Last night I was looking again at Noa Ronkin's book
Early Buddhist Metaphysics. In the chapter "Causation as the Handmaid of Metaphysics" she summarises the 24 conditions as found in the
Paṭṭhāna in a very helpful way. What it now seems to me is that the functions of accumulating and passing forward kamma are distributed amongst several different types of conditionality - dhammas can operate in many different modes as a condition.
Under her discussion of the pair proximity (
antara-paccaya) and and contiguity (
samantara-paccaya) conditions Ronkin says:
"Every preceding thought moment is thus regarded as capable of arousing succeeding states of consciousness similar to it in the immediately following instant." (216)
She further speculates that these two, almost identical, modes of conditionality were
"probably necessary in order to account for the continuity of phenomena without relying on any metaphysical substance". (216)
Thus here we have a strong candidate for solving the problem I originally asked about. This is covered in Visuddhimagga XVII.73-6 (Vol 2, para 598 in the VRI ed.) Buddhaghosa spends some time refuting an internal dispute regarding the need for temporal proximity. This is slightly troubling because if we dispense with the need for temporal proximity we have no answer at all to our problem of action at a temporal distance - it's just something that happens according to Buddhaghosa. This is not how Ronkin interprets the
Paṭṭhāna however. If we follow through the rest of the paccaya modes we find more specific links of this kind.
The decisive support condition (upanissaya-paccaya) allows a dhamma to self-sufficiently arouse a resultant dhamma. It's like a nissaya-paccaya but not necessarily foremost and "it last longer, has long-term effect and implies action at a distance... The importance of the decisive support condition seems to lie in its accounting for more and spiritual progress: virtues like trust or confidence (saddhā), generostiy (dāna), undertaking the precepts and others, all assist the occurrence of their long term results (the jhānas, insight, taking the path etc) as their decisive support, and these results, in their turn, condition the repeated arising of trust, generosity etc. (219, emphasis added)
As the Paṭṭhāna says:
purimā purimā kusalā dhammā pacchimānaṃ pacchimānaṃ kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ upanissayapaccayena paccayo. "All preceeding wholesome dhammas are a condition by way of
decisive support condition of all subsequent wholesome dhammas" (i.5) Similarly for unwholesome (
akusala) and undetermined (
abyākata) dhammas.
This section is covered in Visuddhimagga XVII 80-84. We also have:
Habitual cultivation (āsevana-paccaya)... "for example, developing a certain skilful thought once facilitates the cultivation of the same thought with a greater degree of efficiency and intensity... It therefore underlies the cultivation of right view, right speech and right action." (219)
Habitual cultivation is thus also responsible for memory without an agent that remembers - Ronkin places this observation in a note, with a reference to an article in two parts by David Kalupahana, both (1962) 'The Philosophy of Relations in Buddhism'
University of Ceylon Review: 19-54; 188-208. (task for today is to dig out these articles). Vism XVII 87, though what's here is a bit obscure.
The
kamma-paccaya occurs in two modes simultaneous (
sahajāta) and asynchronous (
nānākhaṇika)... and according to Ronkin:
"An asynchronous condition obtains when a past kamma comes into fruition in a manifest corresponding action. Although the volition itself ceases, it leaves in the mind latent traces that take effect and assist the arising of an appropriate action when the necessary conditions are satisfied" (220)
This is less satisfying because it does not explain the "latent trace" but I think the implication is clear enough in the light of the other passages. Thus we can see now how the Abhidhammikas conceived of this process taking place.
So overall I think we can say that the principle is established with reference to the Abhidhamma, the idea of continuity with no entities, nascent in the suttas is fleshed out in the Paṭṭhāna. It's not so clear what Buddhaghosa intended in Vism, but it may have been so obvious by his time that he does now spell it out (though given how thorough he is otherwise I find this odd). I'm still slightly puzzled that this problem is so prominent elsewhere, and yet here quite submerged and difficult to get at. However in such gaps are where articles are published. I have quite a bit of work to do yet, but the article I'm working on is definitely taking shape.
Thanks to those who provided pointers and suggestions. I think I have what I need (I will thank the participants in the article that I'm writing). Also thanks to the moderator for clearing the way. I never saw most of the deleted posts and I'm glad not to have been distracted by them.