An argument for ultimate reality from a Theravādin perspective.

[chownah]

What is "reality"? What does "utimate reality" mean? What are the other kinds of reality? What are the salient features of the various kinds of reality? Can someone compare the various types in some way so that we can clearly understand what they are and how they differ? Does the "All" contain all of the different kinds of "reality"? Is the "All" one kind of reality? Is the idea that there is a real world out there where things exist one kind of reality?.....and are imaginary sorts of things that don't exist in that real world out there where things exist a different kind of reality?
chownah

[cappuccino]

What is reality?

just our experience of it


which is to say, hope and fear, anxiety, suffering

[chownah]

Similarly one could speculate about What is "knowledge"? What does "utimate knowledge" mean? What are the other kinds of knowledge? What are the salient features of the various kinds of knowledge? Can someone compare the various types of knowledge in some way so that we can clearly understand what they are and how they differ?

Some buddhists seem to like to talk about ultimate this and ultimate that...to me it just seems like bunch of construing.....it seems that the buddha didn't talk about these things in the suttas....if he did I would be glad to see what he had to say.....
chownah

[SteRo]

What does "utimate knowledge" mean?

"The Tathagata — a worthy one, rightly self-awakened — directly knows earth as earth. Directly knowing earth as earth, he does not conceive things about earth, does not conceive things in earth, does not conceive things coming out of earth, does not conceive earth as 'mine,' does not delight in earth. Why is that? Because the Tathagata has comprehended it to the end, I tell you.

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitak ... .than.html

The Blessed One said: "Monks, whatever in the cosmos — with its devas, Maras, & Brahmas, its generations with their contemplatives & brahmans royalty & common people — is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, attained, sought after, pondered by the intellect: That do I know. Whatever in the cosmos — with its devas, Maras, & Brahmas, its generations with their contemplatives & brahmans, their royalty & common people — is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, attained, sought after, pondered by the intellect: That I directly know. That has been realized by the Tathagata, but in the Tathagata[1] it has not been established.[2]

"If I were to say, 'I don't know whatever in the cosmos... is seen, heard, sensed, cognized... pondered by the intellect,' that would be a falsehood in me. If I were to say, 'I both know and don't know whatever in the cosmos... is seen, heard, sensed, cognized... pondered by the intellect,' that would be just the same. If I were to say, 'I neither know nor don't know whatever in the cosmos... is seen, heard, sensed, cognized... pondered by the intellect,' that would be a fault in me.

"Thus, monks, the Tathagata, when seeing what is to be seen, doesn't construe an [object as] seen. He doesn't construe an unseen. He doesn't construe an [object] to-be-seen. He doesn't construe a seer.

"When hearing...

"When sensing...

"When cognizing ...

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitak ... .than.html

[chownah]

What does "utimate knowledge" mean?

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitak ... .than.html


https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitak ... .than.html

The term "ultimate knowledge" does not appear in the links you have brought.....I guess this it is just your contrual that those links describe something called "ultimate knowledge"....it seems that the buddha did not talk about something called "ultimate knowledge" in the suttas.....I don't think the buddha referred to any sort of ultimate thing in the suttas....I would be glad to find out that he did so if someone can find a reference to him speaking this way in a sutta please bring it and share....
chownah

[SteRo]

What does "utimate knowledge" mean?

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitak ... .than.html


https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitak ... .than.html

The term "ultimate knowledge" does not appear in the links you have brought.....I guess this it is just your contrual that those links describe something called "ultimate knowledge"....it seems that the buddha did not talk about something called "ultimate knowledge" in the suttas.....I don't think the buddha referred to any sort of ultimate thing in the suttas....I would be glad to find out that he did so if someone can find a reference to him speaking this way in a sutta please bring it and share....
chownah

It is true that the term "ultimate knowledge" does not appear in the links. The second quote has been provided assuming that the doctrine would implicitly see the knowledge of the buddha of the sutta as a knowledge that cannot be exceeded by any other knowledge and thus may be called "ultimate knowledge".

And the first quote has been provided since in "Because the Tathagata has comprehended it to the end" the "to the end" actually means"ultimately".

[Sabbe_Dhamma_Anatta]

An argument for the dhammas, via the ultimate analysis of the Abhidhamma of the Mahāvihāravasins:

Argument from Essence.
P1) The intrinsic function/essence (sabhāva) of citta is cognition.

P2) Apart from cognition/essence (sabhāva) there is no citta.

P2) A citta existing without function/essence (sabhāva) is impossible.

P3) There is cognition.

C1) Therefore, citta exists.

C2) Therefore, sabhāva = existence.

Thoughts?

I learn a little bit more, when reading in unison with the following.
Thanks.

Greetings,

As we all know, Nāgārjuna is one of the most respected and followed Buddhist philosophers since the Blessed One himself. He is quite popular even among those who claim to follow Theravāda. It is said that he argued for a return to the Middle Way and a move away from the realist extremes of the Ābhidharmikas/Abhidhammikas. As an Abhidhammika I would submit that Nāgārjuna does no such thing. I have made a post regarding this before, but I felt a new post was required as this comes from a slightly different angle.

My argument is simple. Nāgārjuna was opposing the substance metaphysics of Sarvāstivādins and their bastardised form of Abhidhamma. These were likely the principle opponents of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. In opposing substance I agree with Nāgārjuna. However, I feel that Nāgārjuna makes an error that is replicated in his followers today. The error is in moving from establishing that there is no substance to claiming that there is no existence apart from concept. Whilst its true that there can be no substance, it does not follow that there is no existence apart from what is conceptual and conventional. What is forgotten here is essence. There being essence there is existence. Essence, however, does not equate to substance or permanence. To give an example, citta has no substance. There is no enduring "cittahood" that persists. There are only moments of citta. These moments of citta however do have an essence. The essence of citta is to cognise. Apart from cognition there is no citta. Apart from its essence, apart from cognition, there is no citta. To say there is no essence to citta is to say there is no citta. This, however, cannot be true since we do cognise. There is an act of cognition right now. There being cognition there must be an essence. There being an essence to citta, citta then exists since essence is the fundamental requirement for existence apart from concept. If this essence didn't exist, citta would not exist. Therefore, we can speak of dhammas that exist since if we deny their characteristic then we deny their reality. Based on this understanding, dhammas then are not empty of existence. We can say that dhammas exist. They exist because they have essence despite having no substance. Ultimate truth is then not emptiness of existence. It is the emptiness of substance and self. It is emptiness of permanence and self. Indeed, the Awakened One said we have a perverted view not of existence but of permanence, self and beauty. Nāgārjuna's arguments and those of his followers therefore overreach and go from one extreme to another. They overreach by equating the absence of substance with the absence of existence apart from concept. This however is not true for essence entails existence, and essence exists apart from concept and substance.

Thoughts?

Accordingly,
If there actually happens to exist such a claim that: "there is no existence apart from concept", my thought would definitely be: "what a ridiculously funny claim!" [regardless of who actually or purportedly put forward that claim]

[AlexBrains92]

Accordingly,
If there actually happens to exist such a claim that: "there is no existence apart from concept", my thought would definitely be: "what a ridiculously funny claim!" [regardless of who actually or purportedly put forward that claim]

Yes, such a solipsistic claim is ridiculously funny.
But this is not the first time that Ceisiwr attributes it to someone unfairly (I suspect he still can't conceive a third position in addition to his naïve realism and a solipsistic idealism, that is phenomenology; something he never really understood, because in his posts he never came out of an ontological reasoning).
Nagarjuna denied inherent existence.

[Dan74]

I think it pays to go deeper into the terms that are being used. For instance, what is meant by existence?

Otherwise we will be refuting arguments that have never been made.

A lot of unnecessary arguments here could be avoided by first reading this short article from Jan Westerhoff: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nagarjuna/

But for a practitioner, it seems to me that the import of Nagarjuna's critique boils down to an attack on reification - the making of mental objects that one becomes then attached to, fights against, incorporates into a self-notion, etc. Reification is Atta and relinquishing reification is Anatta.

[Aloka]

Pointers to the Utimate by Ajahn Sumedho:

https://buddhismnow.com/2014/08/06/poin ... n-sumedho/

Excerpt:

What I see about Buddhism — especially in the teaching of the Four Noble Truths in the Pali scriptures — is that it’s very much like a perennial philosophy. It points to the way things are, the ultimate, the metaphysical pattern, the relationship of the conditioned to the unconditioned. All the metaphors, similes, and parables, and all the particular ethnical and cultural additions and qualities of a religion are taken away. What you end up with is the conditioned and the unconditioned. The path is always to realise and to let go of anything that blinds you to that ultimate perfection — to be able to see the path clearly and to practise that path.

.

[atipattoh]

An argument for the dhammas, via the ultimate analysis of the Abhidhamma of the Mahāvihāravasins:

Argument from Essence.
P1) The intrinsic function/essence (sabhāva) of citta is cognition.
P2) Apart from cognition/essence (sabhāva) there is no citta.
P2) A citta existing without function/essence (sabhāva) is impossible.
P3) There is cognition.
C1) Therefore, citta exists.
C2) Therefore, sabhāva = existence.
Thoughts?

Ditto.

****

Hi

Looking from Signless release that is arrived at from the attainments of the seasons of the patiloma arupas (a progressive signlessness), your frame of analysis does has meaning.

It holds, from the perspective of the first and second seasons, patiloma space and consciousness; therefore citta can be frame as "existence“. Further retract into the third and fourth seasons, SN40.7

‘It’s when a mendicant, going totally beyond the dimension of infinite consciousness, aware that “there is nothing at all”, enters and remains in the dimension of nothingness.

consciousness already play no part in action. There is no consciousness here (beyond consciousness not-seen); but the Buddha said

‘Moggallāna, Moggallāna! Don’t neglect the dimension of nothingness, brahmin! Settle your mind in the dimension of nothingness; unify your mind and immerse it in the dimension of nothingness.’

‘moggallāna, moggallāna. Mā, brāhmaṇa, ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ pamādo, ākiñcaññāyatane cittaṃ saṇṭhapehi, ākiñcaññāyatane cittaṃ ekodiṃ karohi, ākiñcaññāyatane cittaṃ samādahā’ti.

So, one can says that citta is still present within these third and fourth seasons. B Sujata translates citta as “mind”, i would say "heart" is more appropriate. And I prefer to use mind for mano, which I would place it in space (eg. from mind vs mind object). The arrival onto the seasons is from compounded phenomena, does not necessary means that mind is suitable here. To say that mind exist here, is to say that mind can be present without consciousness.

So, citta =/= consciousness =/= mind, that consciousness cognizes, as and when mind is present.

Although the arriving to these seasons is achieved within compounded phenomena; when the arising does not occur further, at the breaking up of the body, when all is cooled, citta ceased to exist (without remainder) as signless-release no longer be further arrived at.

[Ceisiwr]

Hi Ceisiwr!
I knew that, deep down, you weren't a phenomenologist

I'm certainly an empiricist and a phenomenalist, possibly even a Transcendental Idealist as of late. If by those I can be said to be a "phenomenologist" then I am one. If however by phenomenology you mean the non-assent to ontological claims then no, I am not one.

If not 'sabhava', what is the pali term for 'substance' in this context?

According to the sub-commentary I provided substance would be "dabba".

But... sabbe sankhara anicca

And aren't these patterns conditioned, by your own words?

Yes. Sabbe sankhara anicca is a repeating pattern. It seems you are reifying nāmapaññatti. I am not. When I say there are repeating patterns of citta, that does not mean I think there is the Form of Citta behind the patterns. Such reification of concepts was the mistake of the Sarvāstivādins. There is the actuality of cognition (I don't see how this can be denied). Along with the actuality there arises the concept of "citta". This nāmapaññatti is a universal concept, but there is no enduring substance behind the universal. No Platonic Form of "citta". It's merely a designation for citta, which arises and ceases many times due to causes and conditions.

Yes, such a solipsistic claim is ridiculously funny.

For Nāgārjuna dhammas are empty of "intrinsic existence". He argues that if they had intrinsic existence there would be no arising and ceasing, for that which has intrinsic existence cannot change. What Nāgārjuna is arguing against is a metaphysical substance, the likes of which we find in the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma and within the Hindu Vaiśeṣika school of philosophy. In his commentary to the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā Garfield states:

But Niigiirjuna, through his use of the phrase "the essence of entities" (dngos-po rnams kyi rang bzhin), emphasizes a very important metaphysical consequence of this observation: Given that phenomena depend upon their conditions for their existence and given that nothing answering to an essence of phenomena can be located in those conditions and given that there is nowhere else that an essence could come from, it follows that phenomena that arise from conditions are essenceless. One might argue at this point that just as phenomena come into existence dependent upon conditions, their essences come into existence in this way. But what goes for phenomena24 does not go for essences. For essences are by definition eternal and fixed. They are independent. And for a phenomenon to have an essence is for it to have some permanent independent core. So neither essences nor phenomena with essences can emerge from conditions.

I would say this is an accurate summary of Nāgārjuna's position. On first glance it seems that Nāgārjuna is arguing against the Theravādin understanding of dhammas. I would say, however, that a deeper analysis reveals this to not be the case. Firstly, "essence" poses a difficulty when he writes:

For essences are by definition eternal and fixed. They are independent. And for a phenomenon to have an essence is for it to have some permanent independent core.

The problem is that Garfield here is describing substance metaphysics, not essence itself. A substance is an independent enduring "thing", the modalities of which we perceive as different qualities. An example of western substance theory par excellence can be found in the writings of Spinoza. In India, Samkhya or, from Buddhism, Sarvāstivāda. By comparison essence simply = quality. So, the quality of a brick can be hardness whilst its substance can be some material noumenon. One is reminded of Locke's distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities. The primary quality would be the substance, the secondary quality would be the essence. Substance endures, essence does not. Similar substance type thinking was promoted by the elders of the Sarvāstivāda school. To quote 4 masters as recorded in the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣa Śāstra :

The Venerable Dharmatrāta says that there is change in mode of being (bhāva- anyathātva). The Venerable Ghoṣaka says that there is change in characteristic (lakṣaṇa-anyathātva). The Venerable Vasumitra says that there is change in state (avasthā-anyathātva). The Venerable Buddhadeva says that there is change in [temporal] relativity (anyathā-anyathātva).

[1] The advocate of “change in mode of being” asserts that when dharmas operate (pra-√vṛt) in time, they change on account of their modes of existence/being (bhāva); there is no change in substance. This is like the case of breaking up a golden vessel to produce another thing—there is just a change in shape, not in varṇa- rūpa. It is also like milk, etc., turning into curds, etc.—just the taste, digestibility, etc., are given up, not the varṇa-rūpa. Similarly, when dharmas enter into the present from the future, although they give up their future mode of existence and acquire their present mode of existence, they neither lose nor acquire their substantial essence (AKB: dravya-bhāva). Likewise, when they enter the past from the present, although they give up the present mode of existence and acquire the past mode of existence, they neither give up nor acquire their substantial nature.

[2] The advocate of “change in characteristic” asserts that when dharmas operate in time, they change on account of characteristic (lakṣaṇa); there is no change in substance. A dharma in each of the temporal periods has three temporal characteristics; when one [temporal] characteristic is conjoined, the other two are not severed. This is like the case of a man being attached to one particular woman— he is not said to be detached from other women. Similarly, when dharmas abide in the past, they are being conjoined with the past characteristic but are not said to be severed from the characteristics of the other two temporal characteristics. When they abide in the future, they are being conjoined with the future characteristic but are not said to be severed from the characteristics of the other two temporal characteristics. When they abide in the present, they are being conjoined with the present characteristic, but are not said to be severed from the characteristics of the other two temporal characteristics.

[3] The advocate of “change in state” asserts that when dharmas operate in time, they change on account of state (avasthā); there is no change in substance. This is like the case of moving a token [into different positions]. When placed in the position (avasthā) of ones, it is signified as one; placed in the position of tens, ten; placed in the position of hundreds, hundred. While there is change in the positions into which it is moved, there is no change in its substance. Similarly, when dharmas pass through the three temporal states, although they acquire three different names, they do not change in substance. In the theory proposed by this master, there is no confusion as regards substance, for the three periods are differentiated on the basis of activity (kāritra).

[4] The advocate of “change in [temporal] relativity” asserts that when dharmas operate in time, they are predicated differently [as future, present, or past], relative to that which precedes and that which follows (cf. AKB: pūrvāparam apekṣyānyo’nya ucyate avasthāntarato na dravyāntarataḥ); there is no change in substance. This is like the case of one and the same woman who is called “daughter” relative to her mother, and “mother” relative to her daughter. Similarly, dharmas are called “past” relative to the succeeding ones, “future” relative to the preceding ones, “present” relative to both.

It is this substance metaphysics of the Sarvāstivādins that Nāgārjuna is arguing against, which Garfield wrongly equates with "essence". Sadly, it can't be helped that Garfield makes such a mistake since Nāgārjuna himself seems to confuse the distinction between substance and essence:

8. If existence were through essence,
Then there would be no nonexistence.
A change in essence
Could never be tenable.

9. If there is no essence,
What could become other?
If there is essence,
What could become other?

Nāgārjuna's argument here makes sense in terms of a substance metaphysics, that is a metaphysics of an eternal and permanent substrate. Essence, however, does not equate to this. Essence is, as I have already said, simply "characteristic" or "nature". We can say that both substance and essence gives existence. A substance gives existence because it endures eternally. An essence gives existence because it is that which is left after analysis without which X would cease to be X. However, whilst both can give us existence a substance is permanent and so can never end or change (8 & 9) whilst an essence is not permanent. A characteristic can come into being and cease, yet still exist (for a time). The Visuddhimagga states that apart from their characteristic, there is no dhamma. No substrate from which they arise and fall into, unlike what we find with the Sarvāstivādins:

For they do not come from anywhere prior to their rise, nor do they go anywhere after their fall. On the contrary, before their rise they had no individual essence, and after their fall their individual essences are completely dissolved. And they occur without mastery [being exercisable over them] since they exist in dependence on conditions and in between the past and the future. Hence they should be regarded as having no provenance and no destination.

I've also reposted a screenshot from a sub-commentary which shows that Theravāda does not subscribe to a substance metaphysics, but is more in line with empiricist phenomenalism.

But this is not the first time that Ceisiwr attributes it to someone unfairly

For Nāgārjuna we can only speak of dhammas at all because they are conventionally true. From the point of view of ultimate reality however, there are no such things. Dhammas then are conventions. Being conventions they are then concepts. If so, citta is then a mere concept. If citta is a mere concept, what is constructing the concept?

naïve realism and a solipsistic idealism

If by naïve realism you mean the view that objects are exactly as we perceive them to be in a world out there then no, the Abhidhamma and I are not naïve realists for when I look at an apple this is but a construction of the mind. In the Abhidhamma what we directly perceive are dhammas. So, for example, when seeing a visual object I initially perceive many frames of colour which the mind constructs into a whole object that I call an "apple". The Abhidhamma then is a form of phenomenalism and, possibly, Transcendental Idealism. As for solipsism, the Abhidhamma has always acknowledged the existence of mind independent things such as other beings.

Nagarjuna denied inherent existence.

As far as he denied substance metaphysics, the likes of which was found in the Sarvāstivāda school, the Mahavihāravāsins and I would agree with him. Where he over relied upon synthesis to the point of denying essence and dhammas, we would disagree with him. That would be merely an extreme reaction to the Sarvāstivādin over-reliance on analysis but from the other end. In other words, not the Middle Way.

[Ceisiwr]

I think it pays to go deeper into the terms that are being used. For instance, what is meant by existence?

Otherwise we will be refuting arguments that have never been made.

A lot of unnecessary arguments here could be avoided by first reading this short article from Jan Westerhoff: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nagarjuna/

But for a practitioner, it seems to me that the import of Nagarjuna's critique boils down to an attack on reification - the making of mental objects that one becomes then attached to, fights against, incorporates into a self-notion, etc. Reification is Atta and relinquishing reification is Anatta.

Can you provide a sutta reference where the Buddha taught that "reification is atta"?

[Ceisiwr]

To add further, when analysing the direct experience of "an apple" all I am really aware of are its qualities. That is to say its colour, hardness, temperature, taste etc. Apart from these qualities I know nothing of "an apple". All that I am aware of then are essences. A substance metaphysician would say there is an enduring substance behind the qualities which make up the apple. A noumenon of sorts. Or, they would say that the qualities of colour, hardness etc themselves are substances, the modalities of which I am currently experiencing as "the apple". The Theravādin position is closer to that of Hume. We only know qualities or "bundles of sense data". We never know substance. In our terms we would say we are only aware of dhammas, never an enduring substance that exists behind or through the dhammas. Likewise, the Abhidhamma is similar to Kant's Transcendental Idealism (himself working on the basis of Hume's insights) in that all we can know are these sense bundles (or dhammas) but the mind, in conjunction with these actualities, constructs causality and the conventional world of enduring objects that we know in everyday life.

[Ceisiwr]

What is "reality"? What does "utimate reality" mean? What are the other kinds of reality? What are the salient features of the various kinds of reality?

That which is known via direct perception and exists apart from concept, thus not being liable to being broken down further and so exists bearing its intrinsic essence. Opposed to this is conventional reality. The conceptual world we construct out of the dhammas via the synthesising nature of the mind. The world of whole and enduring permanent objects, beings, self etc.