Two "truths"/"descriptions" and meditation in the suttas

[mikenz66]

Hi Retro,

Abhidhamma aside, I can't work out why you have an objection to the (to me) rather simple observation that thinking about complicated concepts can be broken down into a large number of more elementary steps. This is discussed in the context of papanca in the Honeyball sutta, which I quoted above (http://dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?f=33&t=10229&start=20#p156618) and can be observed for oneself.


Mike

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Mike,

I can't work out why you have an objection to the (to me) rather simple observation that thinking about complicated concepts can be broken down into a large number of more elementary steps.

I have no objection to it whatsoever... the objection is to the idea that this process of papancification is somehow taking place outside the domain of mind-consciousness (i.e. outside loka/sabba).

Metta,
Retro.

[tiltbillings]

Greetings Mike,

I can't work out why you have an objection to the (to me) rather simple observation that thinking about complicated concepts can be broken down into a large number of more elementary steps.

I have no objection to it whatsoever... the objection is to the idea that this process of papancification is somehow taking place outside the domain of mind-consciousness (i.e. outside loka/sabba).

Metta,
Retro.

Just to clarify, what exactly are you calling a "process of papancification?"

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Tilt,

Just to clarify, what exactly are you calling a "process of papancification?"

The extract from MN 18 I posted back here - viewtopic.php?f=33&t=10229&start=100#p157882

"Dependent on intellect & ideas, intellect-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as a requisite condition, there is feeling. What one feels, one perceives (labels in the mind). What one perceives, one thinks about. What one thinks about, one objectifies. Based on what a person objectifies, the perceptions & categories of objectification assail him/her with regard to past, present, & future ideas cognizable via the intellect.

The above does not occur in some magic fairyland outside loka.

Therefore 'concepts' are objects of mind-consciousness, and as objects of mind-consciousness they too are subject to the three characteristics.

Metta,
Retro.

[tiltbillings]

. . .

I understand that; however, I am not sure in what Mike is saying -- "a rather simple observation that thinking about complicated concepts can be broken down into a large number of more elementary steps" -- what that is a "process of papancification?"

Why is making something easier to understand papanca?

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Tilt,

Mike is talking about the Honeyball Sutta - he is talking about breaking conceptual proliferation into its lower-level concomitant activities.

Thus, so am I... the difference is that I'm saying that all those lower-level activities are within loka. In contrast, modern Abhidhammikas work via a bifurcation of "concept" and "reality".... or in other words, "concepts" (which do not "Exist") and "reality" (comprising of "paramattha dhammas" which "Exist").

Metta,
Retro.

[tiltbillings]

viewtopic.php?f=33&t=10229&start=20#p156618

That's the whole point. Insight generally seems to be in terms of breaking experience down into simple objects - khandas, sense bases, elements, not trying to wrestle with complex objects like concepts. The thinking about a concept can be broken down into a lot of "simple" processes happening over a considerable period of time.

Well, it seems that Mike is talking about the meditative experience of seeing things as they are in increasingly finer detail. No papanca in that.

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Tilt,

No papanca in that.

I didn't say there was - you're getting the wrong end of the stick, conflating discussion on two different examples of causality.

I know you're intending well, but this side-discussion is untimely and unintentionally diversionary.

Metta,
Retro.

[tiltbillings]

Greetings Tilt,

No papanca in that.

I didn't say there was - you're getting the wrong end of the stick, conflating discussion on two different examples of causality.

I know you're intending well, but this side-discussion is untimely and unintentionally diversionary.

Metta,
Retro.

I asked you directly what your complaint was. And I'll ask you again, and maybe you will spell it out for me, given my thickness in this issue of what you are trying to say. I do not understand it. Please spell it out so there is no uncertainty.

Mike is talking about the Honeyball Sutta - he is talking about breaking conceptual proliferation into its lower-level concomitant activities.

Is he advocating this as an intellectual exercise or a meditative process? What do you see he is saying, because I thought what he was saying was what I just quoted in my preceding msg?

[mikenz66]

Well, it seems that Mike is talking about the meditative experience of seeing things as they are in increasingly finer detail. No papanca in that.

Yes Sir! No papanca here Sir! No Sir!

Perhaps I should try again. The MN18 quote on papanca describes how the process of thinking about complex concepts can be broken down into smaller chunks. It's a very useful and practical description.

I therefore think that:

Therefore 'concepts' are objects of mind-consciousness, and as objects of mind-consciousness they too are subject to the three characteristics.

is extremely vague. Not "wrong" exactly, but not particularly useful if one is trying to follow the instructions in order to understand one's experience in detail.

In what sense is the concept: "one plus one is two" subject to the characteristics? Every time I check that, via mental and physical processes that do seem to be subject to the characteristics, it stays the same.

And what about the concept "my self"? Is that an "object of mind-conciousness". Kind of, but it's built from complex interactions analysable into all khandhas or sense bases.

It appears to me that learning to break down, and distinguish, complex experiences/concepts ("one plus one is two", "my self") from the simpler processes is an important part of the Dhamma.


Mike

[tiltbillings]

Well, it seems that Mike is talking about the meditative experience of seeing things as they are in increasingly finer detail. No papanca in that.

Yes Sir! No papanca here Sir! No Sir!

Perhaps I should try again. The MN18 quote on papanca describes how the process of thinking about complex concepts can be broken down into smaller chunks. It's a very useful and practical description.

Okay. Just to clarify. You are talking about thinking about the Dhamma teachings in a particular way in order to understand them? Certainly, if we are talking about the process of insight practice, the breaking down of components of experience via insight is free of papanca. In learning the Dhamma, in studying the suttas, in trying to get at what they are saying so I can put them into practice, I may want to break down what it is being said into bits that help me better understand what is being said. Am I getting at what you are saying here? Sort of, maybe?

[mikenz66]

Hi Tilt,

Okay. Just to clarify. You are talking about thinking about the Dhamma teachings in a particular way in order to understand them?

Hmm, why do you say that?

Certainly, if we are talking about the process of insight practice, the breaking down of components of experience via insight is free of papanca.

Yes, that's how I understand it. Actually, perhaps "with papanca"/"without papanca" would be a more palatable to some than the common descriptions "conceptual" and "non-conceptual".

The reason I was quoting that particular teaching about papanca was because it's a good sutta example of a complex process, rather than as a description of the insight process itself.


Mike

[tiltbillings]

Hi Tilt,

Okay. Just to clarify. You are talking about thinking about the Dhamma teachings in a particular way in order to understand them?

Hmm, why do you say that?

It follows from these seven msgs starting with:

viewtopic.php?f=33&t=10229&p=158042#p157961

Certainly, if we are talking about the process of insight practice, the breaking down of components of experience via insight is free of papanca.

Yes, that's how I understand it. Actually, perhaps "with papanca"/"without papanca" would be a more palatable to some than the common descriptions "conceptual" and "non-conceptual".

That is not unreasonable, though papanca is starting to sound like fingernails on a blackboard. It is getting overused.

[retrofuturist]

Greetings,

I suspect you guys are thinking of vittaka moreso than...



Metta,
Retro.

[mikenz66]

That is not unreasonable, though papanca is starting to sound like fingernails on a blackboard. It is getting overused.

Sure. Can you find another synonym for "conceptual"/"non-conceptual"?
"Very conceptual" and "not very conceptual" would get a little cumbersome...


Mike

[tiltbillings]

Greetings,

I suspect you guys are thinking of vittaka moreso than...



Metta,
Retro.

Don't be shy. Explain, please (in 25 words or more).

[Sylvester]

Hi Tilt,

Okay. Just to clarify. You are talking about thinking about the Dhamma teachings in a particular way in order to understand them?

Hmm, why do you say that?

It follows from these seven msgs starting with:

http://dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?f= ... 42#p157961

Certainly, if we are talking about the process of insight practice, the breaking down of components of experience via insight is free of papanca.

Yes, that's how I understand it. Actually, perhaps "with papanca"/"without papanca" would be a more palatable to some than the common descriptions "conceptual" and "non-conceptual".

That is not unreasonable, though papanca is starting to sound like fingernails on a blackboard. It is getting overused.

I have to second that.

Everytime a practical common sense approach to reality is taken, I see the charge of "reification" bandied about. It's as if all reference to the external world are tarred by the Tri-temporal Materialism of the Sarvastivadins.

Charges of papanca are trotted out everytime a meaningful attempt is made to take the suttas at face value. I wonder if any of the anti-papanca brigade have bothered to check DN 15's discussion of the the "delineation" process described in MN 18, and what exactly it pertains to. "Delineation" has a much tinier sphere than it is made out to be, as DN 15 limits its power to "delineations of self".

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Tilt,

Vitakka

Vitakka [vi+takka] reflection, thought, thinking; "initial application" (Cpd. 282). -- Defd as "vitakkanaŋ vitakko, ūhanan ti vuttaŋ hoti" at Vism 142 (with simile on p. 143, comparing vitakka with vicāra: kumbhakārassa daṇḍa -- ppahārena cakkaŋ bhamayitvā, bhājanaŋ karontassa uppīḷana -- hattho viya vitakko (like the hand holding the wheel tight), ito c' ito sañcaraṇahattho viya vicāro: giving vitakka the characteristic of fixity & steadiness, vicāra that of movement & display). -- D ii.277 ("pre -- occupation" trsln: see note Dial. ii.311); iii.104, 222, 287 (eight Mahāpurisa˚); M i.114 (dvidhā -- kato v.), 377; S i.39, 126, 186, 203; ii.153; iv.69, 216; A ii.36; iii.87 (dhamma˚); iv.229 (Mahāpurisa˚), 353 (˚upaccheda); Sn 7, 270 sq., 970, 1109; J i.407 (Buddha˚, Sangha˚, Nibbāna˚); Nd1 386, 493, 501 (nine); Nd2 s. v. takka; Ps i.36, 136, 178; Pv iii.58; Pug 59, 68; Vbh 86, 104 (rūpa˚, sadda˚ etc.), 228 (sa˚), 362 (akusala˚); Dhs 7, 160, 1268; Tikp 61, 333, 353; Vism 291 (˚upaccheda); Miln 82, 309; DhsA 142; DhA iv.68; VbhA 490; PvA 226, 230. -- kāma˚, vihiŋsā˚, vyāpāda˚ (sensual, malign, cruel thought): D iii.226; S ii.151 sq.; iii.93; A i.148, 274 sq.; ii.16, 117, 252; iii.390, 428. Opp. nekkhamma˚, avyāpāda˚, avihiŋsā˚ A i.275; ii.76; iii.429. -- vitakka is often combd with vicāra or "initial & sustained application" Mrs. Rh. D.; Cpd. 282; "reflection & investigation" Rh. D.; to denote the whole of the mental process of thinking (viz. fixing one's attention and reasoning out, or as Cpd. 17 expls it "vitakka is the directing of concomitant properties towards the object; vicāra is the continued exercise of the mind on that object." See also above defn at Vism 142). Both are properties of the first jhāna (called sa -- vitakka sa -- vicāra) but are discarded in the second jhāna (called a˚). See e. g. D. i.37; S iv.360 sq.; A iv.300; Vin iii.4; Vism 85; and formula of jhāna. The same of pīti & samādhi at Vbh 228, of paññā at Vbh 323. The same combn (vitakka+vicāra) at foll. passages: D iii.219 (of samādhi which is either sa˚, or a˚, or avitakka vicāra -- matta); S iv.193; v.111; A iv.409 sq., 450; Nett 16; Miln 60, 62; Vism 453. Cp. rūpa -- (sadda -- etc.) vitakka+rūpa<-> (sadda -- etc.) vicāra A iv.147; v.360; Vbh 103. -- On term (also with vicāra) see further: Cpd. 40, 56, 98, 238 sq., 282 (on difference between v. & manasikāra); Expos. i.188n; Kvu trsln 2381. -- Cp. pa˚, pari˚.
Note. Looking at the combn vitakka+vicāra in earlier and later works one comes to the conclusion that they were once used to denote one & the same thing: just thought, thinking, only in an emphatic way (as they are also semantically synonymous), and that one has to take them as one expression, like jānāti passati, without being able to state their difference. With the advance in the Sangha of intensive study of terminology they became distinguished mutually. Vitakka became the inception of mind, or attending, and was no longer applied, as in the Suttas, to thinking in general. The explns of Commentators are mostly of an edifying nature and based more on popular etymology than on natural psychological grounds.

Source: http://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philol ... :1489.pali

Still occurring in the first jhana, according to the boilerplate...

There is the case where a monk — quite withdrawn from sensuality, withdrawn from unskillful qualities — enters and remains in the first jhana: rapture and pleasure born from withdrawal, accompanied by directed thought and evaluation. He permeates and pervades, suffuses and fills this very body with the rapture and pleasure born from withdrawal. There is nothing of his entire body unpervaded by rapture and pleasure born from withdrawal.

"Just as if a skilled bathman or bathman's apprentice would pour bath powder into a brass basin and knead it together, sprinkling it again and again with water, so that his ball of bath powder — saturated, moisture-laden, permeated within and without — would nevertheless not drip; even so, the monk permeates, suffuses and fills this very body with the rapture and pleasure born of withdrawal. There is nothing of his entire body unpervaded by rapture and pleasure born from withdrawal...

Metta,
Retro.

[nathan]

In what sense is the concept: "one plus one is two" subject to the characteristics? Every time I check that, via mental and physical processes that do seem to be subject to the characteristics, it stays the same.

And what about the concept "my self"? Is that an "object of mind-conciousness". Kind of, but it's built from complex interactions analysable into all khandhas or sense bases.

Assuming this is a serious question I'll attempt an answer. The arising, appearance and passing of the concept: "one plus one is two" is subject to the perception of the three characteristics in manifold ways. A concept is composed of a mind object(s) which arises in co-dependence together with the supporting mental qualities which are also arising together and compounded so as to support cognizance of mind objects and these mental qualities are also co-dependent with the compounded elements which are arising together as the appearances of bodily forms. The arising of a particular concept or mind object is also co-dependent with the specific conditions for either the initial fabrication of a specific mentally fabricated image(s) or sound(s), etc. which symbolize that to which the mind object otherwise refers or else co-dependent with the re-collection of and the re-fabrication of the particular mentally fabricated image(s) or sound(s), etc. which symbolize that to which the mind object otherwise refers.

Each discretely discernible aggregate aspect of the co-dependent phenomena which support the fabrication of, arising of, appearance of, cognizance of, and subsequent disappearance of the given mind objects which necessarily compound to give rise to the appearance of the 'concept' "one plus one is two" can be perceived and discerned to carry the three characteristic marks of all co-dependently compounded phenomena.

The concept "one plus one is two" would not appear to be subject to the perception of the three characteristics of all phenomenal appearances if and when one is unable to attend to the three characteristics as these are discerned in relation to the mind objects and mental qualities, etc. which arise in co-dependence with the appearance of this specific concept or together with the arising of concepts in general.

Similarly with the concept "my self", as 'a concept'. It would be consistent to consider this to also be a dependently co-arising mind object(s) insofar as the specific referent is to a mind object which is representative of a self view regardless of what other basis in one, several or all of the clinging aggregates apart from mind objects there may also be for the appearance of the mental representation of a given self view.

[dhamma follower]

Greetings DF,

One's reading into the same quote can be different from another person.

Indeed - it appears your reading is rooted in Abhidhamma, whereas mine is not.



This being the Mental Cultivation in the Sutta Pitaka forum, I'll leave it there.

Metta,
Retro.

Dear Retro,

There's not yet an agreement that the content of Abhidhamma contradicts the sutta. Therefore, any reading of the sutta is a personal one.

Whether it is Sutta or Abhidhamma, they are only a tool for practitioners on the Path, not to be clung to. The only authority on understanding the sutta is the Buddha, who is no longer there, so we are all on equal footing. We need to constantly check and re-check our understanding of them based on our experiences and insights. I think you agree with me on this.

As my experience so far has confirmed what is explained in the Abhidhamma, and has seen no contradiction between the two, I am sharing it, since it is also the topic of this discussion.

Ok, now, come back to the points raised. Since concepts are considered unreal (think again about the gestalt points), they don't need to be included in sankhara khanda (mental formation) in order to be in loka sphere.

The distinction between paramatha and pannati is relevant on a practical point of view, not rhetorical. What does panna knows?

It knows about the four elements, the six bases, the five khandas... This is explained both in the sutta and the Abhidhamma
It knows about dependent originations;This is explained both in the sutta and the Abhidhamma
It knows about anicca, dukkha, anatta;This is explained both in the sutta and the Abhidhamma.

Does it know about persons, trees, animals... as being anicca, dukkha, anatta as insight leading to liberation ? Not in the sutta nor the Abhidhamma (that I know of).

Why ?

I believe it is because only the realization of reality in terms of paramatha dhamma leads to the arising of panna about the three characteristics, leading to abandonment of the defilements leading to realization of Nibanna.

Again, the key point is to see that concepts come as a result of a sequence of processes, they are not object of panna, they are object (or content) of sanna. Panna is not concerned with the content of sanna, it is concerned with its individual characteristics (sabhava) and general characteristics (tilakkhana). That's why the distinction between the two are necessary, so that yonisso manasikara can arise.

Regards,