An argument for ultimate reality from a Theravādin perspective.

[Ceisiwr]

§2. The Fourfold Ultimate Reality (Catudhā Paramattha)
Tattha vutt’ābhidhammatthā
Catudhā paramatthato
Cittaṁ cetasikaṁ rūpaṁ
Nibbānam iti sabbathā.
The things contained in the Abhidhamma, spoken of therein, are altogether
fourfold from the standpoint of ultimate reality: consciousness (citta), mental factors
(cetasika), matter (rūpa), and Nibbāna.

No reasoning is provided. Also B. Bodhi in his commentary provides no reasoning. So "ultimate reality" seems to be dealt with as "a given" in abhidhamma.

The fourfold realties are those dhammas that bear their intrinsic sabhāva. Sabhāva = indivisible, thus being directly known and necessary. They exist apart from concept. Being so, they make up the ultimate reality.

[retrofuturist]

Greetings,

The intrinsic nature of citta is to cognise. This is not a construct.

Citta arises in dependence... thus it is constructed.

If it were a construct then something is constructing the construct of citta.

The previous citta, or the one before that, or the one before that?

What can this be but an infinite regress? It is either that or we have a fundamental reality called citta, on top of which we construct the concept of "citta".

Respectfully, it sounds like you're stuck in Abhidhamma and coming up against dead ends because of it.

Let us return to the Blessed One's words for a moment...

"From the origination of nama-rupa is the origination of citta. From the cessation of nama-rupa is the cessation of citta

Mind arises dependent upon name and form.

"And what is name-&-form? Feeling, perception, intention, contact, & attention: This is called name. The four great elements, and the form dependent on the four great elements: This is called form. This name & this form are called name-&-form.

How one can conclude from the Blessed One's discourses that any phenomenological reality is ultimate in the sense of being independent, is beyond me.



Metta,
Paul.

[SteRo]

§2. The Fourfold Ultimate Reality (Catudhā Paramattha)
Tattha vutt’ābhidhammatthā
Catudhā paramatthato
Cittaṁ cetasikaṁ rūpaṁ
Nibbānam iti sabbathā.
The things contained in the Abhidhamma, spoken of therein, are altogether
fourfold from the standpoint of ultimate reality: consciousness (citta), mental factors
(cetasika), matter (rūpa), and Nibbāna.

No reasoning is provided. Also B. Bodhi in his commentary provides no reasoning. So "ultimate reality" seems to be dealt with as "a given" in abhidhamma.

The fourfold realties are those dhammas that bear their intrinsic sabhāva. Sabhāva = indivisible, thus being directly known and necessary. They exist apart from concept.

Well this reasoning of yours doesn't seem to be part of abhidhamma. Otherwise please provide a quote from abhidhamma that contains this reasoning.

Above I said:

Actually I think that the kind of discussion intended by the OP is alien to theravada. At least I've never come across such reasonings in theravada sources so far. Seems to be inspired by later philosophies.

In this forum section I am only interested in theravada doctrine, not in later philosophies.

[cappuccino]

Citta arises in dependence...

I don't think this is said, with dependent arising

[retrofuturist]

Greetings,

Citta arises in dependence...

I don't think this is said, with dependent arising

I just showed you SN 47.42. Respectfully, I'm not sure what more you need to see that citta arises, in dependence...

Frankly, anything that arises does so, in dependence, not independently.

Metta,
Paul.

[cappuccino]

Citta arises in dependence...

I don't think this is said, with dependent arising

I just showed you SN 47.42.

From the cessation of consciousness comes the cessation of name-&-form. From the cessation of name-&-form comes the cessation of the six sense media. From the cessation of the six sense media comes the cessation of contact.


Paticca-samuppada-vibhanga Sutta: Analysis of Dependent Co-arising

[Ceisiwr]

retrofuturist

Greetings,

Citta arises in dependence... thus it is constructed.

No. Citta is merely the phenomena of cognition. A construction requires multiple dhammas working in unison in order to construct something. Citta is not a construction. It is the foundation of all construction (along with other dhammas).

The previous citta, or the one before that, or the one before that?

The foundation of all experience is itself dependent.

Respectfully, it sounds like you're stuck in Abhidhamma and coming up against dead ends because of it.

The Wisdom of the Theras of old as encapsulated in the Abhidhamma texts and the Aṭṭhakathā have awoken me from "my dogmatic slumbers"

Mind arises dependent upon name and form.

Yes. Mind constructs this world of substantial "things". If mind is a construct too, what constructs it? Mind synthesises dhammas into a world of existing wholes and constructs things such as "man", "woman", "house", "gay man" and so on. These are constructed fantasies. There is no substance there. Still, in order to construct "man" you need something as a foundation. What can this be but that with essence?

How one can conclude from the Blessed One's discourses that any phenomenological reality is ultimate in the sense of being independent, is beyond me.

The Blessed One declared that things exist beyond mind. Your Phenomenological dhamma is nothing more but a false Abhidhamma. A neo-Sautrāntika of sorts, on par with the Heretic Sujato.

[cappuccino]

No. Citta is merely the phenomena of cognition.

for a zombie perhaps

[Coëmgenu]

on par with the Heretic Sujato.

Well, at least he gets his title capitalized.

[Ceisiwr]

Actually I think that the kind of discussion intended by the OP is alien to theravada. At least I've never come across such reasonings in theravada sources so far. Seems to be inspired by later philosophies.

In this forum section I am only interested in theravada doctrine, not in later philosophies.

Ok ...

From the standpoint of ultimate reality (paramatthato): According to the Abhidhamma philosophy, there are two kinds of realities— the conventional (sammuti) and the ultimate (paramattha). Conventional realities are the referents of ordinary conceptual thought (paññatti) and
conventional modes of expression (voh±ra). They include such entities as living beings, persons, men, women, animals, and the apparently stable persisting objects that constitute our unanalyzed picture of the world. The Abhidhamma philosophy maintains that these notions do not possess
ultimate validity, for the objects which they signify do not exist in their own right as irreducible realities. Their mode of being is conceptual,
not actual. They are products of mental construction (parikappan±), not realities existing by reason of their own nature. Ultimate realities, in contrast, are things that exist by reason of their own intrinsic nature (sabh±va). These are the dhammas: the final, irreducible components of existence, the ultimate entities which result from a correctly performed analysis of experience. Such existents admit of no further reduction, but are themselves the final terms of analysis, the true constituents of the complex manifold of experience. Hence the word paramattha is applied to them, which is derived from parama = ultimate, highest, final, and attha = reality, thing. The ultimate realities are characterized not only from the ontological angle as the ultimate existents, but also from the epistemological angle as the ultimate objects of right knowledge. As one extracts oil from sesame seed, so one can extract the ultimate realities from the conventional realities. For example “being,” and “man,” and “woman” are concepts suggesting that the things they signify possess irreducible ultimate unity. However, when we wisely investigate these things with the analytical tools of the Abhidhamma, we find that they do not possess the ultimacy implied by the concepts, but only a conventional reality as an assemblage of impermanent factors, of mental and physical processes.

Thus by examining the conventional realities with wisdom, we eventually arrive at the objective actualities that lie behind our conceptual constructs. It is these objective actualities—the dhammas, which maintain their intrinsic natures independently of the mind’s constructive functions— that form the ultimate realities of the Abhidhamma. Although ultimate realities exist as the concrete essences of things, they are so subtle and profound that an ordinary person who lacks training cannot perceive them. Such a person cannot see the ultimate realities because his mind is obscured by concepts, which shape reality into conventionally defined appearances. Only by means of wise or thorough attention to things (yoniso manasik±ra) can one see beyond the concepts and take the ultimate realities as one’s object of knowledge. Thus paramattha is described as that which belongs to the domain of ultimate or supreme knowledge.1


At this point ¾cariya Anuruddha has completed his exposition of the four ultimate realities, their classification in various schemata, and their treatment according to the principles of conditionality. However, he has not yet discussed concepts (paññatti). Although concepts pertain to conventional reality and not to ultimate reality, they are still included in the Abhidhamma by the treatise Puggalapaññatti. Therefore in the last part of Chapter VIII he will briefly discuss concepts. They are also called “name”: The four immaterial aggregates are called n±ma, “name,” in the sense of bending (namana) because they bend towards the object in the act of cognizing it. They are also called n±ma in the sense of causing to bend (n±mana) since they cause one another to bend on to the object. Nibb±na is called n±ma solely in the sense of causing to bend. For Nibb±na causes faultless states—that is, the supramundane cittas and cetasikas—to bend on to itself by acting as an objective predominance condition.5 What remains are concepts: There are two kinds of concepts, atthapaññatti or concepts-as-meanings, and n±mapaññatti or conceptsas- names. The former are the meanings conveyed by the concepts, the latter the names or designations which convey that meaning. For example, the notion of a four-legged furry domestic animal with certain physical features and traits is the concept-as-meaning of the term “dog”; the designation and idea “dog” is the corresponding concept-as-name. The meaning-concept is the concept as that which is made known; the nameconcept is the concept as that which makes known.

https://www.saraniya.com/books/meditati ... dhamma.pdf

[Ceisiwr]

on par with the Heretic Sujato.

Well, at least he gets his title capitalized.

Well he is one of the Arch Sautrāntika's of our age

[Ceisiwr]

No. Citta is merely the phenomena of cognition.

for a zombie perhaps

Pray tell what is there to citta bar cognition?

[Ceisiwr]

Greetings,

The characteristics of any dhamma are that which has been imputed. When the commentaries say they uphold their own nature (or words to that effect), I believe their nature is sankata (fabricated), thus they uphold only their own fabricated imputation.

The reality that all dhammas are sankhata (aside from nibbana) is an argument against ultimate reality from a Theravādin perspective.



Metta,
Paul.

If citta is fabricated what is fabricating the fabrication?

[retrofuturist]

Greetings,

Citta is not a construction.

Congratulations. You've built yourself an atta... the hardest one to dislodge.

All the best

Metta,
Paul.

[confusedlayman]

An argument for the dhammas, via the ultimate analysis of the Abhidhamma of the Mahāvihāravasins:

Argument from Essence.
P1) The intrinsic function/essence (sabhāva) of citta is cognition.

P2) Apart from cognition/essence (sabhāva) there is no citta.

P2) A citta existing without function/essence (sabhāva) is impossible.

P3) There is cognition.

C1) Therefore, citta exists.

C2) Therefore, sabhāva = existence.

Thoughts?

there is no ultimate reality or conventional reality

there is conventional illusion or conventional fabrication

there is ultimate illusion or ultimate fabrication relative to conventional ill/fab
if something is known by thought, then its not reality

if something is known not by thought? that is impossible

hence there is illusion existance or absence of illusion existance