some very specific vegetarian questions

[Peter]

By this line of reasoning, it would seem, that to be in accordance with Vinaya, a monk would have to eat some of everything...a reference please for why the Buddha put forth the rules 'precisely to keep monks from choosing...'

I'm referring here to plates on the floor, or a table, not what is put in one's bowl...

I would expect you would know the Vinaya better than I would, Bhante. My understanding, and I my be mistaken, is that there isn't supposed to be plates on the floor or table but that food is to be offered by a lay person directly into the monk's bowl. I read this in a talk by a monk... I will try to find it. The bit about not choosing... again I will have to think about where I read this.

And yes, this discussion of monks and vegetarianism, while interesting, is completely off topic for this thread. I am wishing to specifically discuss whether and how "buying meat" constitutes "urging another to kill". Monks do not buy meat.

[Peter]

When someone buys meat do you really think there is even the remote possibility that the grocery store is going to give up selling meat and call it quits for the meat department?

I'm not sure if it matters. If I take action A and I can be reasonable sure this will result in another person taking action B, does that make me responsible for action B? Are there any Buddhist teachings which speak to this question?

Then we would have the situation of "I suspect my action of buying meat causes the seller to kill or have killed another animal killed as a result." The seller ordering more meat is definitely a case of "urging another to kill". But the buyer? Wouldn't that be a case of urging another to urge another to kill? Does that count? But this then brings us back to my original list of questions. As more people get involved in the chain of distribution, the chain of urging becomes longer and longer. At some point we get to the level where any of our actions cause someone, somewhere to do something unwholesome. This is something no one, not even an arahant, can be free of. Thus I suspect anything outside of the most direct case of the seller also being the slaughterer, I think the link is not relevant to the issue of "urging another to kill".

I see a direct causal direction from meat purchases to another animal being killed.

Whether there is a direct causal connection is irrelevant to the topic I am trying to discuss. The question is whether a direct causal connection, no matter how long or complex, constitutes "urging another to kill". Again, I am trying to discuss this very narrow question.

Whether we find buying meat to be unwholesome or unacceptable for more general reasons is also off-topic for this thread. Please endeavor to stay on topic. I do not wish this thread to become a general debate on vegetarianism.

[Peter]

To get all the cards on the table, I have the impression that this thread is intended to make the point that it's not unwholesome behavior to buy meat in the grocery store, or at least that the behavior is justifiable. I may be mistaken about this, but if my impression is correct, I think the intended point of this thread ought to be stated openly.

The intention of the thread is as I have stated it: to determine if buying meat constitutes urging another to kill. It may be that buying meat is unwholesome for other reasons, but I am not interested in exploring those reasons here in this thread. I only wish to explore this one particular teaching.

[David N. Snyder]

The intention of the thread is as I have stated it: to determine if buying meat constitutes urging another to kill. It may be that buying meat is unwholesome for other reasons, but I am not interested in exploring those reasons here in this thread. I only wish to explore this one particular teaching.

Okay, that really narrows it to a specific point and clarifies your intent of the topic.

That said, then my answer for now is: I don't know.

[Jechbi]

Hello Peter,

You might wish to avoid the same.

I will certainly try to do so.

The intention of the thread is as I have stated it: to determine if buying meat constitutes urging another to kill. It may be that buying meat is unwholesome for other reasons, but I am not interested in exploring those reasons here in this thread. I only wish to explore this one particular teaching.

Thanks for stating an intention clearly. Within that narrowly defined parameter, I still contend that the answer is: It will depend on the particular circumstances. And further, that the very specific questions you asked are not specific enough.

Perhaps you could further clarify which teaching you wish to explore by including a canonical reference to the teaching itself.

Metta

[Jechbi]

Hello Peter and everyone,

In case you have not come across it, Bhikkhu Pesala addresses this topic very directly here:

The Buddha permitted monks to eat meat, provided they have not seen, heard, nor suspected that the animal was killed specifically to offer meat to them. This applies equally to fish, fertile eggs, and other living things such as lizards or insects. In this world, the vast majority of people are not vegetarians. If monks had to be vegetarians, it would be difficult for them to propagate Buddhism. Although Buddhists should not kill living beings, they can eat the meat of animals killed by others, provided they are free from involvement on four counts:

They do not kill themselves.
They do not urge others to kill.
They do no condone killing.
They do not speak in praise of killing.
Even if Buddhists do not buy meat and fish, non-Buddhists, and even some Buddhists, will kill living beings for the sake of a livelihood. The unwholesome kamma of killing is made only by the perpetrator, unless one urges, condones, or speaks in praise of that action.

Growing vegetables also entails the deliberate killing of pests and insects that feed on crops, but by buying vegetables one is not condoning that killing. A Buddhist farmer might be able to produce organic crops without the help of insecticides and pesticides, but his products are likely to be more expensive.

Vegetarians and strict vegans are blameless if they choose not to eat meat or dairy products, but we cannot say that meat-eating is blameworthy in itself, unless one is involved in killing. Butchers who sell meat are not directly involved in the slaughter of animals. Only those who sell livestock for slaughter, and those involved in slaughtering, are guilty of killing living-beings.

The majority of Theravāda Buddhists are not vegetarians, and some are certainly guilty of condoning killing. Mahāyāna and western Buddhists are often strict vegetarians. Many Buddhists are too fond of meat and fish, they should reflect mindfully while eating to be free from excessive craving. A varied diet with plenty of fresh fruit and vegetables, and low in fat, is best for health. Vegetables are cheaper than meat and more healthy.

A true Buddhist should be content to eat any kind of food, mindfully reflecting, “I take this food, not for enjoyment, but only for the sake of nutrition.” If vegetarians take food unmindfully with attachment to the taste, taking pride in being more virtuous than others, or have strong aversion to the smell or taste of meat, they will be making unwholesome kamma.

I believe this is what you were referring to originally, Peter:

Whatever bhikkhu should intentionally deprive a human being of life, or seek a weapon for him for taking [life], or should utter praise of death, or should urge him towards death saying, “Good man, what use to you is this miserable life? Death is better than life.” Or, having such thoughts and intentions in mind, should in several ways utter praise of death, or should urge him towards death, he too becomes defeated, is not in communion.

Vin iii 73: yo pana bhikkhu sañcicca manussa-viggahaṃ jīvitā voropeyya sattha-hārakaṃ vā ’ssa pariyeseyya maraṇa-vaṇṇaṃ vā saṃvaṇṇeyya maraṇāya vā samādapeyya, ambho purisa, kiṃ tuyh’ iminā pāpakena dujjīvitena, mataṃ te jīvitā seyyo ti, iti citta-mano citta-saṃkappo aneka-pariyāyena maraṇa-vaṇṇaṃ vā saṃvaṇṇeyya, maraṇāya vā samādapeyya, ayam pi pārājiko hoti asaṃvāso. Translation adapted from William Pruitt (ed.) and K. R. Norman (trans.), The Pātimokkha (Oxford: Pali Text Society, 2001), p. 9.

I think it also is worth remembering that this topic relates to a point of Vinaya, making it even more narrow. So is the intention of this thread actually to determine whether for a bikkhu buying meat constitutes urging another to kill? Just how tightly focused to you want this discussion to be? At what point does this discussion become applicable to any actual real-life situation for those of us who are not monks? I am asking these questions to more clearly understand the intention of this thread and avoid off-topic posts.

Metta

[Peter]

Within that narrowly defined parameter, I still contend that the answer is: It will depend on the particular circumstances.

Then please be so kind as to present a case wherein:
a] a person buying meat is urging the seller to kill
and
b] a person buying meat is not urging the seller to kill

In other words, if you claim it depends on the circumstances, then you should be able to illustrate exactly what sort of circumstance you are talking about.

In case you have not come across it, Bhikkhu Pesala addresses this topic very directly here:

I have read it. He asserts that buying meat does not constitute killing. It is not clear to me if this assertion represents his own opinion, the traditional opinion of Theravadin practitioners, or a well established conclusion based on the texts. I welcome his participation in this thread.

I think it also is worth remembering that this topic relates to a point of Vinaya, making it even more narrow. So is the intention of this thread actually to determine whether for a bikkhu buying meat constitutes urging another to kill?

Monks cannot handle money and so cannot buy anything. My question, as I have said perhaps a half-dozen times already, has to do with a lay person purchasing meat. If your contention is that this teaching does not apply to lay people I would be interested in hearing your reasoning. It is quite possible that while both lay and monastics are advised to abstain from killing, only monastics need to abstain from urging another to kill. I don't know; my initial assumption was this teaching applies to both monastic and lay.

[Jechbi]

Hello Peter,

Monks cannot handle money and so cannot buy anything. My question, as I have said perhaps a half-dozen times already, has to do with a lay person purchasing meat. If your contention is that this teaching does not apply to lay people I would be interested in hearing your reasoning. It is quite possible that while both lay and monastics are advised to abstain from killing, only monastics need to abstain from urging another to kill. I don't know; my initial assumption was this teaching applies to both monastic and lay.

Yes, of course that's true that a monk cannot buy anything. And I'm sorry if you feel that you are needlessly repeating yourself again and again, but if you wish to drill down to this very specific teaching and define the discussion in a very focused way, then I want to be sure that I'm being responsive, because obviously this topic has broader ramifications than just those you are asking about.

In order to have the discussion within the parameters you have defined, I think an underlying issue is the degree to which Vinaya rules are a basis for determining what is kusula conduct for householders. I would say that broadly, teachings about killing and kusala and so on are applicable to both monks and lay, but I think there is danger in taking the specific Vinaya requirements and trying to extract from them any broad generalizations about what is kusala or akusala for lay followers. My reasoning is as follows: The Vinaya was intended to help the bikkhu community know how to remain in communion. The Vinaya was not intended to instruct householders in how to distinguish kusala from akusala. I understand and accept that my reasoning may be flawed, and I welcome feedback.

Is it your assumption that Vinaya codes are intended to instruct householders in how to conduct themselves? If so, can you provide your reasoning?

Then please be so kind as to present a case wherein:
a] a person buying meat is urging the seller to kill
and
b] a person buying meat is not urging the seller to kill

I'm not sure I really want to be drawn into endless hypotheticals, but:
a] you go to an organic chicken farm and select your live chicken to be butchered.
b] you go to the neighborhood retail grocery store and purchase a pre-killed, CAFO-bred chicken from a grocery employee who earns minimum wage.
Frankly, for the householder, I believe an argument could be made that [a] is more kusula than [b] if choosing between these two hypothetical scenarios, all other things being equal.

In other words, if you claim it depends on the circumstances, then you should be able to illustrate exactly what sort of circumstance you are talking about.

I do not wish to make claims that are unsupportable, so thank you for challenging me. But please remember that anyone can build any hypothetical to support any kind of strange argument. Just because I can illustrate what sort of circumstances I'm talking about doesn't mean that my hypotheticals will be better teachers than real-life situations that you confront in the present moment.

Metta

[Dhammanando]

Hi Peter,

The Buddha taught it is unwholesome to urge another to kill, that it is a violation of the fifth precept.

First a couple of quibbles:

1. This precept is the first, not the fifth.

2. The translation "to urge another to kill" is a little too narrow, for it would imply that the unwholesome kamma in question is limited to cases where one forcefully tries to cajole someone to carry out a killing. No such thing is implied by the Pali terms for the action in question, nor in the description of what it entails. Verbs like ghāteti/ghātayati (as in Dhammapada 129-30 and 405) and mārāpeti (the commentarial gloss on ghāteti) would be better translated "to have someone kill something".

Does purchasing meat at a meat store constitute urging another to kill?

Changing the question to: "Does purchasing meat at a meat store constitute having another kill?" the answer is no.

The unwholesome kamma of having someone kill a living being entails exactly the same five factors as the unwholesome kamma of killing a living being oneself (i.e., a living being, a perception of a living being, a volition bent on killing, an effort towards that end, and the death of a being as a result). The only difference lies in the form that the effort takes.

Since people don't ordinarily purchase meat with the wish that by so doing more animals will be killed, their purchase does not amount to "having another kill something". The factors of killing volition, effort and the death of a being as a result of that effort will all be absent.

One should not give the verb "to have another kill something" a causal scope that stretches way beyond that which it is given in the Pali texts.

Best wishes,
Dhammanando Bhikkhu

[Jechbi]

Thank you, Bhante.

I hope this question is not off-topic, but:

Since people don't ordinarily purchase meat with the wish that by so doing more animals will be killed, their purchase does not amount to "having another kill something". The factors of killing volition, effort and the death of a being as a result of that effort will all be absent.

If a person regularly buys CAFO-bred chickens in the grocery store, and if the person does so without the understanding that the net effect of this continued conduct will result in more chickens being killed, is it a case of ignorance rather than a case of urging?

Metta

[Bhikkhu Pesala]

1. Pāṇātipātīsuttaṃ

264. “Catūhi, bhikkhave, dhammehi samannāgato yathābhataṃ nikkhitto evaṃ niraye. Katamehi catūhi? Attanā ca pāṇātipātī hoti, parañca pāṇātipāte samādapeti, pāṇātipāte ca samanuñño hoti, pāṇātipātassa ca vaṇṇaṃ bhāsati — imehi kho, bhikkhave, catūhi dhammehi samannāgato yathābhataṃ nikkhitto evaṃ niraye. (Book of Fours)

Endowed with four things, monks, one arises in hell as if taken and thrown there. What four?

1. One kills living beings oneself,
2. One urges (samādapeti) another to kill living beings,
3. One approves of or condones (samanuñño) killing,
4. One speaks in praise of it (vaṇṇaṃ bhāsati).

[appicchato]

My understanding, and I my be mistaken, is that there isn't supposed to be plates on the floor or table but that food is to be offered by a lay person directly into the monk's bowl.

Hi Peter,

Well, in the strictest of senses this may be true...although I can't recall reading anything about whether the Buddha ate off of dishes when invited to a home, or ate only from his bowl even then (I'm thinking he probably did)...that said, in today's world, all monks (in Thailand) are required to reside in a wat, and to be the one monk taking his bowl to a lay persons home to be served to, and eat from, while the rest are eating off of plates just wouldn't fly...it is what it is...conceivably one could 'go it alone' (live outside the wat), but for a guy in his sixties, I'd be hard pressed to go that route at this point...although I do contemplate it sometimes...

I know this is completely unrelated to 'vegetarian questions'...I'll leave it here...

[Jechbi]

1. Pāṇātipātīsuttaṃ

264. “Catūhi, bhikkhave, dhammehi samannāgato yathābhataṃ nikkhitto evaṃ niraye. Katamehi catūhi? Attanā ca pāṇātipātī hoti, parañca pāṇātipāte samādapeti, pāṇātipāte ca samanuñño hoti, pāṇātipātassa ca vaṇṇaṃ bhāsati — imehi kho, bhikkhave, catūhi dhammehi samannāgato yathābhataṃ nikkhitto evaṃ niraye. (Book of Fours)

Thank you, Venerable. This demonstrates that we do not have to rely on the Vinaya to find the specific teaching that Peter is asking about. Do you know whether there is a link to an English translation of this passage somewhere, for example to the translation that you provided? I have been unable to find one.

Also, can you tell me whether the Dhammika Sutta expresses the same notion? I believe the Dhammika Sutta does not use the word "samādapeti," so perhaps these are different concepts.

"Now I will tell you the layman's duty. Following it a lay-disciple would be virtuous; for it is not possible for one occupied with the household life to realize the complete bhikkhu practice (dhamma).

"He should not kill a living being, nor cause it to be killed, nor should he incite another to kill. Do not injure any being, either strong or weak, in the world.

Metta

[Peter]

First a couple of quibbles:

1. This precept is the first, not the fifth.

Yes, of course. I don't know what I was thinking. Thanks for the correction, Bhante.

2. The translation "to urge another to kill" is a little too narrow, for it would imply that the unwholesome kamma in question is limited to cases where one forcefully tries to cajole someone to carry out a killing.

I don't know that "urge" implies forcefully cajoling. I would think "entice" or "invite" could be implied as well. My Oxford American Dictionary gives:

urge |ərj|
verb [ trans. usu. infinitive ]
• try earnestly or persistently to persuade (someone) to do something
• recommend or advocate (something) strongly
• encourage (a person or animal) to move more quickly or in a particular direction
• encourage someone to continue or succeed in something

Verbs like ghāteti/ghātayati (as in Dhammapada 129-30 and 405) and mārāpeti (the commentarial gloss on ghāteti) would be better translated "to have someone kill something".

Would this be the same as simply "asking another to kill something"?

Since people don't ordinarily purchase meat with the wish that by so doing more animals will be killed...

I wonder... Certainly not this specific wish, but what about the wish that meat continues to be made available. Does this amount to the same thing?

One should not give the verb "to have another kill something" a causal scope that stretches way beyond that which it is given in the Pali texts.

So then you would say only the example of buying meat from someone who kills the animal to order would constitute "urging"?

[Dhammanando]

Hi Jechbi,

If a person regularly buys CAFO-bred chickens in the grocery store, and if the person does so without the understanding that the net effect of this continued conduct will result in more chickens being killed, is it a case of ignorance rather than a case of urging?

1. A person's purchase of chicken flesh does not amount to the akusala kamma of having someone kill chickens.

2. A person's knowledge that purchasing chicken flesh will be a contributory factor to more chickens being killed, or his ignorance of this, will not alter the fact that his purchase of chicken flesh does not amount to the akusala kamma of having someone kill chickens.

(The Vinaya principle that applies here is that the mere knowing about the probable outcome of an action does not in itself constitute the willing of that outcome. For example, in a forest monastery one of the bhikkhus' daily duties is to sweep the leaves on the forest paths. This sweeping will most probably, indeed almost inevitably, lead to the accidental injury or deaths of some ants and other small insects. But even though a bhikkhu knows that this is likely to happen, he does not incur any offence for the deaths that his sweeping causes, except in the unlikely event that his decision to sweep leaves is prompted by a desire that insects will be killed).

3. Whether the chickens were raised in battery farms, or in free range farms, or in sumptious palaces waited upon by liveried footmen, has no bearing on the question of whether a person's purchasing their dead flesh would amount to the akusala kamma of having someone kill chickens.

4. A person who resolves not to purchase the flesh of chickens, doing so out of compassion for chickens and in the hope that this will reduce the demand for chicken flesh and lead to fewer chickens being killed, performs wholesome mind-door kamma on account of his compassionate volition.

5. But if this same person is the sort of militant vegetarian who alleges that those who don't do as he does are committing the unwholesome body-door kamma of having someone kill chickens, then he goes too far. He is disregarding the most elementary teaching on kamma, namely, that kamma is volition. In permitting such a view to persist within himself he commits the unwholesome mind-door kamma of nurturing a wrong view regarding the wholesome and the unwholesome. In propounding this view to others he commits the unwholesome speech-door kamma of misrepresenting the Tathāgata.

Best wishes,
Dhammanando Bhikkhu

[Jechbi]

Thank you, Bhante.

[Peter]

And the award for comprehensive reply goes to...
Thank you, Bhante, for that thorough answer. I was most intrigued by this bit:

"The Vinaya principle that applies here is that the mere knowing about the probable outcome of an action does not in itself constitute the willing of that outcome."

This was a salient point in recent discussions of this topic between and my wife.

[Dhammanando]

Also, can you tell me whether the Dhammika Sutta expresses the same notion? I believe the Dhammika Sutta does not use the word "samādapeti," so perhaps these are different concepts.

"He should not kill a living being, nor cause it to be killed, nor should he incite another to kill. Do not injure any being, either strong or weak, in the world.

The first two verbs are hanati and ghāteti, meaning to kill and to have another kill. These are the same verbs as in the Dhammapada verses I referred to earlier in this thread. And yes, the latter does mean the same as paraṃ pāṇātipāte samādapeti.

The third verb, hanataṃ paresaṃ anujānāti, would be literally translated as "permit killing on the part of others". It corresponds to approving/condoning (samanuñño) in the sutta quoted by Ven. Pesala. In practice, however, the meaning is rather narrower than this. It generally has to do with conspiracy scenarios in which two or more persons jointly agree to kill someone. When the killing takes place, although perhaps only one person does the actual deed, all those who plotted towards this end incur the akusala body-door kamma of intentional killing. So the verb hanati applies to the fellow who stabs or shoots, while samanuñño or anujānāti apply to the rest of the plotters.

Best wishes,
Dhammanando Bhikkhu

[jcsuperstar]

My understanding, and I my be mistaken, is that there isn't supposed to be plates on the floor or table but that food is to be offered by a lay person directly into the monk's bowl.

Hi Peter,

Well, in the strictest of senses this may be true...although I can't recall reading anything about whether the Buddha ate off of dishes when invited to a home, or ate only from his bowl even then (I'm thinking he probably did)...that said, in today's world, all monks (in Thailand) are required to reside in a wat, and to be the one monk taking his bowl to a lay persons home to be served to, and eat from, while the rest are eating off of plates just wouldn't fly...it is what it is...conceivably one could 'go it alone' (live outside the wat), but for a guy in his sixties, I'd be hard pressed to go that route at this point...although I do contemplate it sometimes...

I know this is completely unrelated to 'vegetarian questions'...I'll leave it here...

as far as i understand it one only has to take whats put into one's bowl, not eat it. this is why you dont have to eat things that would make you sick or kill you.
basicaly the person gets the merit from the giving not the monk eating what is given. this is why overturning the bowl is such a big deal, youre taking away the lay person's ability to gain merit (in this way).

[Prasadachitta]

5. But if this same person is the sort of militant vegetarian who alleges that those who don't do as he does are committing the unwholesome body-door kamma of having someone kill chickens, then he goes too far. He is disregarding the most elementary teaching on kamma, namely, that kamma is volition. In permitting such a view to persist within himself he commits the unwholesome mind-door kamma of nurturing a wrong view regarding the wholesome and the unwholesome. In propounding this view to others he commits the unwholesome speech-door kamma of misrepresenting the Tathāgata.

If I give this view as my personal opinion based upon my own reasoning and reflection I am preserving the truth. I am not misrepresenting the Tathagata. I do want to be sensitive to what the Buddha taught but I do feel that some things in his teaching might be contextual. Meaning they were applied to that time and place in a way that was most conducive to the cultivation of the Dhamma within beings. Im not saying that any of the teachings are not helpful, only that I think there is room for personal reflection on the further development of wholesomeness. When I say that it is my opinion that one way of acting is relativly more wholesome than another especially when I am speaking from reflection upon my own experience, I do so in the hopes of being helpfull. The fact is that I felt I was complicit in the killing of animals when I ate meat. This is why I stopped and I have had a lighter heart ever since.

Metta

Gabriel