Sam Vega wrote:If intentions have effects at a distance, then I want to know how the intention can be a feeling experienced by the person who had the intention.
SN 12.46 wrote:
Then a certain brahman went to the Blessed One and... said to the Blessed One: "What now, Master Gotama: Is the one who acts the same one who experiences [the results of the act]?"
[The Buddha:] "[To say,] 'The one who acts is the same one who experiences,' is one extreme."
[The brahman:] "Then, Master Gotama, is the one who acts someone other than the one who experiences?"
[The Buddha:] "[To say,] 'The one who acts is someone other than the one who experiences,' is the second extreme. Avoiding both of these extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma by means of the middle: From ignorance as a requisite condition...
Sam Vega wrote:...but intention does not merge imperceptibly into feeling; they remain different. And the moral status of the intention is one of the reasons that intention is different from feeling, which is exactly my point. How can an intention give rise to a feeling, when they are two demonstrably different things?
'After doing an intentional kamma by way of body, speech and mind (whose result is) to be felt as pleasure, he feels pleasure; after doing an intentional kamma by way of body, speech and mind (whose result is) to be felt as pain, he feels pain; after doing an intentional kamma by way of body, speech and mind (whose result is) to be felt as neither-pain-nor-pleasure, he feels neither-pain-nor-pleasure'
daverupa wrote:MN 136 wrote:'After doing an intentional kamma by way of body, speech and mind (whose result is) to be felt as pleasure, he feels pleasure; after doing an intentional kamma by way of body, speech and mind (whose result is) to be felt as pain, he feels pain; after doing an intentional kamma by way of body, speech and mind (whose result is) to be felt as neither-pain-nor-pleasure, he feels neither-pain-nor-pleasure'
It doesn't seem to me that intention functions across temporal space, according to the Dhamma. This is because the idea of time as a container within which things occur is a view solidly rooted in substance metaphysics, which the Buddha rejects. Instead, idapaccayata insists on a processual view, on which "kamma" and "vipaka" are distinguished as an explanatory aid but not reified as discreet atomistic entities. In other words, "kamma whose result is to be felt as X" is referring to the process of idapaccayata, in this case with a beginning called kamma and an ending to be felt accordingly. There is no action between intention and result, there is simply that process in toto.
Let's hope this doesn't run afoul of your criteria for sophistry...
All of it up till nowdaverupa wrote:Sylvester wrote:But I think the Buddha was a practical "realist", ie to the extent necessary for us to accept that the external world is "out there".
I don't think the Buddha intended that we accept an external world out there, I think he was practical insofar as he accepted it as the naturally-occurring human perception of things (avijja, anyone?) and was at great pains to distinguish the Dhamma in contradistinction to those natural assumptions. This is why paticcanirodha is described as "against the grain", and as hard to see.
It may help to consider the "three phases of matter" in the Dhamma, as it were: arising is manifest, ceasing is manifest, change while standing is manifest. Here's the Pali for us:Rūpassa [Vedanāya; Saññāya; Sankhārānam; Viññānassa] kho āvuso uppādo paññāyati, vayo paññāyati, thitassa aññatthattam paññāyati.
There is no change of one thing into another thing, there is simply conditionality. The fact that the order is not "arising - change-while-standing - ceasing" is logically significant, despite the fact that this order would seem to make more sense. If it were "arising-changing-ceasing", it would make sense as a characteristic of a thing-in-time that arises-changes-ceases.
Rather, there is arising OR ceasing OR change-while-standing - i.e. a process 'beginning', a process 'ending', or a process '-ing'. If you like, the nature of ones experience is such that the process is not perceived as a whole, but it is perceived piece-meal - which is to say, "over time". However, it is illegitimate to infer ontological entities on that basis.
MN 136 wrote:'After doing an intentional kamma by way of body, speech and mind (whose result is) to be felt as pleasure, he feels pleasure; after doing an intentional kamma by way of body, speech and mind (whose result is) to be felt as pain, he feels pain; after doing an intentional kamma by way of body, speech and mind (whose result is) to be felt as neither-pain-nor-pleasure, he feels neither-pain-nor-pleasure'
It's that "to be felt as" component which is bracketing kamma-vipaka together as a process in toto, rather than as two discreet events. Of note here is that suffering is not a required component - after doing kamma, there is concomitant vipaka, but dukkha is not a requisite component of that vipaka.
Sylvester wrote:The difficulty I faced with the process model was the fact that none of the participants in the process, ie none of the constituents of Namarupa, could "perdure" long enough to account for vipaka (as the terminal point of a process) being experienced into the future. Unless an allowance were made for either -
1. a poly-citta model where the process is never interrupted by the cessation of a citta before the next citta arose; or
2. alaya vijnana,
the process model still does not explain how it works.
). Why each citta needs to be construed as sequential and singular in this way puzzles me; why not a notion of any instantiated citta as having variable degrees of "force" or "impact" with respect to moral valence? Perhaps sankharakhanda is able to sustain multiple intentional trajectories (via a plurality of underlying tendencies, for example)?SN 22.79 wrote:"And why do you call them 'fabrications'? Because they fabricate fabricated things, thus they are called 'fabrications.' What do they fabricate as a fabricated thing? For the sake of form-ness, they fabricate form as a fabricated thing. For the sake of feeling-ness, they fabricate feeling as a fabricated thing. For the sake of perception-hood... For the sake of fabrication-hood... For the sake of consciousness-hood, they fabricate consciousness as a fabricated thing. Because they fabricate fabricated things, they are called fabrications.
Sylvester wrote:While the "process" model certainly abrogates the need for a substance ontology to describe an "agent" and its "patient", the question could be raised - But what mediates the process? I think that would be the crux of Sam Vega's query.
Sam Vega wrote:Otherwise they will have to rely on faith: the Buddha said it, but I can't get it yet.
"'I am the owner of my actions (kamma), heir to my actions, born of my actions, related through my actions, and have my actions as my arbitrator. Whatever I do, for good or for evil, to that will I fall heir'...
Sam Vega wrote:... My specific question is about the mechanism that brings this about. I would like to know people's thoughts on how this occurs. I don't think it is a stupid question, as normally we think of intentions as bringing about an immediate mental change (as when I intend to think about an elephant, or recollect things that make me happy); or bringing about an immediate physical change (as when I intend to raise my arm, etc.). The rest of the universe seems immune and indifferent to my intentions. I cannot cause a change in the weather by means of an unmediated intention. Nor can I alter your thoughts by merely intending to.
...
If the answer is that this must be taken on faith, I am happy with this. I would in fact prefer it to sophistry intended to demonstrate that someone knows more than me. All vague ideas and admissions of bafflement are welcome, as they would reassure me!
chownah wrote:Sam Vega,
In the original post you wrote:
"My specific question is about the mechanism that brings this about. I would like to know people's thoughts on how this occurs."
I suggest that there is no "mechanism that brings this about."....or at least there is no mechanism that we can rationally understand that does this......the Budda seems to teach a sort of mechanics for some things but I'm pretty sure that this is just conventional speech and it is best to remember that all dhammas are empty.......didn't the Buddha teach that the exact workings of kamma were not knowable?
chownah
TMingyur wrote:Sam Vega wrote:... My specific question is about the mechanism that brings this about. I would like to know people's thoughts on how this occurs. I don't think it is a stupid question, as normally we think of intentions as bringing about an immediate mental change (as when I intend to think about an elephant, or recollect things that make me happy); or bringing about an immediate physical change (as when I intend to raise my arm, etc.). The rest of the universe seems immune and indifferent to my intentions. I cannot cause a change in the weather by means of an unmediated intention. Nor can I alter your thoughts by merely intending to.
...
If the answer is that this must be taken on faith, I am happy with this. I would in fact prefer it to sophistry intended to demonstrate that someone knows more than me. All vague ideas and admissions of bafflement are welcome, as they would reassure me!
Actually I don't care about a mechnism but I am content with being able to observe the recurring effects of actions and mental conditionings (thinking about, having intentions, i.e. creating habits) in what is called "this present life".
It is all about experience conditioning itself through grasping itself.
Kind regards
Sam Vega wrote:Well, it's good that you care enough about my caring in order to post!
Sam Vega wrote:It may be all about experience conditioning itself through grasping itself, but this formulation might not mean as much to other people as it does to you.
TMingyur wrote:Sam Vega wrote:Well, it's good that you care enough about my caring in order to post!
"Bhikkhus, for anyone who says, 'In whatever way a person makes kamma, that is how it is experienced,' there is no living of the holy life, there is no opportunity for the right ending of suffering. But for anyone who says, 'When a person makes kamma to be felt in such & such a way, that is how its result (vipaka) is experienced,' there is the living of the holy life, there is the opportunity for the right ending of stress."
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