Is Duality, a necessary evil?

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Ceisiwr
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Re: Is Duality, a necessary evil?

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On the “All”
The “All” is quite clearly referring to the Upanishadic “All”, or Brahman. Note as well that the Kaccānagotta Sutta makes use of sabbaṃ, which is translated as "the All" and not sabba.
“This world, Kaccana, for the most part depends upon a duality—upon the notion of existence and the notion of nonexistence. But for one who sees the origin of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of nonexistence in regard to the world. And for one who sees the cessation of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of existence in regard to the world.

“This world, Kaccana, is for the most part shackled by engagement, clinging, and adherence. But this one with right view does not become engaged and cling through that engagement and clinging, mental standpoint, adherence, underlying tendency; he does not take a stand about ‘my self.’ He has no perplexity or doubt that what arises is only suffering arising, what ceases is only suffering ceasing. His knowledge about this is independent of others. It is in this way, Kaccana, that there is right view. ‘All exists’: Kaccana, this is one extreme. ‘All does not exist’: this is the second extreme”
Kaccānagotta Sutta

Sabbaṃ is a noun. Its the name of something. I wonder what this can be?
“1.4.10. Verily, in the beginning this world was Brahman. It knew only itself
(atmanam): "I am Brahman!" Therefore it became the All. Whoever of
the gods became awakened to this, he indeed became it; likewise in the
case of seers (rsi), likewise in the case of men. Seeing this, indeed, the
seer Vamadeva began:-

I was Manu and the sun (surya)!

This is so now also. Whoever thus knows "I am Brahman!" becomes this
All; even the gods have not power to prevent his becoming thus, for he
becomes their self (atman).

So whoever worships another divinity [than his Self], thinking "He is
one and I another," he knows not. He is like a sacrificial animal for the
gods. Verily, indeed, as many animals would be of service to a man,
even so each single person is of service to the gods. If even one animal
is taken away, it is not pleasant. What, then, if many? Therefore it is
not pleasing to those [gods] that men should know this.
1.4.11. Verily, in the beginning this world was Brahman, one only.”
Brhadaranyaka Upanisad

A further interesting elaboration from “The Early Upanisads - Annotated Text and Translation”:
“4.9-10 the Whole: the exact sense of the term sarva, here translated as "the Whole," has been much debated. As Gonda 1955a has shown, the term in its earliest usage did not mean "everything" but carried the sense of completeness, wholeness, and health. It is, thus, opposed to what is partial, broken, sick, or hurt. In the Upanisads the term is used to indicate not all things in the universe but a higher-level totality that encompasses the universe. Gonda (1955a, 64) observes that the phrase sarvam khalv idam brahma at CU 3.14.1 does not mean "'Brahman is everything here,' but 'Brahman is the complete here, this whole (one),' or: 'Brahman is what is the whole, complete here, is what is entire, perfect, with no part lacking, what is safe and well etc., i.e. Completeness, Totality, the All seen as the Whole.'" Unless the context dictates otherwise, I translate sarvam throughout as "the Whole" and the phrase idam sarvam as "this whole world." To the English reader the term "whole" should evoke the senses of totality and completeness (all there is), as well as perfection, soundness, and wholesomeness.”
Now we do find sabbaṃ in SN 12.15, so could they be talking about the same thing? If we look at the only other place where we find sabbamatthi" (the All exists) and "sabbaṃ natthi" (the All does not exist) we find SN 12.48:
At Savatthī. Then a brahmin who was a cosmologist approached the Blessed One … and said to him:
“How is it, Master Gotama: does all exist?”
“‘All exists’: this, brahmin, is the oldest cosmology.”
“Then, Master Gotama, does all not exist?”
“‘All does not exist’: this, brahmin, is the second cosmology.”
“How is it, Master Gotama: is all a unity?”
“‘All is a unity’: this, brahmin, is the third cosmology.”
“Then, Master Gotama, is all a plurality?”
“‘All is a plurality’: this, brahmin, is the fourth cosmology. Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma by the middle….”
https://suttacentral.net/sn12.48/en/sujato

This matches the pre-Buddhist cosmological debate in the Chandogya Upanisad 6.2 -
“In the beginning, son, this world was simply what is existent—one only, without a second. Now, on this point some do say: 'In the beginning this world was simply what is nonexistent—one only, without a second. And from what is nonexistent was born what is existent.' 2"But, son, how can that possibly be?" he continued. "How can what is existent be born from what is nonexistent? On the contrary, son, in the beginning this world was simply what is existent—one only, without a second. 3 "And it thought to itself: 'Let me become many. Let me propagate myself.' It emitted heat. The heat thought to itself: 'Let me become many. Let me propagate myself.' It emitted water. Whenever it is hot, therefore, a man surely perspires; and thus it is from heat that water is produced. 4The water thought to itself: 'Let me be- come many. Let me propagate myself.' It emitted food. Whenever it rains, therefore, food becomes abundant; and thus it is from water that foodstuffs are produced.”
transl Olivelle, p.247

Given then that the Kaccānagotta Sutta is actually about "the All" existing or not in terms of pre-Buddhist Upanishadic cosmology, of which the Buddha was surely aware, and given that in other suttas the Buddha does say that things exist via the the use of “atthi” its clear that the Buddha did not reject all ontological commitments. Therefore, Nāgārjuna falls. The Dhamma is not about surmounting all views of existence and non-existence and sadly, I'm sorry to say, Ñāṇananda does too.
Last edited by Ceisiwr on Fri Oct 30, 2020 10:54 am, edited 1 time in total.
Saññāvirattassa na santi ganthā,
Paññāvimuttassa na santi mohā;
Saññañca diṭṭhiñca ye aggahesuṃ,
Te ghaṭṭayantā vicaranti loke”ti.


“For one detached from perception, there exist no ties,
for one by wisdom freed, no delusions are there,
but those who have grasped perceptions and views,
they wander the world stirring up strife."


Māgaṇḍiya Sutta
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Ceisiwr
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Re: Is Duality, a necessary evil?

Post by Ceisiwr »

AlexBrains92 wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 10:39 am
Ceisiwr wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 10:30 am
AlexBrains92 wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 10:25 am
But the middle path of
right view is found in the Kaccānagotta Sutta, beautifully used by
Ven. Nāgārjuna. When the Theravadins got engrossed with the
Abhidhamma they forgot about it. The Mādhyamikas were alert
enough to give it the attention it deserved.
Wrong, wrong, wrong. That sutta is attacking the Upanishadic "All exists" or "All does not exist" not ontic claims in of themselves. As for substance, the Buddha denied substance in the Phena sutta but he never denied the existence of consciousness etc :shrug:
What is attacked by Nagarjuna are the claims of intrinsic existence.
As in substance metaphysics like Prakṛti, yes. The Buddha denied Prakṛti and all other substance metaphysics, yet he can still say some things exist and others don't because you can still make ontic claims without substance. You can still view things as existing or not.
Last edited by Ceisiwr on Fri Oct 30, 2020 10:51 am, edited 2 times in total.
Saññāvirattassa na santi ganthā,
Paññāvimuttassa na santi mohā;
Saññañca diṭṭhiñca ye aggahesuṃ,
Te ghaṭṭayantā vicaranti loke”ti.


“For one detached from perception, there exist no ties,
for one by wisdom freed, no delusions are there,
but those who have grasped perceptions and views,
they wander the world stirring up strife."


Māgaṇḍiya Sutta
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Re: Is Duality, a necessary evil?

Post by AlexBrains92 »

AlexBrains92 wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 10:39 am In Kaccanagotta Sutta, dependent origination is "the middle", and dependent origination is the negation of intrinsic existence.
"If appeasement of desires is what is really blissful, 'desirelessness' as the appeasement of all desires would be the Supreme Bliss, and this in fact is what Nibbāna is." (Bhikkhu Kaṭukurunde Ñāṇananda)
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Re: Is Duality, a necessary evil?

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AlexBrains92 wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 10:49 am
AlexBrains92 wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 10:39 am In Kaccanagotta Sutta, dependent origination is "the middle", and dependent origination is the negation of intrinsic existence.
DO negates any substance, but it doesn't negate things which exist. As I have pointed out, the Kaccanagotta Sutta is attacking the Brahmins "All" that Exists with a big "E", but it never says we can't think of things existing with a small "e" contrary to what Nagarjuna and Nanananda claim.
Saññāvirattassa na santi ganthā,
Paññāvimuttassa na santi mohā;
Saññañca diṭṭhiñca ye aggahesuṃ,
Te ghaṭṭayantā vicaranti loke”ti.


“For one detached from perception, there exist no ties,
for one by wisdom freed, no delusions are there,
but those who have grasped perceptions and views,
they wander the world stirring up strife."


Māgaṇḍiya Sutta
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Re: Is Duality, a necessary evil?

Post by AlexBrains92 »

Ceisiwr wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 10:57 am
AlexBrains92 wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 10:49 am
AlexBrains92 wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 10:39 am In Kaccanagotta Sutta, dependent origination is "the middle", and dependent origination is the negation of intrinsic existence.
DO negates any substance, but it doesn't negate things which exist. As I have pointed out, the Kaccanagotta Sutta is attacking the Brahmins "All" that Exists with a big "E", but it never says we can't think of things existing with a small "e" contrary to what Nagarjuna and Nanananda claim.
The "intrinsic existence" being attacked is sabhava, affirmed by the Sarvastivadin at that time, but included also in the Theravada Abhidhamma over time.
"If appeasement of desires is what is really blissful, 'desirelessness' as the appeasement of all desires would be the Supreme Bliss, and this in fact is what Nibbāna is." (Bhikkhu Kaṭukurunde Ñāṇananda)
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Re: Is Duality, a necessary evil?

Post by Ceisiwr »

AlexBrains92 wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 11:02 am
Ceisiwr wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 10:57 am
AlexBrains92 wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 10:49 am
DO negates any substance, but it doesn't negate things which exist. As I have pointed out, the Kaccanagotta Sutta is attacking the Brahmins "All" that Exists with a big "E", but it never says we can't think of things existing with a small "e" contrary to what Nagarjuna and Nanananda claim.
The "intrinsic existence" being attacked is sabhava, affirmed by the Sarvastivadin at that time, but included also in the Theravada Abhidhamma over time.
No, its dravya. The Sarvāstivādin dharmas are classified as phenomena that have intrinsic nature/essence/characteristic and which have dravya, thus truly existing with a big E as substance and so persist through the 3 times. This substance metaphysics is totally lacking in the Theravādin Abhidhamma and indeed the commentaries do make it clear that they oppose such a concept. Within the Theravādin Abhidhamma and subsequent commentaries sabhāva is simply "quality" and not an enduring substance, thus its near the same as what we find in the suttas if we look at the 4 mahābhūta's which are said to exist as qualities yet have no substance. The Sarvāstivādins were committed ontological realists. I mean, we are talking about a school which turned space into a real substance and even turned "arising" into a substance meaning arising had its own arising, leading to the substance of "arising" behind arising :rolleye:

Sadly it seems like many who follow Nāgārjuna you aren't aware of the fine philosophical differences between the Theravāda Abhidhamma and the Sarvāstivādin one, which in turn means you don't really understand what on earth Nāgārjuna was attacking in an over zealous manner based on faulty premises.
Last edited by Ceisiwr on Fri Oct 30, 2020 11:47 am, edited 1 time in total.
Saññāvirattassa na santi ganthā,
Paññāvimuttassa na santi mohā;
Saññañca diṭṭhiñca ye aggahesuṃ,
Te ghaṭṭayantā vicaranti loke”ti.


“For one detached from perception, there exist no ties,
for one by wisdom freed, no delusions are there,
but those who have grasped perceptions and views,
they wander the world stirring up strife."


Māgaṇḍiya Sutta
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Re: Is Duality, a necessary evil?

Post by AlexBrains92 »

Ceisiwr wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 11:10 am
AlexBrains92 wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 11:02 am
Ceisiwr wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 10:57 am

DO negates any substance, but it doesn't negate things which exist. As I have pointed out, the Kaccanagotta Sutta is attacking the Brahmins "All" that Exists with a big "E", but it never says we can't think of things existing with a small "e" contrary to what Nagarjuna and Nanananda claim.
The "intrinsic existence" being attacked is sabhava, affirmed by the Sarvastivadin at that time, but included also in the Theravada Abhidhamma over time.
No, its dravya. The Sarvāstivādins dhammas are classified as phenomena that have intrinsic nature/essence/characteristic and which have dravya, thus truly existing with a big E as substance and so persist through the 3 times. This substance metaphysics is totally lacking in the Theravādin Abhidhamma and indeed the commentaries do make it clear that they oppose such a concept. Within the Theravādin Abhidhamma and subsequent commentaries sabhāva is simply "quality" and not an enduring substance, thus its near the same as what we find in the suttas if we look at the 4 mahābhūta's which are said to exist as qualities yet have no substance. The Sarvāstivādins were committed ontological realists. I mean, we are talking about a school which turned space into a real substance and even turned "arising" into a substance which had its own arising, leading to the substance of "arising" behind arising :rolleye:

Sadly it seems like many who follow Nāgārjuna you aren't aware of the fine philosophical differences between the Theravāda Abhidhamma and the Sarvāstivādin one, which in turn means you don't really understand what on earth Nāgārjuna was attacking in an over zealous manner based on faulty premises.
Am I saying that Sarvastivada and Theravada philosophies don't differ? I'm saying that both affirm sabhava and that is the reason of the disagreement also between Theravada and Nagarjuna: sabhava, and not (as you mistakenly state) that Nagarjuna would deny any kind of existence. That is very different from saying that in Nibbana that notion is abandoned. Again: misunderstood Nagarjuna.
"If appeasement of desires is what is really blissful, 'desirelessness' as the appeasement of all desires would be the Supreme Bliss, and this in fact is what Nibbāna is." (Bhikkhu Kaṭukurunde Ñāṇananda)
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Re: Is Duality, a necessary evil?

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To quote 4 masters as recorded in the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣa Śāstra:
The Venerable Dharmatrāta says that there is change in mode of being (bhāva- anyathātva). The Venerable Ghoṣaka says that there is change in characteristic (lakṣaṇa-anyathātva). The Venerable Vasumitra says that there is change in state (avasthā-anyathātva). The Venerable Buddhadeva says that there is change in [temporal] relativity (anyathā-anyathātva).

[1] The advocate of “change in mode of being” asserts that when dharmas operate (pra-√vṛt) in time, they change on account of their modes of existence/being (bhāva); there is no change in substance. This is like the case of breaking up a golden vessel to produce another thing—there is just a change in shape, not in varṇa- rūpa. It is also like milk, etc., turning into curds, etc.—just the taste, digestibility, etc., are given up, not the varṇa-rūpa. Similarly, when dharmas enter into the present from the future, although they give up their future mode of existence and acquire their present mode of existence, they neither lose nor acquire their substantial essence (AKB: dravya-bhāva). Likewise, when they enter the past from the present, although they give up the present mode of existence and acquire the past mode of existence, they neither give up nor acquire their substantial nature.

[2] The advocate of “change in characteristic” asserts that when dharmas operate in time, they change on account of characteristic (lakṣaṇa); there is no change in substance. A dharma in each of the temporal periods has three temporal characteristics; when one [temporal] characteristic is conjoined, the other two are not severed. This is like the case of a man being attached to one particular woman— he is not said to be detached from other women. Similarly, when dharmas abide in the past, they are being conjoined with the past characteristic but are not said to be severed from the characteristics of the other two temporal characteristics. When they abide in the future, they are being conjoined with the future characteristic but are not said to be severed from the characteristics of the other two temporal characteristics. When they abide in the present, they are being conjoined with the present characteristic, but are not said to be severed from the characteristics of the other two temporal characteristics.

[3] The advocate of “change in state” asserts that when dharmas operate in time, they change on account of state (avasthā); there is no change in substance. This is like the case of moving a token [into different positions]. When placed in the position (avasthā) of ones, it is signified as one; placed in the position of tens, ten; placed in the position of hundreds, hundred. While there is change in the positions into which it is moved, there is no change in its substance. Similarly, when dharmas pass through the three temporal states, although they acquire three different names, they do not change in substance. In the theory proposed by this master, there is no confusion as regards substance, for the three periods are differentiated on the basis of activity (kāritra).

[4] The advocate of “change in [temporal] relativity” asserts that when dharmas operate in time, they are predicated differently [as future, present, or past], relative to that which precedes and that which follows (cf. AKB: pūrvāparam apekṣyānyo’nya ucyate avasthāntarato na dravyāntarataḥ); there is no change in substance. This is like the case of one and the same woman who is called “daughter” relative to her mother, and “mother” relative to her daughter. Similarly, dharmas are called “past” relative to the succeeding ones, “future” relative to the preceding ones, “present” relative to both.
To a Sarvāstivādin a dharma has sabhāva or "intrinsic nature" which is equivalent to its characteristic (lakṣaṇa). So, for example, vedanā has the characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of "feeling", thus this is its sabhāva; however, for the Sarvāstivādin "Vedanā" as the universal has "dravya", thus it truly exists as a substance which endures and exists in the 3 times yet discharges its effects over time (how that works is being debated above). A western comparison is probably Plato's Forms.

To a Theravādin this is alien. The Theravādin Abhidhamma and commentaries do not recognise dravya. If we take vedanā again it has the same characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of "feeling" which is the sabhāva. At first this sounds like there is a "Vedanā" which has the quality of "feeling" and so the ontological trap of the substance metaphysics of dravya is rearing its ugly little head again; however, to avoid the error of the Sarvāstivādins the Theras make it clear that apart from its characteristic, or sabhāva, there is no dhamma. Apart from "feeling" there is no vedanā and so there is no dravya of "Vedanā" out of which vedanā arises and returns. There is only the concept of the universal "Vedanā" without any substance behind it, thus being nominalist in outlook and so perfectly in line with the Buddha and the suttas.

It is therefore fine to say that there are dhammas based on sabhāva, since all we are really saying is that there are phenomenal experiences of "hard" or "colour" or "feeling" etc with zero substance behind them. Stripped of any form of substance they become the phenomena talked about in the Phena sutta. This in turn means the Theravādin concept of sabhāva is fully in line with the sutta outlook on existence.
Last edited by Ceisiwr on Fri Oct 30, 2020 11:50 am, edited 4 times in total.
Saññāvirattassa na santi ganthā,
Paññāvimuttassa na santi mohā;
Saññañca diṭṭhiñca ye aggahesuṃ,
Te ghaṭṭayantā vicaranti loke”ti.


“For one detached from perception, there exist no ties,
for one by wisdom freed, no delusions are there,
but those who have grasped perceptions and views,
they wander the world stirring up strife."


Māgaṇḍiya Sutta
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Re: Is Duality, a necessary evil?

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Where did the Buddha ever say "duality" is evil? More Hinduism or Advaita it seems... :roll:
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Re: Is Duality, a necessary evil?

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AlexBrains92 wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 11:21 am
Ceisiwr wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 11:10 am
AlexBrains92 wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 11:02 am

The "intrinsic existence" being attacked is sabhava, affirmed by the Sarvastivadin at that time, but included also in the Theravada Abhidhamma over time.
No, its dravya. The Sarvāstivādins dhammas are classified as phenomena that have intrinsic nature/essence/characteristic and which have dravya, thus truly existing with a big E as substance and so persist through the 3 times. This substance metaphysics is totally lacking in the Theravādin Abhidhamma and indeed the commentaries do make it clear that they oppose such a concept. Within the Theravādin Abhidhamma and subsequent commentaries sabhāva is simply "quality" and not an enduring substance, thus its near the same as what we find in the suttas if we look at the 4 mahābhūta's which are said to exist as qualities yet have no substance. The Sarvāstivādins were committed ontological realists. I mean, we are talking about a school which turned space into a real substance and even turned "arising" into a substance which had its own arising, leading to the substance of "arising" behind arising :rolleye:

Sadly it seems like many who follow Nāgārjuna you aren't aware of the fine philosophical differences between the Theravāda Abhidhamma and the Sarvāstivādin one, which in turn means you don't really understand what on earth Nāgārjuna was attacking in an over zealous manner based on faulty premises.
Am I saying that Sarvastivada and Theravada philosophies don't differ? I'm saying that both affirm sabhava and that is the reason of the disagreement also between Theravada and Nagarjuna: sabhava, and not (as you mistakenly state) that Nagarjuna would deny any kind of existence. That is very different from saying that in Nibbana that notion is abandoned. Again: misunderstood Nagarjuna.
Nagarjuna and Nanananda both take the position that one needs to abandon all thinking in terms of existence and non-existence. This is not required at all. You only need to abandon substance, not the view and indeed understanding that so many instances of "hardness" etc exist in that moment. Beyond this conditioned ebb and flow of phenomena there is Nibbana.
Saññāvirattassa na santi ganthā,
Paññāvimuttassa na santi mohā;
Saññañca diṭṭhiñca ye aggahesuṃ,
Te ghaṭṭayantā vicaranti loke”ti.


“For one detached from perception, there exist no ties,
for one by wisdom freed, no delusions are there,
but those who have grasped perceptions and views,
they wander the world stirring up strife."


Māgaṇḍiya Sutta
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Re: Is Duality, a necessary evil?

Post by AlexBrains92 »

Ceisiwr wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 11:41 am Nagarjuna and Nanananda both take the position that one needs to abandon all thinking in terms of existence and non-existence.
No, they take the position that one needs to abandon the metaphysical views of existence and non-existence, while still recognizing them in the empirical sense. Again: misunderstood Nagarjuna, and misunderstood Nanananda too.
"If appeasement of desires is what is really blissful, 'desirelessness' as the appeasement of all desires would be the Supreme Bliss, and this in fact is what Nibbāna is." (Bhikkhu Kaṭukurunde Ñāṇananda)
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Re: Is Duality, a necessary evil?

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AlexBrains92 wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 12:06 pm
Ceisiwr wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 11:41 am Nagarjuna and Nanananda both take the position that one needs to abandon all thinking in terms of existence and non-existence.
No, they take the position that one needs to abandon the metaphysical views of existence and non-existence, maintaining the empirical use of these terms. Again: misunderstood Nagarjuna, and misunderstood Nanananda too.
The claim is that to see the emptiness of substance in phenomena is to see that they are empty of inherent existence, therefore it is only by convention that we speak of dhammas that arise and fall. Ultimate reality is ultimately empty. Indeed for Nagarjuna Nibbana is samsara because Nibbana is simply samsara correctly cognised. The Buddha did not teach anything remotely like this. A dhamma arises, persists for a moment and then ceases. Within that it exists and then falls away. By meditating on the dhammas one sees how they are impermanent, empty of self and dukkha and so desire in relation to them fades away. Desire fading away the dhammas, 6 sense bases and namarupa fade away until Nibbana is revealed. After awakening the Arahant returns again to the conditioned world of arising and ceasing dhammas, which we can say exist and then cease. Nagarjuna got to where he did because of a misunderstanding of a sutta and because of his over zealous attacks on substance. Nibbana is not samsara correctly cognised. Citta is not a mere concept or convention and nor are the other dhammas. The dhammas do exist apart from concept or convention, just not substantially. Nanananda is quite clear that any view of existence and non-existence has to go. This is false.

Nagarjuna adds an extra layer of understanding in response to the extra layer of understanding the Sarvāstivādins gave. Its a reaction to an argument the Buddha never made from a wrong premise and so misses the point entirely.
Last edited by Ceisiwr on Fri Oct 30, 2020 12:50 pm, edited 2 times in total.
Saññāvirattassa na santi ganthā,
Paññāvimuttassa na santi mohā;
Saññañca diṭṭhiñca ye aggahesuṃ,
Te ghaṭṭayantā vicaranti loke”ti.


“For one detached from perception, there exist no ties,
for one by wisdom freed, no delusions are there,
but those who have grasped perceptions and views,
they wander the world stirring up strife."


Māgaṇḍiya Sutta
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Re: Is Duality, a necessary evil?

Post by SteRo »

AlexBrains92 wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 12:06 pm
Ceisiwr wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 11:41 am Nagarjuna and Nanananda both take the position that one needs to abandon all thinking in terms of existence and non-existence.
No, they take the position that one needs to abandon the metaphysical views of existence and non-existence, while still recognizing them in the empirical sense. Again: misunderstood Nagarjuna, and misunderstood Nanananda too.
That's an interesting polarity: abandon mere thinking vs abandon wrong views in the context of thinking.

Can anyone tell with reference to abhidamma view of cognitive process where in that process wrong views are connected with arising cittas?
Exhaling अ and inhaling धीः amounts to བྷྲཱུཾ་བི་ཤྭ་བི་ཤུད་དྷེ
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Ceisiwr
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Re: Is Duality, a necessary evil?

Post by Ceisiwr »

Nagarjuna says that dhammas do not really arise nor cease. This is not something you find supported in the early texts.
Saññāvirattassa na santi ganthā,
Paññāvimuttassa na santi mohā;
Saññañca diṭṭhiñca ye aggahesuṃ,
Te ghaṭṭayantā vicaranti loke”ti.


“For one detached from perception, there exist no ties,
for one by wisdom freed, no delusions are there,
but those who have grasped perceptions and views,
they wander the world stirring up strife."


Māgaṇḍiya Sutta
SteRo
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Re: Is Duality, a necessary evil?

Post by SteRo »

Ceisiwr wrote: Fri Oct 30, 2020 12:52 pm Nagarjuna says that dhammas do not really arise nor cease. This is not something you find supported in the early texts.
i think the point is that Nagarjuna refers to conceptual level so there is no contradiction between Nagarjuna and early texts.
Exhaling अ and inhaling धीः amounts to བྷྲཱུཾ་བི་ཤྭ་བི་ཤུད་དྷེ
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