The Eye is Impermanent.

[vinasp]

Hi everyone,

The Eye is Impermanent.

Here we examine six suttas together, SN 35.1 to SN 35.6

"Bhikkhus, the eye is impermanent. What is impermanent is suffering. What
is suffering is nonself. What is nonself should be seen as it really is
with correct wisdom thus:'This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my
self.' [Repeat for ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind.]
Seeing thus, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple experiences revulsion
towards the eye, [ear, nose, tongue, body, mind.]
Experiencing revulsion, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion his
mind is liberated. ..." [ BB CD page 1133, part of SN 35.1]

Here is a part of SN 35.1 with the sentences numbered for easy reference.

1. Bhikkhus, the eye is impermanent.
2. What is impermanent is suffering.
3. What is suffering is nonself.

Does anyone actually understand this?

Let us consider line 1: the eye is impermanent.

This does not, on a surface reading, make any sense (in the context).

What does "eye" mean here? What does "impermanent" mean?

What do you think?

Regards, Vincent.

[vinasp]

Hi everyone,

These six discourses differ only in the first few sentences:

"Bhikhus, the eye is suffering. What is suffering is nonself. What is nonself
should be seen as it really is ....." [SN 35.2]

"Bhikkhus, the eye is nonself. What is nonself should be seen as ...."[SN 35.3]

"Bhikkhus, (visible) forms are impermanent. What is impermanent is suffering.
What is suffering is nonself. What is nonself should be seen as it really is
with correct wisdom ...." [SN 35.4]

"Bhikkhus, (visible) forms are suffering. What is suffering is nonself. What
is nonself should be seen as it really is ...." [SN 35.5]

"Bhikkhus, (visible) forms are nonself. What is nonself should be seen as
it really is with correct wisdom ..." [SN 35.6]

Regards, Vincent.

[Alex123]

Let us consider line 1: the eye is impermanent.
This does not, on a surface reading, make any sense (in the context).
What does "eye" mean here? What does "impermanent" mean?
What do you think?

Why can't we say that "the fleshy eye-organ is impermanent"? It, as a whole, exists as long as body exists (usually around 80-120 years). Also, eye can be damaged and seeing will not occur or be faulty. So we can't fully and permanently rely on eye-organ to give permanent happiness.

The Buddha might be trying to say that what we like, what we use for worldly happiness, depends on causes which are impermanent. Because they are impermanent, we cannot have permanent happiness based on them.


With metta,

Alex

[pegembara]

The eye is impermanent, so what we see is also impermanent. Visual objects arise and pass away in awareness from moment to moment. Whatever you note should be regarded thus :This is not mine(clinging), this I am not(conceit), this is not my self(self view). The same goes with the other senses.

It is the stock instruction of vipassana not to grasp at objects arising and passing away from awareness. But since eyes are usually close, the objects used are sounds, body sensations, feelings, thoughts etc.

Regarding the eye : When you see an object, you must not grasp it. It's true nature is impermanence but grasping to its signs gives rise to perception eg. beautiful man/woman. Then comes feelings of like-dislike-neutral followed by thoughts, mental proliferations and intentions.

If you don't grasp, the object arises and passes as when looking at a large group of group of people. There is no clinging, conceit and wrong view. No suffering.

[vinasp]

Hi Alex123,

Since there are various ways to understand both "eye" and "impermanent" in
these passages, then it follows that many interpretations are possible.

Alex said:"Why can't we say that "the fleshy eye-organ is impermanent"? It, as a whole, exists as long as body exists (usually around 80-120 years)."

We certainly can say this. And this gives us our first interpretations for
both "eye" and "impermanent". Allow me to substitute "actual eye" for your
"the fleshy eye-organ".

Interpretations of "eye" #1 - the actual eye.

Interpretations of "impermanent" #1 - "ceases at death."

So line 1 becomes: The actual eye ceases at death.

Alex said:"Also, eye can be damaged and seeing will not occur or be faulty."

Interpretation of "impermanent" #2 - "can stop functioning before death."

Alex said:"So we can't fully and permanently rely on eye-organ to give permanent happiness."

This is true. But SN 35.2 begins with "the eye is suffering" not that the
eye is a potential source of future suffering by being damaged.

Some problems with these interpretations:

1. SN 35.7 (not quoted before) says: "... the eye is impermanent, both of
the past and the future, not to speak of the present. ..."
This suggests that some other understanding of "impermanent" might be
more appropriate.

2. Since "the eye is suffering" and the aim of the teachings is to bring
suffering to an end, would this not require the "eye" to cease, which is
a problem if we take "eye" as being "the actual eye."

3. "the actual eye ceases at death", do we really need a Buddha to explain
this to us? Does not every ten-year-old already know this?

Regards, Vincent.

[vinasp]

Hi everyone,

I have my own interpretation of what "eye" means in these discourses, but I
am also interested in what others think about this problem.

Before I explain what I think "eye" means, I need to quote a passage from
SN 35.30

"Bhikkhus, I will teach you the way that is appropriate for the uprooting of
all conceivings. Listen to that and attend closely, I will speak ...
"And what, bhikkhus, is the way that is appropriate for uprooting all
conceivings?[15]
Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu does not conceive the eye, does not conceive in
the eye, does not conceive from the eye, does not conceive, 'The eye is mine.'
He does not conceive forms ... eye consciousness ... eye-contact ... and as
to whatever feeling arises with eye-contact as condition - whether pleasant
or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant - he does not conceive that, does
not conceive in that, does not conceive from that, does not conceive, 'That
is mine.'
"He does not conceive the ear ....
He does not conceive the mind ... mental phenomena ... mind-consciousness ...
mind-contact ... and as to whatever feeling arises with mind-contact as
condition ... he does not conceive that, does not conceive in that, does
not conceive from that, does not conceive,'That is mine.'
"He does not conceive all, does not conceive in all, does not conceive from
all, does not conceive,'All is mine.'
"Since he does not conceive anything thus, he does not cling to anything in
the world. Not clinging, he is not agitated. Being unagitated, he personally
attains Nibbana. ....."

[ Bhikkhu Bodhi, Connected Discourses, page 1144, SN 35.30]

Regards, Vincent.

[Alex123]

Hi Vincent

This is true. But SN 35.2 begins with "the eye is suffering" not that the eye is a potential source of future suffering by being damaged.

The Buddha never said that in English. Eye IS dukkha, but dukkha has broader meaning (though it includes) than suffering.

1. SN 35.7 (not quoted before) says: "... the eye is impermanent, both of the past and the future, not to speak of the present. ..." This suggests that some other understanding of "impermanent" might be more appropriate.

In the past, future or present life the eye is impermanent.

2. Since "the eye is suffering" and the aim of the teachings is to bring suffering to an end, would this not require the "eye" to cease, which is a problem if we take "eye" as being "the actual eye."

Not all dukkha is immediately eliminated even for an Arahant. But, no more future dukkha will arise when parinibbana occurs.

"the actual eye ceases at death", do we really need a Buddha to explain this to us? Does not every ten-year-old already know this?

But how many people practice to cease all craving? The point of Buddha's teaching is not to give a description of existence. Buddha gives us instructions on what to do to extinguish all dukha.


With metta,

Alex

[pulga]

What do you think?

The eye -- and the rest of the ajjhatt'ayatanani -- as Husserlian nullpunkts.

[daverupa]

What do you think?

The eye -- and the rest of the ajjhatt'ayatanani -- as Husserlian nullpunkts.

A fruitful direction; although, a relative dearth of contemplative technology renders much of Western phenomenology rather toothless...

[pulga]

A fruitful direction; although, a relative dearth of contemplative technology renders much of Western phenomenology rather toothless...

Ah but apply "contemplative technology" to "Western phenomenology" and an intriguing clarity becomes manifest. It's just a matter of separating the wheat from the chaff.

[Anxt]

What do you think?

The eye -- and the rest of the ajjhatt'ayatanani -- as Husserlian nullpunkts.

I haven't read much Husserl, but "punkt" or "point" sounds too disembodied to me. The experience of being surrounded by forms, opposing them, cannot come from a "no-thing". The external end of my gaze are forms, but the other end is not some "punkt" but a "voluminous" body (with hands and feet etc.) as the means to act. To illustrate what I mean: The things I see are utensils, i.e. objects of an (possible) interaction with the body. By means of an eye alone, forms cannot be utensils, not even obstacles, because seeing cannot be described as contact between two visible opposites (eye and forms). Seeing gives us only one side, but one side cannot stand alone.

I hope you know what I mean. It was not intended to be a criticism of what you said.

[pulga]

I haven't read much Husserl, but "punkt" or "point" sounds too disembodied to me. The experience of being surrounded by forms, opposing them, cannot come from a "no-thing". The external end of my gaze are forms, but the other end is not some "punkt" but a "voluminous" body (with hands and feet etc.) as the means to act. To illustrate what I mean: The things I see are utensils, i.e. objects of an (possible) interaction with the body. By means of an eye alone, forms cannot be utensils, not even obstacles, because seeing cannot be described as contact between two visible opposites (eye and forms). Seeing gives us only one side, but one side cannot stand alone.

One needs to distinguish between reflexive and pre-reflexive experience. The eye appears as a thing amongst other things in reflexion, but pre-reflexively it is inherently negative. But just focus your vision on anything and you'll sense that it is in the background: the very fact that we perceive things from a particular point-of-view confirms that.

[Zach]

Hi everyone,

The Eye is Impermanent.

Here we examine six suttas together, SN 35.1 to SN 35.6

"Bhikkhus, the eye is impermanent. What is impermanent is suffering. What
is suffering is nonself. What is nonself should be seen as it really is
with correct wisdom thus:'This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my
self.' [Repeat for ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind.]
Seeing thus, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple experiences revulsion
towards the eye, [ear, nose, tongue, body, mind.]
Experiencing revulsion, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion his
mind is liberated. ..." [ BB CD page 1133, part of SN 35.1]

Here is a part of SN 35.1 with the sentences numbered for easy reference.

1. Bhikkhus, the eye is impermanent.
2. What is impermanent is suffering.
3. What is suffering is nonself.

Does anyone actually understand this?

Let us consider line 1: the eye is impermanent.

This does not, on a surface reading, make any sense (in the context).

What does "eye" mean here? What does "impermanent" mean?

What do you think?

Regards, Vincent.

Self grasping Ignorance = I

[Anxt]

I haven't read much Husserl, but "punkt" or "point" sounds too disembodied to me. The experience of being surrounded by forms, opposing them, cannot come from a "no-thing". The external end of my gaze are forms, but the other end is not some "punkt" but a "voluminous" body (with hands and feet etc.) as the means to act. To illustrate what I mean: The things I see are utensils, i.e. objects of an (possible) interaction with the body. By means of an eye alone, forms cannot be utensils, not even obstacles, because seeing cannot be described as contact between two visible opposites (eye and forms). Seeing gives us only one side, but one side cannot stand alone.

One needs to distinguish between reflexive and pre-reflexive experience. The eye appears as a thing amongst other things in reflexion, but pre-reflexively it is inherently negative. But just focus your vision on anything and you'll sense that it is in the background: the very fact that we perceive things from a particular point-of-view confirms that.

But that was my point: There is "something in the background", more than just a "point". In order to focus my vision on something, an eye is not enough. In order to focus, the eye must be connected to and held by muscles. And whatever I see then is something which is related to what I can do. Without the individual "behind" the eye or "in the background", the eye has not even a place, it is not "here". Similar to a stone in one's hand, which "disappears" from one's tactile experience if one throws it away - it has no place.

[pulga]

Without the individual "behind" the eye or "in the background", the eye has not even a place, it is not "here".

As I said, the eye at ground level, at the most primitive level of experience, is inherently negative. To think of it as "here" requires an act of reflexion in which it appears as the eye of flesh, an idea of the mind. The idea being attended to at ground level is itself an object, the mind being the inherent negative in the background. To thematize the mind of pre-reflexion, i.e. to objectify it requires a further act of reflexion, and we enter into a sort of noetic hierarchy. (This is where Ven. Nanavira radically departs from both Husserl and Sartre in his understanding of the nature of experience.)

[DarwidHalim]

If eyes are permanent, they are forever there are eyes.

If eyes are impermanent but has self, they last for certain duration, such as 80 years.

But,

If eyes are impermanent, and also nonself, they never last even for single instant. The true eyes are unfounded. What you have is only the empty-appearances of eyes.

Just like the eyes in the magical display, are there the appearance of eyes? Absolutely there are appearances of eyes.

But, in that magical display, are there any true or intrinsic eyes? It looks there is as if due to its appearances, but when you go and search for it, you find nothing. There is no true eyes.

So if you ask is there eye, which one are you asking? True or intrinsic eyes? Or illusion-like eyes?

The eyes that we have is not the intrinsic eyes, the eyes that we have is illusion-like eyes. It appears, but unfound.

You can pin point your eyes with your finger, but if you are very sharp you will know you can never ever pin point the self of the eyes.

If a magician display the illusion of tiger in front of me, although there is the appearances of tiger, that illusion will not give me a single assertion that there is a tiger there. Not even for a single instance, regardless how long that appearance of tiger in front of me.

Similarly, If you don't have the intrinsic eyes, just the appearance of eyes, will you assert you have eyes? Something that you can't find even for a single dot?

[Anxt]

Without the individual "behind" the eye or "in the background", the eye has not even a place, it is not "here".

As I said, the eye at ground level, at the most primitive level of experience, is inherently negative. To think of it as "here" requires an act of reflexion in which it appears as the eye of flesh, an idea of the mind. The idea being attended to at ground level is itself an object, the mind being the inherent negative in the background. To thematize the mind of pre-reflexion, i.e. to objectify it requires a further act of reflexion, and we enter into a sort of noetic hierarchy. (This is where Ven. Nanavira radically departs from both Husserl and Sartre in his understanding of the nature of experience.)

It is quite difficult for me to write an answer, since you don't seem to address the main part of my posting (which I regard as more important than just that one sentence you quote).

The eye is part of one's bodily structure, i.e. "within" the individual, which can be regarded as a compound or a working-together of the six senses, the eye can be located. But an isolated eye has no place. Tear out your eyes and throw them away - they no longer contribute anything to your experience. The senses do not exist apart from an individual, which "unifies" them - that was my point. And because of that, "seeing things" cannot be understood by regarding the eye as an isolated thing, be it an "organ" or a "point" - no more, no less. The Suttas don't say that the eye sees the forms, they (for example) speak of the monk, who sees forms with the eye., i.e. the individual as a whole (capable also of hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, thinking and acting) is seeing, not just an eye. Only because of this we see things and not just differences in colour.

That was my point, arguing against an isolated understanding of the senses as pseudo-subjects, which I was reminded of (perhaps unjustified) when I read "nullpunkts".

[vinasp]

Hi Alex123,

Alex said:"The Buddha never said that in English. Eye IS dukkha, but dukkha has broader meaning (though it includes) than suffering."

You think that translating as "the eye is suffering" is misleading because
dukkha has a wide range of meanings, and here it means something like
"unsatisfactory." I agree that this is a possible reading.

Alex said:"In the past, future or present life the eye is impermanent."

It is certainly possible to construe the text in this way, if one is satisfied
that "present" can mean "present life."

Alex said:"Not all dukkha is immediately eliminated even for an Arahant. But, no more future dukkha will arise when parinibbana occurs."

Yes, there are two kinds of dukkha - body-dukkha and mental-dukkha. The arahant,
while alive, has only eliminated mental-dukkha. When the Buddha says that:
"the eye is dukkha", if you take "eye" in a literal sense, then the dukkha
can only be body-dukkha. [because the actual eye is not mental.]

I think that an interpretation such as yours must be everyone's starting
point, it is the most obvious one. I suspect that the teachings have been
composed in such a way that it is not possible to show conclusively that
such an interpretation is wrong.

In this thread I am not attempting to make anyone change their interpretation.
But it may be useful to set out the various options so that readers can decide
for themselves.

Regards, Vincent.

[vinasp]

Hi everyone,

Skip this if you are not interested in technical stuff.

Here we consider the PED entry on "nicca"/"annicca":

I have edited it to focus on essentials, my comments in brackets {...}

Nicca (adj.)

constant, continuous, permanent. In chain of synonyms nicca dhuva sassata avipariṇāmadhamma ; see below anicca, -- nt. adv. niccaŋ perpetually, constantly, always (syn. sadā).

{That which is permanent continues to exist. But I suspect that, for some, the
meaning is "continues to exist unchanged." So there are two distinct ideas here.}

Far more freq. as anicca (adj.; aniccaŋ nt. n.) unstable impermanent, inconstant; (nt.) evanescence, inconstancy, impermanence.

-- The emphatic assertion of impermanence (continuous change of condition) is a prominent axiom of the Dhamma, & the realization of the evanescent character of all things mental or material is one of the primary conditions of attaining right knowledge.

{ I do not accept that "annicca" means "continuous change of condition", perhaps
PED editors where influenced by the opinions of commentators. The obvious
opposite of "continues to exist" is "does not continue to exist", i.e. ceases,
vanishes, disappears.}

In this import anicca occurs in many combinations of similar terms all characterising change, its consequences & its meaning esp. in the famous triad "aniccaŋ dukkhaŋ anattā" (see dukkha ii.2),...

Opposed to this ever -- fluctuating impermanence is Nibbāna (q. v.), which is therefore marked with the attributes of constancy & stableness (cp. dhuva, sassata amata, vipariṇāma).

Regards, Vincent.

[vinasp]

Hi everyone,

That the Buddha uses figurative language is shown by this passage:

"Potthapada, all those wanderers are blind and sightless, you alone
among them are sighted." DN 9.33 Walshe 1987.

Here, a literal reading is not credible so we are forced to understand it
in another way. The meaning is that "all those wanderers" lack insight into
the deeper aspects of the Buddha's teaching.

When the Buddha talks about the "eye" it is sometimes figurative language, for
example, the "dhamma eye" or the "eye of wisdom".

Sometimes it is literal, as when he describes a monk as:"seeing visible
forms with the eye."

But there is also a third option, SN 35.30 speaks of a bhikkhu who "does not
conceive the eye." The ordinary man does conceive the eye, the enlightened
individual does not conceive the eye. But the arahant still has an actual eye,
so this "conceived eye" must be something different.

It is this "conceived eye" which is suffering, and which is impermanent, in
the sense that it is possible for it to cease, to vanish.

Clearly, "conceiving" is something done by the mind, this "conceived eye" is
a mental fabrication, a constructed thing, and that which the mind has
constructed it can de-construct.

Regards, Vincent.