SN 22.95: Phena Sutta — Foam

[Nyana]

Alright then, the beating of my heart. That's a phenomenological experience. Is that nothing more than deluded conception?

The beating of your heart is just the beating of your heart. How you relate to your body is what is important. This can be done either with appropriate attention (yoniso manasikāra) or inappropriate attention (ayoniso manasikāra). Appropriate attention, conjoined with mindfulness, full awareness, concentration, and discernment attends to unsatisfactoriness, the origin of unsatisfactoriness, the cessation of unsatisfactoriness, and the way leading to the cessation of unsatisfactoriness (dukkha, dukkhasamudaya, dukkhanirodha, and dukkhanirodhagāminīpaṭipadā). Using this framework one comprehends arising, passing away, allure, drawbacks, and escape with regard to all phenomena experienced. Or one can pursue frameworks of inappropriate attention. Some of the unskillful types of inappropriate attention have already been indicated.

All the best,

Geoff

[retrofuturist]

Greetings,

Alright then, the beating of my heart. That's a phenomenological experience. Is that nothing more than deluded conception?

Just to add to what Geoff said, and certainly not to pick on you... I want to analyse this bolded section vis-a-vis the instructions of the Phena Sutta.

If one were to "appropriately examine" and "view the aggregates", this would phenomenologically be experienced within the feeling aggregate - rise, change, and cessation would be observed at the frequency of the heart-beat.

If one were to "inappropriately examine" it they might regard it as "the beating of my heart". This inappropriate attention caused the implicit validation of two unstated ontological cognitions - namely the existence of "me" and "heart". It goes further and establishes a subject-object relationship between these two, and assigns the activity of "beating" to "my heart". All this cognitive distortion is the result of not adhering to the instructions of the Phena Sutta (regarding how to view and regard that which is experienced), the Kaccayanagotta Sutta in terms of positing the extreme ontological view of "existence" and the Bahiya Sutta, not yet quoted in this topic which states... http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

"Then, Bahiya, you should train yourself thus: In reference to the seen, there will be only the seen. In reference to the heard, only the heard. In reference to the sensed, only the sensed. In reference to the cognized, only the cognized. That is how you should train yourself. When for you there will be only the seen in reference to the seen, only the heard in reference to the heard, only the sensed in reference to the sensed, only the cognized in reference to the cognized, then, Bahiya, there is no you in terms of that. When there is no you in terms of that, there is no you there. When there is no you there, you are neither here nor yonder nor between the two. This, just this, is the end of stress."

If the experience is cognized as "the beating of my heart", the Bahiya Sutta suggests we would at least recover to the extent of identifying "In reference to the cognized, only the cognized." Thereby, not conflating the cognized with the phenomenological experience of vedana.

Metta,
Retro.

[mikenz66]

Hi Retro,

All this cognitive distortion is the result of not adhering to the instructions of the Phena Sutta (regarding how to view and regard that which is experienced), the Kaccayanagotta Sutta in terms of positing the extreme ontological view of "existence"...

But don't forget the other extreme view "nothing exists", which, as Kirk points out, is just as much an ontology (a negative one). In my view these suttas (and what I get from Ven Nananada's analyses) suggest that what we perceive is deceptive, but it's not just an invention of our mind. Just as the magic show or the mirage are deceptive but not imaginary.


Mike

[retrofuturist]

Greetings,

But don't forget the other extreme view "nothing exists", which, as Kirk points out, is just as much an ontology (a negative one).

But Mike, where has anyone said otherwise?

Such a view would be equally beyond the range of loka as the other extreme speculative view that everything exists.

Metta,
Retro.

[mikenz66]

Hi Retro,

But Mike, where has anyone said otherwise?

Not explicitly, but by omitting the "nothing exists, that is another extreme" part of the Kaccayanagotta Sutta you seemed to imply that avoiding the extreme that "everything exists" is more important.


Mike

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Mike,

No, not at all... it's just that "non-existence" wasn't an ontological statement implicit in the cognition "the beating of my heart", whereas "existence" was.

Metta,
Retro.

[mikenz66]

No, not at all... it's just that "non-existence" wasn't an ontological statement implicit in the cognition "the beating of my heart", whereas "existence" was.

Yes, but your argument seemed to me to veer towards the extreme view that there is no objective reality.


Mike

[Nyana]

Not explicitly, but by omitting the "nothing exists, that is another extreme" part of the Kaccayanagotta Sutta you seemed to imply that avoiding the extreme that "everything exists" is more important.

In terms of relative importance, it's more important to avoid the extreme of "nothing exists" because nihilism can result in not considering the long term consequences of one's actions, which opens the door to the lower realms.

All the best,

Geoff

[retrofuturist]

Greetings,

Yes, but your argument seemed to me to veer towards the extreme view that there is no objective reality.

No, that's the view of some Mahayanists, but certainly not my view, nor the view of the suttas we've been discussing... but you can see from this kind of discussion why the Buddha was sometimes falsely accused of being an annihilationist by those who didn't understand the nuances of his "middle way" position.

Metta,
Retro.

[Nyana]

Yes, but your argument seemed to me to veer towards the extreme view that there is no objective reality.

Attempting to establish an "objective reality" is, at best, an unnecessary and superfluous line of investigation, and at worst, the extreme of "everything exists," which is an assumption dependent upon deluded cognitions. AN 4.24 Kāḷakārāma Sutta:

• Thus, monks, a Tathāgata does not imagine a visible thing as apart from seeing, he does not imagine an unseen, he does not imagine a thing worth seeing, he does not imagine a seer. He does not imagine an audible thing as apart from hearing, he does not imagine an unheard, he does not imagine a thing worth hearing, he does not imagine a hearer. He does not imagine a thing to be sensed as apart from sensation, he does not imagine an unsensed, he does not imagine a thing worth sensing, he does not imagine one who senses. He does not imagine a cognizable thing as apart from cognition, he does not imagine an uncognized, he does not imagine a thing worth cognizing, he does not imagine one who cognizes.
  
  Thus, monks, the Tathāgata, being such in regard to all phenomena, seen, heard, sensed and cognized, is such. Moreover than he who is such there is none other higher or more excellent, I declare.
  
  Whatever is seen, heard, sensed,
  Or clung to and esteemed as truth by other folk,
  Midst those who are entrenched in their own views,
  Being such, I hold none as true or false.
  This barb I beheld well in advance,
  Whereon mankind is hooked, impaled,
  I know, I see, 'tis verily so,
  No such clinging for the Tathāgatas.

There is no need and no value in constructing an "objective reality" or proving "valid cognitions." The practitioner simply needs to set aside such speculations and return to the practice of the four applications of mindfulness.

All the best,

Geoff

[pt1]

Greetings,

Ven. Ñāṇananda, Seeing Through: A Guide to Insight Meditation:

• The Buddha has compared the aggregate of perception to a mirage. Now if perception is mirage, what is 'rūpa saññā' or a visual percept? That also must be a mirage. What about 'sadda saññā'? What about the auditory percept or what strikes the ear? That too must be a mirage. Though it is not something that one sees with the eye, it has the nature of a mirage. To take as real what is of a mirage-nature, is a delusion. It is something that leads to a delusion. It is an illusion that leads to a delusion. In order to understand deeply this mirage-nature in sensory perception, there is a need for a more refined way of mental attending.

This bolded section seems strongly opposed to the Abhidhamma world-view, where not only are paramattha-dhammas not an illusion, they're deemed to be ultimate realities. Note, it's not their illusory nature that is deemed the ultimate-reality in the Abhidhamma schema, but it is the view of the very existence and reality of the dhammas themselves which is regarded as panna (wisdom) rather than delusion.

Not sure that's quite right when representing the abhidhamma (and commentarial in particular) manner of approaching this issue. Perhaps if you said - "it is the view of the very reality of the conditioned dhammas themselves which is regarded as panna (wisdom) rather than delusion" - that might be a little closer to what abdhidhamma (and commentaries in particular) are saying. Anyway, the point is I guess that afaik there's no place in the abhi/comm that says that dhammas are in fact not conditioned. So, if they're in fact conditioned, then such words as "exist, reality, mirage" etc need to be considered in the context of conditionality.

So, sometimes more positive statements like "reality" seem useful, and sometimes more negative statements like "mirage" seem useful, but none of that defies conditionality and therefore shouldn't be considered in the context of eternalism/nihilism. My own conjecture is that in the commentarial approach more positive statements are used for describing the initial stages of insight, whereas more negative statements are used to describe more advanced stages of insights. In the case of Ven.Nananada, I'm guessing he's on the more advanced stages, hence his preference for more negative statements, but then again his "mirage" statements shouldn't be considered in the context of nihilism, but in the context of conditionality, just like abhi/comm. Otherwise, neither makes much sense.

Best wishes

[mikenz66]

Hi Geoff,

There is no need and no value in constructing an "objective reality" or proving "valid cognitions." The practitioner simply needs to set aside such speculations and return to the practice of the four applications of mindfulness.

Sure, I completely agree with that. I'm not talking about constructing an objective reality, I'm talking about keeping an open mind on the issue. Any arguments that involve negating objective reality seem to me to have exactly the same problem as those that argue for objective realities And, as PT points out, interpreting the Abhidhamma as a realist position is not necessarily accurate, so labelling it as "realist" and thereby dismissing it seems to be somewhat of a straw-man argument. It all depends on how one interprets "paramattha dhamma"


Mike

[kirk5a]

But don't forget the other extreme view "nothing exists", which, as Kirk points out, is just as much an ontology (a negative one). In my view these suttas (and what I get from Ven Nananada's analyses) suggest that what we perceive is deceptive, but it's not just an invention of our mind. Just as the magic show or the mirage are deceptive but not imaginary.


Mike

Yes that is the angle I was pursuing. It is going much too far, and veers off towards "nothing really exists," to start reducing everything to nothing more than deluded conception. Which seemed to be Geoff's statement, but it looks like it only seemed that way.

[Nyana]

There is no need and no value in constructing an "objective reality" or proving "valid cognitions." The practitioner simply needs to set aside such speculations and return to the practice of the four applications of mindfulness.

Sure, I completely agree with that. I'm not talking about constructing an objective reality, I'm talking about keeping an open mind on the issue. Any arguments that involve negating objective reality seem to me to have exactly the same problem as those that argue for objective realities And, as PT points out, interpreting the Abhidhamma as a realist position is not necessarily accurate, so labelling it as "realist" and thereby dismissing it seems to be somewhat of a straw-man argument. It all depends on how one interprets "paramattha dhamma"

The Abhidhammapiṭaka doesn't define conditioned phenomena as paramattha dhammā or paramattha sabhāva. The former does occur once in the Kathāvatthu but it's hardly a ringing endorsement for how this notion of paramattha dhamma later came to be applied and interpreted. Moreover, even someone like Karunadasa admits that the later ābhidhammika treatises present a realist view. As Ven. Ñāṇananda has repeatedly pointed out, this view isn't supported by the suttas or earliest strata of abhidhamma.

All the best,

Geoff

[pulga]

...

The assumption underpinning your line of inquiry is that rúpa, in the context of nama-rupa, is an ontological proposition, i.e. it is physical matter. Or in other words, it is a "body" that complements a "mind".

Hello Retro,

Sorry about the delayed response: I've been away from the computer for the past couple days.

The facticity that is an inherent aspect of our experience is hardly an ontological proposition -- it might very well be that aspect of our experience that determines for us what is real . The idea that I find questionable is the dependency of rúpa upon náma.

Any understanding of námarúpa needs to take into account the Anattalakkhanasutta. As I see it, the intractable nature of our experience is attributable to rúpa. That's not to say that rúpa is permanent, that it doesn't change, only that it is quite independent of our experience of it, and prior to its contact with náma.

Rúpa is only experienced, its resistence (patigha) only manifest through vedaná, saññá, cetaná, phassa, and manasikára, i.e. through náma (cf. M9), i.e. through our designation (adhivacaná) of it together with its presence (viññána). In and of itself it can't be said to exist, so I can imagine how someoned might liken it to a lump of insubstantial foam.

For an example, let's say that I learn of a new word. In order for the word to exist it has to be present (viññána) in some form (náma) -- even if its presence is in some far off corner of the recesses of my vocabularly. But the facticity of the word preceded my knowlege of it, preceded my experience of it. Its inertia (rúpa) is quite independent of my experience of it as námarúpa. (The clock doesn't stop when I leave the room." as the Ven. Ñanavira put it.)

And this is the case with anything we experience, even all those things mentioned in the Múlapariyáyasutta (ones vocabulary being the semantic counterpart to ones world). The experience of the arahant is námarúpa saha viññána just as it is for the puthujjana, but the puthujjana perverts his concept of reality through his belief in a self, his personalizing it (sakkáyaditthi). For the arahant all experience is utterly impersonal, but none the less real and that includes the concepts he draws from his own lived experience.

This is my take on the Ven. Ñanavira -- and I'm inclined to accept it --, so if there are any Ñanavirans out there, please correct me if I've strayed anywhere.

pulga


A