Re: NO self
Posted: Thu Nov 08, 2012 5:59 pm
Self is memory.BubbaBuddhist wrote:"Self" is a fairy tale told by a ghost to its imaginary friend.
BB
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Self is memory.BubbaBuddhist wrote:"Self" is a fairy tale told by a ghost to its imaginary friend.
BB
BB is saying almost the same thing, Dawn, but more poetically. I like his way of saying it.DAWN wrote:Self is memory.BubbaBuddhist wrote:"Self" is a fairy tale told by a ghost to its imaginary friend.
BB
Ah ok I'am sorry.Kim O'Hara wrote:BB is saying almost the same thing, Dawn, but more poetically. I like his way of saying it.DAWN wrote:Self is memory.BubbaBuddhist wrote:"Self" is a fairy tale told by a ghost to its imaginary friend.
BB
Kim
Central to the nihilistic position is the bold text.He may not regard form as self … or hold such an (eternalist) view, but he holds such a view as this: ‘I might not be, and it might not be for me; I will not be, (and) it will not be for me.’ That annihilationist view is a construction….
Na heva kho rūpaṃ attato samanupassati, na vedanaṃ … na saññaṃ… na saṅkhāre… na viññāṇaṃ attato samanupassati; nāpi evaṃdiṭṭhi hoti – ‘so attā so loko, so pecca bhavissāmi nicco dhuvo sassato avipariṇāmadhammo’ti. ca kho evaṃdiṭṭhi hoti – ‘no cassaṃ no ca me siyā na bhavissāmi' na me bhavissati’ti. Yā kho pana sā, bhikkhave, ucchedadiṭṭhi saṅkhāro so.
According to SN 22.55, resolving in such a manner leads to the abandoning of the lower fetters. So how is the ariyan conception different from the nihilistic one?No c’assa no ca me siyā , na bhavissati na me bhavissati
“‘It might not be, and it might not be for me; it will not be, (and) there will not be for me
BB has a fulsome discussion on this sutta. I follow BB is using the Ceylonese variant reading and not using the Burmese reading of SN 22.55 as its "no cassaṃ, no ca me siyā, nābhavissa, na me bhavissatī" appears to have suffered a textual loss.Here, bhikkhu, the uninstructed worldling becomes frightened over an unfrightening matter. For this is frightening to the uninstructed worldling: ‘If there were not, there would not be for me; there will not be, (so) there will not be for me.’
Ye thats a nice note .)The nihilistic position is premised on the verb bhavissāmi actually having a self-referent, since it is in the 1st person singular. This leads to the translation "I will not be". On the other hand, the ariyan version uses the verb bhavissati, which is in the 3rd person singular. In such usage, it takes on an abstract/process oriented conception shorn of self-view, leading to the translation "It will not be".
As the Ven . Dr. Walpole Rahula explains in What the Buddha taught, "self" is a functional creation of the khandhas so the khandas operate together. Otherwise it would be like five horses attempting to pull a cart in five different directions.Perception has the characteristic of perceiving by on act of general inclusion, and the function of making marks as a condition for repeated perception (for recognizing or remembering) (I am using the translation of the ven. Nyanaponika, Abhidhamma Studies, page 69, BPS, Kandy, 1976), as when woodcutters 'perceive' logs and so forth. Its manifestation is the action of interpreting by means of the sign as apprehended.
Sanna is not the same as citta which is the 'leader' in cognizing an object. As we have seen, sanna recognizes the object and it 'marks' it so that it can be recognized again. This is explained by way of a simile: carpenters put tags or signs on logs so that they can recognize them at once by means of these marks. This simile can help us to understand the complex process of recognizing or remembering. What we in conventional language call "remembering" consists of many different moments of citta and each of these moments of citta is accompanied by sanna which connects past experiences with the present one and conditions again recognition in the future. This connecting function is represented by the words 'recognition' and 'marking' (1 See Abhidhamma Studies, by the Ven. Nyanaponika, 1976, page 70, where it is explained that the making of marks and remembering is included in every act of perception.)
Yes, self is not just memory, but memory is the "rupa" of self. Ego is made of memory and leaded by memory, conditioned by memory and die with memory. What is conditon to this memory (consciosness, body etc), is an another question, but self-rupa, is memory.BubbaBuddhist wrote:On the subject of "self" as memory, I think this is an oversimplification. The khandha/cetasika perception or sanna, according to abhidhamma, is what is resposible for memory and is only one component of the functional construction of "self-notion." From Cetasikas by Nina van Gorkon:
As the Ven . Dr. Walpole Rahula explains in What the Buddha taught, "self" is a functional creation of the khandhas so the khandas operate together. Otherwise it would be like five horses attempting to pull a cart in five different directions.Perception has the characteristic of perceiving by on act of general inclusion, and the function of making marks as a condition for repeated perception (for recognizing or remembering) (I am using the translation of the ven. Nyanaponika, Abhidhamma Studies, page 69, BPS, Kandy, 1976), as when woodcutters 'perceive' logs and so forth. Its manifestation is the action of interpreting by means of the sign as apprehended.
Sanna is not the same as citta which is the 'leader' in cognizing an object. As we have seen, sanna recognizes the object and it 'marks' it so that it can be recognized again. This is explained by way of a simile: carpenters put tags or signs on logs so that they can recognize them at once by means of these marks. This simile can help us to understand the complex process of recognizing or remembering. What we in conventional language call "remembering" consists of many different moments of citta and each of these moments of citta is accompanied by sanna which connects past experiences with the present one and conditions again recognition in the future. This connecting function is represented by the words 'recognition' and 'marking' (1 See Abhidhamma Studies, by the Ven. Nyanaponika, 1976, page 70, where it is explained that the making of marks and remembering is included in every act of perception.)
So defining "self" as memory would be the same as defining it as a function of sanna, which I think would be incomplete and unsupported by sutta or abhidhamma.
BB
I can't get this link to work.robertk wrote:I have little time so I hope this old post from Dhammanando is sufficient to explain:
http://www.lioncity.net/buddhism/index. ... 3364&st=60" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
1. Even if this were true, how would it qualify as ironic? "Attack" is overstating it; "outright attack" is completely inappropriate.robertk wrote:It is ironic that Thanissaro's outright attack on Orthodox theravada is now being held up as some type of New Orthodox position.
danieLion wrote:...What Thanissaro teaches about anatta is irrelevant (I don't study Thanissaro much anymore and this latest book is just a compilation of scattered teachings I've already digested or got indigestion from.). Whether or not Thanissaro actually told Dhammanando he believes in an eternal self is irrelevant. Whether the Buddha meant NO self or NOT self by anatta is irrelevant. What is relevant is that the Buddha never came out and plainly said the self does not exist, and the one time (we know of) someone asked him if the self exists he refused to answer. What is relevant is that the texts are full of locutions (personal pronouns, etc...) where the existence of the self is taken for granted.mikenz66 wrote:Hi Daniel,
Since Ven Thanissaro is quite clear that he disgrees with other interpretations in a number of areas, it is no surprise that a number of other interpreters disagree with him....
Ven Thanissaro makes some interesting points regarding how to make use the the "not-self" teachings. Some possible objections to his interpretation have been discussed in the threads.... Robert and others have given some thought to the matter recently in [this NO self] thread...:
Since this issue of not-self is central to the Buddha Dhamma, and grasping it wrongly could be problematical, it seems worthwhile to examine it carefully:
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .ntbb.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
12. "Though certain recluses and brahmans claim to propound the full understanding of all kinds of clinging... they describe the full understanding of clinging to sensual pleasures, clinging to views, and clinging to rules and observances without describing the full understanding of clinging to a doctrine of self. They do not understand one instance... therefore they describe only the full understanding of clinging to sensual pleasures, clinging to views, and clinging to rules and observances without describing the full understanding of clinging to a doctrine of self.
Mike
It makes very little difference if one believes and acts as if one has no self or if one acts and believes that the aggregates are not self because in the context of the whole Buddha Dhamma either view has path utility.
What the recognition of anatta negates is a permanent, unchanging Self. This recognition doesn't preclude the use of pronouns as expedient conventional expressions.danieLion wrote:If the Buddha taught "NO self," why did he instruct bhikkhus to make themselves their governing principle (AN 3.40, Adhipateyya Sutta) and be islands unto themselves (SN 22.43, Attadiipaa Sutta)?
Yes, I' made this point above. This is a further point. The contexts of these passages do not indicate that the Buddha was instructing these bhikkhus in any kind of expedient-conventional-expression way. These are formal instructions.Ñāṇa wrote:What the recognition of anatta negates is a permanent, unchanging Self. This recognition doesn't preclude the use of pronouns as expedient conventional expressions.danieLion wrote:If the Buddha taught "NO self," why did he instruct bhikkhus to make themselves their governing principle (AN 3.40, Adhipateyya Sutta) and be islands unto themselves (SN 22.43, Attadiipaa Sutta)?
All instructions are expedient conventional expressions.danieLion wrote:The contexts of these passages do not indicate that the Buddha was instructing these bhikkhus in any kind of expedient-conventional-expression way. These are formal instructions.
Right. The ego isn't what is being negated by the recognition of anatta. Hence, Jack Engler's phrase: "You have to be somebody before you can be nobody."danieLion wrote:Having a sense of self and a healthy ego is necessary on the path.
I stand corrected and defer to your knoweldge.Ñāṇa wrote:All instructions are expedient conventional expressions.danieLion wrote:The contexts of these passages do not indicate that the Buddha was instructing these bhikkhus in any kind of expedient-conventional-expression way. These are formal instructions.
danieLion wrote:Having a sense of self and a healthy ego is necessary on the path.
Maybe it's just me, but I don't see any way of having a sense of self and a healthy ego if I believe the Buddha taught "NO self."Ñāṇa wrote:Right. The ego isn't what is being negated by the recognition of anatta. Hence, Jack Engler's phrase: "You have to be somebody before you can be nobody."