Against Nāgārjuna

[Ceisiwr]

It seems to me it is a circular argument you're making, since you appear to define self-essence to be the same as an attribute and then declare that it's proven.

Self essence = sabhāva which is the same as attribute/characteristic. Apart from its characteristic there is no dhamma. It is proven to be so under analysis. That which cannot be broken down further bears sabhāva, thus is the ultimate reality.

https://www.amaravati.org/the-view-from-the-centre/

I'm not seeing the relevance?

[Dan74]

Self essence = sabhāva which is the same as attribute/characteristic. Apart from its characteristic there is no dhamma. It is proven to be so under analysis. That which cannot be broken down further bears sabhāva, thus is the ultimate reality.

https://www.amaravati.org/the-view-from-the-centre/

I'm not seeing the relevance?

The relevance is Ajahn Amaro's practical approach to these teachings which avoids getting lost in the thicket of views.

[AlexBrains92]

Greetings,

As we all know, Nāgārjuna is one of the most respected and followed Buddhist philosophers since the Blessed One himself. He is quite popular even among those who claim to follow Theravāda. It is said that he argued for a return to the Middle Way and a move away from the realist extremes of the Ābhidharmikas/Abhidhammikas. As an Abhidhammika I would submit that Nāgārjuna does no such thing. I have made a post regarding this before, but I felt a new post was required as this comes from a slightly different angle.

My argument is simple. Nāgārjuna was opposing the substance metaphysics of Sarvāstivādins and their bastardised form of Abhidhamma. These were likely the principle opponents of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. In opposing substance I agree with Nāgārjuna. However, I feel that Nāgārjuna makes an error that is replicated in his followers today. The error is in moving from establishing that there is no substance to claiming that there is no existence apart from concept. Whilst its true that there can be no substance, it does not follow that there is no existence apart from what is conceptual and conventional. What is forgotten here is essence. There being essence there is existence. Essence, however, does not equate to substance or permanence. To give an example, citta has no substance. There is no enduring "cittahood" that persists. There are only moments of citta. These moments of citta however do have an essence. The essence of citta is to cognise. Apart from cognition there is no citta. Apart from its essence, apart from cognition, there is no citta. To say there is no essence to citta is to say there is no citta. This, however, cannot be true since we do cognise. There is an act of cognition right now. There being cognition there must be an essence. There being an essence to citta, citta then exists since essence is the fundamental requirement for existence apart from concept. If this essence didn't exist, citta would not exist. Therefore, we can speak of dhammas that exist since if we deny their characteristic then we deny their reality. Based on this understanding, dhammas then are not empty of existence. We can say that dhammas exist. They exist because they have essence despite having no substance. Ultimate truth is then not emptiness of existence. It is the emptiness of substance and self. It is emptiness of permanence and self. Indeed, the Awakened One said we have a perverted view not of existence but of permanence, self and beauty. Nāgārjuna's arguments and those of his followers therefore overreach and go from one extreme to another. They overreach by equating the absence of substance with the absence of existence apart from concept. This however is not true for essence entails existence, and essence exists apart from concept and substance.

Thoughts?

The notions of existence and nonexistence are rejected in the Kaccānagotta Sutta (the only discourse cited by Nāgārjuna in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, by the way).

[Coëmgenu]

The notions of existence and nonexistence are rejected in the Kaccānagotta Sutta (the only discourse cited by Nāgārjuna in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, by the way).

He cites the Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitsūtra in numerous places as well, but most people do not recognize these citations because they haven't read it:

[Interlocutor] If these marks of arising, abiding, and ceasing are absolutely non-existent, how can you speak their names in this treatise?

[Root text]
Like an illusion, like a dream,
like a city of gandharvas;
the arising, abiding, and ceasing of which we speak
has marks such as these.

[Ven Vimalākṣa] The characteristics of arising, abiding, and ceasing are not fixed and real. Unenlightened people with their voracious attachments assert that they are fixed and real, so saints and sages, out of pity and compassion and a desire to bring to an end their perverted views, revert to using those terms to which people are attached. Though the expressions are the same, their minds are different. To speak thus of arising, abiding and ceasing should not deserve criticism, just as the acts of an illusionist should not be censured, because of his motive. There should be no feelings of grief or joy in this regard; one should simply see with one's eyes and that is all, just as one should not seek in the real world for something seen only in a dream, and just as, for example, a city of gandharvas, manifesting with the sunrise is not real, but merely a conventional designation which soon ceases to be. 'Arising', 'abiding' and 'ceasing' are also like this. The unenlightened man differentiates them as existents; the sage investigates and finds them untenable.

(中論 T1564.9a7 觀三相品第七, Madhyamakaśāstra Ch. 7 "On Observing the Three Marks," translation C. Bocking et al.)

I put the quotation into italics and bolded an important point that a lot of people who get high on Madhyamaka metaphysics and like to pretend to be Buddhas always miss.

[AlexBrains92]

The notions of existence and nonexistence are rejected in the Kaccānagotta Sutta (the only discourse cited by Nāgārjuna in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, by the way).

He cites the Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitsūtra in numerous places as well, but most people do not recognize these citations because they haven't read it:

[Interlocutor] If these marks of arising, abiding, and ceasing are absolutely non-existent, how can you speak their names in this treatise?

[Root text]
Like an illusion, like a dream,
like a city of gandharvas;
the arising, abiding, and ceasing of which we speak
has marks such as these.

[Ven Vimalākṣa] The characteristics of arising, abiding, and ceasing are not fixed and real. Unenlightened people with their voracious attachments assert that they are fixed and real, so saints and sages, out of pity and compassion and a desire to bring to an end their perverted views, revert to using those terms to which people are attached. Though the expressions are the same, their minds are different. To speak thus of arising, abiding and ceasing should not deserve criticism, just as the acts of an illusionist should not be censured, because of his motive. There should be no feelings of grief or joy in this regard; one should simply see with one's eyes and that is all, just as one should not seek in the real world for something seen only in a dream, and just as, for example, a city of gandharvas, manifesting with the sunrise is not real, but merely a conventional designation which soon ceases to be. 'Arising', 'abiding' and 'ceasing' are also like this. The unenlightened man differentiates them as existents; the sage investigates and finds them untenable.

(中論 T1564.9a7 觀三相品第七, Madhyamakaśāstra Ch. 7 "On Observing the Three Marks," translation C. Bocking et al.)

I put the quotation into italics and bolded an important point that a lot of people who get high on Madhyamaka metaphysics and like to pretend to be Buddhas always miss.

I agree with you, so? Did I write something wrong? I don't think so.
My point is to criticize Ceisiwr's affirmation of the notions of essence and existence.

[Coëmgenu]

I appreciate you might feel like I was chastising you. I was simply posting the Prajñāpāramitā quotation from MMK here to substantiate. I am sorry if quoting you rubbed you the wrong way or if it seemed like I was chastising you for something.

[AlexBrains92]

I appreciate you might feel like I was chastising you. I was simply posting the Prajñāpāramitā quotation from MMK here to substantiate. I am sorry if quoting you rubbed you the wrong way or if it seemed like I was chastising you for something.

Oh! I clearly misunderstood

[Coëmgenu]

One of the difficulties that arises when we speak of "substance versus essence" is that when we go back far enough in the history of European and Mediterranean philosophy that gives us these modern words "substance" and "essence," we find a merger -- that they in fact refer often to the exact same thing. There is a reason the Catholic Church in its scholastic elaborations on its sacraments speaks of the "substance" of the eucharist as opposed to the "accidents" of the eucharist. The substance of the eucharist is God and the accidents of the eucharist are bread and wine in that system. This is because "substance" is what "stands below," (Latin: sub stantia) coming from the Latin term for the underlying essence that "stands below" manifest phenomena, supporting them from an imagined "ground" of their existence. The substance is the "essence," what exists to make possible existence, in a substance metaphysic.

Nowadays, when we say "substance," we often mean "material constituents." The "substance of an object" has come to have an additional meaning of "the material makeup of a material object." Insubstantial is more likely to mean immaterial or nonexistent than devoid of essence. We still use "substance" in its more etymologically philosophical sense when we speak of "the substance of a matter," referring to a subject matter. Here, it is obvious we mean, "The essence of what we're talking about," rather than "the material makeup of the subject of conversation."

All I need is for the Theras of the Mahāvihāra to make a distinction between essence and substance. Thankfully they do. Substance endures. Essence does not.

[...]

So how do the Theras of the Mahāvihāra differentiate between essence and substance in their writings? It seems like a very modern distinction based on English-language terms.

[SteRo]

The notions of existence and nonexistence are rejected in the Kaccānagotta Sutta (the only discourse cited by Nāgārjuna in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, by the way).

And the notions of existence and nonexistence are affirmed in the Puppha Sutta:

“Form that’s constant, permanent, eternal, not subject to change is agreed upon by the wise as not existing in the world, and I too say, ‘It doesn’t exist.’
...
“Form that’s inconstant, stressful, subject to change is agreed upon by the wise as existing in the world, and I too say, ‘It exists.’

https://www.dhammatalks.org/suttas/SN/SN22_94.html

[AlexBrains92]

The notions of existence and nonexistence are rejected in the Kaccānagotta Sutta (the only discourse cited by Nāgārjuna in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, by the way).

And the notions of existence and nonexistence are affirmed in the Puppha Sutta:

“Form that’s constant, permanent, eternal, not subject to change is agreed upon by the wise as not existing in the world, and I too say, ‘It doesn’t exist.’
...
“Form that’s inconstant, stressful, subject to change is agreed upon by the wise as existing in the world, and I too say, ‘It exists.’

https://www.dhammatalks.org/suttas/SN/SN22_94.html

You're right... but my sutta has more parallels than yours

Jokes aside, we can see from both these suttas that the pali term for 'existence' is 'atthita'.
If we use 'essence' as a synonym for 'existence', like Ceisiwr does, 'essence' is not 'sabhava', but 'atthita'.
'Sabhava' can be 'essence' only as a synonym for 'substance'.

[SteRo]

The notions of existence and nonexistence are rejected in the Kaccānagotta Sutta (the only discourse cited by Nāgārjuna in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, by the way).

And the notions of existence and nonexistence are affirmed in the Puppha Sutta:

“Form that’s constant, permanent, eternal, not subject to change is agreed upon by the wise as not existing in the world, and I too say, ‘It doesn’t exist.’
...
“Form that’s inconstant, stressful, subject to change is agreed upon by the wise as existing in the world, and I too say, ‘It exists.’

https://www.dhammatalks.org/suttas/SN/SN22_94.html

You're right... but my sutta has more parallels than yours

Jokes aside, we can see from both these suttas that the pali term for 'existence' is 'atthita'.
If we use 'essence' as a synonym for 'existence', like Ceisiwr does, 'essence' is not 'sabhava', but 'atthita'.
'Sabhava' can be 'essence' only as a synonym for 'substance'.

Maybe. Nevertheless I think that such topics are alien to original theravada.

[Ceisiwr]

The notions of existence and nonexistence are rejected in the Kaccānagotta Sutta (the only discourse cited by Nāgārjuna in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, by the way).

What seems to be being rejected there is the Upanishadic sarvaṃ asti such as what we see in the Chandogya Upanishad rather than notions of existence and non-existence themselves.

‘The self and the world are eternal, barren, steadfast as a mountain peak, standing firm like a pillar. And though these beings roam and wander (through the round of existence), pass away and re-arise, yet the self and the world remain the same just like eternity itself."

DN1

“Bhikkhus, held by two kinds of views, some devas and
human beings hold back and some overreach; only those with vision see.

“And how, bhikkhus, do some hold back? Devas and humans enjoy being, delight in being, are satisfied with being. When Dhamma is taught to them for the cessation of being, their minds do not enter into it or acquire confidence in it or settle upon it or become resolved upon it. Thus, bhikkhus, do some hold back.

“How, bhikkhus, do some overreach? Now some are troubled, ashamed, and disgusted by this very same being and they rejoice in (the idea of) non-being, asserting: ‘In as much as this self, good sirs, when the body perishes at death, is annihilated and destroyed and does not exist after death—this is peaceful, this is excellent, this is reality!’ Thus, bhikkhus, do some overreach.

Diṭṭhigata Sutta

[Ceisiwr]

So how do the Theras of the Mahāvihāra differentiate between essence and substance in their writings? It seems like a very modern distinction based on English-language terms.

The Visuddhimagga states that apart from their characteristic, there is no dhamma. No substrate from which they arise and fall into, unlike what we find with the Sarvāstivādins:

For they do not come from anywhere prior to their rise, nor do they go anywhere after their fall. On the contrary, before their rise they had no individual essence, and after their fall their individual essences are completely dissolved. And they occur without mastery [being exercisable over them] since they exist in dependence on conditions and in between the past and the future. Hence they should be regarded as having no provenance and no destination.

Likewise a sub-commentary states that dhammas = essence, not substance. Apart from essence, there is no dhamma.

[AlexBrains92]

The notions of existence and nonexistence are rejected in the Kaccānagotta Sutta (the only discourse cited by Nāgārjuna in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, by the way).

What seems to be being rejected there is the Upanishadic sarvaṃ asti such as what we see in the Chandogya Upanishad rather than notions of existence and non-existence themselves.

‘The self and the world are eternal, barren, steadfast as a mountain peak, standing firm like a pillar. And though these beings roam and wander (through the round of existence), pass away and re-arise, yet the self and the world remain the same just like eternity itself."

DN1

“Bhikkhus, held by two kinds of views, some devas and
human beings hold back and some overreach; only those with vision see.

“And how, bhikkhus, do some hold back? Devas and humans enjoy being, delight in being, are satisfied with being. When Dhamma is taught to them for the cessation of being, their minds do not enter into it or acquire confidence in it or settle upon it or become resolved upon it. Thus, bhikkhus, do some hold back.

“How, bhikkhus, do some overreach? Now some are troubled, ashamed, and disgusted by this very same being and they rejoice in (the idea of) non-being, asserting: ‘In as much as this self, good sirs, when the body perishes at death, is annihilated and destroyed and does not exist after death—this is peaceful, this is excellent, this is reality!’ Thus, bhikkhus, do some overreach.

Diṭṭhigata Sutta

Yes, maybe you're right.

And what about this?

Jokes aside, we can see from both these suttas that the pali term for 'existence' is 'atthita'.
If we use 'essence' as a synonym for 'existence', like Ceisiwr does, 'essence' is not 'sabhava', but 'atthita'.
'Sabhava' can be 'essence' only as a synonym for 'substance'.

[Ceisiwr]

And what about this?
AlexBrains92 wrote: ↑Sat Oct 10, 2020 1:39 pm
Jokes aside, we can see from both these suttas that the pali term for 'existence' is 'atthita'.
If we use 'essence' as a synonym for 'existence', like Ceisiwr does, 'essence' is not 'sabhava', but 'atthita'.
'Sabhava' can be 'essence' only as a synonym for 'substance'

Sabhāva is not found in the suttas directly. It is, however, alluded to. For example, in the Khajjanīya Sutta the Blessed One discusses the intrinsic characteristics of the aggregates:

And why, bhikkhus, do you call it form? ‘It is deformed,’ bhikkhus, therefore it is called form. Deformed by what? Deformed by cold, deformed by heat, deformed by hunger, deformed by thirst, deformed by contact with flies, mosquitoes, wind, sun, and serpents. ‘It is deformed,’ bhikkhus, therefore it is called form.

“And why, bhikkhus, do you call it feeling? ‘It feels,’ bhikkhus, therefore it is called feeling. And what does it feel? It feels pleasure, it feels pain, it feels neither-pain-nor-pleasure. ‘It feels,’ bhikkhus, therefore it is called feeling.

“And why, bhikkhus, do you call it perception? ‘It perceives,’ bhikkhus, therefore it is called perception. And what does it perceive? It perceives blue, it perceives yellow, it perceives red, it perceives white. ‘It perceives,’ bhikkhus, therefore it is called perception.

“And why, bhikkhus, do you call them volitional formations? ‘They construct the conditioned,’ bhikkhus, therefore they are called volitional formations. And what is the conditioned that they construct? They construct conditioned form as form; they construct conditioned feeling as feeling; they construct conditioned perception as perception; they construct conditioned volitional formations as volitional formations; they construct conditioned consciousness as consciousness. ‘They construct the conditioned,’ bhikkhus, therefore they are called volitional formations.

“And why, bhikkhus, do you call it consciousness? ‘It cognizes, ’ bhikkhus, therefore it is called consciousness. And what does it cognize? It cognizes sour, it cognizes bitter, it cognizes pungent, it cognizes sweet, it cognizes sharp, it cognizes mild, it cognizes salty, it cognizes bland. ‘It cognizes,’ bhikkhus, therefore it is called consciousness.

https://suttacentral.net/sn22.79/en/bodhi

It is interesting to note that, as far as I'm aware, atthi is never used in conjunction with a whole. Only ever with that which cannot be reduced further. In other words, in relation to sabhāva.