The Ethics of Non Action (Classical Theravada version)

[Bankei]

Hi

I am wondering if there is any concept of Karmic consequences of not doing something.

eg. You see someone drowning and don't save them.

In this situation would you have an intention to left them suffer. Kamma = Intention.

What do you think?

Bankei

[Ben]

Hi Bankei

Unfortunately, I do not have the majority of my texts with me to help you with this problem.

Morally there seems to be very little difference, if any, between acting and passively standing by to allow an event to unfold to effect a desired result.

Just a few quotes...

"In which four ways does one commit no evil action? Led by desire does one commit evil. Led by anger does one commit evil. Led by ignorance does one commit evil. Led by fear does one commit evil.
-- DN 31 Sigalovada Sutta

Righteous conduct is the observance of the ten good actions (kusalákammapatha) in thought, word and deed: freeing the mind of greed, ill-will and wrong views; avoiding speech that is untruthful, slanderous, abusive and frivolous; and the non- committal acts of killing, stealing and sexual misconduct.
-- Everyman's Ethics: Four Discourses of the Buddha adapted from the translations of Narada Thera: http://www.bps.lk/wheels_library/wheels_pdf/wh_014.pdf

The person who 'passively' allows something immoral to happen, is actually led by the akusala thoughts of desire, anger, ignorance and fear, and attracts the consequent vipaka as a result.
Metta

Ben

[Peter]

I can't recall coming across anything in the texts which points to non-action as unwholesome.
On the other hand, various abstinences are taught to be wholesome.

[Ben]

Thanks Jechbi and Peter.

Its time like these I wish I had my Dhamma books. In particular my copy of Ven Bodhi's translation of the Majjhima, A comprehensive manual of the Abhidhamma and the Vissudhimagga. I think they could shine some light on this issue.

My reasoning above is based on the Upali Sutta (?) in the Majjhima Nikaya where the Buddha refutes the doctrine of the Jains who held that the 'physical rod' to be the root of kamma. The Buddha, in the Upali Sutta and elsewhere, asserted that it was the 'mental rod', to use the expression favoured by the Jains, as kammically most potent. Perhaps it was an error of my interpretation to then jump to say that inaction, particularly when the result coincided with the unwholesome roots of desire, aversion or ignorance, were not kammically neutral.

Hi Jechbi
From memory, ahetu-apaccayavada maybe treated in Ledi Sayadaw's Manual of Conditionality and perhaps also in the Compendium of Conditionality in Venerable Bodhi's A Comprehensive Manual of the Abhidhamma.
Kind regards

Ben

[retrofuturist]

Hi

I personally would find it hard to justify non action if someone was suffering in front of me.

The reason I ask this question is that I had been reading some writings by Peter Singer who is a modern philosopher. He argues that it is also unjustifiable to not help someone who you can see suffering. But he takes things further.
e.g. there are people starving right now in many places of the world.
e.g. There are people dying because they can't afford medicine etc.

Do we have a moral obligation to help these people (even though they may be located far away)?

Could there be any karmic affects of not helping them - there is no real conscious decision as there would be with watching someone drown in front of you. Most people would not give a moments thought to these issues, so how could there be Karma?

Bankei

[Annapurna]

I posted a reply here.

It is gone, without a notification as to why.

Why?

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Annabel,

All posts not relevant to the Classical Mahavihara Theravada position have been moved to the General Theravada version of this thread to be found at viewtopic.php?f=13&t=621 . If you have not done so, please read the recently updated guidelines specific to the Classical Mahavihara Theravada section here: viewtopic.php?f=19&t=373

Posts not even relevant to the Theravada perspective have been removed in accordance with the Terms of Service: viewtopic.php?f=8&t=2

Now...



Metta,
Retro.

[gavesako]

According to the Pali Vinaya, a bhikkhu incurs no fault when he lets someone drown. As the rule is defined, one has to make some active effort to commit an offence. That is how the Vinaya structure is made, usually it works well but in some cases (such as this one) if does not quite make sense.

[Peter]

Perhaps to understand why inaction would not create karma...

What we might do in the course of a day is finite.
What we might not do in the course of a day is infinite.

For each day the Buddha sought out someone to help there were countless beings he did not try to help.
Conversely, even if I harm one person every day there are countless beings I'm not harming every day.

I suspect a good answer to the question is to be found in the Abhidhamma. Unfortunately I am not familiar with Abhidhamma.

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Peter,

I suspect a good answer to the question is to be found in the Abhidhamma. Unfortunately I am not familiar with Abhidhamma.

Yes, and in the suttas. In both situations it's the volitional quality of the mindstate (wholesome/unwholesome) at the time that determines the kammic quality... not the physical action (or non-action) itself.

Metta,
Retro.

[Will]

According to the Pali Vinaya, a bhikkhu incurs no fault when he lets someone drown. As the rule is defined, one has to make some active effort to commit an offence. That is how the Vinaya structure is made, usually it works well but in some cases (such as this one) if does not quite make sense.

I wonder if you could fill this out a little Bhante? If the spectator of the drowning one would like to help, but cannot swim or swim well enough, then I can understand no bad vipaka. But suppose the spectator is gleefully wishing on the drowning or as has actually happened, a crowd cheers on a stranger who is thinking of jumping off a building to his death. In those latter cases, would not the intent or will of the sociopath(s) qualify as "some active effort", even if it is mental or verbal effort and not physical?

[gavesako]

Well, the Vinaya only deals with the legal aspect of the situation (i.e. whether he would incur an offence according to the Vinaya) and not with the skilful or unskilful action itself -- that is more in the area of Dhamma.

[Peter]

Correct me if I'm wrong, Bhante, but I would guess the Vinaya only deals with speech and action, not thoughts.

[Peter]

it's the volitional quality of the mindstate (wholesome/unwholesome) at the time that determines the kammic quality... not the physical action (or non-action) itself.

Certainly I agree with this. Still I don't think this addresses the original poster's question. All we can conclude from this is that some instances of abstaining will be unwholesome and some will be wholesome. But I think there's a slightly more specific question being asked. Given:

The suttas teach certain actions to always be unwholesome, such as intentional killing.
The suttas also teach it is the underlying mind-state which makes an action unwholesome, such as greed, hate, or delusion.
Thus we can conclude that certain actions (such as intentional killing) will always be based in an unwholesome mind-state (such as hate).
Furthermore, we can easily imagine that one might abstain from an action based in an unwholesome mind-state. I might refrain from jumping in to rescue my drowning enemy and I might refrain from finding someone else to help him because I wish to see him drown. Clearly there's some unwholesomeness going on in this scenario.

From all this we might ask the following question:

Just as certain actions are understood to always be unwholesome...
and just as certain abstinences are understood to always be wholesome (abstaining from killing)...
are certain abstinences understood to always be unwholesome?

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Peter,

Just as certain actions are understood to always be unwholesome...

Are they? Or is it just that the mindstates that underpin such actions are nearly always unwholesome?

Metta,
Retro.

[Peter]

Just as certain actions are understood to always be unwholesome...

Are they? Or is it just that the mindstates that underpin such actions are nearly always unwholesome?

Either you didn't read my post carefully enough or I'm not understanding your question.

The suttas teach certain actions to always be unwholesome, such as intentional killing.
The suttas also teach it is the underlying mind-state which makes an action unwholesome, such as greed, hate, or delusion.
Thus we can conclude that certain actions (such as intentional killing) will always be based in an unwholesome mind-state (such as hate).

I can try to rephrase my question using your own verbiage if it will help you...

Are certain abstinences understood to always be underpinned by unwholesome mind-states?

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Peter,

What I'm suggesting is that the movement of physical elements that comprise the bodily form is in itself morally neutral or amoral. The moral quality of the volitional kammic action is the mindstate underpinning it, which can be wholesome or unwholesome. The strength of the volition could be measured in part by whether that mindstate manifests itself by way of speech or physical action, but it's not the action or the inaction at a physical elemental level which is important in terms of kamma or Buddhist ethics - it is the mindstate that is important. This is why I questioned your assumption that "Just as certain actions are understood to always be unwholesome..."

This is how I understand the situation as per the Abhidhammic analysis. I am happy to be corrected if this is wrong.

Metta,
Retro.

[cooran]

Helllo all,

My understanding is that Kamma is Intentional Action - a choice.

But .... no intentional action can occur without either a wholesome or unwholesome mental state arising i.e. 'a thought' prior to the choice .... even if it lasts only a millionth of a second.

metta
Chris

[Peter]

Retro, I still don't know what you are disagreeing with.

The moral quality of the volitional kammic action is the mindstate underpinning it, which can be wholesome or unwholesome.

The suttas ... teach it is the underlying mind-state which makes an action unwholesome, such as greed, hate, or delusion.

Do you feel what you've said differs in any substantial way with what I've said?

Let me try to phrase my question yet another way.

Since the suttas teach:
a] the moral quality of the volitional kammic action is the mind-state underpinning it, which can be wholesome or unwholesome
and
b] certain actions are always unwholesome (such as intentional killing)
we can conclude
c] certain actions (such as intentional killing) will always be underpinned by unwholesome mind-states.
but can we also conclude
d] certain inactions (like letting someone drown) always underpinned by unwholesome mind-states?

[clw_uk]

Would it be Inaction?

If there is still ignorance then one would choose not to act because one is not awakened.

Only when one is awakened does action stop.