SN 35.95: Malunkyaputta Sutta

[kirk5a]

Hi Sylvester,

Could you elaborate on that interesting observation? Certainly I don't find the argument that because our experience is deluded there is no external reality convincing. As I said here, it doesn't seem logical:

I think there is a bit of a tendency in meditative circles to start forming metaphysics on the basis of meditation experience, and it often seems to be in the mode of saying something about the world as illusion. It goes too far, it goes beyond "just the seen in the seen" off into views about "what exists," tilting towards non-existence. To the point of saying, maybe not in so many words, but basically, "nothing does exist." Which I enjoy sparring with, because then why do they keep getting up in the morning to feed the supposedly "illusory" body?

[mikenz66]

Hmmm "Tilting towards non-existence"... Hopefully not a reference to a certain member of this forum...

Seriously, I certainly agree that sometimes too much emphasis is often put on the "all exists" extreme...


Mike

[Sylvester]

Hi Sylvester,

Could you elaborate on that interesting observation? Certainly I don't find the argument that because our experience is deluded there is no external reality convincing. As I said here, it doesn't seem logical:
http://dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?f= ... =0#p131514" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;


Mike

Sorry, Mike. Not much more to offer, other than to note that without some "reality" to the external ayatanas, the nidanas of salayatana-phassa and phassa-vedana become totally irrelevant and a sham. DO would then become an unconvincing explanation of Dukkha, and we may as well find another Dependant Cessation schema to escape Dukkha.

Psst, psst - if you're looking for a discussion of the 4 dhatus in SN 14, pop over to SN 14.30 - 39. There, the suttas extend the discussion of desire for the 18 dhatus to these 4 dhatus, but instead of desire/chanda, the suttas discuss in terms of delight/nandi.

[daverupa]

without some "reality" to the external ayatanas, the nidanas of salayatana-phassa and phassa-vedana become totally irrelevant and a sham.

I don't follow the chain of reasoning here.

[Sylvester]

Hi dave.

Phassa is common to both nidanas. I take the plain sutta reading of phassa as being the conjunction of indriya, ayatana and the corresponding vinnana.

Now, if the ayatana were illusory or mind-made, could there be such an event as phassa? Possibly, if one were to argue that in all unenlightened beings, such beings "manufacture" the external reality through some process.

But this does not account for how the nidanas still operate for enlightened beings - to the extent that buddhas continue to feel after sambodhi. I don't think there's any unenlightened process in a buddha that continues to manufacture the external reality that is a sliver of rock that cuts and hurts.

The hypothetical "manufacturing" of the external reality, in my view, is discounted by the explanation of the process of cognition in MN 28. What accounts for contact is tajja samannahara, plus the indriya and ayatana. Whether or not tajja samannahara is in place, MN 28 posits that the ayatana can "be"; this independance of the ayatana from tajja samannahara is what gives the external some objective reality, and not an exclusively subjective one.

Hope this makes sense.

[mikenz66]

Thanks Sylvester,

The hypothetical "manufacturing" of the external reality, in my view, is discounted by the explanation of the process of cognition in MN 28. What accounts for contact is tajja samannahara, plus the indriya and ayatana. Whether or not tajja samannahara is in place, MN 28 posits that the ayatana can "be"; this independance of the ayatana from tajja samannahara is what gives the external some objective reality, and not an exclusively subjective one.

It would be helpful to give translations of some of those Pali terms (such as tajja samannahara) when you use them. Some of us are not so fluent...

Here's a link to MN28: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
I guess you mean passages like:

"And if other people attack the monk in ways that are undesirable, displeasing, & disagreeable — through contact with fists, contact with stones, contact with sticks, or contact with knives — the monk discerns that 'This body is of such a nature that contacts with fists come, contacts with stones come, contacts with sticks come, & contacts with knives come. Now the Blessed One has said, in his exhortation of the simile of the saw [MN 21], "Monks, even if bandits were to carve you up savagely, limb by limb, with a two-handled saw, he among you who let his heart get angered even at that would not be doing my bidding." So my persistence will be aroused & untiring, my mindfulness established & unconfused, my body calm & unaroused, my mind centered & unified. And now let contact with fists come to this body, let contact with stones, with sticks, with knives come to this body, for this is how the Buddha's bidding is done.'

Mike

[Sylvester]

It would be helpful to give translations of some of those Pali terms (such as tajja samannahara) when you use them. Some of us are not so fluent...

Oops Sorry about the Pali-gush. Here's the passage from MN 28 that describes the cognitive process and tajja samannahara's role in it -

Now if internally the eye is intact but externally forms do not come into range, nor is there a corresponding engagement, then there is no appearing of the corresponding type of consciousness. If internally the eye is intact and externally forms come into range, but there is no corresponding engagement, then there is no appearing of the corresponding type of consciousness. But when internally the eye is intact and externally forms come into range, and there is a corresponding engagement, then there is the appearing of the corresponding type of consciousness.

[retrofuturist]

Greetings,

Interesting extract from MN 28 (thanks Sylvester)... a good reminder, if ever one was needed, not to take key Dhamma terms at simplistic face value.

Metta,
Retro.

[Sylvester]

Just another short note to address something interesting which pulga raised in respect of Berkeley's "esse est percipi" axiom of Idealism. He's raised it before in this thread, citing one of Ven Nanavira's letters - http://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.ph ... 40#p126619" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

I'm glad that Ven Nanavira does not lean towards Berkeley's Idealism, where it concerns the external world. I think where Idealism has a proper footing in Buddhism is probably the internal world - the mental khandhas. Those 4 states only arise with contact as condition (although MN 43 accords the "conjoined"/sahagata status to consciousness, feelings and perception, and omits intention). Contact, as an event made up of sense, object and consciousness, seems rather distinct from the internal experience(s) of the exterior, unless one subscribes to the Abhidhammic treatment of "phassa" as another cetasika/mental concommitant...

Some older ruminations about the intent for this sutta and the Bahiya Sutta, ie appropriation and the anusayas -
http://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.ph ... 20#p126574" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

[mikenz66]

Thanks for the cross-references Sylvester.


Mike

[Sylvester]

Something else interesting to note about SN 35.95's language "in the seen will only be the seen". Have you seen this construction anywhere else?

Well then, Maalu"nkyaputta, in things seen, heard, sensed, cognized: in the seen there will only be the seen, in the heard only the heard, in the sensed only the sensed, in the cognized only the cognized... Then, Maalu"nkyaputta, there will be no 'thereby' for you. Having no 'thereby' you have no 'there.' Having no 'there,' Maalu"nkyaputta, there is for you neither this world, nor the next, nor anywhere in between. That in itself is the end of suffering. (Walshe)

Ettha ca te, mālukyaputta, diṭṭhasutamutaviññātabbesu dhammesu diṭṭhe diṭṭhamattaṃ bhavissati, sute sutamattaṃ bhavissati, mute mutamattaṃ bhavissati, viññāte viññātamattaṃ bhavissati. Yato kho te, mālukyaputta, diṭṭhasutamutaviññātabbesu dhammesu diṭṭhe diṭṭhamattaṃ bhavissati, sute sutamattaṃ bhavissati, mute mutamattaṃ bhavissati, viññāte viññātamattaṃ bhavissati; tato tvaṃ, mālukyaputta, na tena. Yato tvaṃ, mālukyaputta, na tena; tato tvaṃ, mālukyaputta, na tattha. Yato tvaṃ, mālukyaputta, na tattha; tato tvaṃ, mālukyaputta, nevidha, na huraṃ, na ubhayamantarena. Esevanto dukkhassā ti.

(note all the locative constructions of seen, heard, sensed and cognised)

In all of the Satipatthana Suttas, the same use of the locative case is applied to how one is supposed to contemplate the body, feelings, mind and states -

And how does a monk remain focused on the body in & of itself? (Ven T)

Kathañca, bhikkhave, bhikkhu kāye kāyānupassī viharati?

Unlike Walshe who translates the locative case to mean "in the seen...", I follow Warder and Ven Thanissaro in reading the locative in SN 35.95 as meaning "with reference to the seen...". However, I'm not sure why Ven Thanissaro renders the Satipatthana Sutta's locative for the objects to read as "in".

So, do you think SN 35.95 and the Bahiya Sutta look just like satipatthana instructions?

[mikenz66]

So, do you think SN 35.95 and the Bahiya Sutta look just like satipatthana instructions?

Sorry, can't help you with the tricky Pali stuff, but, of course, it's very common to wheel out this Sutta (well, usually the Bahiya version) as an example of how one should be practising satipatthana.


Mike