is a refutation as such, because if you conceive of cognizing as being logically dependent upon a mysterious something that cognizes, then you have defined yourself into a problem from which there is no escape.

Why can't we say that the mind cognizes, and that even though it changes, it is like waves in the ocean which are both water.

If you could see the Citta, it would be something other than the Citta in question; .

One hand can make a clap by bending the fingers which slap the hand.

Maybe if we say that in order to cognize itself one needs another object, then it could become an infinite regress. In order to know 1 you need 2. In order to know 2 you need 3...etc without end.

[DAWN]

Здравствуйте,

Thanks you Alex for this image, that shows that under different light, dhamma take different aspect.

[Sam Vara]

I don't think that there is a refutation as such, because if you conceive of cognizing as being logically dependent upon a mysterious something that cognizes, then you have defined yourself into a problem from which there is no escape.

Why can't we say that the mind cognizes, and that even though it changes, it is like waves in the ocean which are both water.

If you could see the Citta, it would be something other than the Citta in question; .

One hand can make a clap by bending the fingers which slap the hand.

Maybe if we say that in order to cognize itself one needs another object, then it could become an infinite regress. In order to know 1 you need 2. In order to know 2 you need 3...etc without end.

A hand can indeed make a clap by bending the fingers which slap the hand, but this is something different from "knowing in the first person". The posited thing which cognizes would need to cognize itself, to become an object rather than a subject. To say that it can do this while remaining a subject is to allow reality to be driven by the analogy rather than being illuminated by it. A hand that claps itself remains an object that merely demonstrates a different function or property. The subjectivity that is grasped becomes an object.