suttas where mind and body (31 body parts of meditator) dichotomy is incontrovertible, exposing Abhidhamma incoherence (

[pitithefool]

You haven't provided sufficient evidence to prove that vitakka-vicara as a jhana factor must not be discursive thought.

But MN 19 is sufficient evidence.

That's what I'm not so sure about. i've offered an alternative explanation in which what differentiates vitakka-vicara as "skillful thoughts" from vitakka-vicara as a jhana factor is the presence of strong piti-sukha.

Nowhere in the canon is discursive thought labeled as wrong thought unless it's connected with unwholesome states or sensuality. Even in the jhana pericope, if non-verbal vitakka-vicara was strictly meant here, it would make sense that it would be specified as such.

If we're working with the jhana pericope alone, what's more important is that the vitakka-vicara is centered around the object and the dhamma, and nowhere that I've found says explicitly that vitakka-vicara must be without some sort of verbal mental activity.

Further, can we go into a jhana on recollection of the Buddha? It can certainly arouse piti and very strongly so. If so, isn't it incredibly arbitrary to say "imagine the Buddha, but don't say anything in your mind because that ruins it". That seems rather silly to me, as we are even given phrases to go along with the recollections to repeat to ourselves, entire suttas even. If that's the case, then it makes sense that thinking about our object is hugely important.

It's different for the breath though. What we're examining and analyzing with that breath meditation is what is currently fabricating our present experience, and whether or not we use words in our head doesn't matter at best, and at worst suppressing thought about it can hinder it. Again though, once the jhana factors are there to where they don't need any more support, then thoughts in whatever way we're thinking of them as verbal and subverbal, can be let go of and will fade away.

It's again quite arbitrary that we say "no verbal thoughts" when those can be very much skillful resolves, just like non-verbal thoughts can be.

[pitithefool]

saṅkappa: intention; purpose. (m.)

Vitakka-vicāra in the Jhāna pericope are skilful intentions. They are not normal thoughts and pondering, which disturb the stillness required for Jhāna.

I agree with this. Nowheere have I asserted that the jhana factor of vitakka-vicara is the same as normal discursive thinking. Rather I am saying that discursive thinking can be a jhana factor if and only if it is skillful, solely centered around its object, is not connected with sensuality, and is accompanied by the other jhana factors.

Discursive thinking can be a skillful resolve, and can give rise to other jhana factors, especially in the case of subjects like Buddhanussati, Dhammanussati, and the four foundations of mindfulness. Just thinking about them does not make it a jhana, rather what makes it a jhana is strong piti-sukha and not getting distracted.

I also want to be very clear that the traditional "placing and holding attention" definition still fits under how I've chosen to define "thought". That being said making the distinction between thinking about the breath using words and thinking about the breath not using words is not in any way a definition between jhana and non-jhana. Rather, the definition is more appropriately the presence of the other jhana factors and verbal vs. non-verbal thinking is an arbitrary distinction in practice. We can meditate without using words, but it's not going to be any better than if we can skillfully use verbal thoughts. Further, the use of those very verbal thoughts is heavily dependent on the type of object we're using. Breathing and kasinas lend themselves to non-verbal placing and keeping, but recollection of the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha do not as do other meditation subjects like metta and 32 body parts. You can do them without but you'll probably get the mind where you want it faster and with more strength if you can help by hijacking that discursive tendency of the mind to your benefit.

That's what I'm arguing for, is not so much saying "think all you want", no I'm saying don't reject the discursive tendency of the mind as useless, because it can be used for getting the mind to stay put and give rise to wholesome states. It would be stupid to just let it run rampant or worse, try and stop it directly. It's a veritable gold mine. Nothing is more valuable than a well trained mind and nothing is more harmful than an ill-trained one.

[pitithefool]

Nothing in the grammar suggests this is occurring whilst in the jhāna

To see it as an affliction you need to see it as impermanent and disintegrating, since the jhāna itself is an extremely blissful and refined state (speaking of the 1st for arguments sake here). You can't do any of that whilst actually in jhāna.

You can't see the jhāna as an affliction until it has fallen away. If it has fallen away, you aren't in jhāna. Part of the "knowledge of how things are" is in seeing the conditionality of the jhāna. You can't do that until it has disintegrated due to conditions.

You can and must see the three marks while in jhana AND after. It's easy to think this amounts to vitakka-vicara, but it doesn't. The three marks amount to perception, and are not necessarily vitakka-vicara, a term which denotes willful thinking. Perceiving is not the same thing. Perceiving doesn't require direct willed effort and is more a product of conditioning (vitakka-vicara, anapana, vedana and other sanna). Those conditioners set up how perceptions occur and that's precisely what we're tasked with doing in meditation.

[Pondera]

Nothing in the grammar suggests this is occurring whilst in the jhāna

To see it as an affliction you need to see it as impermanent and disintegrating, since the jhāna itself is an extremely blissful and refined state (speaking of the 1st for arguments sake here). You can't do any of that whilst actually in jhāna.

You can't see the jhāna as an affliction until it has fallen away. If it has fallen away, you aren't in jhāna. Part of the "knowledge of how things are" is in seeing the conditionality of the jhāna. You can't do that until it has disintegrated due to conditions.

You can and must see the three marks while in jhana AND after. It's easy to think this amounts to vitakka-vicara, but it doesn't. The three marks amount to perception, and are not necessarily vitakka-vicara, a term which denotes willful thinking. Perceiving is not the same thing. Perceiving doesn't require direct willed effort and is more a product of conditioning (vitakka-vicara, anapana, vedana and other sanna). Those conditioners set up how perceptions occur and that's precisely what we're tasked with doing in meditation.

I fully concur.

How do you entertain those who attack suttas like the Jhana Sutta line for line to show that there is (supposedly) no argument to be made that vision or perception of the three marks occurs inside the jhana?

I think the argument lies in fact that the perception of the marks is followed by - “he turns away from those phenomenon - and, having done so, inclines his mind towards the deathless.”

That is where a departure from the jhanas seems to occur. Not (as our opponents say) during the perception of the marks.

[Srilankaputra]

If one were listening to a sermon, all of the mind would be given over to it.

Yes indeed, it is possible to experience a great deal of Samadhi(ekaggata) accompanied by Piti and Sukha just listening to a Dhamma talk.

Actually it is possible to develop all seven Bojjangas while listening to a Dhamma talk.

When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple listens to the Dhamma with eager ears, attending to it as a matter of vital concern, directing his whole mind to it, on that occasion the five hindrances are not present in him; on that occasion the seven factors of enlightenment go to fulfilment by development.

https://suttacentral.net/sn46.38/en/bodhi

Not having mastered Appana Samadhi does not exclude one from the Path.

What I am really trying to do is avoid the word 'Jhana'. There doesn't seem to be any other word able to stir the passions as this word on Bhuddist forums. My first language is not English, I think the proper word to use here is 'ironic' or may be 'moronic'.

[DooDoot]

That's what I'm not so sure about.

doesn't matter what u say; its not jhana. The dye is already cast

i've offered an alternative explanation in which what differentiates vitakka-vicara as "skillful thoughts" from vitakka-vicara as a jhana factor is the presence of strong piti-sukha.

its not an "alternate explanation". it merely an idiosyncratic speculative theory that attempts to make an unwarranted non-existent claim to personal attainment to what the suttas call a SUPERHUMAN STATE

if i think about my favourite food, this can give rise to piti or sukha. but this is not jhana

Nowhere in the canon is discursive thought labeled as wrong thought unless it's connected with unwholesome states or sensuality.

irrelevant. MN 19 clearly says the wholesome thoughts of the noble path are not jhana

Even in the jhana pericope

please do not use the term "periscope" because i have no idea what it means apart from in yellow submarines

if non-verbal vitakka-vicara was strictly meant here, it would make sense that it would be specified as such.

no. again, the above demonstrates no refuge in the Sangha or in the Teachings. EVERY JHANA HAS THE FACTOR OF EKAGGATA. in ekaggata, there can be no discursive thought. the suttas are clear

If we're working with the jhana pericope alone, what's more important is that the vitakka-vicara is centered around the object and the dhamma, and nowhere that I've found says explicitly that vitakka-vicara must be without some sort of verbal mental activity.

more gibberish.

Further, can we go into a jhana on recollection of the Buddha? It can certainly arouse piti and very strongly so.

no. the above is ridiculous & low however the above verifies our correct assessment of such ridiculous & low ideas. thinking about the Buddha or thinking about your favorite bikini girl is not jhana. all rapture is not jhana.

It's different for the breath though. What we're examining and analyzing with that breath meditation is what is currently fabricating our present experience, and whether or not we use words in our head doesn't matter at best, and at worst suppressing thought about it can hinder it. Again though, once the jhana factors are there to where they don't need any more support, then thoughts in whatever way we're thinking of them as verbal and subverbal, can be let go of and will fade away.

more gibberish.. such as "fabricating our present experience"

It's again quite arbitrary that we say "no verbal thoughts" when those can be very much skillful resolves, just like non-verbal thoughts can be.

jhana has no active verbal thoughts to maintain the jhana ... the 'pondering' in jhana is merely very subtle perceptions & movements ... all jhanas are ekaggata

[ToVincent]

Two remarks:

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
Remark one:
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

There should not be two camps:
- One who says samadhi* eliminates all sense perception and cognition.
- One who says samadhi does not eliminate all sense perception and cognition.
(*or more properly said, upekkhāsatipārisuddhi)

For nirodha does not always mean "eliminate"/destroy/ cease/etc. — but also means to restrain/control/constrain/etc.

For instance, later on, when in the first arupa "jhana" (fifth attainment), one has transcended any acquiescence towards rupa* , and any acquiescence based on the organs of senses [sensory āyatanāni of the salayatana nidana (including mano)]** — YET, one has still to "restrain/control/constrain" the mano, so that it "does not turn towards" any "acquiescence based on what is distinct from one"*** — (difference/nānatta/nānātva - I suppose this means to constrain the mano not to agree with the differentiation, (and therefore sense-consciousness, ) that occurs in the salayatana nidana).
In other words, although in pure upekkhāsatipārisuddhi — and "seeing" with a liberated citta, how things (the objects of senses) have come to be - which is dukkha — one still uses the mano to control and constrain any further acknowledgement/acquiescence/intent/ownership, based upon these organs of senses (including itself).

* rūpasaññānaṃ samatikkamā & ** paṭighasaññānaṃ atthaṅgamā.
*** nānattasaññānaṃ amanasikārā

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
Remark two
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

For Buddha's sake, tell us at least if there is a parallel to the extract you are quoting.
No need to get into the translation per se. Just tell us if there is or not, a parallel to that extract.

That would be swell.
.
.

[Ceisiwr]

“Regards” = verb —-> implies there is something to view or consider “in that place” (ie. the jhana)

“Exists” = verb ——> implies there is something to view or consider “in that place” (ie. the jhana)

“Place” = noun ——> implies there is something to view or consider ”in that place” (ie. the jhana)

IMO, almost every word in that sentence implies that the regarding of those phenomena happen in the jhana.

But they don't. If I regard something that exists in a place as being x it doesn't necessarily mean it is directly happening right now. For example, I can regard the craving that exists when having used cocaine to be unwholesome without actually being high right now.

It is quite paradoxical that you think the rapture and pleasure of the jhana are too “extreme” and “refined” to do any insight, and at the same time think that the memory of it should suffice to point out the three marks.

Why use memory, when you have direct experience?

Sañña functions a bit like memory. It compares the signs and marks of a phenomenon with what has been experienced before so we gain the concept "a tree", or whatever it might be. In order then to recognise the Jhānā as being impermanent, dukkha and not-self they first then have to fall away. This rules out any insight when attaining the Jhānā for the 1st time. Regarding subsequent entries into Jhānā can insight be done then, based on this recognition system? Well, no as it turns out. Apart from the mind being still in Jhānā, which means sañña is also still and is merely sañjānāti 1 aspect of 1 dhamma, we find that aniccasaññā, anattasaññā and ādīnavasaññā (drawbacks) aren't saññā simpliciter. Instead they require paṭisañcikkhati (AN 10.60):

Paṭisañcikkhati: (paṭi+saṃ+cikkhati of khyā; cp. paṭisaṅkhāti & BSk. pratisañcikṣati MVastu II. 314) to think over, to discriminate, consider, reflect Vin. I, 5; D. I, 63; M. I, 267, 499; III, 33; S. I, 137; A. I, 205; Pug. 25; Vism. 283. (Page 400)

Considering how vitakka-vicāra are intentions rather than normal thinking and pondering, and especially since discrimination of dhammas (dhamma vicaya) can't even occur post the 2nd Jhāna even if we define vitakka-vicāra as normal thinking and pondering, it stands to reason that there can be no insight in any Jhāna.

Out of curiosity, why do you think sukha is a prerequisite for samadhi?

Contentment.

Out of curiosity, if sukha is so “extreme” and “refined” why is it called “gross” when abandoned in the fourth jhana?

Because the meditator sees that even these states disturb the mind's stillness. All of the Jhānā are an exercise in stilling the mind.

Out of curiosity - what happens to samadhi when one exits the jhana?

There is a looser concentration.

Out of curiosity - is MN 111 a “fake sutta”? In your opinion, of course.

It's certainly suspicious.

Out of curiosity - that other post (the one where I figuratively drag you through the mud) ... would you like to comment on it?

You'll have to remind me?

[Ceisiwr]

Nothing in the grammar suggests this is occurring whilst in the jhāna

To see it as an affliction you need to see it as impermanent and disintegrating, since the jhāna itself is an extremely blissful and refined state (speaking of the 1st for arguments sake here). You can't do any of that whilst actually in jhāna.

You can't see the jhāna as an affliction until it has fallen away. If it has fallen away, you aren't in jhāna. Part of the "knowledge of how things are" is in seeing the conditionality of the jhāna. You can't do that until it has disintegrated due to conditions.

You can and must see the three marks while in jhana AND after. It's easy to think this amounts to vitakka-vicara, but it doesn't. The three marks amount to perception, and are not necessarily vitakka-vicara, a term which denotes willful thinking. Perceiving is not the same thing. Perceiving doesn't require direct willed effort and is more a product of conditioning (vitakka-vicara, anapana, vedana and other sanna). Those conditioners set up how perceptions occur and that's precisely what we're tasked with doing in meditation.

See above.

I agree with this. Nowheere have I asserted that the jhana factor of vitakka-vicara is the same as normal discursive thinking. Rather I am saying that discursive thinking can be a jhana factor if and only if it is skillful, solely centered around its object, is not connected with sensuality, and is accompanied by the other jhana factors.

No, this is wrong. Discursive thinking is the opposite of a stilled mind, no matter how skilful. There is no thinking, pondering or discursive thought in any of the Jhānā.

[Coëmgenu]

Even in the jhana pericope

please do not use the term "periscope" because i have no idea what it means apart from in yellow submarines

Then look it up. It's called Google.



These are basic words that you should really know if you're going to be analyzing this kind of literature. Instead of policing people's language, their vocabulary and pronoun usage, instead of complaining that the words they use are too large, teach yourself. Actually Google something. You don't need to be spoon-fed knowledge at your age.

[pitithefool]

No, this is wrong. Discursive thinking is the opposite of a stilled mind, no matter how skilful. There is no thinking, pondering or discursive thought in any of the Jhānā.

Your comment here fails to address what I've said about both verbal and non-verbal vitakka-vicara being abandoned by entry into the second jhana.

Regardless of whether the vitakka-vicara is verbal or not, all of it is abandoned upon attainment of the second jhana.

If that's the case, then what of the time before that when discursive thought may be used to settle the mind (although admittedly not very frequently)?

Further, You've also failed to explain why it's important for it to be non-verbal. Why is that, Ceisiwr? Why is what's apparently such an arbitrary distinction so important, when the content and and direction of the mind is the same regardless of whether we're thinking verbal thoughts or not? I've already shown that they can be used skillfully AND that they aren't used often at all, so why so much ill-will towards it? What evidence can you show me that vitakka-vicara is necessarily non-verbal, and please don't bring up MN 19 again, because it has absolutely nothing to do with verbal or non-verbal vitakka-vicara, only skillful resolves.

[pitithefool]

Sañña functions a bit like memory. It compares the signs and marks of a phenomenon with what has been experienced before so we gain the concept "a tree", or whatever it might be. In order then to recognise the Jhānā as being impermanent, dukkha and not-self they first then have to fall away. This rules out any insight when attaining the Jhānā for the 1st time. Regarding subsequent entries into Jhānā can insight be done then, based on this recognition system? Well, no as it turns out. Apart from the mind being still in Jhānā, which means sañña is also still and is merely sañjānāti 1 aspect of 1 dhamma, we find that aniccasaññā, anattasaññā and ādīnavasaññā (drawbacks) aren't saññā simpliciter. Instead they require paṭisañcikkhati (AN 10.60):

Paṭisañcikkhati: (paṭi+saṃ+cikkhati of khyā; cp. paṭisaṅkhāti & BSk. pratisañcikṣati MVastu II. 314) to think over, to discriminate, consider, reflect Vin. I, 5; D. I, 63; M. I, 267, 499; III, 33; S. I, 137; A. I, 205; Pug. 25; Vism. 283. (Page 400)

Considering how vitakka-vicāra are intentions rather than normal thinking and pondering, and especially since discrimination of dhammas (dhamma vicaya) can't even occur post the 2nd Jhāna even if we define vitakka-vicāra as normal thinking and pondering, it stands to reason that there can be no insight in any Jhāna.

So you seem to be implying that perception of the three marks has patisancikkhati (which is a type of vitakka-vicara) as a prerequesite?

Why yes, yes it does. But let me ask you further, is it possible to perceive things as imperment without vitakka-vicara? I.e. trough constantly reminding yourself of the three marks and constantly applying the perception to phenomena does it reach a point where the perception and subject action of abandonment becomes automatic and you no longer have to think about it? Is that not what we are doing when we sit down to meditate (cough cough DooDoot)?

Because the meditator sees that even these states disturb the mind's stillness. All of the Jhānā are an exercise in stilling the mind.

If insight doesn't occur while in jhana, how is it possible that the meditator partakes in distinction, i.e. moving from the first into the second? How does the mind turn away from courser jhana factors it when it cannot perceive them as such? The view you espouse that jhana only has one perception makes it impossible to meditate in line with the Buddha's instruction. In order to enter jhana, a whole host of skillful perceptions has to take place and in order for the jhana to raise we must see that the vitakka-vicara is course and piti-sukha born of samadhi is much finer. According to you, that perception cannot occur while in the jhana but yet somehow, you can magically raise into a higher jhana? How does this come about? How are we partaking of distinction without perception, without discriminating "this is course, this is finer"? And how can it be that this perception can't occur in jhana while the decision based on it can? It doesn't make sense.

[Ratnakar]

Sañña functions a bit like memory. It compares the signs and marks of a phenomenon with what has been experienced before so we gain the concept "a tree", or whatever it might be. In order then to recognise the Jhānā as being impermanent, dukkha and not-self they first then have to fall away. This rules out any insight when attaining the Jhānā for the 1st time. Regarding subsequent entries into Jhānā can insight be done then, based on this recognition system? Well, no as it turns out. Apart from the mind being still in Jhānā, which means sañña is also still and is merely sañjānāti 1 aspect of 1 dhamma, we find that aniccasaññā, anattasaññā and ādīnavasaññā (drawbacks) aren't saññā simpliciter. Instead they require paṭisañcikkhati (AN 10.60):

Paṭisañcikkhati: (paṭi+saṃ+cikkhati of khyā; cp. paṭisaṅkhāti & BSk. pratisañcikṣati MVastu II. 314) to think over, to discriminate, consider, reflect Vin. I, 5; D. I, 63; M. I, 267, 499; III, 33; S. I, 137; A. I, 205; Pug. 25; Vism. 283. (Page 400)

Considering how vitakka-vicāra are intentions rather than normal thinking and pondering, and especially since discrimination of dhammas (dhamma vicaya) can't even occur post the 2nd Jhāna even if we define vitakka-vicāra as normal thinking and pondering, it stands to reason that there can be no insight in any Jhāna.

So you seem to be implying that perception of the three marks has patisancikkhati (which is a type of vitakka-vicara) as a prerequesite?

Why yes, yes it does. But let me ask you further, is it possible to perceive things as imperment without vitakka-vicara? I.e. trough constantly reminding yourself of the three marks and constantly applying the perception to phenomena does it reach a point where the perception and subject action of abandonment becomes automatic and you no longer have to think about it? Is that not what we are doing when we sit down to meditate (cough cough DooDoot)?

Because the meditator sees that even these states disturb the mind's stillness. All of the Jhānā are an exercise in stilling the mind.

If insight doesn't occur while in jhana, how is it possible that the meditator partakes in distinction, i.e. moving from the first into the second? How does the mind turn away from courser jhana factors it when it cannot perceive them as such? The view you espouse that jhana only has one perception makes it impossible to meditate in line with the Buddha's instruction. In order to enter jhana, a whole host of skillful perceptions has to take place and in order for the jhana to raise we must see that the vitakka-vicara is course and piti-sukha born of samadhi is much finer. According to you, that perception cannot occur while in the jhana but yet somehow, you can magically raise into a higher jhana? How does this come about? How are we partaking of distinction without perception, without discriminating "this is course, this is finer"? And how can it be that this perception can't occur in jhana while the decision based on it can? It doesn't make sense.

I think buddhaghosa is right, if you can do vippassana while in jhana then all devas can attain arahantship since jhana state is heaven state, what do you think was there any deva that did vippassana and attained arahantship ?

[Ratnakar]

You can and must see the three marks while in jhana AND after. It's easy to think this amounts to vitakka-vicara, but it doesn't. The three marks amount to perception, and are not necessarily vitakka-vicara, a term which denotes willful thinking. Perceiving is not the same thing. Perceiving doesn't require direct willed effort and is more a product of conditioning (vitakka-vicara, anapana, vedana and other sanna). Those conditioners set up how perceptions occur and that's precisely what we're tasked with doing in meditation.

See above.

I agree with this. Nowheere have I asserted that the jhana factor of vitakka-vicara is the same as normal discursive thinking. Rather I am saying that discursive thinking can be a jhana factor if and only if it is skillful, solely centered around its object, is not connected with sensuality, and is accompanied by the other jhana factors.

No, this is wrong. Discursive thinking is the opposite of a stilled mind, no matter how skilful. There is no thinking, pondering or discursive thought in any of the Jhānā.

Where are hindrances abandoned in jhana or in access ?

[Pondera]

“Regards” = verb —-> implies there is something to view or consider “in that place” (ie. the jhana)

“Exists” = verb ——> implies there is something to view or consider “in that place” (ie. the jhana)

“Place” = noun ——> implies there is something to view or consider ”in that place” (ie. the jhana)

IMO, almost every word in that sentence implies that the regarding of those phenomena happen in the jhana.

But they don't. If I regard something that exists in a place as being x it doesn't necessarily mean it is directly happening right now. For example, I can regard the craving that exists when having used cocaine to be unwholesome without actually being high right now.

I see your point. I don’t agree with it in terms of this passage, but I will not try to persuade you any further.

It is quite paradoxical that you think the rapture and pleasure of the jhana are too “extreme” and “refined” to do any insight, and at the same time think that the memory of it should suffice to point out the three marks.

Why use memory, when you have direct experience?

Sañña functions a bit like memory. It compares the signs and marks of a phenomenon with what has been experienced before so we gain the concept "a tree", or whatever it might be. In order then to recognise the Jhānā as being impermanent, dukkha and not-self they first then have to fall away.

That is not my experience. In my experience the three marks reveal themselves as inherent and ever present in the skhandas. When entering jhana, the skhandas do not first come into being - only to later come out of being. It is at death that the skhandas come apart.

This rules out any insight when attaining the Jhānā for the 1st time. Regarding subsequent entries into Jhānā can insight be done then, based on this recognition system? Well, no as it turns out. Apart from the mind being still in Jhānā, which means sañña is also still and is merely sañjānāti 1 aspect of 1 dhamma, we find that aniccasaññā, anattasaññā and ādīnavasaññā (drawbacks) aren't saññā simpliciter. Instead they require paṭisañcikkhati (AN 10.60):

Paṭisañcikkhati: (paṭi+saṃ+cikkhati of khyā; cp. paṭisaṅkhāti & BSk. pratisañcikṣati MVastu II. 314) to think over, to discriminate, consider, reflect Vin. I, 5; D. I, 63; M. I, 267, 499; III, 33; S. I, 137; A. I, 205; Pug. 25; Vism. 283. (Page 400)

That seems like an odd argument, considering that one experiences the above defined “discernment” during cessation.

[7] "And what is the perception of cessation? There is the case where a monk — having gone to the wilderness, to the shade of a tree, or to an empty building — reflects thus: 'This is peace, this is exquisite — the stilling of all fabrications, the relinquishment of all acquisitions, the ending of craving, cessation, Unbinding.' This is called the perception of cessation.

There is also nothing in AN 10.60 that says one cannot discern while in jhana. A sutta on Post jhana reflection does not imply an impossibility on mid-jhana discernment.

Again, and this is just a personal observation - the skhandas reveal their three marks as an inherent feature. Not as something to be discerned after their disintegration. In fact, if we had to wait for the skhandas to disintegrate before achieving insight, it would already be to late (ie. we would be dead).

Considering how vitakka-vicāra are intentions rather than normal thinking and pondering, and especially since discrimination of dhammas (dhamma vicaya) can't even occur post the 2nd Jhāna even if we define vitakka-vicāra as normal thinking and pondering, it stands to reason that there can be no insight in any Jhāna.

Out of curiosity, why do you think sukha is a prerequisite for samadhi?

Contentment.

Sukha brings contentment? Contentment causes samadhi?

Okay. Look at it this way.

Do you think that the body holds on to pain? Do you think that by letting go of that pain, one might feel pleasure?

Out of curiosity, if sukha is so “extreme” and “refined” why is it called “gross” when abandoned in the fourth jhana?

Because the meditator sees that even these states disturb the mind's stillness. All of the Jhānā are an exercise in stilling the mind.

How does stillness lead to “knowledge and vision of things as they really are”?

Out of curiosity - what happens to samadhi when one exits the jhana?

There is a looser concentration.

What do you think accomplishes a more penetrating insight? Loose concentration? Or acute concentration?

Out of curiosity - is MN 111 a “fake sutta”? In your opinion, of course.

It's certainly suspicious.

Inconvenient, too

Out of curiosity - that other post (the one where I figuratively drag you through the mud) ... would you like to comment on it?

You'll have to remind me?

My concerns were stated here: viewtopic.php?p=620482#p620482