Patigha and vyāpāda

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retrofuturist
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Patigha and vyāpāda

Post by retrofuturist »

Greetings Pali friends,

A couple of questions in relation to the following quotations...

1. I suspect "to hit against" is the literal translation of patigha, rather than vyāpāda. Is this correct?

2. What practical experiential application might there be for maintaining and adopting "to hit against" as an English translation, in preference for traditional interpretations of "ill will", "aversion" or "hatred"?

Thank you.

Metta,
Retro. :)
Patigha, also vyāpāda, The literal meaning of this term is "to hit against," but it is often translated into English as "ill-will or hatred."

Source: http://sped2work.tripod.com/fetters.html
patigha

1. In an ethical sense, it means: 'repugnance', grudge, resentment, anger, and is a synonym of vyāpāda, 'ill-will' (s. nīvarana) and dosa, 'hate' (s. mūla). It is one of the proclivities (anusaya, q.v.).

2. '(Sense-) reaction'. Applied to five-sense cognition, p. occurs in the following contexts:

(a) as patigha-saññā, 'perception of sense-reaction', said to be absent in the immaterial absorptions (s. jhāna 5). Alternative renderings: resistance-perception, reflex-perception;

(b) as patigha-samphassa, '(mental) impression caused by 5fold sensorial reaction' (D. 15); s. phassa;

(c) as sappatigha-rūpa, 'reacting corporeality', and appatigha, 'not reacting', which is an Abhidhammic classification of corporeality, occurring in Dhs. 659, 1050. Sappatigha are called the physical sense-organs as reacting (or responding) to sense stimuli; and also the physical sense-objects as impinging (or making an impact) on the sense-organs. All other corporeality is appatigha, non-reacting and non-impinging. These 2 terms have been variously rendered as resistant and not, responding and not, with and without impact.

Source: http://www.palikanon.com/english/wtb/n_r/patigha.htm
vyāpāda: 'ill-will', is a synonym of dosa see: mula it is one of the 5 hindrances nivarana and one of the 10 mental chains samyojana.

Source: http://www.dhammawiki.com/index.php?title=Vyapada
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gavesako
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Re: Patigha and vyāpāda

Post by gavesako »

"Resistance" is a good and accurate translation for patigha.
Bhikkhu Gavesako
Kiṃkusalagavesī anuttaraṃ santivarapadaṃ pariyesamāno... (MN 26)

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Sylvester
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Re: Patigha and vyāpāda

Post by Sylvester »

Hi retro

A useful supplement to the above would be the PED entry -
Paṭigha (m. & nt.) [paṭi+gha, adj. suffix of ghan=han, lit. striking against] 1. (ethically) repulsion, repugnance, anger D i.25, 34; iii.254, 282; S i.13; iv.71, 195, 205, 208 sq.; v.315; A i.3, 87, 200; Sn 371, 536; Dhs 1060; Miln 44; DA i.22. -- 2. (psychologically) sensory reaction D iii.224, 253, 262; S i.165, 186; A i.41, 267;ii.184; Dhs 265, 501, 513, 579; VbhA 19. See on term Dhs trsln 72, 204, 276 and passim. -- appaṭigha see separately s. v. Note. How shall we read paṭighaṭṭha nānighaŋso at DhsA 308? (paṭigha -- ṭṭhāna -- nighaŋso, or paṭighaṭṭana -- nighaŋso?)
The bit is highlighted in red indicates its root as understood in Pali/Sanskrit etymology. The root √han has quite a number of uses and derivatives and one of its attested Vedic usages which may be relevant to paṭighasaññā is said to be -
; -gh/ātam - etc - to strike, beat (also a drum) , pound, hammer (accusative), strike etc. upon (locative case)
This was the entry I found from sanskritdictionary.com, and the entry says that this usage is attested in the Brahmana literature and the Rig Veda. A cross-check with its source, Monier Williams' Sanskrit English Dictionary has the same explanation. Monier also has an additional entry explaining its use in astronomy to mean -
to touch , come into contact
When it is used in the DN 15 sense and formless attainment formula, paṭigha is understood (both in Theravada and the Sarvastivada, and perhaps even the Dharmagupta) in the sense closest to the 2 examples I gave above. I like BB's "impingement". The CPD offers "collision". The sense being conveyed is a rather neutral description of a sense object "making contact" with its corresponding sense faculty.

Re Ven Nyanatiloka's entry above, here are a few additional sources in red for the definition in the sense of "sense reaction" -
2. '(Sense-) reaction'. Applied to five-sense cognition, p. occurs in the following contexts:

(a) as patigha-saññā, 'perception of sense-reaction', said to be absent in the immaterial absorptions (s. jhāna 5). Alternative renderings: resistance-perception, reflex-perception; (Given in Vbh 603, where it is limited to the 5 "physical" faculties)

(b) as patigha-samphassa, '(mental) impression caused by 5fold sensorial reaction' (D. 15); s. phassa; (Given in DA 114, where paṭighasamphasso = sappaṭighaṃ rūpakkhandhaṃ vatthuṃ katvā uppajjanakasamphasso, of which sappaṭigha rūpakkhandha is defined in (c) below. Vatthu is an Abhidhammic concept of the physical organ underlying the sense faculty. The equation simply means the type of arising (initial?) contact that results from the 5 physical organs).

(c) as sappatigha-rūpa, 'reacting corporeality', and appatigha, 'not reacting', which is an Abhidhammic classification of corporeality, occurring in Dhs. 659, 1050. Sappatigha are called the physical sense-organs as reacting (or responding) to sense stimuli; and also the physical sense-objects as impinging (or making an impact) on the sense-organs. All other corporeality is appatigha, non-reacting and non-impinging. These 2 terms have been variously rendered as resistant and not, responding and not, with and without impact.
Just wanted to be complete, and show how much of the rūpa controversy is generated by the Abhidhamma definitions. See this thread for some discussion on the issue - http://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.ph ... 99#p204070

On the other hand, where paṭigha is used in the context of paṭighanusaya (the latent tendency to paṭigha), the sense conveyed by the suttas is no longer that of neutral contact, but that of aversion.

Does this help? I would say the DN 15 sense is of very little practical significance to the hoi-polloi, since very few of us are dabbling with the ability to conceptualise without any mental feeling.
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Re: Patigha and vyāpāda

Post by retrofuturist »

Greetings,
Sylvester wrote:On the other hand, where paṭigha is used in the context of paṭighanusaya (the latent tendency to paṭigha), the sense conveyed by the suttas is no longer that of neutral contact, but that of aversion.
Well yes, I was thinking of it specifically in the context of the fifth fetter.

What I find interesting is that the 5th fetter does say paṭigha, rather than vyāpāda, when it would be very easy to have simply made it vyāpāda.

So I guess what I'm getting at then is why did the Buddha specifically choose a term, with a literal meaning of "striking against", which has closer connotations to terms like "resistance", "impingement", "collision", "making contact" etc. when it would have been just as easy to opt for vyāpāda, which does mean something more along the lines of "hatred", "aversion", and "ill will"...

Why and what is the potential experiential significance of this choice?

Metta,
Retro. :)
"Whatever is true, whatever is noble, whatever is right, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is admirable—if anything is excellent or praiseworthy—think about such things."
Sylvester
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Re: Patigha and vyāpāda

Post by Sylvester »

I think in those contexts when He elected to use paṭigha over vyāpāda, the Buddha was differentiating between the manifestation (which is ill-will/vyāpāda) and its root/mūla (which is the latent tendency to aversion. Bear in mind that even if one maintains avyāpādasaṅkappa (the intention of non ill-will), it does not mean that paṭighanusaya as an āsava (the most basic form of defilement) has been uprooted.

Where actually have you seen the 5 Lower Fetters discuss paṭigha instead of vyāpāda? The reverse seems to be typical, I think.
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gavesako
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Re: Patigha and vyāpāda

Post by gavesako »

Here are some relevant quotes on this topic:

Ven. K. Nanananda:
Phassa - Contact: A hybrid between 'Verbal Impression' (adhivacana-samphassa) and 'Resistance Impression' (paṭigha-samphassa).

One can form an idea about the relation between name-and-form and consciousness by going deeper into the implications of this discourse. In the discussion of the interrelation between name and form, the Buddha makes use of two highly significant terms, namely adhivacanasamphassa and paṭighasamphassa. How contact arises dependent on name-and-form is explained by the Buddha in the MahāNidānasutta of the Dīgha Nikāya.
It is addressed to Venerable Ānanda in the form of a catechism.
Phassa, or contact, is a sort of hybrid, carrying with it the implications of both adhivacanasamphassa and paṭighasamphassa. That is to say, it partakes of the character of name, nāma, as suggested by adhivacanasamphassa, as well as that of form, rūpa, indicated by paṭighasamphassa. This will be clear from the relevant section of the catechism in the MahāNidānasutta:
'Nāmarūpapaccayā phasso'ti iti kho panetaṃ vuttaṃ, tad'Ānanda, imināpetaṃ pariyāyena veditabbaṃ, yathānāmarūpapaccayā phasso. Yehi, Ānanda, ākārehi yehi liṅgehi yehi nimittehi yehi uddesehi nāmakāyassa paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu tesu liṅgesu tesu nimittesu tesu uddesesu asati api nu kho rūpakāye adhivacanasamphasso paññāyethā'ti?' 'No hetaṃ, bhante.'
'Yehi, Ānanda, ākārehi yehi liṅgehi yehi nimittehi yehi uddesehi rūpakāyassa paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu tesu liṅgesu tesu nimittesu tesu uddesesu asati api nu kho nāmakāye paṭighasamphasso paññāyethā'ti?' 'No hetaṃ, bhante.'
'Yehi, Ānanda, ākārehi yehi liṅgehi yehi nimittehi yehi uddesehi nāmakāyassa ca rūpakāyassa ca paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu tesu liṅgesu tesu nimittesu tesu uddesesu asati api nu kho adhivacanasamphasso vā paṭighasamphasso vāpaññāyethā'ti?' 'No hetaṃ, bhante.'
'Yehi, Ānanda, ākārehi yehi liṅgehi yehi nimittehi yehi uddesehi nāmarūpassa paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu tesu liṅgesu tesu nimittesu tesu uddesesu asati api nu kho phasso paññāyethā'ti?' 'No hetaṃ, bhante.' 'Tasmātih'Ānanda, eseva hetu etaṃ nidānaṃ esa samudayo esa paccayo phassassa, yadidaṃ nāmarūpaṃ.'
"From name-and-form as condition, contact comes to be. Thus it has been said above. And that Ānanda, should be understood in this manner, too, as to how from name-and-form as condition, contact arises. If, Ānanda, all those modes, characteristics, signs and exponents, by which the name-group, nāma-kāya, is designated were absent, would there be manifest any verbal impression, adhivacanasamphassa, in the form-group, rūpa-kāya?" "There would not, lord."
"If, Ānanda, all those modes, characteristics, signs and exponents, by which the form-group is designated were absent, would there be manifest any resistance-impression, paṭighasamphasso, in the name-group?" "There would not, lord."
"And if, Ānanda, all those modes, characteristics, signs and exponents, by which there is a designation of both name-group and form-group were absent, would there be manifest either any verbal impression or any resistance-impression?" "There would not, lord."
"And if, Ānanda, all those modes, characteristics, signs and exponents, by which there comes to be a designation of name-and-form were absent, would there be manifest any contact?" "There would not, lord." "Wherefore, Ānanda, this itself is the cause, this is the origin, this is the condition for contact, that is to say, name-and-form."

With the help of four words of allied sense, namely ākāra, mode, liṅga, characteristic, nimitta, sign, and uddesa, exponent, the Buddha catechetically brings out four conclusions by this disquisition. They are:
1) By whatever modes, characteristics, signs and exponents the name-group, nāma-kāya, is designated, in their absence no designation of verbal impression, adhivacanasamphassa, in the form-group, rūpa-kāya, is possible.
2) By whatever modes, characteristics, signs and exponents the form-group is designated, in their absence no designation of resistance-impression, paṭighasamphasso, in the name-group, nāmakāya, is possible.
3) By whatever modes, characteristics, signs and exponents both name-group and form-group are designated, in their absence no designation of verbal impression or resistance-impression is possible.
4) By whatever modes, characteristics, signs and exponents name-and-form is designated, in their absence no designation of contact is possible.

What we have here is adhivacanasamphassa. Its affinity to name is obvious, and this is precisely the meaning we attributed to nāma. Therefore, what we have in this concept of nāmakāya, or name-group, literally 'name-body', is a set of first principles in linguistic usage pertaining to definition.
The form-group, or rūpakāya, literally 'form-body', on the other hand has something to do with resistance, as suggested by the term paṭighasamphassa. Paṭigha means 'striking against'. Form, or rūpa, has a striking quality, while name, or nāma, has a descriptive quality. Phassa, or contact, is a hybrid of these two. This is what gives a deeper dimension to the above disquisition.
The point that the Buddha seeks to drive home is the fact that the concept of contact necessarily presupposes both name and form. In other words, name and form are mutually interrelated, as already stated above. There would be no verbal impression in the form-group, if there were no modes, characteristics, etc., proper to name. Likewise there could be no resistant impression in the name-group, if there were no modes, characteristics, etc., proper to form.
At first sight these two may appear as totally opposed to each other. But what is implied is a case of mutual interrelation. The expression peculiar to the name-group is a necessary condition for the form-group, while the resistance peculiar to the form-group is a necessary condition for the name-group. Since here we have something deep, let us go for an illustration for the sake of clarity.
As we have already stated, a verbal impression in regard to the form-group is there because of the constituents of the name-group. Now the form-group consists of the four great primaries earth, water, fire and air. Even to distinguish between them by their qualities of hardness and softness, hotness and coolness, etc., feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention, which are the constituents of the name-group, have to play their part. Thus it is with the help of those members on the name side that the four basic elements associated with form receive recognition.

Interest, attention and contact together bring out some deeper implications of the law of dependent arising. Not only with regard to inanimate objects, but even in the case of this conscious body, the question of contact is related to the fact of attention.
If, for instance I ask what I am touching now, one might say that I am touching the palm leaf fan in my hand. This is because we usually associate the idea of touching with the hand that holds. But suppose I put away the fan and ask again what I am touching now, one might find it difficult to answer. It might not be possible for another to guess by mere external observation, since it is essentially subjective. It is dependent on my attention. It could even be my robe that I am touching in the sense of contact, in which case I am becoming conscious of my body as apart from the robe I am wearing.
Consciousness follows in the wake of attention. Whatever my attention picks up, of that I am conscious. Though I have in front of me so many apparently visible objects, until my attention is focused, eye-consciousness does not come about. The basic function of this type of consciousness, then, is to distinguish between the eye and the object seen. It is only after the eye has become conscious, that other factors necessary for sense perception fall into place.
The two things born of that basic discrimination, together with the discriminating consciousness itself, that is eye-consciousness, make up the concept of contact. Cakkhuñca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇaṃ, tiṇṇaṃ saṅgati phasso. "Dependent on eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises, the concurrence of the three is contact."

Let us now consider how resistance-impression, paṭighasamphassa, comes about. It is said that the factors of the form-group have a part to play in producing resistance-impression on the name-group. We sometimes speak of an idea 'striking us', as if it were something material. Or else an idea could be 'at the back' of our mind and a word 'on the tip' of our tongue.
The clearest manifestation of contact is that between material objects, where collision is suggestive of resistance, as implied by the word paṭigha. This primary sense of striking against or striking together is implicit even in the simile given by the Buddha in the Dhātuvibhaṅgasutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, and in the Phassamūlakasutta of the Saṃyutta Nikāya, concerning two sticks being rubbed together to kindle a fire.
Though as a gross manifestation contact is primarily associated with the form-group, it is essentially connected with the name-group, as we have already explained with illustrations. It is when both resistance-impression and verbal impression come together that contact arises, dependent on name-and-form, nāmarūpapaccayā phasso.

http://www.seeingthroughthenet.net/file ... dstilled10


Kalupahana, in explicating the Buddha's teaching phenomenologically, writes the following: "... when the question regarding the nature of mind (nama) and matter (rupa) was raised, he responded by saying that the so-called matter is 'contact with resistence' (patigha-samphassa) and what is called mind is 'contact with concepts' (adhivacana-samphassa). In doing so, he was reducing both mind and matter to contact (samphassa) and, therefore, processes of experience rather than any kind of material-stuff or mind-stuff." (The Principles of Buddhist Philosophy)


Ajahn Buddhadasa:
MINDFULNESS IS DIFFICULT BECAUSE PHASSA IS NOTED ON ONLY ONE LEVEL.
The problem is that it is difficult to note anatta in the arammana (objects) that strike (the senses). This is because we don't know how to note both levels of phassa (contact). The level of patigha-samphassa (sensory contact) is to be aware merely of color or sound; once there is adhivacana-samphassa (designating contact) the meaning or value is known. Right here it is possible for sati (mindfulness) to note the fact of anatta in time. We consider patigha-samphassa to be "literal" and adhivacana-samphassa to be "essential." There's enough of a chance to note anatta in the nick of time.
http://www.suanmokkh.org/archive/nbooks/illness1.htm


Ajahn Sucitto:
‘Being touched’ is a formation; contact/impression (phassa) is an activity that modifies and colours the sense of self. In this respect, I’m referring not so much to direct sensory contact or ‘impingement contact’ (patigha-phassa), but the impression that the mind makes of that contact, called ‘designation contact’ (adhivacana-phassa). This form of contact is the significant one: owing to the subjective flavouring of designation contact, different people find different sights, sounds, flavours, ideas, remarks and gestures delightful, repugnant, or neutral. Designation contact sets up the familiar pattern of how we experience the world; and the consequent perceptions and impressions guide what we will make impingement contact with in the future. So this is the key to how we react and create fresh action, or kamma, based on the blueprint of the past. (Only to discover that what was wonderful once becomes ‘same old thing’ the third time round.)
Bhikkhu Gavesako
Kiṃkusalagavesī anuttaraṃ santivarapadaṃ pariyesamāno... (MN 26)

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Sylvester
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Re: Patigha and vyāpāda

Post by Sylvester »

So delightful to see I'm not alone in my heresy. I'm still trying to find that odd Samyukta sutra on namarupa that is the genesis of the Abhidharma injunction against patighasanna being established at the mind. All it took was one small change for Buddhist phenomenology to evolve into an enterprise on ontology.
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katavedi
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Re: Patigha and vyāpāda

Post by katavedi »

Hello Paul,

I wonder if the translation of patigha as "to hit against" might be useful to point to the illusion of a subject in our experience that is being hit. It seems there must be two things present for there to be a "hit against". If there is no longer a subject in experience, there is nothing to hit against.

It seems that the stages of awakening correspond to a progressive dissolving of the subject in experience. Perhaps the non-returner's conceit is dissolved enough that there is no longer a sense of being impinged upon?

Kind wishes,
katavedi
“But, Gotamī, when you know of certain things: ‘These things lead to dispassion, not to passion; to detachment, not to attachment; to diminution, not to accumulation; to having few wishes, not to having many wishes; to contentment, not to discontent; to seclusion, not to socializing; to the arousing of energy, not to indolence; to simple living, not to luxurious living’ – of such things you can be certain: ‘This is the Dhamma; this is the Discipline; this is the Master’s Teaching.’”
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