It can be tested by anyone. it is true whether a Buddha is present or not. also see my last comments (this part is why I responded there).Ñāṇa wrote:How is that an "objective fact"?Cittasanto wrote:This would be an "objective fact".The application of the noble eightfold path leading to dispassion makes a difference.
edit - it does not depend on one's personal perspective for it to be the case.
there will be recourse to faith, but being doubtful and using scepticism's tools are not the same thing, one part of empirical scepticism is accepting a workable model yet remaining open to a better one.Ñāṇa wrote:Right. Valid means of acquiring knowledge are direct perception and inference. But the use of the latter generally involves accepting valid authorities -- for us as Buddhists these authorities are the three jewels. And unless one is already liberated there is going to be some recourse to faith. The alternative is to remain skeptical about the teachings.Cittasanto wrote:There are ways in-which knowledge can be acquired - such as the list found in the Kalama sutta (to name one instance) - but these need to be independently verifiable, i.e., just because you think it is the case doesn't make it so, and others need to be able to repeat subjectively.
and a valid authority is as the Buddha said time and again, in various ways (particularly about practice and finding a teacher,) one that can be observed and tested.
That is accountable through randomness. Just because one can not guarantee 100% reproducibility of experience or how people would express said experiences, that does not mean there are no rules by which these follow. So something does not have to be identical for them to be the same, but they do need to meet certain targets, hence the formulated descriptions, or preciseness of the passage (particularly when you get to precepts for the latter) and various practices to account for the randomness brought in through the hindrances and background.Ñāṇa wrote:Well, just as one can't step into the same river twice, one can't duplicate the same experience twice. It seems to me that path structures and formulated descriptions are generalized approximations at best. Thus, path structures are merely provisional expedients. The canonical discourses employ nominal designations to point the way towards utterly non-referential dispassion. But there is a significant amount of diversity in the actual practices offered in the discourses to attain this end. And in terms of individuals there is an even greater diversity of aptitudes and past conditioning.Cittasanto wrote:Objectivity could be how it is expressed; does the experience (or in this case the path) change between two or more people which isn't accountable through randomness.