Why Suttanta?

[zan]

First of all! I want to be abundantly clear: I do not find the Suttanta position to be incorrect! Not at all! I understand their positions and see their validity. They may very well have the correct understanding of the suttas. I am classical Theravada, but I am not an Arahant, so I accept the possibility that my position is wrong, and the Suttanta may be the correct one.

That said:

Suttanta generally differs from Classical Theravada in one or more of the three following respects:

1.) It posits a self to some degree. Whether it is called "self" or not, some kind of eternalism in the form of something existing forever that is somehow connected to the self (even if this is denied by adherents) is posited.

2.) It posits that Nibbana is consciousness.

3.) It posits that all is one.
a.) It posits that all is mind.

What I'm wondering is: why not just go with Hinduism or Mahayana or Vajrayana Buddhism? Instead we have to read the suttas and carefully interpret them to allow for one or all of the above points to be correct. There is endless debate as the suttas do not come right out and declare any of the above three in clear, repeated and utterly unambiguous terms (Yes there are vague references, some poems and such, but not flatly stated, repeated, unambiguos declarations).

The Hindu texts do, so do some Mahayana and Vajrayana texts.

So why fight through these texts that don't overtly agree with your views when others absolutely do?

Hinduism states that all is mind (consciousness or Brahman), there is a self and all is one and that Moksha is eternal life as pure consciousness. Some branches of the Mahayana and Vajrayana share these exact views, others share them except they deny the self and claim that while all is mind, mind does not exist and/or that they are atheist and/or that there is no self, and that this differentiates them from the Hindu position. However the Brihadaranyaka, Isha, Mundaka Upanishads, in which Brahman is everything and "no-thing" and are considered to support a possible atheistic reading, would include the Mahayana position as well.

And so, what makes Theravada unique is it's denial of oneness, denial of the self, atheism, and it's denial that all is mind. The opposite positions are held by the majority of Hindu texts. The above mentioned Upanishads could be interpreted to be atheist, and, at a stretch, to be selfless, but still teach that all is one, and that all is mind.

So, why not go with Hinduism or a Mahayana or Vajrayana school that overtly agrees with your position, rather than using texts that require interpretation to support it?

The Suttanta positions are all personal extrapolations that are made and discussed by Suttantists, but what they seem to miss is that they are repeating history, as the Mahayana and Vajrayana thinkers came to the exact same conclusions that they have and already formed their Suttanta equivalent schools hundreds or over a thousand years ago. Every Suttanta view has a Mahayana or Vajrayana school for them, and/or a Hindu school. These schools teach exactly what you believe and have already worked out all the kinks you run into. Why do you reject them?

[Coëmgenu]

Suttanta generally differs from Classical Theravada in one or more of the three following respects:

1.) It posits a self to some degree. Whether it is called "self" or not, some kind of eternalism in the form of something existing forever that is somehow connected to the self (even if this is denied by adherents) is posited.

2.) It posits that Nibbana is consciousness.

3.) It posits that all is one.
a.) It posits that all is mind.

I don't mean to be too negative, but these things appear to be all made up. Can you substantiate any of them? Can you point to sutta-followers arguing any of these things from the suttas?

[Nicolas]

I was similarly surprised to see these 3-4 points connected to Suttanta.
Could it be in connection instead to (Wat Phra) Dhammakaya, or perhaps the notion of "original mind" present in some of the Thai Forest Tradition?

[SDC]

I don't mean to be too negative, but these things appear to be all made up. Can you substantiate any of them? Can you point to sutta-followers arguing any of these things from the suttas?

I think because I brought up attavādupādāna (clinging to the doctrine of self) as the condition of the ordinary person, it is being taken as an endorsement of eternalism? However, considering it is done so in the suttas as a description of ignorance and this mass of suffering, it isn't an endorsement. It is simply the world of the ordinary person. It isn't supposed to be denied, it is to be understood as not mine, not I am and not myself.

The Pali for "not self" is anatta, the negation of the noun atta. Not sure if the addition of an is considered an inflection, but the term anatta is a modifier, hence it is an adjective, not a noun. It is not the strongest available affirmation of a negation, hence "not": the property of being not self. I imagine if the Buddha wanted to say there is "no self" it would've been closer to natthi atta, the verb as (to be), with the indeclineable na, an emphatic expression. But why would he do that if he must address the effects of attavāda for those not free from it? *Paging our Pali gurus*

That was the point I intended to make.

I also have doubts as to the prevalence of self-denial in the Classical Theravada view. I'm just not immersed in it enough to know for sure if it truly is a theme. Considering most modern translators have settle on "non" or "not" self, perhaps it is more isolated than zan has been led to believe. I honestly don't know.

[DNS]

1.) It posits a self to some degree. Whether it is called "self" or not, some kind of eternalism in the form of something existing forever that is somehow connected to the self (even if this is denied by adherents) is posited.
2.) It posits that Nibbana is consciousness.
3.) It posits that all is one.
a.) It posits that all is mind.

Not all Suttanta adherents do that. For example, Bhante Sujato (EBT, Suttanta) has written Nibbana is not viññāṇa. Really, it just isn’t.
https://sujato.wordpress.com/2011/05/13 ... E2%80%99t/

You will find some of that in some Thai forest traditions and perhaps some other Theravada traditions, sub-sects, I suppose you could call them, but not all of them.

[Coëmgenu]

I imagine if the Buddha wanted to say there is "no self" it would've been closer to natthi atta, the verb as (to be), with the indeclineable na, an emphatic expression. But why would he do that if he must address the effects of attavāda for those not free from it?

The Buddha has "natthattā" posed to him as an inquiry by Vatsagotra, and the Buddha declines to respond not because it is wrong, but because it would not be useful to Vatsagotra, who would generate further speculation. To quote a popular movie, "You can't handle the truth." This is in the Ānandasutta but obviously I'm presenting a take on it. This is a point often pointed to by those who believe in an ineffiable ātma, but they don't often consider the reason why the Buddha does not say natthattā, which has to do with who he was speaking to and his knowledge of that other mind (one of the ṛddhis of the Buddha). My personal gripe, anyways.

The reason I bring this up is because "nātthi attā" does sort of show up in this way, not because of ātmavāda accusations against you particularly. I've actually read Venerable Thānissaro use this line of inquiry in setting up his "no-self as strategy" framing of anattā. He doesn't consider in his citing of the sutta the above-mentioned "reason" and "who." He doesn't address the end of the sutta at all, unless I'm to be corrected.

A bit of poetic coincidence, given the OP, is that it is the Sautrāntika para-Abhidharma texts like Tattvasiddhiśāstra etc. where we are most likely to find "nāstyātma," the Sanskritized reflex of "natthattā."

tasya nāstyātmasaṃjñā|
ātmano'sattvānnāsti prītiḥ|

(Venerable Harivarman, Satyasiddhiśāstra)

[DNS]

The Suttanta positions are all personal extrapolations that are made and discussed by Suttantists, but what they seem to miss is that they are repeating history, as the Mahayana and Vajrayana thinkers came to the exact same conclusions that they have and already formed their Suttanta equivalent schools hundreds or over a thousand years ago. Every Suttanta view has a Mahayana or Vajrayana school for them, and/or a Hindu school. These schools teach exactly what you believe and have already worked out all the kinks you run into. Why do you reject them?

Which Mahayana and Vajrayana schools are you talking about? Mahayana and Vajrayana have anatta too. It is a doctrine shared by all Buddhist schools. Mahayana and Vajrayana have bodhisattva vows. Where is that in the Suttanta?

The Suttanta focuses on the EBT (early buddhist texts). It could be argued that Mahayana and Vajrayana have much more added to it.

[SDC]

I imagine if the Buddha wanted to say there is "no self" it would've been closer to natthi atta, the verb as (to be), with the indeclineable na, an emphatic expression. But why would he do that if he must address the effects of attavāda for those not free from it?

The Buddha has "natthattā" posed to him as an inquiry by Vatsagotra, and the Buddha declines to respond not because it is wrong, but because it would not be useful to Vatsagotra, who would generate further speculation. To quote a popular movie, "You can't handle the truth." This is in the Ānandasutta but obviously I'm presenting a take on it. This is a point often pointed to by those who believe in an ineffiable ātma, but they don't often consider the reason why the Buddha does not say natthattā, which has to do with who he was speaking to and his knowledge of that other mind (one of the ṛddhis of the Buddha). My personal gripe, anyways.

The reason I bring this up is because "nātthi attā" does sort of show up in this way, not because of ātmavāda accusations against you particularly. I've actually read Venerable Thānissaro use this line of inquiry in setting up his "no-self as strategy" framing of anattā. He doesn't consider in his citing of the sutta the above-mentioned "reason" and "who." He doesn't address the end of the sutta at all, unless I'm to be corrected.

A bit of poetic coincidence, given the OP, is that it is the Sautrāntika para-Abhidharma texts like Tattvasiddhiśāstra etc. where we are most likely to find "nāstyātma," the Sanskritized reflex of "natthattā."

tasya nāstyātmasaṃjñā|
ātmano'sattvānnāsti prītiḥ|

(Venerable Harivarman, Satyasiddhiśāstra)

So for Vacchagotta, the issue is already with what he meant when he said "Self". A very potent observation by Ven. Nanavira was that the question of Being is always its affirmation (paraphrase). The answer does not even matter. Posing the question affirms to some degree that the issue has enough significance to further question its meaning; to seek clarification. Is there this thing? Yes, it is already designated in the subject of the question. The answer will only be an accumulation on whatever assumption is taken up in order to pose the question to begin with.

So the reason it "sort of" shows up is because the question is tremendously significant for the ordinary person who doesn't understand the framework upon which the question depends. And it isn't just attavādupādāna, it is also the the different cases of the manifestation of craving for both existence and non-existence (bhava, vibhava). Calling self into question is always a case of it already having significance in some way. And if we look at the famous MN 44 passage:

That clinging is not the exact same thing as the five clinging aggregates. Nor is clinging one thing and the five clinging aggregates another. The desire and lust for the five clinging aggregates, that is the clinging there.”

And put it along side this:

At Savatthi. “Bhikkhus, those ascetics and brahmins who regard anything as self in various ways all regard as self the five aggregates subject to clinging, or a certain one among them. What five?

...it can be understood that the attavāda is all over the aggregates in anyway they are considered because of desire and lust, not because they are merely present.

The Buddha acknowledges both sides; what is wrong about it and how to see it rightly. Too often interpretation will conflate the two at the expense of the distinction; putting the wisdom of not-self into the ordinary person's world as optional thinking. But considering it is that entire world that is affected by desire-and-lust, this option is too insignificant to contain the scope of their wrong view. At best it can indicate its severity, but in no way should it be assumed as full, direct access to the extent of attavāda or bhava.

[mikenz66]

1.) It posits a self to some degree. Whether it is called "self" or not, some kind of eternalism in the form of something existing forever that is somehow connected to the self (even if this is denied by adherents) is posited.
2.) It posits that Nibbana is consciousness.
3.) It posits that all is one.
a.) It posits that all is mind.

Not all Suttanta adherents do that. For example, Bhante Sujato (EBT, Suttanta) has written Nibbana is not viññāṇa. Really, it just isn’t.
https://sujato.wordpress.com/2011/05/13 ... E2%80%99t/

You will find some of that in some Thai forest traditions and perhaps some other Theravada traditions, sub-sects, I suppose you could call them, but not all of them.

I think it would also be a mistake to call "Thai Forest Tradition" a Suttanta approach in general. It's probably true of most of the Westerners who ordained in, or followed one of the Thai Forest groups. Teachers such as Ajahn Chah and others simply don't make an issue out of it. There are plenty of Abhidhamma/Commentary concepts in his talks.

I would also note that a number of Western monastics sometimes comment in their talks that that their training in Thailand did not involve much study of texts. I have heard Ajahn Amaro and Thanissaro Bhikkhu say in various talks that they only started studying the suttas seriously after they came back to the West, and had to answer questions from lay people who had studied suttas. Their monastic education in Thailand was much more practice oriented.

[One would probably find the same among those Westerners who were monastics in Myanmar. From listening to their talks, most of their effort went into practice, following the practical guidance of their teachers.]

Unfortunately, I would have difficulty locating the talks I'm thinking of. The remarks tend to be short passages, sometimes responding to questions. Next time I come across something I'll try to remember to write it down!


Mike

[binocular]

Suttanta generally differs from Classical Theravada in one or more of the three following respects:

1.) It posits a self to some degree. Whether it is called "self" or not, some kind of eternalism in the form of something existing forever that is somehow connected to the self (even if this is denied by adherents) is posited.

2.) It posits that Nibbana is consciousness.

3.) It posits that all is one.
a.) It posits that all is mind.

That's a strange characterization ... What is it based on?

What I'm wondering is: why not just go with Hinduism or Mahayana or Vajrayana Buddhism?

It has been my impression that those people who focus primarily on the suttas tend to avoid belonging to lineages and submitting to gurus.
It has been my impression that those people who focus primarily on the suttas do so in an effort to be as self-sufficient in the practice as possible, as soon as possible.

Every Suttanta view has a Mahayana or Vajrayana school for them, and/or a Hindu school. These schools teach exactly what you believe and have already worked out all the kinks you run into. Why do you reject them?

Probably because the Suttavadis are actually aiming for enlightenment, the sooner the better, rather than focusing on being members of some particular religion/spirituality.

[zan]

Suttanta generally differs from Classical Theravada in one or more of the three following respects:

1.) It posits a self to some degree. Whether it is called "self" or not, some kind of eternalism in the form of something existing forever that is somehow connected to the self (even if this is denied by adherents) is posited.

2.) It posits that Nibbana is consciousness.

3.) It posits that all is one.
a.) It posits that all is mind.

I don't mean to be too negative, but these things appear to be all made up. Can you substantiate any of them? Can you point to sutta-followers arguing any of these things from the suttas?

Are you aware that issue two is hotly contested and promoted by many suttantists? Bhikkhu Sujato has written three different articles refuting this position and one has only to skim the comments of the articles to see many suttantists arguing for this position and against Sujato's refutation. Are you familiar with the user Cappaccino on this forum? Ask him, he believes that Nibbana is consciousness as well, or something along those lines. These suttantists use the "featureless consciousness" of MN 49 to ostensibly substantiate their claim. Cappuccino quotes MN 49 on a regular basis to support the idea that Nibbana is not utter cessation of a being.

Here is part one, (there are two more you can google to find):

https://sujato.wordpress.com/2011/05/13 ... E2%80%99t/

As far as issue 1 and 2 please see this thread (it is one of many, many others where you'll find these ideas)

https://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?f=13&t=22409

Also here:

https://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.p ... it=surface

Also just search around this forum. People promote these and similar ideas regularly.

I am at a total loss as to how it's even possible that anyone on this forum could be unaware of these suttanta positions. I would think you were trolling me but I saw that several other users also have no idea what I'm talking about.

This is very bizarre.

[zan]

Suttanta generally differs from Classical Theravada in one or more of the three following respects:

1.) It posits a self to some degree. Whether it is called "self" or not, some kind of eternalism in the form of something existing forever that is somehow connected to the self (even if this is denied by adherents) is posited.

2.) It posits that Nibbana is consciousness.

3.) It posits that all is one.
a.) It posits that all is mind.

That's a strange characterization ... What is it based on?

What I'm wondering is: why not just go with Hinduism or Mahayana or Vajrayana Buddhism?

It has been my impression that those people who focus primarily on the suttas tend to avoid belonging to lineages and submitting to gurus.
It has been my impression that those people who focus primarily on the suttas do so in an effort to be as self-sufficient in the practice as possible, as soon as possible.

Every Suttanta view has a Mahayana or Vajrayana school for them, and/or a Hindu school. These schools teach exactly what you believe and have already worked out all the kinks you run into. Why do you reject them?

Probably because the Suttavadis are actually aiming for enlightenment, the sooner the better, rather than focusing on being members of some particular religion/spirituality.

See my reply to Congemu. Again, I'm baffled that anyone could be unaware of these suttanta positions and also at all familiar with this site.

[zan]

The Suttanta positions are all personal extrapolations that are made and discussed by Suttantists, but what they seem to miss is that they are repeating history, as the Mahayana and Vajrayana thinkers came to the exact same conclusions that they have and already formed their Suttanta equivalent schools hundreds or over a thousand years ago. Every Suttanta view has a Mahayana or Vajrayana school for them, and/or a Hindu school. These schools teach exactly what you believe and have already worked out all the kinks you run into. Why do you reject them?

Which Mahayana and Vajrayana schools are you talking about? Mahayana and Vajrayana have anatta too. It is a doctrine shared by all Buddhist schools. Mahayana and Vajrayana have bodhisattva vows. Where is that in the Suttanta?

The Suttanta focuses on the EBT (early buddhist texts). It could be argued that Mahayana and Vajrayana have much more added to it.

Here is atta or atta in all but coming out and saying it in Mahayana and Vajrayana. As to where it is in the suttanta, I've seen users on this forum say as much.

Buddha-nature
Main articles: Buddha-nature and Tathāgatagarbha Sutras
An influential division of 1st-millennium CE Buddhist texts develop the notion of Tathāgatagarbha or Buddha-nature.[76][77] The Tathāgatagarbha doctrine, at its earliest probably appeared about the later part of the 3rd century CE, and is verifiable in Chinese translations of 1st millennium CE.[78]

The Tathāgatagarbha is the topic of the Tathāgatagarbha sūtras, where the title itself means a garbha (womb, matrix, seed) containing Tathāgata (Buddha). In the Tathāgatagarbha sūtras' the perfection of the wisdom of not-self is stated to be the true self. The ultimate goal of the path is characterized using a range of positive language that had been used in Indian philosophy previously by essentialist philosophers, but which was now transmuted into a new Buddhist vocabulary to describe a being who has successfully completed the Buddhist path.[79]

These Sutras suggest, states Paul Williams, that 'all sentient beings contain a Tathāgata as their 'essence, core or essential inner nature'.[78] They also present a further developed understanding of emptiness, wherein the Buddha Nature, the Buddha and Liberation are seen as transcending the realm of emptiness, i.e. of the conditioned and dependently originated phenomena.[80]

One of these texts, the Angulimaliya Sutra, contrasts between empty phenomena such as the moral and emotional afflictions (kleshas), which are like ephemeral hailstones, and the enduring, eternal Buddha, which is like a precious gem:

The tens of millions of afflictive emotions like hail-stones are empty. The phenomena in the class of non-virtues, like hail-stones, quickly disintegrate. Buddha, like a vaidurya jewel, is permanent ... The liberation of a buddha also is form ... do not make a discrimination of non-division, saying, "The character of liberation is empty".'[81]

The Śrīmālā Sūtra is one of the earliest texts on Tathāgatagarbha thought, composed in 3rd century in south India, according to Brian Brown. It asserted that everyone can potentially attain Buddhahood, and warns against the doctrine of Sunyata.[82] The Śrīmālā Sūtra posits that the Buddha-nature is ultimately identifiable as the supramundane nature of the Buddha, the garbha is the ground for Buddha-nature, this nature is unborn and undying, has ultimate existence, has no beginning nor end, is nondual, and permanent.[83] The text also adds that the garbha has "no self, soul or personality" and "incomprehensible to anyone distracted by sunyata (voidness)"; rather it is the support for phenomenal existence.[84]

The notion of Buddha-nature and its interpretation was and continues to be widely debated in all schools of Mahayana Buddhism. Some traditions interpret the doctrine to be equivalent to emptiness (like the Tibetan Gelug school), the positive language of the texts Tathāgatagarbha sutras are then interpreted as being of provisional meaning, and not ultimately true. Other schools however (mainly the Jonang school), see Tathāgatagarbha as being an ultimate teaching and see it as an eternal, true self, while Sunyata is seen as a provisional, lower teaching.[85]

Likewise, western scholars have been divided in their interpretation of the Tathāgatagarbha, since the doctrine of an 'essential nature' in every living being appears to be confusing, since it seems to be equivalent to a 'Self',[note 8][87] which seems to contradict the doctrines in a vast majority of Buddhist texts. Some scholars, however, view such teachings as metaphorical, not to be taken literally.[80]

According to some scholars, the Buddha nature which these sutras discuss, does not represent a substantial self (ātman). Rather, it is a positive expression of emptiness, and represents the potentiality to realize Buddhahood through Buddhist practices. In this view, the intention of the teaching of Buddha nature is soteriological rather than theoretical.[88][89] According to others, the potential of salvation depends on the ontological reality of a salvific, abiding core reality — the Buddha-nature, empty of all mutability and error, fully present within all beings.[90]
-Wiki page on Sunyata

Avalokitesvara himself is linked in the versified version of the sutra to the first Buddha, the Adi-Buddha, who is 'svayambhu' (self-existent, not born from anything or anyone). Studholme comments:

'Avalokitesvara himself, the verse sutra adds, is an emanation of the Adibuddha, or 'primordial Buddha', a term that is explicitly said to be synonymous with Svayambhu and Adinatha, 'primordial lord'.' [7
-Wiki page on Kāraṇḍavyūha Sūtra

Shentong (Tibetan: གཞན་སྟོང་, Wylie: gzhan stong, Lhasa dialect: [ɕɛ̃̀tṍŋ], also transliterated zhäntong or zhentong; literally "other-emptiness") is a position within Tibetan Madhyamaka. It applies śūnyatā in a specific way, agreeing that relative reality is empty of self-nature, but stating that absolute reality (Paramarthasatya)[2][note 1] is "non-dual Buddhajnana"[2][note 2] and "empty" (Wylie: stong) only of "other," (Wylie: gzhan) relative phenomena, but is itself not empty[3] and "truly existing."[4] This absolute reality is described by positive terms, an approach which helps "to overcome certain residual subtle concepts"[5] and "the habit [...] of negating whatever experience arises in his/her mind."[6] It destroys false concepts, as does prasangika, but it also alerts the practitioner "to the presence of a dynamic, positive Reality that is to be experienced once the conceptual mind is defeated."[6]
-Wiki page on Rangtong-Shentong

Āstika derives from the Sanskrit asti, "there is, there exists", and means one who believes in the existence of a Self/Soul[disambiguation needed] or Brahman, etc. and nāstika means the one who doesn't believe in existence of a Soul or Self.[1] These have been concepts used to classify Indian philosophies by modern scholars, and some Hindu, Buddhist and Jaina texts.[2][3][5]

...

According to Andrew Nicholson, later Buddhists understood Asanga to be targeting Madhyamaka Buddhism as nastika, while considering his own Yogacara Buddhist tradition to be astika.

-Wiki page on Astika and Nastika

[Coëmgenu]

That's a bit rich. Maybe just pretend I'm a troll rather than pretend to be baffled. I don't count the philosphising of forum members here as majority voices of the Buddhist community. Maybe because my connection to Buddhism isn't Internet-based, I don't take the eccentric positions taken on forums seriously.

You should take them less seriously too. It's twisting your whole idea of what actual Suttanta is.

Your post to me uses one Suttantist (Cappucino) disagreeing with Ven Sujato (another Suttantist) to "prove" that Suttantists believe something. What sophomoric mediocrity dressed in the drag of critical analysis.

[zan]

I don't mean to be too negative, but these things appear to be all made up. Can you substantiate any of them? Can you point to sutta-followers arguing any of these things from the suttas?

I think because I brought up attavādupādāna (clinging to the doctrine of self) as the condition of the ordinary person, it is being taken as an endorsement of eternalism? However, considering it is done so in the suttas as a description of ignorance and this mass of suffering, it isn't an endorsement. It is simply the world of the ordinary person. It isn't supposed to be denied, it is to be understood as not mine, not I am and not myself.

The Pali for "not self" is anatta, the negation of the noun atta. Not sure if the addition of an is considered an inflection, but the term anatta is a modifier, hence it is an adjective, not a noun. It is not the strongest available affirmation of a negation, hence "not": the property of being not self. I imagine if the Buddha wanted to say there is "no self" it would've been closer to natthi atta, the verb as (to be), with the indeclineable na, an emphatic expression. But why would he do that if he must address the effects of attavāda for those not free from it? *Paging our Pali gurus*

That was the point I intended to make.

I also have doubts as to the prevalence of self-denial in the Classical Theravada view. I'm just not immersed in it enough to know for sure if it truly is a theme. Considering most modern translators have settle on "non" or "not" self, perhaps it is more isolated than zan has been led to believe. I honestly don't know.

Rest assured, this post is in no way related to our conversation. These suttanta views are everywhere on this site. You only seem to push ideas that are on the fringe of these types of things. I've never seen you come out and declare views like those mentioned above.

As to the prevalence of self denial in classical Theravada, a quote that is from our previous conversation:

It seems the Buddha did categorically rule out the self:

The Buddha declares that “all phenomena are nonself” (sabbe dhammā anattā), which means that if one seeks a self anywhere one will not find one. Since “all phenomena” includes both the conditioned and the unconditioned, this precludes an utterly transcendent, ineffable self.

-Bhikkhi Bodhi’s footnote to the Ānanda Sutta (SN.44.10)

And so did Buddhaghosa

“Here in this world there is no self that is something other than and apart from the
aggregates” (Vism-mhþ 830)

...the Ancients said:

There is no doer of a deed
Or one who reaps the deed’s result;
Phenomena alone flow on—
No other view than this is right.

-Vism XIX.20

And so did Anuruddha:

Great seers who are free from craving declare that Nibbana is an
objective state which is deathless, absolutely endless, unconditioned,
and unsurpassed.
Thus as fourfold the Tathagatas reveal the ultimate realities—
consciousness, mental factors, matter, and Nibbana.

Abhidhammattha Sangaha IV. 32