Re: Anatta = not Atman or No-Self
Posted: Tue Apr 09, 2013 10:50 pm
Ah, I see. Thanks for the clarification.
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Alex123 wrote:There is this wrong idea that Atman is beyond 6 senses (12 āyatana) and is indescribable so the Buddha employed a negative teaching which he used to describe what Atman is not rather than what it is. Of course I don't buy this.reflection wrote:Hi Alex. Why would it not be absolute if it was about the six senses? The Buddha called it 'the world' with a reason. Is there a seventh sense? I can't find it. To me the six senses are all-pervasive, they are everything.
The people who follow the true Atman interpretation should really read this whole sutta."As for the person who says, 'Feeling is not the self: My self is oblivious [to feeling],' he should be addressed as follows: 'My friend, where nothing whatsoever is sensed (experienced) at all, would there be the thought, "I am"?'"
"No, lord."
"Thus in this manner, Ananda, one does not see fit to assume that 'Feeling is not my self: My self is oblivious [to feeling].'
"As for the person who says, 'Neither is feeling my self, nor is my self oblivious [to feeling], but rather my self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling,' he should be addressed as follows: 'My friend, should feelings altogether and every way stop without remainder, then with feeling completely not existing, owing to the cessation of feeling, would there be the thought, "I am"?'"
"No, lord."
"Thus in this manner, Ananda, one does not see fit to assume that 'Neither is feeling my self, nor is my self oblivious [to feeling], but rather my self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling.'
"Now, Ananda, in as far as a monk does not assume feeling to be the self, nor the self as oblivious, nor that 'My self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling,' then, not assuming in this way, he is not sustained by anything (does not cling to anything) in the world. Unsustained, he is not agitated. Unagitated, he is totally unbound right within. He discerns that 'Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this world.'
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html
This analysis seems more straightforward and logical, though it seems odd that the Buddha didn't present it in this direct way. It might be worth exploring further the relationship between anatta and anicca - they appear to me like two sides of the same coin, because one could say that because of anicca there is anatta.reflection wrote:Because of anatta, there is impermanence. Because of impermanence, there is suffering.
Hi,The soul can never be cut into pieces by any weapon, nor can he be burned by fire, nor moistened by water, nor withered by the wind.
This individual soul is unbreakable and insoluble, and can be neither burned nor dried. He is everlasting, all-pervading, unchangeable, immovable and eternally the same.
It is said that the soul is invisible, inconceivable, immutable, and unchangeable. Knowing this, you should not grieve for the body.
http://www.asitis.com/2/23.html
Do we need a notion of permanence to understand how the actions a person did 10 years ago might have results for that person today?Lazy_eye wrote:For me, the vexing issue still remains: how do we account for karma-vipaka without introducing some notion of permanence? If the recipient of the "fruit of good and bad actions" is not in some sense the same as the person who acted, then the teaching becomes meaningless. It would be like saying that Jack acted, but Mark received the result.
In the course of one lifetime, the illusion of permanence can be accounted for by memory cells, habitual behavior caused by genetics or environmental conditioning, social/family narrative, etc. We can explain the feeling of continuity without setting up a notion of Self. But since none of these factors persist across lives, what can be said to provide continuity on the longer scale?
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/auth ... el186.htmlThe sum total of the philosophy of change taught in Buddhism is that all component things that have conditioned existence are a process and not a group of abiding entities, but the changes occur in such rapid succession that people regard mind and body as static entities. They do not see their arising and their breaking up (udaya-vaya), but regard them unitarily, see them as a lump or whole (ghana sa~n~naa).
It is very hard, indeed, for people who are accustomed to continually think of their own mind and body and the external word with mental projections as wholes, as inseparable units, to get rid of the false appearance of "wholeness." So long as man fails to see things as processes, as movements, he will never understand the anatta (no-soul) doctrine of the Buddha. That is why people impertinently and impatiently put the question:
"If there is no persisting entity, no unchanging principle, like self or soul what is it that experiences the results of deeds here and hereafter?"
Two different discourses (MN 109; SN 22.82) deal with this burning question. The Buddha was explaining in detail to his disciples the impermanent nature of the five aggregates, how they are devoid of self, and how the latent conceits "I am" and "mine" cease to exist. Then there arose a thought in the mind of a certain monk thus: "Material body is not self, feeling is not self, perception is not self, mental formations are not self, consciousness is not self. Then what self do selfless deeds affect?"
The Buddha, reading the thought of the monk's mind, said, "The question was beside the point" and made the monk understand the impermanent, unsatisfactory, and non-self nature of the aggregates.
"It is wrong to say that the doer of the deed is the same as the one who experiences its results. It is equally wrong to say that the doer of the deed and the one who experiences its results are two different persons,"[4] for the simple reason that what we call life is a flow of psychic and physical processes or energies, arising and ceasing constantly; it is not possible to say that the doer himself experiences results because he is changing now, every moment of his life; but at the same time you must not forget the fact that the continuity of life that is the continuance of experience, the procession of events is not lost; it continues without a gap. The child is not the same as an adolescent, the adolescent is not the same as the adult, they are neither the same nor totally different persons (na ca so na ca a~n~no, — Milinda Pa~nho). There is only a flow of bodily and mental processes.
Doesn't the phrase "that person today" imply permanence to some degree? Something must have persisted across the ten years in order for us to say it is still "that person". Say you are Kirk5a today, but three hundred lifetimes later you are Dirk Gently. For karma-vipaka to have any moral weight, Kirk5a and Dirk Gently must in some sense be the same person -- but to say this might imply some underlying essence.kirk5a wrote: Do we need a notion of permanence to understand how the actions a person did 10 years ago might have results for that person today?
What I gather is that the Buddha sometimes leaned close to eternalism when he wished to stress the moral impact of choices, and that he sometimes leaned more towards annihilationism when he wanted to stress the impermanence of phenomena. But in neither case was he attempting to set up a metaphysical "view"."It is wrong to say that the doer of the deed is the same as the one who experiences its results. It is equally wrong to say that the doer of the deed and the one who experiences its results are two different persons,"[4] for the simple reason that what we call life is a flow of psychic and physical processes or energies, arising and ceasing constantly; it is not possible to say that the doer himself experiences results because he is changing now, every moment of his life; but at the same time you must not forget the fact that the continuity of life that is the continuance of experience, the procession of events is not lost; it continues without a gap. The child is not the same as an adolescent, the adolescent is not the same as the adult, they are neither the same nor totally different persons (na ca so na ca a~n~no, — Milinda Pa~nho). There is only a flow of bodily and mental processes.
It doesn't imply permanence any more than the acorn which eventually becomes an oak tree implies permanence. Neverthless, the continuity is traceable from the acorn to the oak tree. That particular oak tree, not the other one over there.Lazy_eye wrote: Doesn't the phrase "that person today" imply permanence to some degree? Something must have persisted across the ten years in order for us to say it is still "that person".
Oh my.Say you are Kirk5a today, but three hundred lifetimes later you are Dirk Gently.
No, they don't have to be "the same person." There just has to be a traceable continuity.For karma-vipaka to have any moral weight, Kirk5a and Dirk Gently must in some sense be the same person -- but to say this might imply some underlying essence.
The continuity across lifetimes is mental, not physical.As I said earlier, we can account for the sense of continuity in the present life by referring to memory cells in the brain, habits of thought and behavior, social interactions that tell us who "we" are, etc. But an issue arises when we start talking about rebirth cycles, because it is no longer clear where the continuity lies.
No, we aren't saying there is something permanent. Time is not an obstacle to causality. To use the "chain of cittas" imagery, an alteration in an earlier state of mind can emerge as an effect in a later one. If I should think thoughts of ill-will, then I might become irritable. Going into work, being irritable, I might be short tempered with my co-workers. Being short tempered, my boss gets fed up with my attitude. I get fired. Same principle. Just extrapolate it over a longer time frame.We can say there is a chain of cittas. But why does citta Y, five hundred years away, "remember" what occurred with citta X, so that the fruit of a good or bad action can be received? We can perhaps say the entire chain of cittas was somehow colored or permeated by the karmic act. But then we are still saying there is something persistent about this "coloring", i.e. it was not characterized by anicca.
Well then, what was he attempting?What I gather is that the Buddha sometimes leaned close to eternalism when he wished to stress the moral impact of choices, and that he sometimes leaned more towards annihilationism when he wanted to stress the impermanence of phenomena. But in neither case was he attempting to set up a metaphysical "view".
Hmm, not sure about that. There is a 'traceable continuity" between my great-grandfather and myself -- but in Buddhist terms, we cannot say I am experiencing vipaka produced by his kamma. For kamma-vipaka to have moral force, the giver and recipient must be in some sense the same individual.kirk5a wrote:No, they don't have to be "the same person." There just has to be a traceable continuity.
Right, this is the "continuum of consciousness" argument -- that there is some individuated continuum which exists in distinction to all the other continua."That particular oak tree, not the other one over there."
That makes sense, yes. Good explanation.No, we aren't saying there is something permanent. Time is not an obstacle to causality. To use the "chain of cittas" imagery, an alteration in an earlier state of mind can emerge as an effect in a later one. If I should think thoughts of ill-will, then I might become irritable. Going into work, being irritable, I might be short tempered with my co-workers. Being short tempered, my boss gets fed up with my attitude. I get fired. Same principle. Just extrapolate it over a longer time frame.
My overall sense is that he was primarily concerned with what is conducive to the holy life, to the path of liberation. If we look at his critiques of various other religious/philosophical belief systems, we find that he rejects them not so much because he is interested in settling a philosophical question, but because he does not consider the belief system to be an aid to the holy life. Eternalism and annihilationism each present different sets of problems. At the earlier stages of the path, annihilationism is more of a problem because it doesn't provide a framework for moral behavior. But at later stages, eternalism becomes more of a problem because it blocks the insights needed for liberation.Well then, what was he attempting?
Ganges has a certain geographical location and certain features. A thing can be the same from one point of view and different from the others.reflection wrote:The river Ganges has been called the river Ganges for a long time, and it will still be called that long after we die. Still, the water of the Ganges is never the same water. The path of the river is also changing all the time. Still we call it Ganges always, while in essence it is nothing. Nobody can point to the real 'self' of the Ganges.
Hypothetical scenario.As I said earlier, we can account for the sense of continuity in the present life by referring to memory cells in the brain, habits of thought and behavior, social interactions that tell us who "we" are, etc. But an issue arises when we start talking about rebirth cycles, because it is no longer clear where the continuity lies.
We can say there is a chain of cittas. But why does citta Y, five hundred years away, "remember" what occurred with citta X, so that the fruit of a good or bad action can be received? We can perhaps say the entire chain of cittas was somehow colored or permeated by the karmic act. But then we are still saying there is something persistent about this "coloring", i.e. it was not characterized by anicca.
Jack must've done some bad kamma in a past lifeLazy_eye wrote:
Tom is a highly intelligent and cunning man who has hurt many people. He flies off to a foreign country and is never seen again. Another man, named Jack, happens to bear a close physical resemblance to Tom. He moves into the neighborhood where he encounters one of Tom's victims – who mistakes him for Tom and proceeds to attack him with a hammer.
Jack, dying from a lethal wound to the skull, has no idea why this person would want to hurt him. As far as he is concerned this stranger has an intense hatred for him for no apparent reason.