Idealism Revisited

A discussion on all aspects of Theravāda Buddhism
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cappuccino
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Re: Idealism Revisited

Post by cappuccino »

the Blessed One wrote:He would say, 'I won't have this arrow removed until I know whether the shaft with which I was wounded was that of a common arrow, a curved arrow, a barbed, a calf-toothed, or an oleander arrow.' The man would die and those things would still remain unknown to him.

the Blessed One wrote:the man would die and those things would still remain undeclared by the Tathagata
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Ceisiwr
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Re: Idealism Revisited

Post by Ceisiwr »

Coëmgenu wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 7:21 am
Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 7:12 am
Coëmgenu wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 7:08 am If form is no longer beyond mind, then why is form (the world) not then determined by the same karma that governs the circumstances of the mindstream? Why is the world then not the karma-based perceptions of the perceiver? You rejected this earlier.
Are you asking why the world persists for a myriad of minds and when no minds might be looking at once?
Regardless of if the world is the same for everyone or not (after all, form cannot be not beyond the mind under the new stipulations, and the minds are not the same, so why would the form be the same for the minds?), earlier you rejected that the "the land (the perception of the land)" was "determined by the deeds (the karma, seed and fruit) of the perceiver of the land."
Ceisiwr wrote: Thu Oct 22, 2020 8:06 am
Coëmgenu wrote: Thu Oct 22, 2020 7:27 am
Here it is: https://dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?f ... ly#p577293

How do you differentiate your new idealism from that in which the land (the perception of the land) is determined by the deeds (the karma, seed and fruit) of the perceiver of the land?
I find myself deferring to Vasubandhu if I’m honest.
How do you defer to Ven Vasubandhu? The world is no longer in part form beyond mind, unperceived form, and no longer has an objective basis that is itself existing independent of the mind as "not a mind." Instead, the world is now defined as a series of sense-impressions. These sense-impressions are dependently originated according to, among other things, karma. How is the world not determined by the karma-based perceptions of the perceiver? The world is just the perceptions of the perceiver, and these are caught up with the karma.
As far as I understand Vasubandhu's position, of which I'm not all that well read, the objective world is the net result of the kamma of the (possible) infinite number of beings who populate it.
Saññāvirattassa na santi ganthā,
Paññāvimuttassa na santi mohā;
Saññañca diṭṭhiñca ye aggahesuṃ,
Te ghaṭṭayantā vicaranti loke”ti.


“For one detached from perception, there exist no ties,
for one by wisdom freed, no delusions are there,
but those who have grasped perceptions and views,
they wander the world stirring up strife."


Māgaṇḍiya Sutta
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Coëmgenu
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Re: Idealism Revisited

Post by Coëmgenu »

I understand that as agreeing that "the land (the perception of the land) is determined by the deeds (the karma, seed and fruit) of the perceiver[s] of the land." Is that wrong?
The thus come thus gone,
who has neither came nor went,
enthroned on men’s breath,

like the still turtle,
withdraws six appendages
and is clothed in light --

illuminating
the unilluminated
with three shining cures.
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Ceisiwr
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Re: Idealism Revisited

Post by Ceisiwr »

Coëmgenu wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 7:26 am I understand that as agreeing that "the land (the perception of the land) is determined by the deeds (the karma, seed and fruit) of the perceiver[s] of the land." Is that wrong?
So far I can't see how it can be otherwise, but of course this includes the mind of Mara and other deities. We see in the suttas Mara equated with sense phenomena. Perhaps this is what is meant?
Saññāvirattassa na santi ganthā,
Paññāvimuttassa na santi mohā;
Saññañca diṭṭhiñca ye aggahesuṃ,
Te ghaṭṭayantā vicaranti loke”ti.


“For one detached from perception, there exist no ties,
for one by wisdom freed, no delusions are there,
but those who have grasped perceptions and views,
they wander the world stirring up strife."


Māgaṇḍiya Sutta
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AlexBrains92
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Re: Idealism Revisited

Post by AlexBrains92 »

Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 3:52 am
AlexBrains92 wrote: Thu Oct 22, 2020 12:52 pm
Sabhava is not just about characteristics, it is literaly "own-becoming".
Nibbana becomes? :thinking:
However, let us admit that Nibbana has sabhava... it would only because it is unconditioned.
So no ultimate existence at least for conditioned things, like consciousness.
Etymology is more than just understanding the exact definition of a word. Its also how the word is used. For example, when I call someone a "dick-head" it doesn't literally mean that i think they have a phallus growing from their head. When the Theravādins say that cittas has sabhāva of cognition they mean that citta = cognition. Apart from cognition, there is no citta. The commentaries do explain that apart from the characteristic there is no dhamma. A dhamma then has "intrinsic nature". The intrinsic nature of nibbāna is as previously described. Ultimate existence means not a concept.
You are clutching at straws.

In the Paṭisambhidāmagga we find:
«Born materiality is empty of sabhāva (sabhāvena suññaṭ); disappeared materiality is both changed and empty. Born feeling is empty of sabhāva; disappeared feeling is both changed and empty… Born apperception… Born volitions… Born consciousness… Born beco­ming is empty of sabhāva; disappeared becoming is both changed and empty. This is emptiness by change.»
"If appeasement of desires is what is really blissful, 'desirelessness' as the appeasement of all desires would be the Supreme Bliss, and this in fact is what Nibbāna is." (Bhikkhu Kaṭukurunde Ñāṇananda)
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Ceisiwr
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Re: Idealism Revisited

Post by Ceisiwr »

AlexBrains92 wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 7:29 am
Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 3:52 am
AlexBrains92 wrote: Thu Oct 22, 2020 12:52 pm
Sabhava is not just about characteristics, it is literaly "own-becoming".
Nibbana becomes? :thinking:
However, let us admit that Nibbana has sabhava... it would only because it is unconditioned.
So no ultimate existence at least for conditioned things, like consciousness.
Etymology is more than just understanding the exact definition of a word. Its also how the word is used. For example, when I call someone a "dick-head" it doesn't literally mean that i think they have a phallus growing from their head. When the Theravādins say that cittas has sabhāva of cognition they mean that citta = cognition. Apart from cognition, there is no citta. The commentaries do explain that apart from the characteristic there is no dhamma. A dhamma then has "intrinsic nature". The intrinsic nature of nibbāna is as previously described. Ultimate existence means not a concept.
You are clutching at straws.

In the Paṭisambhidāmagga we find:
«Born materiality is empty of sabhāva (sabhāvena suññaṭ); disappeared materiality is both changed and empty. Born feeling is empty of sabhāva; disappeared feeling is both changed and empty… Born apperception… Born volitions… Born consciousness… Born beco­ming is empty of sabhāva; disappeared becoming is both changed and empty. This is emptiness by change.»
Not really, you just haven't read the orthodox explanation of that passage: viewtopic.php?f=18&t=37771&p=572396&hil ... ga#p572396
Saññāvirattassa na santi ganthā,
Paññāvimuttassa na santi mohā;
Saññañca diṭṭhiñca ye aggahesuṃ,
Te ghaṭṭayantā vicaranti loke”ti.


“For one detached from perception, there exist no ties,
for one by wisdom freed, no delusions are there,
but those who have grasped perceptions and views,
they wander the world stirring up strife."


Māgaṇḍiya Sutta
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AlexBrains92
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Re: Idealism Revisited

Post by AlexBrains92 »

Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 7:31 am Not really, you just haven't read the orthodox explanation of that passage: viewtopic.php?f=18&t=37771&p=572396&hil ... ga#p572396
It denies individual essence, and you don't.
"If appeasement of desires is what is really blissful, 'desirelessness' as the appeasement of all desires would be the Supreme Bliss, and this in fact is what Nibbāna is." (Bhikkhu Kaṭukurunde Ñāṇananda)
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Ceisiwr
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Re: Idealism Revisited

Post by Ceisiwr »

AlexBrains92 wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 7:44 am
Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 7:31 am Not really, you just haven't read the orthodox explanation of that passage: viewtopic.php?f=18&t=37771&p=572396&hil ... ga#p572396
It denies individual essence, and you don't.
Essence = characteristic. A brick has the characteristic, or essence, of hardness. Citta has the essence of cognition. Beyond these dhammas there is no substance. Beyond "hardness" there is no brick, no matter.
Saññāvirattassa na santi ganthā,
Paññāvimuttassa na santi mohā;
Saññañca diṭṭhiñca ye aggahesuṃ,
Te ghaṭṭayantā vicaranti loke”ti.


“For one detached from perception, there exist no ties,
for one by wisdom freed, no delusions are there,
but those who have grasped perceptions and views,
they wander the world stirring up strife."


Māgaṇḍiya Sutta
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AlexBrains92
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Re: Idealism Revisited

Post by AlexBrains92 »

Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 7:47 am
AlexBrains92 wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 7:44 am
Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 7:31 am Not really, you just haven't read the orthodox explanation of that passage: viewtopic.php?f=18&t=37771&p=572396&hil ... ga#p572396
It denies individual essence, and you don't.
Essence = characteristic. A brick has the characteristic, or essence, of hardness. Citta has the essence of cognition. Beyond these dhammas there is no substance. Beyond "hardness" there is no brick, no matter.
You are affirming an individual characteristic, here.
"If appeasement of desires is what is really blissful, 'desirelessness' as the appeasement of all desires would be the Supreme Bliss, and this in fact is what Nibbāna is." (Bhikkhu Kaṭukurunde Ñāṇananda)
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Re: Idealism Revisited

Post by Ceisiwr »

AlexBrains92 wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 7:49 am
Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 7:47 am
AlexBrains92 wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 7:44 am

It denies individual essence, and you don't.
Essence = characteristic. A brick has the characteristic, or essence, of hardness. Citta has the essence of cognition. Beyond these dhammas there is no substance. Beyond "hardness" there is no brick, no matter.
You are affirming an individual characteristic, here.
Yes. Citta = cognition. Earth = hardness.
Saññāvirattassa na santi ganthā,
Paññāvimuttassa na santi mohā;
Saññañca diṭṭhiñca ye aggahesuṃ,
Te ghaṭṭayantā vicaranti loke”ti.


“For one detached from perception, there exist no ties,
for one by wisdom freed, no delusions are there,
but those who have grasped perceptions and views,
they wander the world stirring up strife."


Māgaṇḍiya Sutta
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AlexBrains92
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Re: Idealism Revisited

Post by AlexBrains92 »

Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 7:57 am
AlexBrains92 wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 7:49 am
Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 7:47 am

Essence = characteristic. A brick has the characteristic, or essence, of hardness. Citta has the essence of cognition. Beyond these dhammas there is no substance. Beyond "hardness" there is no brick, no matter.
You are affirming an individual characteristic, here.
Yes. Citta = cognition. Earth = hardness.
So you don't agree with that very explanation, that denies individual essence.
"If appeasement of desires is what is really blissful, 'desirelessness' as the appeasement of all desires would be the Supreme Bliss, and this in fact is what Nibbāna is." (Bhikkhu Kaṭukurunde Ñāṇananda)
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Ceisiwr
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Re: Idealism Revisited

Post by Ceisiwr »

AlexBrains92 wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 7:59 am
Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 7:57 am
AlexBrains92 wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 7:49 am

You are affirming an individual characteristic, here.
Yes. Citta = cognition. Earth = hardness.
So you don't agree with that very explanation, that denies individual essence.
I don't understand your reasoning?
Saññāvirattassa na santi ganthā,
Paññāvimuttassa na santi mohā;
Saññañca diṭṭhiñca ye aggahesuṃ,
Te ghaṭṭayantā vicaranti loke”ti.


“For one detached from perception, there exist no ties,
for one by wisdom freed, no delusions are there,
but those who have grasped perceptions and views,
they wander the world stirring up strife."


Māgaṇḍiya Sutta
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AlexBrains92
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Re: Idealism Revisited

Post by AlexBrains92 »

Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 8:03 am
AlexBrains92 wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 7:59 am
Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 7:57 am

Yes. Citta = cognition. Earth = hardness.
So you don't agree with that very explanation, that denies individual essence.
I don't understand your reasoning?
You are affirming individual essence/characteristic, the explanation you quoted denies it.
"If appeasement of desires is what is really blissful, 'desirelessness' as the appeasement of all desires would be the Supreme Bliss, and this in fact is what Nibbāna is." (Bhikkhu Kaṭukurunde Ñāṇananda)
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Ceisiwr
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Re: Idealism Revisited

Post by Ceisiwr »

AlexBrains92 wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 8:06 am
Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 8:03 am
AlexBrains92 wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 7:59 am

So you don't agree with that very explanation, that denies individual essence.
I don't understand your reasoning?
You are affirming individual essence/characteristic, the explanation you quoted denies it.
The commentarial explanation:
MAHANAMA ON “MATERIALITY IS EMPTY WITH REGARD TO INDIVIDUAL ESSENCE”
(from the Saddhammappakaasinii, Su––akathaa-va.n.nanaa)

Tattha ‘jaata.m ruupan’ ti paccuppanna.m ruupa.m.

Here [i.e. in the passage he is commenting on] ‘born [or ‘arisen’] materiality’ is the materiality [existing in] the present.

[elsewhere he explains that it refers to materiality at the moment of stasis — thiti — in between arising and dissolution]

FIRST GLOSS

‘Sabhaavena su––an’ ti ettha saya.m bhaavo sabhaavo, sayameva uppaado’ ti attho.

‘Empty regarding individual essence’: here individual essence is ‘essence by itself’; arising just of itself is the meaning.

[Here Mahanama appears to take ’empty regarding sabhaava’ as being denial of a false conception of sabhaava, namely a sabhaava which is its own cause. The 199 dhammas lack such a sabhaava]

SECOND GLOSS

Sato vaa bhaavo sabhaavo, attatoyeva uppaado’ ti attho. Paccayaayattavuttittaa paccaya.m vinaa sayameva bhaavo, attato eva vaa bhaavo etasmi.m natthiiti sabhaavena su––a.m, sayameva bhaavena, attato eva vaa bhaavena su––anti vutta.m hoti.

Or, individual essence is own essence; arising solely by itself. Because of existence in dependence on conditions there is in it no essence by itself or essence of its own, thus it is ’empty regarding individual essence’. What is meant is that it is empty of essence by itself or of its own essence.

[This is simply the corollary to the first gloss, being the denial of a sabhaava that is not dependent on other conditions]

THIRD GLOSS

Atha vaa sakassa bhaavo sabhaavo. Pathaviidhaatuaadiisu hi anekesu ruupaaruupadhammesu ekeko dhammo para.m upaadaaya sako naama. ‘bhaavo’ ti ca dhammapariyaayavacanameta.m. Ekassa ca dhammassa a––o bhaavasan.khaato dhammo natthi, tasmaa sakassa a––ena bhaavena su––a.m, sako a––ena bhaavena su––oti attho. Tena ekassa dhammassa ekasabhaavataa vuttaa hoti.

Or else it is the essence that it itself has; for each single dhamma among the various dhammas beginning with the earth principle is itself, and ‘essence’ is a figurative term for dhamma; and each single dhamma does not have any other dhamma called an ‘essence’, therefore it is empty of any essence other than itself: the meaning is that it itself is empty of another essence. Hence what is meant is that a single dhamma has a single individual essence.

[If I understand this correctly, any given dhamma is empty of the sabhaavas that would characterize other dhammas, but is not empty of whatever makes it what it is. Karuna, for example, is empty of the quality of promoting cruelty but is not empty of the quality of allaying suffering]

FOURTH GLOSS

Atha vaa ‘sabhaavena su––an’ ti su––asabhaaveneva su––a.m. Ki.m vutta.m hoti? Su––asu––ataaya eva su––a.m, na a––aahi pariyaayasu––ataahi su–– anti vutta.m hoti.

Or alternatively ’empty regarding individual essence’ is to be taken as empty through having emptiness as its individual essence. What is meant? What is meant is empty owing to emptiness-as-emptiness and not empty according to some other implicated emptiness.

[‘Emptiness-as-emptiness’ is the first of the 25 emptinesses, described thus: “Eye is empty of self or what belongs to self, or of what is permanent or stable or eternal or not subject to change. Ear…nose…tongue…body…mind is empty of self or what belongs to self, or of what is permanent or stable or eternal or not subject to change.” The reference is to the nature common to all dhammas, as opposed to the specific nature that makes a dhamma whatever it is. ‘Implicated emptiness’ refers to the fact that every dhamma is by its nature empty of any characteristic that would make it something other than what it is. E.g. “Past formations are empty of future and presently arisen formations. Future formations are empty of past formations…etc.”]

WRONG UNDERSTANDING OF “MATERIALITY IS EMPTY WITH REGARD TO INDIVIDUAL
ESSENCE”

Sace pana keci vadeyyu.m “sako bhaavo sabhaavo, tena sabhaavena su–– an” ti. Ki.m vutta.m hoti? Bhaavoti dhammo, so para.m upaadaaya sapadena visesito sabhaavo naama hoti. Dhammassa kassaci avijjamaanattaa “jaata.m ruupa.m sabhaavena su––an” ti ruupassa avijjamaanataa vuttaa hotiiti.

But if someone should say: “Own essence is individual essence; it is empty of that individual essence. What is meant? A dhamma is called an ‘essence’; that [essence] is distinguished by the prefix ‘individual’ in comparison with any other and is thus called ‘individual essence’. Because of the non-existence of any dhamma whatever it is the non-existence of materiality that is expressed by the words ‘born materiality is empty regarding individual essence’.”

[Mahanama does not specify whom he has in mind who might say such a thing. The claim as it stands is not clearly attributable to any Buddhist school that I know of. However, the anonymous author of the ‘Clarifier of the Meanings of Knotty Terms in the Path of Discrimination’ (Patisambhidaamaggamuulaganthipadatthavannanaa) expands on the above, adding the words ‘in the highest sense’ (paramatthato). So if he is right, then the wrong interpretation would appear to be a Mahayanic one, namely, that owing to emptiness of sabhaava, in the highest sense dhammas do not exist]

FIRST REFUTATION

Eva.m sati “jaata.m ruupan” tivacanena virujjhati. Na hi uppaadarahita.m jaata.m naama hoti. Nibbaana–hi uppaadarahita.m, ta.m jaata.m naama na hoti, jaatijaraamara.naani ca uppaadarahitaani jaataani naama na honti. Tenevettha “jaataa jaati sabhaavena su––aa, jaata.m jaraamara.na.m sabhaavena su––an” ti eva.m anuddharitvaa bhavameva avasaana.m katvaa niddi.t.tha.m.

[snip Nyanamoli’s trans. as it doesn’t seem to make any sense. I’ll post a new translation when I have time. Or perhaps someone else would like to have a go at it]

SECOND REFUTATION

Yadi uppaadarahitassaapi “jaatan” tivacana.m yujjeyya, “jaataa jaati, jaata.m jaraamara.nan” ti vattabba.m bhaveyya. Yasmaa uppaadarahitesu jaatijaraamara.nesu “jaatan” tivacana.m na vutta.m, tasmaa “sabhaavena su––a.m avijjamaanan” ti vacana.m avijjamaanassa uppaadarahitattaa “jaatan” tivacanena virujjhati.

[ditto]

THIRD REFUTATION

Avijjamaanassa ca “su––an” tivacana.m he.t.thaa vuttena lokavacanena ca bhagavato vacanena ca –aayasaddaganthavacanena ca virujjhati, anekaahi ca yuttiihi virujjhati, tasmaa ta.m vacana.m kacavaramiva cha.d.ditabba.m.

And the word ’empty’ for what is non-existent contradicts both worldly usage and the Blessed One’s usage above, and also the words of the books of logic and linguistics; and it contradicts many logical arguments. Therefore that assertion should be discarded like rubbish.

“Ya.m, bhikkhave, atthisammata.m loke pa.n.ditaana.m, ahampi ta.m atthiiti vadaami. Ya.m, bhikkhave, natthisammata.m loke pa.n.ditaana.m, ahampi ta.m natthiiti vadaami. Ki–ca, bhikkhave, atthisammata.m loke pa.n.ditaana.m, yamaha.m atthiiti vadaami? Ruupa.m, bhikkhave, anicca.m dukkha.m vipari.naamadhamma.m atthisammata.m loke pa.n.ditaana.m, ahampi ta.m atthiiti vadaamii” tiaadiihi anekehi buddhavacanappamaa.nehi.

In many passages in the Buddha-word such as this: “Bhikkhus, what sages in the world say is not, of that too I say that it is not; what sages in the world say is, of that too I say that it is….Sages in the world say of impermanent, painful and changeable materiality that it is, and I too say of it that it is.”

Anekaahi ca yuttiihi dhammaa sakakkha.ne vijjamaanaa evaati ni.t.thamettha gantabba.m.

And in many logical arguments [it is demonstrable that] dhammas exist in their own moments. Thus should this [abovementioned assertion] be refuted.
Saññāvirattassa na santi ganthā,
Paññāvimuttassa na santi mohā;
Saññañca diṭṭhiñca ye aggahesuṃ,
Te ghaṭṭayantā vicaranti loke”ti.


“For one detached from perception, there exist no ties,
for one by wisdom freed, no delusions are there,
but those who have grasped perceptions and views,
they wander the world stirring up strife."


Māgaṇḍiya Sutta
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AlexBrains92
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Re: Idealism Revisited

Post by AlexBrains92 »

Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Oct 24, 2020 8:11 am Or, individual essence is own essence; arising solely by itself. Because of existence in dependence on conditions there is in it no essence by itself or essence of its own, thus it is ’empty regarding individual essence’. What is meant is that it is empty of essence by itself or of its own essence.
You don't seem to agree with this.
"If appeasement of desires is what is really blissful, 'desirelessness' as the appeasement of all desires would be the Supreme Bliss, and this in fact is what Nibbāna is." (Bhikkhu Kaṭukurunde Ñāṇananda)
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