The problem of infinity in Buddhism

[Circle5]

So when you can't pin down the Tathagata's existence in the present life it is proper to declare the Existence in the present life?
If it is proper to declare the existence in this life even tho it cant be pinned down, why is not proper after death.

Adress this

First of all, a more appropiate translation is not "as a truth or reality" but "as real and actual".

Second, to understand it, you need to read the whole sutta. There are a lot of suttas identical to that one, making the same case. Please read the whole sutta, stop this habit of reading just the beginning of a sutta or just the beginning of a post on the forum.

The sutta is reffering to the lack of self. He describes how the 5 aggregates that make up the Tathagata (WICH DO EXIST) are not to be regarded as self.

From the same sutta:

“What do you think, Anuradha, do you regard form as the Tathagata?”—“No, venerable sir.”—“Do you regard feeling … perception … volitional formations … consciousness as the Tathagata?”—“No, venerable sir.”

“What do you think, Anuradha, do you regard the Tathagata as in form?”—“No, venerable sir.”—“Do you regard the Tathagata as apart from form?”—“No, venerable sir.”—“Do you regard the Tathagata as in feeling? As apart from feeling? As in perception? As apart from perception? As in volitional formations? As apart from volitional formations? As in consciousness? As apart from consciousness?”—“No, venerable sir.”

“What do you think, Anuradha, do you regard form, feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness taken together as the Tathagata?”—“No, venerable sir.”

“What do you think, Anuradha, do you regard the Tathagata as one who is without form, without feeling, without perception, without volitional formations, without consciousness?”—“No, venerable sir.”

To put it more simply: There are just the aggregates, there is no Tathagata. They are not "the aggregates of the tathagata", that is incorrect. There are simply the aggregates. For example, the branches and leaves of a forest do exist. But they are not me, they are not mine, I can not be described in terms of the leaves and branches of a certain forest. In the same way the aggregates should be regarded.

[User156079]

So when you can't pin down the Tathagata's existence in the present life it is proper to declare the Existence in the present life?
If it is proper to declare the existence in this life even tho it cant be pinned down, why is not proper after death.

Adress this

First of all, a more appropiate translation is not "as a truth or reality" but "as real and actual".

Second, to understand it, you need to read the whole sutta. There are a lot of suttas identical to that one, making the same case. Please read the whole sutta, stop this habit of reading just the beginning of a sutta or just the beginning of a post on the forum.

The sutta is reffering to the lack of self. He describes how the 5 aggregates that make up the Tathagata (WICH DO EXIST) are not to be regarded as self.

From the same sutta:

“What do you think, Anuradha, do you regard form as the Tathagata?”—“No, venerable sir.”—“Do you regard feeling … perception … volitional formations … consciousness as the Tathagata?”—“No, venerable sir.”

“What do you think, Anuradha, do you regard the Tathagata as in form?”—“No, venerable sir.”—“Do you regard the Tathagata as apart from form?”—“No, venerable sir.”—“Do you regard the Tathagata as in feeling? As apart from feeling? As in perception? As apart from perception? As in volitional formations? As apart from volitional formations? As in consciousness? As apart from consciousness?”—“No, venerable sir.”

“What do you think, Anuradha, do you regard form, feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness taken together as the Tathagata?”—“No, venerable sir.”

“What do you think, Anuradha, do you regard the Tathagata as one who is without form, without feeling, without perception, without volitional formations, without consciousness?”—“No, venerable sir.”

To put it more simply: There are just the aggregates, there is no Tathagata. They are not "the aggregates of the tathagata", that is incorrect. There are simply the aggregates. For example, the branches and leaves of a forest do exist. But they are not me, they are not mine, I can not be described in terms of the leaves and branches of a certain forest. In the same way the aggregates should be regarded.

You have not answered either question.

[Garrib]

The fact that we, as beings, exist since forever and have been reborn again and again since forever is not one of the imponderables. It is a clearly stated fact and important part of buddhist doctrine.

Do you think this view is compatible with the Buddha's statement that he has left these things undeclared: The Universe is infinite...finite...eternal...non-eternal...??

It seems to me that you are trying to take the Buddha's statement that there is "no discernible beginning" to Samsara and make it 100% equivalent to "the universe is eternal and all of us have literally infinite previous lives" ... are you sure this is correct? I don't know personally the answer to these things, though I do have faith in the Buddha.

Respectfully,

Brad

[Circle5]

For this, I suggest reading: SN, Book of causation, Chapter IV, Anamataggasa˙yutta, Connected Discourses on Without Discoverable Beginning

[Coëmgenu]

Just my take:

An infinite time would lead to the conclusion that the present moment could not exist.

Why ? Why in the world would an infinite time lead to the conclusion that present moment could not exist lol ?

As far as I can tell the Buddha didn't answer these kinds of questions (imponderables) for at least two reasons:

The fact that we, as beings, exist since forever and have been reborn again and again since forever is not one of the imponderables. It is a clearly stated fact and important part of buddhist doctrine.

If I may contextualize as best I can what I think is Madhyamaka (early proto-Mahāyāna) teaching being presented, especially given the quotes brought up from Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. I will give some short contextualizations, as best as I am able, in the interest of open discussion, but will not engage beyond this one post in this thread on the matter (as it is off-topic for the General Theravāda subforum, but given that the OP brought it up himself, I felt the need to respond), perhaps if people want another Nāgārjuna conversation someone can start it in "Connections to Other Paths".

Twilight, you have given a few quotes from the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, but haven't demonstrated a willingness to meet the text on its own grounds, and seem to be pre-emptively assuming it will be based on innovative dharma espoused in non-EBTs and/or "postmodern" "illogical" nonsense exclusively. Such is not the case. Nāgārjuna, like any philosopher, Buddhist or non-Buddhist, does include many of his own interpretations and conclusions, but these are always thoroughly grounded in Buddhadharma and Buddhavacana, regardless of if you agree with his conclusions or not. Furthermore I think you are misunderstanding a few key Madhyamaka concepts, as evidenced by your responses to the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.

Similarly, you seem to think that Madhyamaka is about critiquing existence and reality itself. In a manner of speaking, yes, our basic experiences and what we consider to be "truly real" are brought into question, but not to the extent that you seem to think (Madhyamaka is not nihilism or solipsism as it is traditionally taught).

If I can contextualize a few of the quotes you have presented

When asked whether any beginning can be seen,
The Able One answered in the negative.
Cyclic existence has no beginning or end;
There is no before and there is no after.

It has an end, Nibbana is the end. (if it happens, cause it could very well not happen for a particular person, as the statistics presented here also show) From the fact that the round of rebirth has no beginning, that it is happening since forever, he concludes that there must be no end to the round of rebirth.

This is a matter of expression. The Pāli Canon is full of argumentation like this, because, if you don't practice well, and the never do so, then cyclical existence will have absolutely no end, ever (look up "endless" and related words like that on SuttaCentral's search function, the expression appears more often in later material, like the Theragāthā, but expresses the fact that without practice, there is no end to cyclical existence, I am looking up the quotes now, but the Theravāda school has some very compelling later literature that deals with universal salvation, and if it is reasonable or not).

When something has neither beginning nor end,
How could it possibly have a middle?

This is just a logical conclusion, it should be right up your alley, since you identify yourself in your posts as a logical positivist. Consider: if samsara is causeless, and Nibbāna is causeless, than lacking a cause in general, technically everything within the set of samsara or Nibbāna (the empty set? Sorry, I couldn't resist) can be also thought of as similarly fundamentally uncaused, because they all stem, all of these causes, conditions, effects, from a fundamental lack of cause itself, which, in Madhyamaka, is the asaṃskṛta (uncreated, unconditioned, etc).

[Circle5]

This is just a logical conclusion, it should be right up your alley, since you identify yourself in your posts as a logical positivist. Consider: if samsara is causeless, and Nibbāna is causeless, than lacking a cause in general, technically everything within the set of samsara or Nibbāna (the empty set? Sorry, I couldn't resist) can be also thought of as similarly fundamentally uncaused, because they all stem, all of these causes, conditions, effects, from a fundamental lack of cause itself, which, in Madhyamaka, is the asaṃskṛta (uncreated, unconditioned, etc).

This is using logic, it's not total nonsense. The problem is, it's using flawed logic. With a proper use of logic we get: If samsara exists since forever, with no "ultimate cause" for it's existence, just an endless string of causality. Then it can be said from this point of view that the existence of samsara is without a "primordial" cause. From this we can conclude that the existence of things from samsara, although all having a proximate cause, are lacking a "primordial cause" for their existence. Something like that.

What we CAN NOT CONCLUDE is that things in samsara are causless in the proximate sense. For example this computer exists because of a cause: the creation of the computer in a factory. The creation of it also has a cause. And so on and so on. Samsara is an endless string of causality that goes back to infinity. There was no point when samsara did not exist and a primordial cause appeared that made samsara exist. There is just an endless string of causality. Therefore, it is much more correct to say "everything is conditioned" as Buddha did, then to say "everything is not conditioned" based on flawed logic as Nagarjuna did.

As for Nibbana, here is again a flawed use of logic. While nibbana is the unconditioned, the path leading to it is totally conditioned.

Through the use of flawed logic, we can draw all kind of conclusions. For example we can say: If there is no primordial cause for the creation of samsara, and if Nibbana is the unconditioned, then this means pizza has the color blue and purple. This is using logic, nobody can deny that. But it's using flawed logic.

PS: Nagarjuna was not a postmodernist, he was a monist. From what I see on wikipedia, his monist position is called "dialectical monism" and is based on a twisting of the SN 12:15 sutta.

[Coëmgenu]

This is just a logical conclusion, it should be right up your alley, since you identify yourself in your posts as a logical positivist. Consider: if samsara is causeless, and Nibbāna is causeless, than lacking a cause in general, technically everything within the set of samsara or Nibbāna (the empty set? Sorry, I couldn't resist) can be also thought of as similarly fundamentally uncaused, because they all stem, all of these causes, conditions, effects, from a fundamental lack of cause itself, which, in Madhyamaka, is the asaṃskṛta (uncreated, unconditioned, etc).

This is using logic, it's not total nonsense. The problem is, it's using flawed logic. With a proper use of logic we get: If samsara exists since forever, with no "ultimate cause" for it's existence, just an endless string of causality. Then it can be said from this point of view that the existence of samsara is without a "primordial" cause. From this we can conclude that the existence of things from samsara, although all having a proximate cause, are lacking a "primordial cause" for their existence. Something like that.

What we CAN NOT CONCLUDE is that things in samsara are causless in the proximate sense.

Then you and Nāgārjuna are talking in different senses. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā is not concerned with the provisional/proximate, that is not questioned at all, hence the abundant negation in it. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā is essentially, you can think of it as like a "guide to dispelling false idols (of the unconditioned)".

I already broke my own promise ! No more for me except in the Nāgārjuna thread.

[Garrib]

For this, I suggest reading: SN, Book of causation, Chapter IV, Anamataggasa˙yutta, Connected Discourses on Without Discoverable Beginning

Thanks for the suggestion Circle 5 - I did just read through that SN selection. What I didn't see was anything said about 'infinite previous lives' - rather that we have had an unfathomable number of previous existences, and that a similarly unfathomable number of aeons have passed. We've been rich, poor, fortunate, unfortunate - there have been many civilizations, different Buddhas have come to teach the Dhamma, and because of impermanence all of these things of the past are no more. Present circumstances are impermanent in just the same way. Contemplating this we should become weary of cyclic existence and strive for liberation.

It is clear that the Buddha is saying we will not discover a beginning to samsara, no matter how far we are able to look back. However, it is still of interest to me that he does not explicitly seem to declare that we have all had infinite previous lives, or have existed in samsara "since forever." Perhaps that is being implied, but then why only imply what you mean to say outright?

You have said that this question is settled. Buddha taught in the affirmative that we have all had infinite previous lives and that samsara has existed "since forever." You claim this has nothing to do with the imponderables - but on what grounds? What did the Buddha mean when he said he has left undeclared "the universe is infinite...finite...eternal...non-eternal..."? Obviously, by "eternal" he does not mean 'possessing some unchanging essence', because this would never be an 'imponderable'. This would violate the tilakkhana - the Buddha would flatly reject it, right?

So what did the Buddha mean by "eternal" or "non eternal"??

Here I quote from the Suttas via Wikipedia:


Therefore, o monks, do not brood over [any of these views] Such brooding, O monks, is senseless, has nothing to do with genuine pure conduct (s. ādibrahmacariyaka-sīla), does not lead to aversion, detachment, extinction, nor to peace, to full comprehension, enlightenment and Nibbāna, etc.[8]

And the Aggi-Vacchagotta Sutta, "Discourse to Vatsagotra on the [Simile of] Fire," Majjhima Nikaya 72:

Vaccha, [any of these views] is a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views. It is accompanied by suffering, distress, despair, & fever, and it does not lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation; to calm, direct knowledge, full Awakening, Unbinding.[web 3]

The buddha further warns that

Whoever speculates about these things would go mad & experience vexation

[Circle5]

Perhaps that is being implied, but then why only imply what you mean to say outright?

Not only is it implied, but it could not be implied more clearly. He said there is no beginning to this round of rebirth. He further gave the example of "bigger than 1000, than 100.000 ... etc". If he were to say it outright, how would he have said it ? Something like this: "you have been reborn since forever, you have lived an infinite amount of lives before" - witch would imply existence of a self. But Buddha never spoke like that. That's why the correct way to say it is "there is no beginning to the round of rebirth" or "there is no beginning to samsara". Because Buddha avoided saying things that could be interpreted as a self existing and used the method of inferrence, this gives a small window for people to use an ultra-literalist interpretation of suttas and claim ridiculous things. For example Thanissaro is famous for claiming "Buddha had no clear position on weather a self exists or not, he refused to answer when asked point blank about it". This is ignoring the fact that he explains in the very sutta he makes this case upon why he did respond like that and ignores the fact that probably over 2000-3000 pages out of 10.000 of sutta pitakka are about this. It's the most fundamental doctrine of his and he went to great lenghts to make it clear. But still, there will always be people using an ultra-literalist twisting of suttas to claim all sort of things.

"Monks, these two slander the Tathagata. Which two? He who explains a discourse whose meaning needs to be inferred as one whose meaning has already been fully drawn out. And he who explains a discourse whose meaning has already been fully drawn out as one whose meaning needs to be inferred. These are two who slander the Tathagata."

http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html

[Coëmgenu]

Perhaps that is being implied, but then why only imply what you mean to say outright?

Not only is it implied, but it could not be implied more clearly. He said there is no beginning to this round of rebirth.

[...]

It's the most fundamental doctrine of his and he went to great lenghts to make it clear. But still, there will always be people using an ultra-literalist twisting of suttas to claim all sort of things.

"Monks, these two slander the Tathagata. Which two? He who explains a discourse whose meaning needs to be inferred as one whose meaning has already been fully drawn out. And he who explains a discourse whose meaning has already been fully drawn out as one whose meaning needs to be inferred. These are two who slander the Tathagata."

http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html

The Sarvāstivāda remembered this discourse differently. Who are you going to go with: the Vibhajyavāda or the Sarvāstivāda? Both constitute EBT collections, only one of them is contemporary Theravāda.

[Circle5]

How did they remembered it differently ?

[Coëmgenu]

How did they remembered it differently ?

MA 51 (translator: Charles D Patton):

Section 5: Related to Cultivation
The Ultimate Origin

1. I have heard thus: Once, the Buddha travelled to Śrāvastī and stayed at Anāthapiṇḍada’s Park in Jeta’s Grove.
2. At that time, the World Honored One addressed the bhikṣus: “That the craving for existence is the ultimate origin for it is unknowable. Or is there no craving for existence at the origin? But, there does presently arise this craving for existence.
3. The craving for existence has its cultivation; it is not without any cultivation. What is said to cultivate the craving for existence?”
4. They replied: “Non-insight (ignorance) is its cultivation.”

For something that is "the most fundamental doctrine of his", he seems awfully noncommittal the way that the Sarvāstivāda remembered the Buddha giving this discourse.

Beginningless samsara is a tenet in most Buddhisms I know of, aside from Tibetan Buddhism which has an "original Nirvana" idea, and it is certainly vital to Madhyamaka Buddhism, without beginningless samsara all of Madhyamaka seems questionable, but the Sarvāstivāda have the Buddha comment wistfully on the subject matter, as if it didn't really matter or he couldn't be bothered too think about it too hard to give a definite answer.

The two recensions don't contradict eachother per se, but they definitely do have the Buddha teach his teaching framed in slightly different ways. The nikāya can be read as possibly constituting a more authoritative characterization of the Buddha's teaching, as he outrightly states it "is not seen" at all (now whether "it is not seen (generally, by most)" and "it is not seen (by all including me)" are very different statements, one has the Buddha speaking from a "general perspective" and the other has the Buddha speaking from "his perspective" (abhiñña?), and both are possibilities for reading I think, as both are ultimately inferred. The less authoritative Sarvāstivāda Gautama wavers (?) on the subject, an interesting feature of speech, almost as if someone were thinking out loud or entertaining multiple possibilities.

[Circle5]

But the sutta you quoted is not about this subject. It is about the cause of craving for existence. And he explains there exists a cause for this craving for existence. It's like asking if craving for non-existence has a cause or not. And of course it has a cause, it has a cultivation. Or asking if craving for sensual pleasures has a cause, and it does have a cause, a cultivation. Also, the servastidian nikayas are almost identical to the theravada ones only that they're arranged differently. I am sure you can find the suttas about no discoverable beginning in the servastidian nikayas too if you search.

The begininggless round of rebirth is not only a fundamental doctrine clearly stated in the suttas, but it's an obvious logical conclusion of causality. You don't even need any suttas to figure it out for ourselves. Ask yourself: If there was a beginning, if there was a point where nothing existed and suddently the 5 aggregates appeared, because of what cause did that happen ? Why did it happen at that particular point and not another ? You go in the "god of the gaps" or "spagette monster" direction, you end up with "who created this god ? - another god and another god". That's why Buddha called idealism the theory of the turtle. You ask "why does this world exist ?" well, "it's kept on the back of a turtle". And who keeps that turtle ? Another turtle on her back. And another and another .

And we know that the cause for rebirth is craving. There had to be a craving for rebirth to happen. And there had to be feeling for craving to possibly develop, etc. That's why it's like a wheel, the wheel of Patticasamupada. A wheel of conditions can not have a beginning. Each conditions has another condition, but they run in circle.

The concept of infinity just feel strange, but it's just the logical conclusion. You follow the line of conditions and can only conclude that they had no beginning. It would be impossible for them to have a beginning. It's a clear implication of conditionality.

[Garrib]

I don't think you totally understood what I was trying to communicate in my last post...Probably my fault for not being clear enough with my own thinking and phrasing. I apologize.

I think this is actually the question I would like you to respond to, if you have the chance:
Why did the Buddha leave undeclared "the Universe is eternal...not-eternal"??


As far as I understand it, the Buddha said that people can go insane from thinking about things like this...that's not something I'm prepared to do just yet!

Thank you!

[Circle5]

Well, there are 4 unanswerable questions.

1) Is the world eternal or not ?
2) Is the world finite or infinite ?
3) Is the soul identical to the body ?
4) Does the Tathagata exist after death ?

The last two of them are pretty simple and explained in detail in other suttas. Which leaves us with the first two.

In my opinion, it might be something very very simple. When people from 2500 years ago had such questions, we can be 99% sure they referred to weather this universe is finite or infinite, weather it is eternal or not. Today, we know that the universe is finite, but there was no possibility for them to know such a thing in ancient times. They could think about this for ages and would never find an answer due to their lack of technology, no matter how much logic they would put into this. So we already solved the second question.

About the first question of weather it is eternal or not, we know that Buddha also described the big bang, how the universe expands and then contracts into a tiny point etc. So he could answer that yes it's infinite, this string of big-bangs goes on forever. But could you figure this out through logic ? And also, from another point of view it's not eternal. It gets destroyed and then appears again through a big bang. So it is complicated to describe and, more important, you just can't figure this out through the use of logical deduction. They could contemplate about this for ages and never find an answer due to their lack of technology. Even 200 years ago people would be in the same situation. So why have people losing time contemplating on such things when they would never come to a conclusion ? Wouldn't that be a huge waste of time ?

It's not that there are no answers to these questions, it's just that the last 2 can not be answered without first understanding the dhamma to a good degree and the first 2 were impossible to answer for people in that period. Not to mention if Buddha were to declare that, how could his disciples defend that point in a debate, especially since they were important debating issues at that time ? And they are not important for the path anyway.

"And why are they undeclared by me? Because they are not connected with the goal, are not fundamental to the holy life. They do not lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation, calming, direct knowledge, self-awakening, Unbinding. That's why they are undeclared by me.