Not for lay people - but the monks have to fuss ...retrofuturist wrote:However, the Buddha didn't kick up a fuss about insects...
from Buddhist Monastic Code - Translated and Explained by Thanissaro Bhikkhu
Metta61. Should any bhikkhu intentionally deprive an animal of life, it is to be confessed.
There are five factors for the full offense here.
1) Object: a living animal.
2) Perception: One perceives it to be a living animal.
3) Intention: One knowingly, consciously, deliberately, and purposefully wants to cause its death.
4) Effort: whatever one does with the purpose of causing it to die.
5) Result: It dies as a result of one's action.
Object. Animal here covers all common animals. As the Commentary notes, whether the animal is large or small makes no difference in terms of the penalty, although the size of the animal is one of the factors determining the moral gravity of the act.
Apparently, this factor does not include beings too small to be seen with the naked eye, inasmuch as the classes of medicine allowed in Mv.VI include a number of anti-bacterial and anti-viral substances — some mineral salts and the decoctions made from the leaves of some trees, for example, can be antibiotic. The Commentary's example of the smallest extreme to which this rule extends is a bed bug egg. The four "Things Not To Be Done" taught to every new bhikkhu immediately after his full Acceptance (Mv.I.78.4) say that one should not deprive an animal of life "even if it is only a black or white ant."
On the other end of the spectrum, Pr 3 imposes a pārājika for deliberately killing a human being, and a thullaccaya for deliberately killing a peta, yakkha, or nāga.
Perception. If one is in doubt as to whether something is a living animal, it is grounds for a dukkaṭa regardless of whether it actually is. If one perceives an inanimate object to be a living animal, it is grounds for a dukkaṭa. If one perceives an object to be inanimate, then regardless of whether it actually is, it is not grounds for an offense. Thus, for example, if — with murderous intent — one steps on a spot of dirt thinking it to be a bed bug egg, the penalty is a dukkaṭa. If one steps on bed bug eggs thinking them to be spots of dirt, there is no penalty.
Intention, in the Vibhaṅga, is described as "having willed, having made the decision knowingly and consciously" — the same phrase used to define intention under Pr 3. The Commentary to this rule refers back to the Commentary to that rule, where having willed means having willed, having planned, with a murderous intention. Having made the decision means "having summoned up a reckless mind-state, 'crushing' through the power of an attack." Knowingly means knowing that, "This is a living being." Consciously means being aware that one's action is depriving the animal of life.
All of this indicates that this factor is fulfilled only when one acts on a clear and consciously made decision to deprive the animal of life. Thus, for example, if one is sweeping a walk, trying carefully not to kill any insects, and yet some ants happen to die, one does not commit an offense even if one knew that there was the possibility that some might die, because one's purpose in acting was not to cause their death.
Motive, here, is irrelevant to the offense. Even the desire to kill an animal to "put it out of its misery" fulfills the factor of intention all the same.
Effort. The act of taking life may take the form of any of the six types of action listed under Pr 3:
using one's own person (e.g., hitting with the hand, kicking, using a knife or a club);
throwing (hurling a stone, shooting an arrow or a gun);
using a stationary device (setting a trap, placing poison in food);
using magical formulae;
using psychic powers;
commanding.
Mv.V.10.10 discusses a case of this last instance, in which a depraved bhikkhu tells a layman that he has use for a certain calf's hide, and the layman kills the calf for him. Because the bhikkhu did not give a specific command that the calf be killed, and yet the Buddha said that his action did come under this rule, we can conclude that there is no room for kappiya-vohāra in this context. Whatever one says in hopes of inciting someone else to kill an animal would fulfill this factor. This rule thus differs from Pr 3, under which commanding covers only clear imperatives.
Result. Only if the animal dies does one incur the pācittiya here. The Commentary to Pc 74 imposes a dukkaṭa on the simple act of striking an animal.
Non-offenses. There is no offense in killing an animal —
unintentionally — e.g., accidentally dropping a load that crushes a cat to death;
unthinkingly — e.g., absent-mindedly rubbing one's arm while it is being bitten by mosquitoes;
unknowingly — e.g., walking into a dark room and, without realizing it, stepping on an insect; or
when one's action is motivated by a purpose other than that of causing death — e.g., giving medicine to a sick dog whose system, it turns out, cannot withstand the dosage.
Still, the Commentary states that if one notices even bed bug eggs while cleaning a bed, one should be careful not to damage them. Thus, "out of compassion, one's duties are to be done carefully." Or, in the words of the Sub-commentary: "One's duties in looking after one's dwelling are to be done with mindfulness well-established so that such creatures do not die."
Summary: Deliberately killing an animal — or having it killed — is a pācittiya offense.
62. Should any bhikkhu knowingly make use of water containing living beings, it is to be confessed.
This rule is similar to Pc 20, differing only in the factor of effort and the way the non-offenses are defined. Here, as under that rule, the factors for the full offense are four.
Object: water containing living creatures. This includes things like mosquito larvae, but not beings too small to be seen.
Perception. One knows that they are there — either from having sensed their presence on one's own or from having been told of their presence — and that they will die from the factor of effort, defined below.
If one is in doubt as to whether water contains living beings, or if one perceives living beings in the water when there actually aren't, then to use it in a way that would cause their death if they were there is to incur a dukkaṭa.
Effort. The Vibhaṅga does not go into detail on this factor, while the Commentary defines it with examples: drinking the water, using it to wash one's bowl, using it to cool hot porridge, dipping it out of a tank or pond to bathe with it, making waves in a pool so that the water will splash over its banks. The Sub-commentary suggests that this rule covers only cases in which one is using water for one's own personal consumption, but this does not fit with the fact that, under this rule, the Commentary explains how one should go about cleaning out a dirty pool. (Place eight to ten potfuls of water containing no living beings in another place that will hold the water, and then dip the water from the pool into it.) The Commentary to Pr 3 states that using water to put out a fire — even an approaching wildfire that threatens one's dwelling — would also come under this rule.
From all of this, it would appear that this rule covers all cases of using water containing living beings that are not covered by Pc 20.
Unlike that rule, though, the Vibhaṅga here makes no mention of whether the factor of effort here would include the act of getting other people to make use of water containing living beings. The Commentary and K/Commentary argue, reasonably, that it would.
Accidentally spilling or splashing water would apparently not come under the term using here.
Intention. This factor is fulfilled simply by the immediate aim of using the water. As the K/Commentary notes, one need not have murderous motives in order to fulfill this factor. For example, if after perceiving that the water contains insects, one chooses to ignore their existence and boils the water — not to kill the insects, but to use the water for bathing — one commits an offense all the same.
"Result" is not a factor here. Whether the living beings actually die is of no consequence in determining the offense.
Non-offenses. There is no offense in using water —
if one does not know that it contains living beings;
if one knows that it does not contain living beings; or
if one knows that the living beings it contains will not die from the use one has in mind.
Water strainers. Cv.V.13.1 gives permission for one to use a water strainer to remove dirt and living beings from water before using it, and such strainers eventually became one of a bhikkhu's eight basic requisites. According to Cv.V.13.2, one must take a water strainer along when going on a journey. If one has no strainer, one may determine the corner of one's outer robe as a strainer and use it to filter water.
Summary: Using water, or getting others to use it, knowing that it contains living beings that will die from that use, is a pācittiya offense.