What fabrications to still? What acquisitions to relinquish?

[Sylvester]

The former, which I thought was Matheesha's discussion.

As for the latter, I do not know what to make of Ven Nanananda's exposition cited. If the salayatana are completely out, what is mediating the "in-sight"? Can there be contact-less nana?

[Nyana]

As for the latter, I do not know what to make of Ven Nanananda's exposition cited. If the salayatana are completely out, what is mediating the "in-sight"?

Having emerged from all signs, consciousness which is non-indicative (viññāṇa anidassana) is not experienced in terms of "the allness of the all." (MN 49). The "all" being the twelve āyatanas (SN 35.23), which are to be abandoned (SN 35.24). Thus, just like all fabricated dhammas, the twelve āyatanas and the six types of contact and the six types of consciousness are merely designations (paññattimatta) demonstrating the unsatisfactoriness of deluded cognition. They are not to be taken as "the given."

Can there be contact-less nana?

When all acquisitions have been released (i.e. sabbūpadhipaṭinissagga) there is no need to designate "contact." Udāna 2.4 (Ud 12):

• Contacts make contact
  Dependent on acquisition.
  Where there is no acquisition,
  What would contacts contact?

Explained with slightly different translation of terms in Ven. Ñāṇananda's Nibbāna Sermons:

• In order to transcend the narrow point of view limited to the bases of sense contact or the six sense spheres and realize the state of Nibbāna indicated by the words viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ, anantaṃ sabbato pabhaṃ, "consciousness which is non-manifestative, endless, lustrous on all sides", one has to see the cessation of contact.
  
  In a certain discourse in the Mucalindavagga of the Udāna, the Buddha has declared in a verse of uplift that the cessation of contact comes about only by doing away with that which brings about contact. The wandering ascetics of other sects grew jealous of the Buddha and his congregation of monks, because of their own loss of gain and honour, and began to hurl abuse on monks in the village and in the forest. A group of monks came and reported this to the Buddha. The Buddha's response to it was only a paean of joy. Udāna actually means a spontaneous utterance of joy, and the verse he uttered was such a one. But it embodied an instruction on Dhamma and a norm of Dhamma as well.
  
  Gāme araññe sukhadukkhaphuṭṭho,
  nev'attato no parato dahetha,
  phusanti phassā upadhiṃ paṭicca,
  Nirūpadhiṃ kena phuseyyum phassā.
  
  In the first two lines we get an instruction:
  
  "Touched by pain in village or in forest,
  Think not in terms of oneself or others."
  
  The reason for it is given in the norm of Dhamma which follows:
  
  "Touches can touch one, because of assets,
  How can touches touch him, who is asset-less?"
  
  This is all what the Buddha uttered. From this we can glean another aspect of the significance of the terms sabbūpadhipaṭinissagga, relinquishment of all assets, and nirupadhi, the asset-less, used with reference to Nibbāna.

Also, Ven. Ñāṇavīra's Notes on Dhamma:

• Phassa, 'contact', is defined as the coming together of the eye, forms, and eye-consciousness... But it is probably wrong to suppose that we must therefore understand the word phassa, primarily at least, as contact between these three things. So long as there is avijjā, all things (dhammā) are... inherently in subjection, they are appropriated, they are mine. This is the foundation of the notion that I am and that things are in contact with me. This contact between me and things is phassa. The ditthisampanna sees the deception, but the puthujjana accepts it at its face value and elaborates it into a relationship between himself and the world... But though the ditthisampanna is not deceived, yet until he becomes arahat the aroma of subjectivity hangs about all his experience.
  
  All normal experience is dual: there are present (i) one's conscious six-based body (saviññānaka salāyatanika kāya), and (ii) other phenomena (namely, whatever is not one's body); and reflexion will show that, though both are objective in the experience, the aroma of subjectivity that attaches to the experience will naturally tend to be attributed to the body. In this way, phassa comes to be seen as contact between the conscious eye and forms—but mark that this is because contact is primarily between subject and object, and not between eye, forms, and eye-consciousness. This approach makes it possible to see in what sense, with the entire cessation of all illusion of 'I' and 'mine', there is phassanirodha in the arahat (where, though there are still, so long as he continues to live, both the conscious body and the other phenomena, there is no longer any appropriation).
  
  But when (as commonly) phassa is interpreted as 'contact between sense-organ and sense-object, resulting in consciousness'—and its translation as '(sense-)impression' implies this interpretation—then we are at once cut off from all possibility of understanding phassanirodha in the arahat; for the question whether or not the eye is the subject is not even raised—we are concerned only with the eye as a sense-organ, and it is a sense-organ in puthujjana and arahat alike. Understanding of phassa now consists in accounting for consciousness starting from physiological (or neurological) descriptions of the sense-organs and their functioning. Consciousness, however, is not physiologically observable, and the entire project rests upon unjustifiable assumptions from the start. This epistemological interpretation of phassa misconceives the Dhamma as a kind of natural-science-cum-psychology that provides an explanation of things in terms of cause-and-effect.

All the best,

Geoff

[Sylvester]

Hi Geoff

I'm afraid your reply to my first query totally escapes my simple mind.

I read s.23 of MN 49 as being simply the abandonment of all types of ditthi in relation to the ALL. If so, then it doesn't appear to be anything more mysterious than the abandonment of the sakkaya mentioned in MN 44.

As for your reply to my 2nd query, I agree with Ud 2.4, but it seems to me to be capable of a rather simple reading of giving up of the Aggregates, which is possibly meant by sabbūpadhipaṭinissagga. Insofar as the mental aspects (vinnana, vedana, sanna and cetana) depend on phassa to arise, their having been relinquished must suggest also the disappearance of phassa. Although I have to admit that the paccaya sequence suggested by Ud 2.4 seems somewhat at variance to the standard one in MN 43.

I'm still left wondering about the contactless nana.

I'll put aside discussion of viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ and leave that to more qualified souls.

[pulga]

Also, Ven. Ñāṇavīra's Notes on Dhamma:

• All normal experience is dual: there are present (i) one's conscious six-based body (saviññānaka salāyatanika kāya), and (ii) other phenomena (namely, whatever is not one's body); and reflexion will show that, though both are objective in the experience, the aroma of subjectivity that attaches to the experience will naturally tend to be attributed to the body. In this way, phassa comes to be seen as contact between the conscious eye and forms—but mark that this is because contact is primarily between subject and object, and not between eye, forms, and eye-consciousness. This approach makes it possible to see in what sense, with the entire cessation of all illusion of 'I' and 'mine', there is phassanirodha in the arahat (where, though there are still, so long as he continues to live, both the conscious body and the other phenomena, there is no longer any appropriation).

I think it is important to understand why phassa is classified under náma, and thus why any particular experience of subjectivity itself is impermanent.

In a letter to Sister Vajira the Ven. Ñanavira writes:

"In visual experience (considered alone) the eye does not appear (na pātubhavati) at all, either as cakkhundriya or as mamsacakkhu, since vision itself is not visible, and the eye does not see itself. Since visual experience alone neither reveals cakkhundriya nor mamsacakkhu there is (or should be) no justification for calling either of them subject. When other faculties (or a looking glass) are used the mamsacakkhu appears (pātubhavati), but it appears as a phenomenon (to avoid using the word 'object' for the moment) amongst other phenomena, and, as such, has no claim to be called subject. In neither case is there any subject to be found. This being so, when these two experiences, visual and the other, occur together (as is usual), although there is the constriction you speak of (I would rather call it a superposition) there is no reason whatsoever for any 'discrepancy between subject and object'; for we have not found any subject. And in the arahat (do I disconcert you?) no discrepancy is, in fact, experienced, and no dukkha. It is only in the puthujjana, for whom an apparent self is manifest, and who necessarily divides things into subject and object, that the discrepancy you speak of can arise."

One needs to fully appreciate the Ven. Ñanavira's holistic approach to understanding the Dhamma to understand what he is saying here, but it seems to me to be directly verifiable without recourse to faith in the veracity of ones interpretations of obscure sutta passages. (Though that is not to say that trying to interpret the suttas isn't without merit, only that one needs to recognize the difference between speculation and understanding.)

[kirk5a]

I'm increasingly inclined to turn to Luangta Maha Boowa's words for clarification on all this.

from Samana – Luangta Maha Boowa Memorial Book p. 91
http://www.forestdhammabooks.com/index.php?page=Books" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

"At the beginning of our practice the heart
had no worth, since it was filled with nothing
but the excrement of greed, hatred and delusion.
By totally washing away that excrement using
the principles of the Dhamma, the heart itself
becomes pure Dhamma. Once that happens,
it’s infinitely at ease. Wherever you go, you’re
at ease. “Nibbana is the ultimate void.” Whatever
is annihilated in that void, this you’ll know. Whatever remains there, this
also you’ll know. Who can know this better than one without defilements? The
Buddha, in saying that Nibbana is the ultimate void, was speaking from his
absolute freedom from defilement. He said this from having seen Nibbana. But
we haven’t seen it yet. No matter how much we repeat his words, we just stay
where we are. Investigate so that you truly see it. The saying “Nibbana is the
ultimate void” will no longer be a problem, because what is annihilated and
what’s not will be fully clear to the heart.

“Nibbana is the ultimate happiness.” Listen! The ultimate happiness here
isn’t a feeling of pleasure or happiness. Instead, it’s the happiness that comes
with the absolute purity of the heart, with no arising or ceasing like our feelings
of pleasure and pain. This has nothing to do with the three characteristics
of existence. The ultimate happiness as a constant feature of the pure heart has
absolutely nothing to do with the three characteristics, nothing at all to do with
impermanence, dissatisfaction and not-self – it doesn’t change, it always stays
just as it is.

The Buddha says Nibbana is constant. What’s constant? The pure heart
and nothing else; that’s what’s constant. Get so that you see it, get so that you
know."

[rowyourboat]

Hi Geoff,

Do you agree that the stream entrant see the forward (samudaya) as well as the ceasing (nirodha) portions of the paticcasamuppada?

with metta

Matheesha

[Nyana]

Do you agree that the stream entrant see the forward (samudaya) as well as the ceasing (nirodha) portions of the paticcasamuppada?

Yes. In canonical abhidhamma terms, when one who has entered the stream is abiding in supramundane jhāna they discern the signlessness of phenomena which is equivalent to the reverse sequence of paṭiccasamuppāda. The penetration of paṭiccasamuppāda in both forward sequence (anuloma) and reverse sequence (paṭiloma) eliminates adherence to any mistaken views of existence and non-existence. When one who's entered the stream has developed supramundane jhāna sufficiently they realize the fruition of stream-entry (sotāpattiphala) which is the complete termination of the first three fetters (saṃyojanā).

All the best,

Geoff

[Nyana]

I'm still left wondering about the contactless nana.

When we are talking about the noble paths and fruitions we employ designations, but these are merely designations (paññattimatta). Whether the cognitions of the paths and fruitions attend to signs (i.e. when engaged in the supramundane applications of mindfulness) or discern the signlessness of phenomena (supramundane jhāna), those path and fruition cognitions are measureless (appamāṇa) and have measureless object-supports (appamāṇārammaṇa) and are non-indicative (anidassana), cf. Abhidhamma Vibhaṅga. Thus, they are all unincluded (apariyāpanna). And so, although we can employ designations such as "contact," etc., these designations are not ultimately established (paramatthasiddhi). They are merely designations (paññattimatta) employed for the purpose of explaining the path leading to the cessation of unsatisfactoriness. The raft is for crossing over, not for constructing philosophical systems.

All the best,

Geoff

[Sylvester]

Thanks Geoff.

But it looks as if this bifurcation into paññattimatta and paramattha (implied from the former) seems only necessary if one approaches from a certain Abhidhammic angle. Your treatment of phassa echoes the Sautrantika thesis, whereas the Sarvastivadins and the Pali Dhammasangani accords phassa "dhamma" status : Karunadasa p.102.

Even if I go with the Sautrantika position that phassa is merely paññattimatta, this does not alter the fact the designation "phassa" describes the phenomenon of the triad of ayatana, indriya and vinnana. Which still brings us back to the question - can there be nana without this triad?

Might you happen to have at hand a sutta that expresses or implies the bifurcation of mindfulness and jhana into mundane and supramundane? What do you or your textual source mean by "supramundane"?

[rowyourboat]

Do you agree that the stream entrant see the forward (samudaya) as well as the ceasing (nirodha) portions of the paticcasamuppada?

Yes. In canonical abhidhamma terms, when one who has entered the stream is abiding in supramundane jhāna they discern the signlessness of phenomena which is equivalent to the reverse sequence of paṭiccasamuppāda.

Hi Goeff

Considering the 'patiloma' or nirodha portion of the paticcasamuppada, would you agree that it contains non-arising of consciousness, non-arising of nama rupa, non-arising of salayatana and non-arising of phassa?

with metta

Matheesha

[Nyana]

But it looks as if this bifurcation into paññattimatta and paramattha (implied from the former) seems only necessary if one approaches from a certain Abhidhammic angle. Your treatment of phassa echoes the Sautrantika thesis, whereas the Sarvastivadins and the Pali Dhammasangani accords phassa "dhamma" status : Karunadasa p.102.

Following Ven. Ñāṇananda, there is no need and no soteriological purpose in trying to establish any dhammas as anything more than nominal designations. The teachings are prescriptive and descriptive, and this is all that one needs in order to develop the path. From his The Magic of the Mind, pp. 62-63:

• According to the phenomenalistic approach of the Buddha, not only the different types of feelings and mental states but the entire range of doctrinal categories summed up under the last section [of the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta] i.e. ‘contemplation of mind-objects,’ has nothing in it that is worth ‘clinging to.’ All of them can be subsumed under the term ‘concept’ and that is to recognize their conditioned nature – the nature of arising and ceasing.
  
  “Friends, when there is the eye and there are forms and there is eye-consciousness, it is possible that one will point out a designation of contact (phassapaññatti). When there is a designation of contact, it is possible that one will point out a designation of feeling (vedanāpaññatti). When there is a designation of feeling, it is possible that one will point out a designation of perception (saññāpaññatti). When there is a designation of perception, it is possible that one will point out a designation of thought (vitakkapaññatti). When there is a designation of thought, it is possible that one will point out a designation of obsession due to reckonings born of prolific perception (papañcasaññāsaṅkhāsamudācaraṇapaññatti).
  
  “When there is the ear... When there is the nose... When there is the tongue... When there is the body...
  
  “When there is the mind and there are mental phenomena and there is mental-consciousness, it is possible that one will point out a designation of contact. When there is a designation of contact, it is possible that one will point out a designation of feeling. When there is a designation of feeling, it is possible that one will point out a designation of perception. When there is a designation of perception, it is possible that one will point out a designation of thought. When there is a designation of thought, it is possible that one will point out a designation of obsession due to reckonings born of prolific perception.” – M I 112 Madhupiṇḍika Sutta
  
  It would indeed appear strange to us that in Buddhist psychology even contact and feeling – with which we are so intimate – are treated as ‘designations’ (paññatti). We might feel that this is an intrusion of the ‘designation’ into the jealously guarded recesses of the psyche. Yet this is not the case, for, in the very act of apperception contacts and feelings are reckoned, evaluated, defined, and designated on the basis of one’s latencies (i.e. the aggregates). Thus there is hardly any justification for regarding them as ‘the given’, though we are accustomed to take them for granted. In other words, what we are wont to treat as ‘the given,’ turns out to be ‘synthetic’ and ‘composite’ (saṅkhata).

And from his Concept and Reality In Early Buddhist Thought, p. 87:

• The primary significance of the formula of Dependent Arising lies here. Lists of phenomena, both mental and material, are linked together with the term "paccayā" or any of its equivalents, and the fact of their conditionality and non-substantiality is emphasized with the help of analysis and synthesis. Apart from serving the immediate purpose of their specific application, these formulas help us to attune our minds in order to gain paññā. Neither the words in these formulas, nor the formulas as such, are to be regarded as ultimate categories. We have to look not so much at them as through them. We must not miss the wood for the trees by dogmatically clinging to the words in the formulas as being ultimate categories. As concepts, they are merely the modes in which the flux of material and mental life has been arrested and split up in the realm of ideation....

Concept and Reality, pp. 55 - 56:

• Concepts – be they material or spiritual, worldly or transcendental – are not worthy of being grasped dogmatically. They are not to be treated as ultimate categories and are to be discarded in the course of the spiritual endeavour.... That the emancipated sage (muni) no longer clings even to such concepts as "nibbāna" or "detachment" (virāga) is clearly indicated in the following verse of the Sutta Nipāta:
  
  "For the Brahmin (the Muni) who has transcended all bounds, there is nothing that is grasped by knowing or by seeing. He is neither attached to attachment nor is he attached to detachment. In this world, he has grasped nothing as the highest." [Sn 795]

And there is no need for a two truth theory either. Concept and Reality In Early Buddhist Thought, pp. 44-45:

• [T]he word ‘paramattha’ in its earlier and non-technical usage, actually meant the Highest Goal as the object of realization, and any words tending towards that goal were called ‘paramatthasaṃhita’ (connected with the Highest Goal), irrespective of their precision or technicality. However, the Buddha, for his part, was content to treat all of them as ‘sammuti’. For him, they were ‘merely worldly conventions in common use, which he made use of, without clinging to them’ (DN I 202, Poṭṭhapāda Sutta).
  
  One wonders whether this simple though profound attitude of the Buddha towards concepts, has been properly handed down in tradition, when for instance one comes across the following verse quoted approvingly by Buddhaghosa (source unknown) in his commentary to the Anaṅgaṇa Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya:
  
  Duve saccāni akkhāsi, sambuddho vadataṃ varo;
  sammutiṃ paramatthañca, tatiyaṃ nūpalabbhati.
  Saṅketavacanaṃ saccaṃ, lokasammutikāraṇā;
  paramatthavacanaṃ saccaṃ, dhammānaṃ bhūtakāraṇā.
  Tasmā vohārakusalassa, lokanāthassa satthuno;
  sammutiṃ voharantassa, musāvādo na jāyati.
  
  [Translation:] "The Fully Enlightened One, the best of those who speak, declared two truths, the conventional and the absolute; there can be no third. Words of symbolic nature are true by reason of their existence in worldly parlance. Words of absolute significance, are true by reason of the existence of the elements. Hence, even though the Lord of the World, the Teacher versed in worldly parlance, makes use of such conventional speech, there arises no offense of falsehood for him."
  
  If one can appreciate the significance of the term ‘nippapañca,’ one might realize that the Buddha could magnanimously afford to dispense with such naïve defenses as the above, against any charges of his having violated the fourth precept.

And also, in his The Mind Stilled, Nibbāna Sermon 13:

• [Nibbāna] is not a paramattha in the sense of an absolute. It is a paramattha only in the sense that it is the highest good, parama attha. This is the sense in which the word was used in the discourses, though it has different connotations now. As exemplified by such quotations as āraddhaviriyo paramatthapattiyā, "with steadfast energy for the attainment of the highest good," the suttas speak of Nibbāna as the highest good to be attained.
  
  In later Buddhist thought, however, the word paramattha came to acquire absolutist connotations, due to which some important discourses of the Buddha on the question of worldly appellations, worldly expressions and worldly designations fell into disuse. This led to an attitude of dwelling in the scaffolding, improvised just for the purpose of constructing a building....
  
  t is not proper to relegate some sermons as discursive or conventional in style. Always it is a case of using concepts in worldly parlance. In the laboratory one uses a particular set of symbols, but on returning home he uses another. In the same way, it is not possible to earmark a particular bundle of concepts as absolute and unchangeable. As stated in the Poṭṭhapādasutta, already discussed, all these concepts are worldly appellations, worldly expressions, worldly usages, worldly designations, which the Tathāgata makes use of without tenacious grasping. However philosophical or technical the terminology may be, the arahants make use of it without grasping it tenaciously. What is of importance is the function it fulfills. We should make use of the conceptual scaffolding only for the purpose of putting up the building. As the building comes up, the scaffolding has to leave. It has to be dismantled. If one simply clings onto the scaffolding, the building would never come up.

Might you happen to have at hand a sutta that expresses or implies the bifurcation of mindfulness and jhana into mundane and supramundane?

The basic distinction is given in MN 117, and developed in the Abhidhammapiṭaka such as the Vibhaṅga, etc.

What do you or your textual source mean by "supramundane"?

It's a translation of lokuttara, which is defined in the Paṭisambhidāmagga Treatise on the Supramundane as follows:

• What dhammas are supramundane?
  
  The four applications of mindfulness, the four right endeavors, the four pathways of achievement, the five faculties, the five strengths, the seven factors of awakening, the eightfold path, and the four noble paths, the four ascetic fruitions, and nibbāna.
  
  In what sense are they supramundane?
  
  They cross from the world, thus they are supramundane. They cross over from the world, thus they are supramundane.

All the best,

Geoff

[Nyana]

Considering the 'patiloma' or nirodha portion of the paticcasamuppada, would you agree that it contains non-arising of consciousness, non-arising of nama rupa, non-arising of salayatana and non-arising of phassa?

Conditioned arising in its forward sequence is always a description of deluded cognition. When rooted in ignorance and craving, any experience automatically includes all of the first eleven links. That is, for the worldling there is always ignorance, contact, craving, grasping, becoming, and birth, which is the birth of a "being" (satta).

This sets up identity and alienation -- i.e. the struggle for ego survival -- of "my being" in "the world." Whenever there is "a being" in "the world" there is going to arise circumstances of "my being" vs. "the world."

When the forward and reverse sequences of conditioned arising are penetrated the entire deluded cognitive and conflicted affective edifice of the forward sequence of dependent arising immediately collapses like a house of cards. This is why the mind of a learner engaged in practice is designated as measureless (appamāṇa). But this does not mean that there is a non-cognitive blackout. Non-cognitive absorptions are never considered supramundane. Ven. Ñāṇananda, Nibbāna Sermons:

• The cessation of the six sense-bases does not mean that one does not see anything. What one sees then is voidness. It is an in-‘sight’. He gives expression to it with the words suñño loko, “void is the world.”

In Concept and Reality Ven. Ñāṇananda equates the experience of non-indicative/non-manifestative consciousness (anidassana viññāṇa) with the fruition-gnosis samādhi (aññāphala samādhi) of an arahant. AN 9.37 describes this samādhi as follows:

• Sister, the concentration whereby -- neither pressed down nor forced back, nor with fabrication kept blocked or suppressed -- still as a result of release, contented as a result of standing still, and as a result of contentment one is not agitated: This concentration is said by the Blessed One to be the fruit of gnosis.

On page 61 of Concept and Reality he discusses this samādhi:

• The unique feature of this samādhi is its very fluxional character. In it there is no such fixity as to justify a statement that it 'depends on' (nissāya) some object (ārammaṇa) as its support -- hence the frustration of gods and men who seek out the basis of the Tathāgata's consciousness. Normally, the jhānas are characterized by an element of fixity on which consciousness finds a footing or a steadying point. It is on this very fixity that the illusion of the ego thrives. In the above jhāna of the emancipated one, however, the ego has melted away in the fire of wisdom which sees the cosmic process of arising and cessation. Not only has the concept "I" (papañca par excellence) undergone combustion, but it has also ignited the data of sensory experience in their entirety. Thus in this jhāna of the Arahant, the world of concepts melts away in the intuitional bonfire of universal impermanence.

And on p. 67:

• With his penetrative insight the Arahant sees through the concepts. Now, an object of perception (ārammaṇa) for the worldling is essentially something that is brought into focus -- something he is looking at. For the Arahant, however, all concepts have become transparent to such a degree in that all-encompassing vision, that their boundaries together with their umbra and penumbra have yielded to the radiance of wisdom. This, then, is the significance of the word ‘anantaṃ’ (endless, infinite). Thus the paradoxically detached gaze of the contemplative sage as he looks through concepts is one which has no object (ārammaṇa) as the point of focus for the worldling to identify it with.

All the best,

Geoff

[kirk5a]

Following Ven. Ñāṇananda, there is no need and no soteriological purpose in trying to establish any dhammas as anything more than nominal designations.

Except for the need to breathe, in which case, oxygen does in fact need to be something more than a nominal designation. The soteriological purpose in trying to establish oxygen as something more than a nominal designation would be so that we don't take up the view of non-existence (or a variation thereof, which says everything is just a concept).

But the purpose of the path is for not-clinging, not for developing views on the ontological status of dhammas.

[Nyana]

Following Ven. Ñāṇananda, there is no need and no soteriological purpose in trying to establish any dhammas as anything more than nominal designations.

Except for the need to breathe, in which case, oxygen does in fact need to be something more than a nominal designation. The soteriological purpose in trying to establish oxygen as something more than a nominal designation would be so that we don't take up the view of non-existence (or a variation thereof, which says everything is just a concept).

Does one really require someone to establish oxygen as a truly existent entity in order to breathe? How did sentient beings on this planet know how to breathe before oxygen was identified as a chemical element? Does one really need someone to tell them to breathe? If they do then here's a book called Breathe! You Are Alive. But I doubt that the author felt compelled to establish oxygen as a truly existent entity in order to discuss the subject.

At any rate, the teachings are prescriptive and descriptive. They designate the path to develop in order to realize the cessation of unsatisfactoriness. For this purpose designations are used which are accepted in worldly parlance. Ven. Ñāṇananda:

• It would indeed appear strange to us that in Buddhist psychology even contact and feeling – with which we are so intimate – are treated as ‘designations’ (paññatti). We might feel that this is an intrusion of the ‘designation’ into the jealously guarded recesses of the psyche. Yet this is not the case, for, in the very act of apperception contacts and feelings are reckoned, evaluated, defined, and designated on the basis of one’s latencies (i.e. the aggregates). Thus there is hardly any justification for regarding them as ‘the given’, though we are accustomed to take them for granted. In other words, what we are wont to treat as ‘the given,’ turns out to be ‘synthetic’ and ‘composite’ (saṅkhata).

And:

• As concepts, they are merely the modes in which the flux of material and mental life has been arrested and split up in the realm of ideation.

And:

• The Buddha, for his part, was content to treat all of them as ‘sammuti’. For him, they were ‘merely worldly conventions in common use, which he made use of, without clinging to them’ (DN I 202, Poṭṭhapāda Sutta).

And:

• As stated in the Poṭṭhapādasutta, already discussed, all these concepts are worldly appellations, worldly expressions, worldly usages, worldly designations, which the Tathāgata makes use of without tenacious grasping. However philosophical or technical the terminology may be, the arahants make use of it without grasping it tenaciously. What is of importance is the function it fulfills. We should make use of the conceptual scaffolding only for the purpose of putting up the building. As the building comes up, the scaffolding has to leave. It has to be dismantled. If one simply clings onto the scaffolding, the building would never come up.

But the purpose of the path is for not-clinging, not for developing views on the ontological status of dhammas.

Precisely.

All the best,

Geoff

[kirk5a]

Following Ven. Ñāṇananda, there is no need and no soteriological purpose in trying to establish any dhammas as anything more than nominal designations.

Except for the need to breathe, in which case, oxygen does in fact need to be something more than a nominal designation. The soteriological purpose in trying to establish oxygen as something more than a nominal designation would be so that we don't take up the view of non-existence (or a variation thereof, which says everything is just a concept).

Do you really require someone to establish oxygen as a truly existent entity in order for you to breathe?

Of course not.

How did sentient beings on this planet know how to breathe before oxygen was identified as a chemical element?

They didn't need to identify it as a chemical element, but before the atmosphere contained enough oxygen, there were no sentient beings breathing on this planet.

Do you really need someone to tell you to breathe?

Of course not.

If you do then here's a book called Breathe! You Are Alive. But I doubt that the author felt compelled to establish oxygen as a truly existent entity in order to discuss the subject.

For certain.

At any rate, the teachings are prescriptive and descriptive. They designate the path to develop in order to realize the cessation of unsatisfactoriness. For this purpose designations are used which are accepted in worldly parlance.

Right. Which is different from saying that there is nothing more to dhammas other than these designations. I'm not saying you are promoting that view. I might just responding to my own thoughts. So - you aren't saying that, right?