Moderator: mikenz66
Bhikkhu Pesala wrote:See also: A Discourse on the Bhāra Sutta by the Mahāsi Sayādaw.
mikenz66 wrote:Note
1. This discourse parallels the teaching on the four noble truths, but with a twist. The "burden" is defined in the same terms as the first noble truth, the truth of suffering & stress. The taking on of the burden is defined in the same terms as the second noble truth, the origination of stress; and the casting off of the burden, in the same terms as the third noble truth, the cessation of stress. The fourth factor, however — the carrier of the burden — has no parallel in the four noble truths, and has proven to be one of the most controversial terms in the history of Buddhist philosophy. When defining this factor as the person (or individual, puggala), the Buddha drops the abstract form of the other factors, and uses the ordinary, everyday language of narrative: the person with such-and-such a name. And how would this person translate into more abstract factors? He doesn't say. After his passing away, however, Buddhist scholastics attempted to provide an answer for him, and divided into two major camps over the issue. One camp refused to rank the concept of person as a truth on the ultimate level. This group inspired what eventually became the classic Theravada position on this issue: that the "person" was simply a conventional designation for the five aggregates. However, the other camp — who developed into the Pudgalavadin (Personalist) school — said that the person was neither a ultimate truth nor a mere conventional designation, neither identical with nor totally separate from the five aggregates. This special meaning of person, they said, was required to account for three things: the cohesion of a person's identity in this lifetime (one person's memories, for instance, cannot become another person's memories); the unitary nature of rebirth (one person cannot be reborn in several places at once); and the fact that, with the cessation of the khandhas at the death of an arahant, he/she is said to attain the Further Shore. However, after that moment, they said, nothing further could be said about the person, for that was as far as the concept's descriptive powers could go.
As might be imagined, the first group accused the second group of denying the concept of anatta, or not-self; whereas the second group accused the first of being unable to account for the truths that they said their concept of person explained. Both groups, however, found that their positions entangled them in philosophical difficulties that have never been successfully resolved.
Individual wrote:The Theravadins and Pudgalavadins both seem to raise legitimate points, although as you say, neither seem to have resolved the issue.
Individual wrote:People still ask Theravadins, "What is it that is reborn?" out of confusion and nobody can answer that question without invalidating their experience or contradicting anatta.
Many bhikkhus, heard that this evil view had arisen to a bhikkhu, named Sāti the son of a fisherman: 'As I know the Teaching of the Blessed One, this consciousness transmigrates through existences, not anything else'.
...
Then the Blessed One, addressed the bhikkhus:
Bhikkhus, do you too know this Teaching, wrongly grasped by the bhikkhu Sāti the son of a fisherman. By that he blames me. Destroys himself, and accumulates much unpleasantness.
No, venerable sir. In various ways we are told, that consciousness arises dependently. Without a cause there is no arising of consciousness.
Bhikkhus, it is good, you know the Teaching preached by me. In various ways I have preached that consciousness arises dependently. Without a cause, there is no arising of consciousness. Yet, this bhikkhu Sāti son of a fisherman, grasping this wrong view blames me and destroys himself, and accumulates much demerit. It will be for his undoing and unpleasāntness for a long time.
Individual wrote:If I remember correctly, isn't the self one of four or five things that lead to madness when contemplated?
"There are these four unconjecturables that are not to be conjectured about, that would bring madness & vexation to anyone who conjectured about them. Which four?
"The Buddha-range of the Buddhas[1] is an unconjecturable that is not to be conjectured about, that would bring madness & vexation to anyone who conjectured about it.
"The jhana-range of a person in jhana...[2]
"The [precise working out of the] results of kamma...
"Conjecture about [the origin, etc., of] the world is an unconjecturable that is not to be conjectured about, that would bring madness & vexation to anyone who conjectured about it.
"These are the four unconjecturables that are not to be conjectured about, that would bring madness & vexation to anyone who conjectured about them."
Notes
1. I.e., the range of powers a Buddha develops as a result of becoming a Buddha.
2. I.e., the range of powers that one may obtain while absorbed in jhana.
mikenz66 wrote:Hi Individual,
The Buddha addresses this question when admonishing Sati, the Fisherman's son, in MN 38:
http://awake.kiev.ua/dhamma/tipitaka/2S ... ta-e1.htmlMany bhikkhus, heard that this evil view had arisen to a bhikkhu, named Sāti the son of a fisherman: 'As I know the Teaching of the Blessed One, this consciousness transmigrates through existences, not anything else'.
...
Then the Blessed One, addressed the bhikkhus:
Bhikkhus, do you too know this Teaching, wrongly grasped by the bhikkhu Sāti the son of a fisherman. By that he blames me. Destroys himself, and accumulates much unpleasantness.
mikenz66 wrote:You mean this Sutta?
AN 4.77 Acintita Sutta: Unconjecturable
Individual wrote:As I read that, Sati is making the statement that consciousness transmigrates, certainly a mistaken view. "What is it that is reborn?" can be the perception, feeling, or experience that there is something that forms the basis, foundation, ground of experience, the complex of aggregates, rebirth -- without asserting whatever it is might be, without specifying; innocently inquiring about an aspect of experience without mistaken preconceptions. It's what makes some of us wonder whether robots can be sentient beings, and whether "sentience" is something real that's clarified by enlightenment or a bizarre illusion that's snuffed out by enlightenment.
"Then does Master Gotama hold the view: 'After death a Tathagata exists: only this is true, anything otherwise is worthless'?"
"...'after death a Tathagata does not exist'...
"...'after death a Tathagata both exists & does not exist'...
"...'after death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist'.
"And suppose someone were to ask you, 'This fire that has gone out in front of you, in which direction from here has it gone? East? West? North? Or south?' Thus asked, how would you reply?"
"That doesn't apply, Master Gotama. Any fire burning dependent on a sustenance of grass and timber, being unnourished — from having consumed that sustenance and not being offered any other — is classified simply as 'out' (unbound)."
"Even so, Vaccha, any physical form by which one describing the Tathagata would describe him: That the Tathagata has abandoned, its root destroyed, made like a palmyra stump, deprived of the conditions of development, not destined for future arising. Freed from the classification of form, Vaccha, the Tathagata is deep, boundless, hard to fathom, like the sea. 'Reappears' doesn't apply. 'Does not reappear' doesn't apply. 'Both does & does not reappear' doesn't apply. 'Neither reappears nor does not reappear' doesn't apply.
mikenz66 wrote:Hi Individual,
I tend to think that the question of "what is reborn" is one of those questions that is simply invalid. I'm not aware of that question being specifically discussed, but the question of whether the Tathagata continues after death is certainly examined.
Individual wrote:mikenz66 wrote:Hi Individual,
I tend to think that the question of "what is reborn" is one of those questions that is simply invalid. I'm not aware of that question being specifically discussed, but the question of whether the Tathagata continues after death is certainly examined.
No question is invalid, because even questions made out of ignorance can help clarify ignorance.
Individual wrote:You cannot answer the question, "What is it that is reborn?" without invalidating a person's experience or contradicting anatta. The personalists did the latter, the impersonalists (i.e. the Theravada) did the former.
Individual wrote:Was the Buddha an "impersonalist" too?
mikenz66 wrote:SN 22.22 Bhaara.m Sutta: The Burden
translated from the Pali by Maurice O'Connell Walshe
"'The five groups of clinging' is the answer. Which five? They are: the group of clinging to corporeality,... to feelings,... to perceptions,... to mental formations,... to consciousness. This, monks, is called 'the burden.'
"What is the laying hold of the burden? The answer is that it is the person, the Venerable So-and-so, of such-and-such a family. This, monks, is called 'the laying hold of the burden.'
SN 22.22 Bhara Sutta: The Burden
translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu
The Blessed One said, "And which is the burden? 'The five clinging-aggregates,' it should be said. Which five? Form as a clinging-aggregate, feeling as a clinging-aggregate, perception as a clinging-aggregate, fabrications as a clinging-aggregate, consciousness as a clinging-aggregate. This, monks, is called the burden.
"And which is the carrier of the burden? 'The person,' it should be said. This venerable one with such a name, such a clan-name. This is called the carrier of the burden.

Spk: In what sense are these "five aggregates subject to clinging" called the burden? In the sense of having to be borne through maintenance. For their maintenance - by being lifted up, moved about, seated, ... fed, nourished - is something to be borne; thus they are called a burden in the sense of having to be borne through maintenance.
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