Ñāṇa wrote:Moreover, the individuation of phenomena requires apperceptive memory recognition (saññā) and conceptual designation (paññatti) for differentiation. All such individuation is fabricated, relational, and conventional, and therefore phenomena cannot be established as ultimately existent.
this doesnt do anything to address that prior to being conceptually designated, the thing is still the thing. if the thing werent a thing, there would be a lack of the thing (nihilism) in which case it would be senseless to say it could be the focus of conceptual designation.
I've never denied the appearance of phenomena.
5heaps wrote:but i prefer to talk about what seems to be the more commonly accepted position, which is that things are marked by findable characteristic natures. this way, moments exist regardless of conceptualization.
Which position would that be? More specifically, which theory of radical momentariness do you accept? The Vaibhāṣika-Sarvāstivāda version? The Sautrāntika-Sarvāstivāda version? The Theravāda version? And which author within your chosen vāda? Because even within any particular vāda there are significant disagreements. For example, if your choice is the Theravāda version, then which Theravāda version do you accept? Ācariya Ānanda’s version? Ācariya Anuruddha’s version? Ācariya Sumaṅgala’s version?
5heaps wrote:this way, moments exist regardless of conceptualization.
Sorry, but no Theravāda commentator would agree that "moments exist."
5heaps wrote:the thing which is impermanent is the thing which is momentary (maintains its characteristic nature as it is undergoing subtlest change). for us its simple -- impermanent thing, momentary thing, conditioned thing and functioning thing are all equivalent.
And how are you going to establish the objective validity your momentary thing "that maintains its characteristic nature as it is undergoing subtlest change"? If you rely on any criterion or measurement (pamāṇa) based on deluded worldly cognitions, then all you will ever "prove" is that deluded worldly cognitions are deluded. Not a valid source for establishing the unerring validity of any supposed objective truth-claims. Sn 3.12 Dvayatānupassanā Sutta:
Entrenched in name and form,
They conceive that “This is true.”
In whatever way (worldlings) conceive it,
It turns out other than that.
For that is what is false about it.
Whatever is transitory certainly has a false nature.
If, on the other hand, you attempt to employ any criterion or measurement (pamāṇa) in order to try to establish liberated cognitons, then you will also be at a loss because there are no means of measurement which can be used as reference points to validate a measureless cognition (appamāṇacetasa). SN 6.7 (S i 148) Kokālika Sutta:
What wise man here would seek to define
A measureless one by taking his measure?
He who would measure a measureless one
Must be, I think, an obstructed worldling.
Better to practice satipaṭṭhāna and begin to relinquish notions of objective truth-claims about theories of radical momentariness.
All the best,