something endures unchanged for at least a certain interval

[5heaps]

No, one is trying to end unsatisfactoriness by removing ignorant reification and craving

ignorant reification of what? the nature of objects. whats wrong with objects? we dont know how they exist, we think they have intrinsic existence. whats the study of the nature of existence? ontology.

I'm not under any obligation to accept any commentarial use of sabhāva,

are you suggesting Theravada is not a realist school?

Do you have a clue as the the context of what is being stated here? No, I didn't think so.

"they would have seen that all time could be divided time into past and future. Therefore, there should be no present moment at all."

What is this besides the simple negation of the conventional existence of the present moment? what do you think that means? try and give me some crap about designation. tell me that the present moment of any instance of the form aggregate is an internal object (ie. a designation).

[tiltbillings]

I would suspect that Ven. Ñāṇavīra was probably taking issue with the classical Theravāda theory of radical momentariness. But this theory doesn't negate true, inherent existence (sabhāvasiddhi). Thus, classical Theravāda is a realist school.

The difference between something such as the Sarvastivadin notion of svabhava, the almost looks like a platonic form and has been characterized as an atman (by its critics) and the Theravadin notion sabhava, which is what gives a dhamma its characteristics as a result of interdependence. We are then talking about these terms, svabhava/sabhava, used in very different way by these different schools.

But they are both realist schools. One only has to read Prof. Karunadasa's Dhamma Theory, Philosophical Cornerstone of the Abhidhamma, to see that he is describing a realist tenet system:

• p. 1: All the different modes p. 22: ...a dhamma is a truly existent thing (sabhavasiddha)....

And by the time one gets to page 22, one has gone a far down the time-line. I have been fairly consistent in what I have been referring to in terms of sabhava and dhamma. Page 9: But the Pali Abhidhamma Pitaka did not succumb to this error of conceiving the dhammas as ultimate unities or discrete entities. In the Pali tradition it is only for the sake of definition and description that each dhamma is postulated as if it were a separate entity; but in reality it is by no means a solitary phenomenon having an existence of its own.

Now, as for the Mahayana:. . . .

Conze's and Streng's translations aren't very clear.

Conze's translation is fine. I watched two Sanskrit scholars from Otani Univesrity go through the Sanskrit line by line. Conze’s translation works.

As for the second, here's the verse translated by Ari Goldfield with comments by Khenpo Tsultrim Rinpoche:

• Dependently arisen entities
  Are called "emptiness,"

And even as late as the Visuddhimagga, dhammas are seen as dependently arisen.

[For] that which is dependently arisen
Is that which has no inherent nature. (22)

And here it depends upon how you define sabhava. My argument still stands.

[5heaps]

I see the back of my hand surrounded by monitor. How does this show parts as real and not simply a convention?

they dont function as "conventions". they function as things out of which you can mentally construct conventions.

Without recognition of things the variation is not bounded spatially or temporally. Its all a process which rolls on without parts enduring. Our communication is what makes parts relevant if they help us understand relational conditionality.

saying things are not bound is equivalent to saying things dont function, cos theyre just imagined. things dont have their own properties, because they dont have their own causes and conditions, cos actually theyre just my imaginations (namely, my designations). does this sound right, or helpful?

[tiltbillings]

Do you have a clue as the the context of what is being stated here? No, I didn't think so.

"they would have seen that all time could be divided time into past and future. Therefore, there should be no present moment at all."

What is this besides the simple negation of the conventional existence of the present moment? what do you think that means? try and give me some crap about designation. tell me that the present moment of any instance of the form aggregate is an internal object (ie. a designation).

Obviously the point is that the later Theravadins did not do that. Had they, your silly criticism would be appropriate.

Other than riding your Tibetan tenet system hobby-horse, trying filter the Theravada through the Tibetan tenet system, what is your point here?

[5heaps]

Obviously the point is that the later Theravadins did not do that. Had they, you silly criticism would be appropriate.

im not attacking them, i agree with momentariness. what im attacking is your idea which i cited

since all youve been saying lately is stuff about how things are designations, what, then, can that person possibly mean wen he says that the present doesnt exist because there is no present, theres just past and future? i think you have to employ the use of some form of designation, otherwise it is sheer nihilism. if you to use designation i will attempt to show how it too is nihilistic just as im trying with nana

what this has to do with tenet systems i dont quite know. if you just accepted momentariness it would be fine. apparently, however, you think characteristic natures exist without actually existing in any substantial way, somehow.

[tiltbillings]

Obviously the point is that the later Theravadins did not do that. Had they, you silly criticism would be appropriate.

im not attacking them, i agree with momentariness. what im attacking is your idea which i cited

What idea was that. It is very hard follow you.

since all youve been saying lately is stuff about how things are designations,

And they are not?

what, then, can that person possibly mean wen he says that the present doesnt exist because there is no present, theres just past and future?

Who would possibly say that? Again, you are filtering what is being said through your understanding of the tenet system.

i think you have to employ the use of some form of designation, otherwise it is sheer nihilism. if you to use designation i will attempt to show how it too is nihilistic just as im trying with nana

You are doing a rather poor job of it.

what this has to do with tenet systems i dont quite know. if you just accepted momentariness it would be fine. apparently, however, you think characteristic natures exist without actually existing in any substantial way, somehow.

Just a yes or no question: Does Nagarjuna say things exist in a substantial (whatever that might mean) way?

Actually, what does this have to do with the OP? It is always the same thing with you - trying to filter the Theravada through your non-Theravadin point of view. Why? You have essentially hijacked this thread with your postings that really are not to the point of what is being discussed. You want to discuss this stuff, start a new thread, please.

[Sanghamitta]

Do you have a clue as the the context of what is being stated here? No, I didn't think so.

"they would have seen that all time could be divided time into past and future. Therefore, there should be no present moment at all."

What is this besides the simple negation of the conventional existence of the present moment? what do you think that means? try and give me some crap about designation. tell me that the present moment of any instance of the form aggregate is an internal object (ie. a designation).

Obviously the point is that the later Theravadins did not do that. Had they, you silly criticism would be appropriate.

Other than riding your Tibetan tenet system hobby-horse, trying filter the Theravada through the Tibetan tenet system, what is your point here?

As usual. 5heaps your frequent (and frequently rancorous ) attempts to smuggle Vajrayana concepts under the wire led me some time ago to conclude that i was not inclined to take your critique of the Theravada with any degree of seriousness. You seem to be part of the small but active group of those who join a Theravada forum in the main the refute the Theravada...or as you would no doubt see it...to fill in the gap in our knowledge. Speaking for myself your efforts are noted but not required ..thank you.

[Hoo]

I guess it's time for me to ask the question....How many of the participants in this discussion actually have degrees in philosophy? Are they Western philosophy, Eastern, comparative religion, theology, etc? Any professional philosophers?

Hoo

[Individual]

I guess it's time for me to ask the question....How many of the participants in this discussion actually have degrees in philosophy? Are they Western philosophy, Eastern, comparative religion, theology, etc? Any professional philosophers?

Hoo

At the local community college, I took intro to philosophy, intro to logic, and intro to ethics

And I kept the textbooks for all three classes

[Prasadachitta]

I see the back of my hand surrounded by monitor. How does this show parts as real and not simply a convention?

they dont function as "conventions". they function as things out of which you can mentally construct conventions.

Ok. From my point of view you just keep stating what is the case and so do I. Neither of us really knows. All I can say is that you havnt said anything that comes close to changing how I feel about the way in which things endure. It does not make sense to me logically or in terms of how my experience unfolds.

saying things are not bound is equivalent to saying things dont function, cos theyre just imagined. things dont have their own properties, because they dont have their own causes and conditions, cos actually theyre just my imaginations (namely, my designations). does this sound right, or helpful?

I do not see how saying things are not bound is equivalent to saying things dont function. The way in which a thing functions is not free from the influence of nominal designation. Designation is not the same as imagination but similar. If I draw a map in the sand with houses and roads I use my imagination to designate a model of some place onto the sand. If I properly convey how my the model corresponds to your need to find your way then the map has served its purpose. In no way is the map in the sand separate from the sand. If I did not convey what the marks in the sand meant then it would be seen as sand just like all the rest.

Designations are not imagined because we do it together. Everyone interacting in society continually influences designations of various kinds. Also we have been setting up these ways of construing the world through countless lives. The way in which parts exist for us is not just a matter imagination. Its part of who we think we are. It is Nihilism to simply reject all of this as unreal because we must work with the forms which are present. We must stay alert because all of our designations are continually changing but always under the influence of those which came before.


Metta


Gabe

[Prasadachitta]

I guess it's time for me to ask the question....How many of the participants in this discussion actually have degrees in philosophy? Are they Western philosophy, Eastern, comparative religion, theology, etc? Any professional philosophers?

Hoo

I have no formal training whatsoever. Whatever I say should not be given any weight beyond what you perceive me to be saying. Unless it has to do with photography which I am very knowledgeable about as I have been working in the field my whole adult life.

[Individual]

Designations are not imagined because we do it together. Everyone interacting in society continually influences designations of various kinds. Also we have been setting up these ways of construing the world through countless lives. The way in which parts exist for us is not just a matter imagination. Its part of who we think we are. It is Nihilism to simply reject all of this as unreal because we must work with the forms which are present. We must stay alert because all of our designations are continually changing but always under the influence of those which came before.

It isn't nihilism if you regard virtually all designations as imagined, but without rejecting any of it as "unreal", and feel disinterested in forming a universally perfect expression

"Designations are not imagined because we do it together": what the heck? People can't be stupid in unison?

[Prasadachitta]

Designations are not imagined because we do it together. Everyone interacting in society continually influences designations of various kinds. Also we have been setting up these ways of construing the world through countless lives. The way in which parts exist for us is not just a matter imagination. Its part of who we think we are. It is Nihilism to simply reject all of this as unreal because we must work with the forms which are present. We must stay alert because all of our designations are continually changing but always under the influence of those which came before.

It isn't nihilism if you regard virtually all designations as imagined, but without rejecting any of it as "unreal", and feel disinterested in forming a universally perfect expression

"Designations are not imagined because we do it together": what the heck? People can't be stupid in unison?

You are using imagination in a different way than I am. You equate it with stupidity. One might know they are imagining. Again I said that designations are similar to imaginings.


Metta


Gabe

[Sobeh]

For thems who have not kept up with set theory since 9th grade, his point, in clear lucid English, is?

To present a description of experience which conserves the appearance of permanence sensed by the putthujana while describing a fundamental structure which reveals the underlying fact of impermanence. Permanence involves experiencing one level of epistemological generality in isolation from other levels of generality, and change is similarly described.

[Nyana]

No, one is trying to end unsatisfactoriness by removing ignorant reification and craving

ignorant reification of what?

Reification of persons and things as permanent persons and self-existent things. And to what end? To eliminate craving sensual pleasure (kāmataṇhā), craving existence (bhavataṇhā), and craving non-existence (vibhavataṇhā).

I'm not under any obligation to accept any commentarial use of sabhāva,

are you suggesting Theravada is not a realist school?

As already mentioned, at some point the Theravāda commentaries certainly began making realist claims. And as Tilt has implied, this doesn't really come to the fore until at least the sub-commentarial period.

if you to use designation i will attempt to show how it too is nihilistic just as im trying with nana

Well, then I would suggest that you're attempting to beat a dead horse!

And on a related note, I quit thinking in terms of vādas and yānas a long time ago. I consider everything other than the suttas of the Nikāyas and Āgamas to be a series of endnotes to the teachings of the ascetic Gotama. Some of these endnotes are more informative than others. Many just wander off into thickets of views.

All the best,

Geoff