AlexBrains92 wrote: ↑Fri Oct 09, 2020 1:03 pm
Hi Ceisiwr!
I knew that, deep down, you weren't a phenomenologist
I'm certainly an empiricist and a phenomenalist, possibly even a Transcendental Idealist as of late. If by those I can be said to be a "phenomenologist" then I am one. If however by phenomenology you mean the non-assent to ontological claims then no, I am not one.
If not 'sabhava', what is the pali term for 'substance' in this context?
According to the sub-commentary I provided substance would be "dabba".
But... sabbe sankhara anicca
And aren't these patterns conditioned, by your own words?
Yes. Sabbe sankhara anicca is a repeating pattern. It seems you are reifying nāmapaññatti. I am not. When I say there are repeating patterns of citta, that does not mean I think there is the Form of Citta behind the patterns. Such reification of concepts was the mistake of the Sarvāstivādins. There is the actuality of cognition (I don't see how this can be denied). Along with the actuality there arises the concept of "citta". This nāmapaññatti is a universal concept, but there is no enduring substance behind the universal. No Platonic Form of "citta". It's merely a designation for citta, which arises and ceases many times due to causes and conditions.
Yes, such a solipsistic claim is ridiculously funny.
For Nāgārjuna dhammas are empty of "intrinsic existence". He argues that if they had intrinsic existence there would be no arising and ceasing, for that which has intrinsic existence cannot change. What Nāgārjuna is arguing against is a metaphysical
substance, the likes of which we find in the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma and within the Hindu Vaiśeṣika school of philosophy. In his commentary to the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā Garfield states:
But Niigiirjuna, through his use of the phrase "the essence of entities" (dngos-po rnams kyi rang bzhin), emphasizes a very important metaphysical consequence of this observation: Given that phenomena depend upon their conditions for their existence and given that nothing answering to an essence of phenomena can be located in those conditions and given that there is nowhere else that an essence could come from, it follows that phenomena that arise from conditions are essenceless. One might argue at this point that just as phenomena come into existence dependent upon conditions, their essences come into existence in this way. But what goes for phenomena24 does not go for essences. For essences are by definition eternal and fixed. They are independent. And for a phenomenon to have an essence is for it to have some permanent independent core. So neither essences nor phenomena with essences can emerge from conditions.
I would say this is an accurate summary of Nāgārjuna's position. On first glance it seems that Nāgārjuna is arguing against the Theravādin understanding of dhammas. I would say, however, that a deeper analysis reveals this to not be the case. Firstly, "essence" poses a difficulty when he writes:
For essences are by definition eternal and fixed. They are independent. And for a phenomenon to have an essence is for it to have some permanent independent core.
The problem is that Garfield here is describing substance metaphysics, not essence itself. A substance is an independent enduring "thing", the modalities of which we perceive as different qualities. An example of western substance theory par excellence can be found in the writings of Spinoza. In India, Samkhya or, from Buddhism, Sarvāstivāda. By comparison essence simply = quality. So, the quality of a brick can be hardness whilst its substance can be some material noumenon. One is reminded of Locke's distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities. The primary quality would be the substance, the secondary quality would be the essence. Substance endures, essence does not. Similar substance type thinking was promoted by the elders of the Sarvāstivāda school. To quote 4 masters as recorded in the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣa Śāstra :
The Venerable Dharmatrāta says that there is change in mode of being (bhāva- anyathātva). The Venerable Ghoṣaka says that there is change in characteristic (lakṣaṇa-anyathātva). The Venerable Vasumitra says that there is change in state (avasthā-anyathātva). The Venerable Buddhadeva says that there is change in [temporal] relativity (anyathā-anyathātva).
[1] The advocate of “change in mode of being” asserts that when dharmas operate (pra-√vṛt) in time, they change on account of their modes of existence/being (bhāva); there is no change in substance. This is like the case of breaking up a golden vessel to produce another thing—there is just a change in shape, not in varṇa- rūpa. It is also like milk, etc., turning into curds, etc.—just the taste, digestibility, etc., are given up, not the varṇa-rūpa. Similarly, when dharmas enter into the present from the future, although they give up their future mode of existence and acquire their present mode of existence, they neither lose nor acquire their substantial essence (AKB: dravya-bhāva). Likewise, when they enter the past from the present, although they give up the present mode of existence and acquire the past mode of existence, they neither give up nor acquire their substantial nature.
[2] The advocate of “change in characteristic” asserts that when dharmas operate in time, they change on account of characteristic (lakṣaṇa); there is no change in substance. A dharma in each of the temporal periods has three temporal characteristics; when one [temporal] characteristic is conjoined, the other two are not severed. This is like the case of a man being attached to one particular woman— he is not said to be detached from other women. Similarly, when dharmas abide in the past, they are being conjoined with the past characteristic but are not said to be severed from the characteristics of the other two temporal characteristics. When they abide in the future, they are being conjoined with the future characteristic but are not said to be severed from the characteristics of the other two temporal characteristics. When they abide in the present, they are being conjoined with the present characteristic, but are not said to be severed from the characteristics of the other two temporal characteristics.
[3] The advocate of “change in state” asserts that when dharmas operate in time, they change on account of state (avasthā); there is no change in substance. This is like the case of moving a token [into different positions]. When placed in the position (avasthā) of ones, it is signified as one; placed in the position of tens, ten; placed in the position of hundreds, hundred. While there is change in the positions into which it is moved, there is no change in its substance. Similarly, when dharmas pass through the three temporal states, although they acquire three different names, they do not change in substance. In the theory proposed by this master, there is no confusion as regards substance, for the three periods are differentiated on the basis of activity (kāritra).
[4] The advocate of “change in [temporal] relativity” asserts that when dharmas operate in time, they are predicated differently [as future, present, or past], relative to that which precedes and that which follows (cf. AKB: pūrvāparam apekṣyānyo’nya ucyate avasthāntarato na dravyāntarataḥ); there is no change in substance. This is like the case of one and the same woman who is called “daughter” relative to her mother, and “mother” relative to her daughter. Similarly, dharmas are called “past” relative to the succeeding ones, “future” relative to the preceding ones, “present” relative to both.
It is this substance metaphysics of the Sarvāstivādins that Nāgārjuna is arguing against, which Garfield wrongly equates with "essence". Sadly, it can't be helped that Garfield makes such a mistake since Nāgārjuna himself seems to confuse the distinction between substance and essence:
8. If existence were through essence,
Then there would be no nonexistence.
A change in essence
Could never be tenable.
9. If there is no essence,
What could become other?
If there is essence,
What could become other?
Nāgārjuna's argument here makes sense in terms of a substance metaphysics, that is a metaphysics of an eternal and permanent substrate. Essence, however, does not equate to this. Essence is, as I have already said, simply "characteristic" or "nature". We can say that both substance and essence gives existence. A substance gives existence because it endures eternally. An essence gives existence because it is that which is left after analysis without which X would cease to be X. However, whilst both can give us existence a substance is permanent and so can never end or change (8 & 9) whilst an essence is not permanent. A characteristic can come into being and cease, yet still exist (for a time). The Visuddhimagga states that apart from their characteristic, there is no dhamma. No substrate from which they arise and fall into, unlike what we find with the Sarvāstivādins:
For they do not come from anywhere prior to their rise, nor do they go anywhere after their fall. On the contrary, before their rise they had no individual essence, and after their fall their individual essences are completely dissolved. And they occur without mastery [being exercisable over them] since they exist in dependence on conditions and in between the past and the future. Hence they should be regarded as having no provenance and no destination.
I've also reposted a screenshot from a sub-commentary which shows that Theravāda does not subscribe to a substance metaphysics, but is more in line with empiricist phenomenalism.
But this is not the first time that Ceisiwr attributes it to someone unfairly
For Nāgārjuna we can only speak of dhammas at all because they are conventionally true. From the point of view of ultimate reality however, there are no such things. Dhammas then are conventions. Being conventions they are then concepts. If so, citta is then a mere concept. If citta is a mere concept, what is constructing the concept?
naïve realism and a solipsistic idealism
If by naïve realism you mean the view that objects are exactly as we perceive them to be in a world out there then no, the Abhidhamma and I are not naïve realists for when I look at an apple this is but a construction of the mind. In the Abhidhamma what we directly perceive are dhammas. So, for example, when seeing a visual object I initially perceive many frames of colour which the mind constructs into a whole object that I call an "apple". The Abhidhamma then is a form of phenomenalism and, possibly, Transcendental Idealism. As for solipsism, the Abhidhamma has always acknowledged the existence of mind independent things such as other beings.
Nagarjuna denied inherent existence.
As far as he denied substance metaphysics, the likes of which was found in the Sarvāstivāda school, the Mahavihāravāsins and I would agree with him. Where he over relied upon synthesis to the point of denying essence and dhammas, we would disagree with him. That would be merely an extreme reaction to the Sarvāstivādin over-reliance on analysis but from the other end. In other words, not the Middle Way.