Theravada against mathematics

[Germann]

None of that means that Theravada is reducible to Abhidhamma.

I understand that Theravada can be called a new religious movement of Pali monasticism, copying the Madhyamaka philosophy. But if we talk about the ancient school (younger than Madhyamaka, but also ancient) - if we talk about the Pali commentator tradition - then this is an abhidhammmic school.

[cappuccino]

then this is an abhidhammmic school.

Abhidhamma should be ignored

[Pseudobabble]

None of that means that Theravada is reducible to Abhidhamma.

I understand that Theravada can be called a new religious movement of Pali monasticism, copying the Madhyamaka philosophy. But if we talk about the ancient school (younger than Madhyamaka, but also ancient) - if we talk about the Pali commentator tradition - then this is an abhidhammmic school.

Right, of course you conveniently left out everything that doesn't fit your pre-planned trajectory.

Answer me this - have you ever meditated?

[Germann]

Earlier you 'refuted' Theravada on the basis that the Abhidhamma is mathematically incoherent. So what if it is?

If Theravada is right, then by becoming a Mahayanist, a Buddhist will not lose anything - after all, a completely non-existent person does not lose anything and nothing threatens him. (“Man” is the same simulacrum as “World Soul” - avijjamana, non-existent).

If Mahayana is right, then by becoming a Theravadin, a Buddhist will lose proper meditation - instead of what is actually (manifestations that are empty from self-existence, one in taste), the beholder will concentrate on an erroneous concept (on mirage of absolutely impersonal mechanical causality).

At the same time, the Theravadin school Abhidhamma is clearly wrong, offering a mathematically impossible model of reality.

[Ceisiwr]

I can see this thread going on ad infinitum

[Pseudobabble]

Earlier you 'refuted' Theravada on the basis that the Abhidhamma is mathematically incoherent. So what if it is?

If Theravada is right, then by becoming a Mahayanist, a Buddhist will not lose anything - after all, a completely non-existent person does not lose anything and nothing threatens him. (“Man” is the same simulacrum as “World Soul” - avijjamana, non-existent).

If Mahayana is right, then by becoming a Theravadin, a Buddhist will lose proper meditation - instead of what is actually (manifestations that are empty from self-existence, one in taste), the beholder will concentrate on an erroneous concept (on mirage of absolutely impersonal mechanical causality).

At the same time, the Theravadin school Abhidhamma is clearly wrong, offering a mathematically impossible model of reality.

You failed to answer the question.

'A Mahayanist', 'a Theravadin', 'a Madhyamika' - names, designations. Being correct, being right, seems to be a great concern of yours. Naturally, it is normal to want to be correct - but at what point does the desire for correctness become an obstacle?

Have you ever meditated, Germann?

[Pseudobabble]

I can see this thread going on ad infinitum

Yep, it certainly looks that way. At first I wanted to ignore it, but since Germann is apparently here to stay, we might as well play along.

[binocular]

If Theravada is right, then by becoming a Mahayanist, a Buddhist will not lose anything - after all, a completely non-existent person does not lose anything and nothing threatens him. (“Man” is the same simulacrum as “World Soul” - avijjamana, non-existent).

If Mahayana is right, then by becoming a Theravadin, a Buddhist will lose proper meditation - instead of what is actually (manifestations that are empty from self-existence, one in taste), the beholder will concentrate on an erroneous concept (on mirage of absolutely impersonal mechanical causality).

And if the Protestants are right, we will all burn in hell for all eternity!

I mean, how did you come to whittle down your options to just these two -- either Mahayana or Theravada?

Why not worry about all the other religions where choosing for or against them is said to have momentuous repercussions?

[Freddie]

If all events are completely deterministic, then for an infinite number of steps in the deterministic algorithm of combinations of elements any possible combination is also realized. Nibbana should already be achieved. The path to Nibbana should have been fully formed.

This is false. Even if all events in a universe with a finite number of objects are mechanistically determined it does not follow that there are a finite number of possible states that will be fulfilled in a finite time, provided the existence of a spatial continuum in which the objects (dhammas) can move within. This false assumption leads to Nietzsche's fallacious concept of the Eternal Recurrence. To quote Walter Kauffman's criticism on the Eternal Recurrence:


Even if there were exceedingly few things in a finite space in an infinite time, they would not have to repeat in the same configurations. Suppose there were three wheels of equal size, rotating on the same axis, one point marked on the circumference of each wheel, and these three points lined up in one straight line. If the second wheel rotated twice as fast as the first, and if the speed of the third wheel was 1/π of the speed of the first, the initial line-up would never recur

Thus your inference that determinism+finite constituent parts of the universe+infinite past time equals all possible events have already occurred is wrong as long as space is not discrete. The monkey-typewriter example is inappropriate here because the alphabet is not a continuum, there are not an infinite number of gradations between letters of the alphabet while space and time are infinitely divisible.

[Dan74-MkII]

I am not sure why you talk about "all possible lives". We have a finite number of sentient beings. They have their unique pasts. Think of the grid example, can you phrase your question in its terms, so that it is more concrete and understandable?

If you do not deny the limit on longevity for the gods of the sphere of light (not the fact that their lifespan can be arbitrarily long), then the set of all possible lives is a finite set, similar to the Shannon number (when the length of a game of chess is limited to 40 moves). A finite set of possible lives with an infinite set of past lives also means that all possible lives have already been lived ... But an infinite set of possible lives will be lived, because their set is countable.

http://mymathforum.com/number-theory/34 ... ments.html

Life is a finite sequence of combinations of a finite set of elements (dhammas).

I don't follow.

[Sherab]

If satta, the subject of free choice, is totally denied, then all events are random or predetermined.

The lack of free choice (i.e. a choice that is not determined by any cause or influence by any condition (I am not even sure if there is such a thing in reality)) does not mean that there is no choice.

The ability to choice is something that is needed in the context of limited information. In any other context, it makes no sense. In a context of limited information, we have to decide based on what we are taught and what we have experienced. There is always uncertainty around the importance of the factors that will affect a choice. Therefore the outcome of an act of choosing is deterministic but not pre-determined. There will always be different possible outcomes depending on what choice is made. The past is therefore fixed but the future is not pre-determined.

For this, a subject of free choice is needed (the subject is a stream of dharmas), and not a denial of the existence of the subject (the stream of dharmas exists, the "man" is called the stream of dharmas). It is not about absolute freedom. There is some degree of freedom, that's enough.

If a subject does not have free choice, but choice as I have described, are you okay with this? Or do you still hold that a subject must have free choice in order to ensure that the Theravadin's interpretation of the Buddha's teachings is not against mathematics?

[Sherab]

Nibbana can be anything. Theravadin Nibbana is most similar to Nirguna Brahman - a transcendental entity, an absolute reality that remains out of experience, after all phenomena cease.

What are your reasons for saying the above?

Absolute reality that exists after the cessation of phenomena.

Absolute reality is there with relative reality. Is it NOT that absolute reality exists AFTER the cessation of phenomena.

Udana 8.3
There is, bhikkhus, a not-born, a not-brought-to-being, a not-made, a not-conditioned. If, bhikkhus, there were no not-born, not-brought-to-being, not-made, not-conditioned, no escape would be discerned from what is born, brought-to-being, made, conditioned. But since there is a not-born, a not-brought-to-being, a not-made, a not-conditioned, therefore an escape is discerned from what is born, brought-to-being, made, conditioned.

[Sherab]

Nibbana has no kammic reasons, but its manifestation has conditions. The realization of Nibbana is the well-known sequence of dhammas. This sequence of dhammas, if possible, has a non-zero probability.

If Nibbana is mere cessation, then we can say that mere cessation requires that condition of the cessation of the phenomenon of mind. If Nibbana is not mere cessation but a realization, then that realization cannot come from the mind in the realm of phenomena because that mind has already ceased. The realization of Nibbana therefore comes from a different consciousness. Therefore, that realization has nothing to do with any casually chained events.

The obvious question to ask then is did the Buddha himself alluded to the fact that there is two type of consciousness in the Pali canon? The answer is yes.

If there is no subject of free choice, then the path to Nibbana (the sequence of combinations of dhammas, after which Nibbana manifests) is random or deterministic. In any case, this path will be traversed for an infinite past. Here, in this thread, random events were denied in favor of fully deterministic ones. If reality is such a deterministic algorithm, then any deterministic sequence of combinations of elements is implemented in an infinite number of steps of this algorithm. All steps of the algorithm are a countable set (the “smallest” among infinite sets). All steps of the algorithm fit in the infinite past.

I said that if Nibbana is a REALIZATION, then that realization cannot come from a dependently arisen mind because that mind would have ceased when Cessation happens.

So is Nibbana a realization or not?

[cappuccino]

not a sudden realization, a very gradual insight

[Germann]

The lack of free choice (i.e. a choice that is not determined by any cause or influence by any condition (I am not even sure if there is such a thing in reality)) does not mean that there is no choice.

The ability to choice is something that is needed in the context of limited information. In any other context, it makes no sense. In a context of limited information, we have to decide based on what we are taught and what we have experienced. There is always uncertainty around the importance of the factors that will affect a choice. Therefore the outcome of an act of choosing is deterministic but not pre-determined. There will always be different possible outcomes depending on what choice is made. The past is therefore fixed but the future is not pre-determined.

For this, a subject of free choice is needed (the subject is a stream of dharmas), and not a denial of the existence of the subject (the stream of dharmas exists, the "man" is called the stream of dharmas). It is not about absolute freedom. There is some degree of freedom, that's enough.

If a subject does not have free choice, but choice as I have described, are you okay with this? Or do you still hold that a subject must have free choice in order to ensure that the Theravadin's interpretation of the Buddha's teachings is not against mathematics?

No one exists, but there is a free choice? This is absurd.

Such a "free choice" is no different from a conditioned event, as in physics (it is simply a conditioned Dhamma), or the freedom of choice of this dhamma itself and has. If the dhamma is a subject, then it has no recompense, because any such Dhamma has the same end regardless of its choice - cessation, death. A man like the Parliament of dhammas, a rather strange idea - but does not save the system.