NO self

[robertk]

Perhaps this sutta appeals to you Alex:

Question: Is suffering caused by the self?

Answer: Do not put it that way.

Question: Is suffering then caused by external factors?

Answer: Do not put it that way.

Question: Is suffering then caused both by oneself and external factors?

Answer: Do not put it that way.

Question: Is suffering then caused neither by oneself nor external factors?

Answer: Do not put it that way.

Question: In that case, is there no such thing as suffering?

Answer: It is not that there is no such thing as suffering. Suffering does exist.

Question: In that case, is it that Venerable Gotama does not see or know suffering?

Answer: It is not that I do not see or know suffering. I do indeed know and see suffering.

Question: May the Blessed One please tell me then, please instruct me, about suffering.

Answer: To say 'suffering is caused by the self,' is the same as saying 'he who acts receives the results (suffering).' This tends to the eternalist view (sassataditthi). Saying 'suffering is caused by other agents,' as a person who experiences sharp and painful feelings would feel, is just like saying, 'one person acts, another suffers.' This tends to the annihilationist view (ucchedaditthi). The Tathagata, avoiding those two extremes, proclaims a teaching that is balanced, thus, 'With ignorance as condition there are volitional impulses; with volitional impulses as condition, consciousness ... with the complete abandoning of ignorance, volitional impulses cease; with the cessation of volitional impulses, consciousness ceases ...' [S.II.19]

[mikenz66]

Thanks Robert,

There are various comments about that Sutta on this thread: viewtopic.php?f=25&t=11403


Mike

[tiltbillings]

SN 5.9 PTS: S i 134 CDB i 228
Sela Sutta: Sela
translated from the Pali by Bhikkhu Bodhi
© 1997–2012

Setting at Savatthi. Then, in the morning, the bhikkhuni Sela dressed... she sat down at the foot of a tree for the day's abiding.

Then Mara the Evil One, desiring to arouse fear, trepidation, and terror in the bhikkhuni Sela, desiring to make her fall away from concentration, approached her and addressed her in verse:

By whom has this puppet been created?
Where is the maker of the puppet?
Where has the puppet arisen?
Where does the puppet cease?

Then it occurred to the bhikkhuni Sela: "Now who is this...? This is Mara the Evil One... desiring to make me fall away from concentration."

Then the bhikkhuni Sela, having understood, "This is Mara the Evil One," replied to him in verses:

This puppet is not made by itself,
Nor is this misery made by another.
It has come to be dependent on a cause,
When the cause dissolves then it will cease.

As when a seed is sown in a field
It grows depending on a pair of factors:
It requires both the soil's nutrients
And a steady supply of moisture.

Just so the aggregates and elements,
And these six bases of sensory contact,
Have come to be dependent on a cause;
When the cause dissolves they will cease.

Then Mara the Evil One, realizing, "The bhikkhuni Sela knows me," sad and disappointed, disappeared right there. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .bodh.html

[pegembara]

"This is how he attends inappropriately: 'Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what was I in the past? Shall I be in the future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future? How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I be in the future?' Or else he is inwardly perplexed about the immediate present: 'Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Where has this being come from? Where is it bound?'

"As he attends inappropriately in this way, one of six kinds of view arises in him: The view I have a self arises in him as true & established, or the view I have no self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive not-self... or the view It is precisely by means of not-self that I perceive self arises in him as true & established, or else he has a view like this: This very self of mine — the knower that is sensitive here & there to the ripening of good & bad actions — is the self of mine that is constant, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, and will stay just as it is for eternity. This is called a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views. Bound by a fetter of views, the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is not freed from birth, aging, & death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair. He is not freed, I tell you, from suffering & stress."

Sabbasava Sutta

So the thought "I don't exist" is not the answer.

And if I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self — were to answer that there is no self, the bewildered Vacchagotta would become even more bewildered: 'Does the self I used to have now not exist?'"

[Alex123]

Hello RobertK,

Perhaps this sutta appeals to you Alex:Question: Is suffering caused by the self?

Thank you for your sutta quote. Dukkha is inherent characteristic in phenomenon, just like anicca and anatta. One or some other person doesn't have to create it for it to exist. Our ignorance of fire being hot doesn't prevent it from burning something.


I do not, do not, claim that Atta exists. I believe that we should relate to every dhamma as "Not-I, not-Me, not-Mine".

[twelph]

With the Buddha stating that the Dhamma is "visible here and now", how are we able to cultivate a view of "no-self"? I am able to view each of the aggregates as not-self, but trying to cultivate a view of the self not existing is not something I can comprehend trying to practice with. As far as I know, the only things that the Buddha wanted us to take as fact are the 4 noble truths. Annata seems to only be grouped with right view when the three marks of existence are mentioned, but there is controversy about it being grouped together with dukkha and anicca.

[robertk]

By hearing or reading deep teachings on anatta there will/may (it depends) begin to be wise consideration about this matter. And that is the first step, which will/may, lead to moments of seeing the anattaness of realities that are appearing now.
For example, one might start to see that no one can make or stop a moment of seeing arise: it simply happens that there is seeing (cakkhuvinnana) when the eyes are open.There is no self deciding to see.

[DAWN]

All that impermanent is conditioned.
All that conditioned don't have any independent existence.

Because all fenomena is conditioned, there is no independant self.
There is fenomenal self, but that self is no-self, because conditioned, there is no doer, fenomenas condition them selves and keep they narutal mouvement of causes and consequances.

Self is brain memory about past fenomenas.
There is no past fenomenas in the present.
There is no memory in the present.
There is no self.
All that birn will dead.

[SamKR]

I think there are two types of "no self". The first is the wrong view of "no self" related to ucchedavada.
The second is the right view that "all" is "not self"; or that there is "no self" in "all".
So to me,
no-self = not-self
In "all" we can not find any immutable and indivisible "doer" which "does" with "free will".

[Reductor]

[dhammapal]

Hi,

Check out AN6:38 Attakari Sutta: The Self-Doer. The Buddha says that he's never heard of the view that there is no self-doer and asks the brahman if he agrees that there is an element of initiating or beginning an action.

With metta / dhammapal.

[SamKR]

Hi,

Check out AN6:38 Attakari Sutta: The Self-Doer. The Buddha says that he's never heard of the view that there is no self-doer and asks the brahman if he agrees that there is an element of initiating or beginning an action.

With metta / dhammapal.

True, but I said: In "all" we can not find any immutable and indivisible "doer" which "does" with "free will". This is consistently supported by various suttas on anicca and anatta.

Of course, there are mutable and divisible aggregates (perceived as self and others) which "do", and which experience the results of the deeds.
The view "‘There is no self-doer, there is no other-doer.’” (in the context and situation of above sutta, when the Buddha was instructing that certain Brahman) could be one of the wrong views related to annihilationism and amoralism which could lead to the wrong view that individuals are not responsible for the deeds.

[DAWN]

Into jail we can move to, but we can't go out.
All fenomena, all that can be known is conditioned, not free, not self.

[whynotme]

I think there are two types of "no self". The first is the wrong view of "no self" related to ucchedavada.
The second is the right view that "all" is "not self"; or that there is "no self" in "all".
So to me,
no-self = not-self
In "all" we can not find any immutable and indivisible "doer" which "does" with "free will".

I agree with you that there is no self in all, and I agree that we can not find any immutable and indivisible "doer" which "does" with "free will", but I do not agree that there is no self.

What is all? All is six senses, there is no self in six senses. All is five aggregates, there is no self in five aggregates. All is the world, there is no self, no owner of the world. There is no doer or soul in six senses or five aggregate.

But just saying merely there is no self, is wrong view, where it means differently to these cases above: the self does not exist. Because all is different to everything, i.e there is thing outside of all, that thing is unconditioned and unchanged, it is called nibbana. Because of nibbana's properties, it is impossible to talk about it, words can't describe it, but nibbana truly exists outside of all - the conditioned world. I remember there is a sutta, maybe in Khuddaka Nikaya not the earliest sutta but it is still worth to consider, where the Buddha stated that, if there isn't anything that unconditioned, unchanged, then there would be no release from things that conditioned, impermanent. Because there is thing that unconditioned, unchanged so there is release from conditioned, permanent things.

So, there are two type of self:
1/ The conventional self, which is needed in communication and right intention, e.g I did this, I tried this, I will do this, you do that, he did that, they did that.. The sutta above talked about this self, if one thinks there is no one does anything, then he can not have right intention, will, exertion to do the works that need to be done.
2/ The absolute self, the true self, which means soul, ego,.. or in simple words, just I or me. The Buddha had never stated that there is no self in according to this meaning.

Regards

[tiltbillings]

2/ The absolute self, the true self, which means soul, ego,.. or in simple words, just I or me. The Buddha had never stated that there is no self in according to this meaning.

Where is this "absolute/true self" and what does it do? Does it think? Does it perceive? Does it feel?

[whynotme]

2/ The absolute self, the true self, which means soul, ego,.. or in simple words, just I or me. The Buddha had never stated that there is no self in according to this meaning.

Where is this "absolute/true self" and what does it do? Does it think? Does it perceive? Does it feel?

No the true self doesn't think, perceive or feel.
In a similar way, where is nibbana? Is nibbana on the surface of the Earth, or it is on the Mars? No, you can't tell where nibbana is. Does nibbana think, perceive or feel? No, it doesn't. Can it be seen? No, it doesn't have color. Can it be heard, touched, smelt, tasted (by tounge)? No. Can it be measured or tracked? No, it doesn't have any manifestation. But does nibbana exist? Yes, nibbana exists

What does self mean? OK here is my definition: self means a thing that doesn't change over time. People tried to find the soul, the thing that identifies each of themselves, it means the thing that doesn't change over time. But everything they found will be changed over time.

Thing changes over time has no self, because it becomes a thing different to itself. You can't use changed properties to describe a thing, only unchanged properties could be used to identify a thing, that's the way we named everything around us, books, computers, houses, countries, people.. But in the long run, everything changes, so everything has no self.

But is there anything that does not change over time, the Buddhism says yes, there is a thing does not change over time. So it is the true self according to the above definition.
Well, time is based on changing so saying a thing does not change over time is not accurate, but just a way to say. Better should say it is outside of time scope. Because thought, perception, feeling, experience are based on change, thing outside of time scope is outside of worldly scope, outside of description. But it does exist.

Regards

[tiltbillings]

2/ The absolute self, the true self, which means soul, ego,.. or in simple words, just I or me. The Buddha had never stated that there is no self in according to this meaning.

Where is this "absolute/true self" and what does it do? Does it think? Does it perceive? Does it feel?

No the true self doesn't think, perceive or feel.

Then what is the point of it? What doers it do? What is its function?

Let us keep nibbana out of this discussion, given that nibbana "exist" -- according to the suttas -- in as much as there are individuals who have destroyed greed, hatred, and delusion -- which is to say, they are no longer conditioned by greed, hatred, and delusion. But what do the suttas say about a self that feels nothing, perceives nothing, and does not act?

[whynotme]

Then what is the point of it? What doers it do? What is its function?

Let us keep nibbana out of this discussion, given that nibbana "exist" -- according to the suttas -- in as much as there are individuals who have destroyed greed, hatred, and delusion -- which is to say, they are no longer conditioned by greed, hatred, and delusion. But what do the suttas say about a self that feels nothing, perceives nothing, and does not act?

tilblillings, you read pali, so you can confirm there is a message by the Buddha that, if there isn't anything permanent, unconditioned then there would be no release from suffering and death, and because there is thing permanent, unconditioned so there is release from suffering. There is a statement similar to this, right? That statement clearly indicated that there is thing exists but has no beginning, and is permanent.

What is the point of self? I do not have enough wisdom to talk about a thing that impermanent, so I based on confirmed properties. And since wrong views can not lead to the right goal, I just want to counter the view that there is no self, I don't want to establish the view there is the self. Just because many here hold on the view there is no self which is not supported by the suttas. I know there is no self is supported by many monks, but the Kalama sutta said that we should not merely believe in monks, teachers, or traditions.. And especially, many of us have many more things to do than holding a view which is too far ahead of ourselves. Holding a view, no matter what is right or wrong, is a wrong attitude.

It is not logical to say there is no self based on examination. E.g I looked for my cell phone, I looked in the bedroom, the bathroom, kitchen.. I looked for it in all of my rooms and I didn't find it, then I came to a conclusion my cell phone doesn't exist, it is illogical. It is right to just say, there is no cell phone in bedroom, bathroom, kitchen, but it is wrong to say there is no cell phone (at all). Similarly, consciousness looked for self in six senses, in five aggregates and didn't find any self, the it comes to a conclusion, there is no self, it is a wrong statement and illogical. The only right and honest conclusion is that, there is no self in six senses, there is no self in five aggregate.

And I still don't believe most of us here have enough concentration to state that he already looked for self in all of six senses or five aggregates to say there is no self in them. Pana or wisdom only comes after concentration, they just believe in there is no self, and I think no need to hold on that view.

Regards

[SamKR]

It is not logical to say there is no self based on examination. E.g I looked for my cell phone, I looked in the bedroom, the bathroom, kitchen.. I looked for it in all of my rooms and I didn't find it, then I came to a conclusion my cell phone doesn't exist, it is illogical. It is right to just say, there is no cell phone in bedroom, bathroom, kitchen, but it is wrong to say there is no cell phone (at all).

"Cell phone" is just a concept referring to an aggregate of various parts which are in turn aggregates, and so on.
Similar to "chariot" mentioned in Milindapanha. http://www.dhammawiki.com/index.php?title=Anatta

[tiltbillings]

Then what is the point of it? What doers it do? What is its function?

Let us keep nibbana out of this discussion, given that nibbana "exist" -- according to the suttas -- in as much as there are individuals who have destroyed greed, hatred, and delusion -- which is to say, they are no longer conditioned by greed, hatred, and delusion. But what do the suttas say about a self that feels nothing, perceives nothing, and does not act?

tilblillings, you read pali, so you can confirm there is a message by the Buddha that, if there isn't anything permanent, unconditioned then there would be no release from suffering and death, and because there is thing permanent, unconditioned so there is release from suffering. There is a statement similar to this, right? That statement clearly indicated that there is thing exists but has no beginning, and is permanent.

A permanent, unconditioned thing that exists -- that is what you are saying that the Buddha taught. The problem with that, however, is that if there is some self-existing thing that is unconditioned -- which would mean that it is also unchanging -- there could be no possible connexion between that and what is conditioned, which puts the supposed unconditioned, unchanging thing out of reach, out knowledge, out of experience to the conditioned thing. If the unconditioned thing were in some sort of relationship to what is conditioned, the unconditioned thing would be in a relative -- that is, conditioned -- relationship with the conditioned, which would mean that the unconditioned is in fact conditioned by virtue of its relationship. This is a problem for theism. God is an unconditioned, absolute, and unchanging existence, which would mean that I could not pray to that god. If I could pray to that god, it heard and answered my prayer, the god would not be absolute, unconditioned, and unchanging.

The Buddha, in the Kaccaayanagotto Sutta (SN 12.15 PTS: S ii 16 CDB i 544), made it quite clear that the idea of existence is not reality. One needs to keep in mind that the Buddha never posited that nibbana was a self-existing thing. The Buddha did, however, state that nibbana is being free of the conditioning of greed, hatred, and delusion -- that is, one, who is nibbana-ized, is unconditioned by greed, hatred, and delusion.

Now, as for the "self," the Buddha clearly stated:

Bhikkhus, what exists by clinging to what, by adhering to what does view of self arise? … When there is form, bhikkhus, by clinging to form, by adhering to form, view of self arises. When there is feeling…perception…voltional formations…consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, view of self arises. … Seeing thus… He understands: …there is no more for this state of being. – SN III 185-6.

Monks, whatever contemplatives or priests who assume in various ways when assuming a self, all assume the five clinging-aggregates, or a certain one of them. SN III 46

It is impossible, it cannot come to pass that a man possessed of (right) view would treat any dhamma as self - this situation does not occur. MN iii 64

‘”I am’ is derivative upon form … perception … feelings … volitional formation … consciousness’ – S XXII 83/iii 105

In other words, there is no self to be found that is not a conditioned product of our experience. An unconditioned self would be meaningless because it could not feel, see, hear, or act. There would be no way to experience it, given that it could have no relationship to experience in any way.

The problem, it seems, with your assumptions about nibbana, and the idea of an (to use your words) "absolute self, the true self," is that you are still stuck of thinking these things in terms existence and non-existence, which the Buddha stated is the wrong way to approach experience.