Translated by Bhikku Bodhi
Thus have I heard.  On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Sāketa, at Kāḷaka’s Park.  There the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus: “Bhikkhus!”
“Venerable sir!” those bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:
“Bhikkhus, in this world with its devas, Māra, and Brahmā, among this population with its ascetics and brahmins, its devas and humans, whatever is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, reached, sought after, examined by the mind—that I know.
“Bhikkhus, in this world with its devas, Māra, and Brahmā, among this population with its ascetics and brahmins, its devas and humans, whatever is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, reached, sought after, examined by the mind—that I have directly known. It has been known by the Tathāgata,  but the Tathāgata did not become subservient to it. 
“Bhikkhus, if I were to say, ‘In this world with its devas … whatever is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, reached, sought after, examined by the mind—that I do not know,’ that would be a falsehood on my part.
“Bhikkhus, if I were to say, ‘In this world with its devas … whatever is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, reached, sought after, examined by the mind—that I both know and do not know,’ that too would be just the same. 
“Bhikkhus, if I were to say, ‘In this world with its devas … whatever is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, reached, sought after, examined by the mind—that I neither know nor do not know,’ that would be a fault on my part. 
(1) “So, having seen what can be seen, the Tathāgata does not misconceive the seen, does not misconceive the unseen, does not misconceive what can be seen, does not misconceive one who sees.  (2) Having heard what can be heard, he does not misconceive the heard, does not misconceive the unheard, does not misconceive what can be heard, does not misconceive one who hears. (3) Having sensed what can be sensed, he does not misconceive the sensed, does not misconceive the unsensed, does not misconceive what can be sensed, does not misconceive one who senses. (4) Having cognized what can be cognized, he does not misconceive the cognized, does not misconceive the uncognized, does not misconceive what can be cognized, does not misconceive one who cognizes.
“Thus, bhikkhus, being ever stable among things seen, heard, sensed, and cognized, the Tathāgata is a stable one.  And, I say, there is no stable one more excellent or sublime than that stable one.”
- Amid those who are self-constrained, the Stable One
would not posit as categorically true or false
anything seen, heard, or sensed,
clung to and considered truth by others. 
Since they have already seen this dart 
to which people cling and adhere,
saying “I know, I see, it is just so,”
the Tathāgatas cling to nothing.
 Ce has this in brackets. Be and Ee do not have it at all.
 According to Mp, Kāḷaka was a wealthy financier and the fatherin-law of Anāthapiṇḍika’s daughter Cūḷasubhaddā. At the time of her marriage, he had been a devotee of the naked ascetics and knew nothing about the Buddha or his teaching. Cūḷasubhaddā contrived to get him to invite the Buddha and the monks for a meal offering. After the meal, the Buddha gave a discourse that established him in the fruit of stream-entry. Kāḷaka then built a monastery in his park and donated both monastery and park to the Buddha. One day, when the bhikkhus who were natives of Sāketa were sitting in the meeting hall discussing the Buddha’s success in converting Kāḷaka, the Buddha read their minds and knew they were ready for a discourse that would settle them in arahantship. It would also cause the great earth to quake up to its boundaries. Hence he addressed the bhikkhus.
 Mp: “By these three terms (jānāmi, abbhaññāsiṃ, viditaṃ) the plane of omniscience (sabbaññutabhūmi) is indicated.” In the history of Buddhism, as well as in modern scholarship, the question whether the Buddha claimed omniscience has been a subject of debate. The Buddha certainly rejected the claim that one could know everything all the time (see MN 71.5, I 482,4–18) as well as the claim that one could know everything simultaneously (see MN 90.8, II 127,28–30). But he also says that to hold that he totally rejects the possibility of omniscience is to misrepresent him (MN 90.5, II 126,31–27,11). Thus it seems to follow that what the Buddha rejected is the possibility of continuous and simultaneous knowledge of everything, but not discrete and intentional knowledge of whatever can be known (which would exclude much of the future, since it is not predetermined).
 Taṃ tathāgato na upaṭṭhāsi. Mp: “The Tathāgata did not become subservient to any object at the six sense doors, that is, he did not take it up (na upagañchi) through craving or views. For it is said: ‘The Blessed One sees a form with the eye, but he has no desire and lust for it; the Blessed One is fully liberated in mind…. The Blessed One cognizes a phenomenon with the mind, but he has no desire and lust for it; the Blessed One is fully liberated in mind’ (see SN 35:232, IV 164–65). By this the plane of arahantship (khīṇāsavabhūmi) is indicated.”
 Taṃ p’assa tādisameva. Mp: “That too would just be false speech.”
 Taṃ mam’assa kali. Mp: “That statement would be a fault of mine. With the above three statements, the plane of truth (saccabhūmi) is indicated.”
 Mp: “He does not misconceive (na maññati) visible form by way of craving, conceit, or views; and so for the other objects. By this passage, the plane of emptiness (suññatābhūmi) is explained.”
 The word tādī, originally a simple referential term meaning “that one,” takes on a special sense when used to designate the Buddha or an arahant. Nidd I 114–15 explains that an arahant is called tādī because he has transcended preferences, given up (catto) defilements, crossed (tiṇṇo) the floods, and has a liberated (mutto) mind.
Mp: “Being ever stable … is a stable one (tādīyeva tādī): ‘Stable’ means exactly the same (ekasadisatā). The Tathāgata is the same both in gain and loss, fame and obscurity, blame and praise, and pleasure and pain…. By this the plane of the stable one (tādibhūmi) has been explained. As he concluded the teaching with these five planes, on each of the five occasions the earth quaked as testimony.”
 I paraphrase Mp’s explanation of this verse: “He would not take even one claim of the speculative theorists (diṭṭhigatikā)—who are ‘self-constrained’ (sayasaṃvutesu) in the sense that they are constrained or blocked by their conceptions—to be categorical or supreme and trust it, believe it, fall back on it as true or false (evaṃ saccaṃ musā vāpi paraṃ uttamaṃ katvā na odaheyya, na saddaheyya, na pattiyāyeyya), thinking: ‘This alone is true and anything else is false.’” This explanation nicely connects the verse to the prose line, “the Tathāgata did not become subservient to it.”
 MP identifies the “dart” as the dart of views (diṭṭhisalla). Elsewhere craving is spoken of as the dart, for instance, at MN II 258,27, and SN I 40,7; in still other passages, the dart is sorrow, as at 5:48, 5:50.