suttas where mind and body (31 body parts of meditator) dichotomy is incontrovertible, exposing Abhidhamma incoherence (

[pitithefool]

So if you have mindfulness of breathing with vitakka-vicara (again defined as thoughts, verbal fabrications), it's not a jhana?

vitakka-vicara in the 1st jhana do not refer to ordinary thoughts. MN 19 should make this clear:

And as I remained thus heedful, ardent, & resolute, thinking imbued with renunciation arose in me. I discerned that 'Thinking imbued with renunciation has arisen in me; and that leads neither to my own affliction, nor to the affliction of others, nor to the affliction of both. It fosters discernment, promotes lack of vexation, & leads to Unbinding. If I were to think & ponder in line with that even for a night... even for a day... even for a day & night, I do not envision any danger that would come from it, except that thinking & pondering a long time would tire the body. When the body is tired, the mind is disturbed; and a disturbed mind is far from concentration.' So I steadied my mind right within, settled, unified & concentrated it. Why is that? So that my mind would not be disturbed.

Unflagging persistence was aroused in me, and unmuddled mindfulness established. My body was calm & unaroused, my mind concentrated & single. Quite withdrawn from sensuality, withdrawn from unskillful mental qualities, I entered & remained in the first jhana: rapture & pleasure born from withdrawal, accompanied by directed thought & evaluation.

MN 19

Of course they don't. They are accompanied by piti-sukha.

Let's get this straight once and for all:

Where are the literal definitions (in Pali)between:

Vaca

Vitakka-vicara

& Sanna ?

Vaca appears to be actual spoken word, while vitakka-vicara covers both directed thought and attention and discursive thought, internal dialogue, etc.

Further, sanna appears to be perception, I.e. "this is impermanent, this is dukkha, this is blue, red, etc. I.e. the interpretation of a phenomenon as something. The point I'm trying to make is that vitakka-vicara is often taken to be mental activity when in reality it is the motive and verbal component of that. Sanna, is the interpretive component of the mind and is subverbal, though in english, we might consider this under the umbrella of "thought", though vitakka-vicara does not seem to include sanna under its own umbrella.

I think the main delineation of interest is whether vitakka-vicara is non-verbal motivic activity only rather than motivic and verbal activity as it's rather consistently defined as elsewhere in the canon. If it's both motivic and verbal, as it appears to be, then what reason do we have that it's only motivic and is non-verbal as a jhana factor?

Furthermore, MN19 does not in fact provide conclusive evidence that vitakka-vicara is non-verbal as a jhana factor, because of the following interpretation:

1. The thinking imbued with renunciation, etc. is a jhana factor if and only if it's accompanied by rapture and pleasure born of seclusion.

2. The passage "I do not envision any danger that would come from it, except that thinking & pondering a long time would tire the body. When the body is tired, the mind is disturbed; and a disturbed mind is far from concentration.' So I steadied my mind right within, settled, unified, & concentrated it. Why is that? So that my mind would not be disturbed." implies either the arising of piti-sukha as a jhana factor, or the entrance into the second jhana if piti-sukha was present, or (more likely) both, and the subsequent settling of the mind into the third, fourth etc.

3. The passages explaining vitakka imbued with renunciation, etc. are notably devoid of "accompanied by piti-sukha". If they were accompanied by piti-sukha, they would be jhana factors. The transition then between access or whatever you want to call it and the first jhana is then not the transition between verbal and non-verbal vitakka-vicara, but rather the arising of the concomitant jhana factors.

You may bring up suttas which state that speech has ceased upon attainment of the first jhana. If you can prove to me that vaca in this case means verbal thinking (which I think is a long shot) I will renounce my views on this matter.

[DooDoot]

Furthermore, MN19 does not in fact provide conclusive evidence that vitakka-vicara is non-verbal as a jhana factor, because of the following interpretation:

1. The thinking imbued with renunciation, etc. is a jhana factor if and only if it's accompanied by rapture and pleasure born of seclusion.

2. The passage "I do not envision any danger that would come from it, except that thinking & pondering a long time would tire the body. When the body is tired, the mind is disturbed; and a disturbed mind is far from concentration.' So I steadied my mind right within, settled, unified, & concentrated it. Why is that? So that my mind would not be disturbed." implies either the arising of piti-sukha as a jhana factor, or the entrance into the second jhana if piti-sukha was present, or (more likely) both, and the subsequent settling of the mind into the third, fourth etc.

No. The sutta clearly says the mind was "settled" or "quietened" prior to the 1st jhana.

Regardless, senior monks & practitioners have said vitakka & vicara are not ordinary thinking. In Buddhism, it is not the role of puthujjana or "groundlings" to question senior Sangha on such matters unverifiable to non-jhana groundlings. Its like a groundling that has never climbed Mt Everest claiming to know what the view is like from the top of Mt. Everest.

28. Just as one upon the summit of a mountain beholds the groundlings, even so when the wise man casts away heedlessness by heedfulness and ascends the high tower of wisdom, this sorrowless sage beholds the sorrowing and foolish multitude.

Dhammapada

[pitithefool]

No. The sutta clearly says the mind was "settled" or "quietened" prior to the 1st jhana.

Regardless, senior monks & practitioners have said vitakka & vicara are not ordinary thinking. In Buddhism, it is not the role of puthujjana or "groundlings" to question senior Sangha on such matters.

If it's the case that vitakka-vicara is non-verbal, then why is called a verbal fabrication?

[DooDoot]

If it's the case that vitakka-vicara is non-verbal, then why is called a verbal fabrication?

Its not called verbal fabrication in jhana context. The above question is non-sequitur.

[pitithefool]

If it's the case that vitakka-vicara is non-verbal, then why is called a verbal fabrication?

Its not called verbal fabrication in jhana context. The above question is non-sequitur.

Wot

MN44?

"When a monk is attaining the cessation of perception & feeling, verbal fabrications cease first, then bodily fabrications, then mental fabrications."

[DooDoot]

Wot

MN44?

MN 44 & SN 41.6 say the vacisankharo (verbal fabricator; lit: condition for speech) is the cause of speech (vaci). Jhana is not about speech. Your objection to my post is both non-sequitur & irrelevant. It was already explained vitakka & vicara not ordinary thought. This has been explained by many monks, from Buddhadasa, to Brahm, to Sujato.

[pitithefool]

Wot

MN44?

MN 44 & SN 41.6 say the vacisankharo (verbal fabricator; condition for speech) is the cause of speech (vaci). Jhana is not about speech. Your objection to my post is non-sequitur.

So you've proven my point that vitakka-vicara is not the same as speech. I maintain that the only difference between vitakka-vicara as thought and as a jhana factor is the presence of the other jhana factors as well as the content of the thinking.

[DooDoot]

So you've proven my point that vitakka-vicara is not the same as speech.

You didn't make any point.

I maintain that the only difference between vitakka-vicara as thought and as a jhana factor is the presence of the other jhana factors as well as the content of the thinking.

You are free to maintain your pointless groundling nonsense; which gives the impression of aspiring towards something very mundane. Possibly you can become a devotee of Leigh Brasington & his papanca jhana.

[pitithefool]

So you've proven my point that vitakka-vicara is not the same as speech.

You didn't make any point.

I maintain that the only difference between vitakka-vicara as thought and as a jhana factor is the presence of the other jhana factors as well as the content of the thinking.

You are free to maintain your pointless groundling nonsense; which gives the impression of aspiring towards something very mundane. Possibly you can become a devotee of Leigh Brasington & his papanca jhana.

You haven't provided sufficient evidence to prove that vitakka-vicara as a jhana factor must not be discursive thought. I'm not asking you to insult me and others as you seem to enjoy doing, rather I'm asking you to help me to gain a better, more mutual understanding. I can't do that on blind faith, and you've given me very little reason to abandon the view that vitakka-vicara as a jhana factor can include mental speech and that using verbal thought is of great use if one learns how to.

Further, both verbal and non-verbal vitakka-vicara are abandoned at entrance into the second jhana, so all we're really debating (again) is whether or not verbal thoughts can constitute vitakka-vicara as a factor of the first jhana. Please, again, I don't want to fight with you, I want you to convince me otherwise, not by harsh or abusive speech, but through logic and citation.

The point I'm trying to make is that whether one thinks the word for something while thinking it makes no difference when a) both types of thinking are abandoned and b) they consist of the same content, the only difference being the presence of the word in the mind.

[Pondera]

You can't know that Jhāna is impermanent, dukkha and not-self until it has fallen away. If it has fallen away then you are not in Jhāna. There is no insight whilst in any Jhāna.

Is this true of all phenomena? Can I look at a rock and not know it's impermenant until it's out of view? Are you confusing vitakka-vicara with sanna? Thoughts are not the same as perceptions, perceptions can and must occur in jhana and they don't fall away until cessation of perception and feeling occurs.

You can't know that Jhāna is impermanent, dukkha and not-self until it falls away.

This is mistaken. From the “Jhana Sutta”

"'I tell you, the ending of the mental fermentations depends on the first jhana.' Thus it has been said. In reference to what was it said? There is the case where a monk, secluded from sensuality, secluded from unskillful qualities, enters & remains in the first jhana: rapture & pleasure born of seclusion, accompanied by directed thought & evaluation. He regards whatever phenomena there that are connected with form, feeling, perception, fabrications, & consciousness, as inconstant, stressful, a disease, a cancer, an arrow, painful, an affliction, alien, a disintegration, an emptiness, not-self. He turns his mind away from those phenomena, and having done so, inclines his mind to the property of deathlessness: 'This is peace, this is exquisite — the resolution of all fabrications; the relinquishment of all acquisitions; the ending of craving; dispassion; cessation; Unbinding.'

The “phenomenon” are “there” in the Jhana. He regards them by the three marks and, having achieved “disenchantment” he “turns away from those phenomenon”.

There is nothing special about the Jhana ending. The special thing is that the Jhana produces Samadhi.

Samadhi is only developed to produce “knowledge and vision of things as they are” (and that is from transcendental DO).

So, one observes the skhandas in the present moment and understands all three marks at the same time.

Impermanence can be viewed as an insight - not something that falls out of logic.

[DooDoot]

You haven't provided sufficient evidence to prove that vitakka-vicara as a jhana factor must not be discursive thought.

But MN 19 is sufficient evidence.

[Ceisiwr]

This is mistaken. From the “Jhana Sutta”...The “phenomenon” are “there” in the Jhana. He regards them by the three marks and, having achieved “disenchantment” he “turns away from those phenomenon”.

so yadeva tattha hoti

He whatever in that place exists.

He regards whatever exists in that place.

Nothing in the grammar suggests this is occurring whilst in the jhāna.

The “phenomenon” are “there” in the Jhana. He regards them by the three marks and, having achieved “disenchantment” he “turns away from those phenomenon”.

To see it as an affliction you need to see it as impermanent and disintegrating, since the jhāna itself is an extremely blissful and refined state (speaking of the 1st for arguments sake here). You can't do any of that whilst actually in jhāna.

Samadhi is only developed to produce “knowledge and vision of things as they are” (and that is from transcendental DO).

So, one observes the skhandas in the present moment and understands all three marks at the same time.

Impermanence can be viewed as an insight - not something that falls out of logic.

You can't see the jhāna as an affliction until it has fallen away. If it has fallen away, you aren't in jhāna. Part of the "knowledge of how things are" is in seeing the conditionality of the jhāna. You can't do that until it has disintegrated due to conditions.

[Ceisiwr]

I maintain that the only difference between vitakka-vicara as thought and as a jhana factor is the presence of the other jhana factors as well as the content of the thinking.

Ime ca, thapati, kusalā saṅkappā kuhiṁ aparisesā nirujjhanti?
Nirodhopi nesaṁ vutto.
Idha, thapati, bhikkhu vitakkavicārānaṁ vūpasamā …pe… dutiyaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajja viharati;
etthete kusalā saṅkappā aparisesā nirujjhanti.

And where do these skillful intentions cease without anything left over?
Their cessation has also been stated.
It’s when, as the placing of the mind and keeping it connected are stilled, a mendicant enters and remains in the second absorption, which has the rapture and bliss born of immersion, with internal clarity and confidence, and unified mind, without placing the mind and keeping it connected.
This is where these skillful intentions cease without anything left over.

MN 78

saṅkappa: intention; purpose. (m.)

Vitakka-vicāra in the Jhāna pericope are skilful intentions. They are not normal thoughts and pondering, which disturb the stillness required for Jhāna.

[Ceisiwr]

"So kho ahaṁ, bhikkhave, ajjhattameva cittaṁ saṇṭhapemi sannisādemi ekodiṁ karomi samādahāmi."

"So I steadied my mind internally, sannisādemi, brought it to singleness, and concentrated it."

sannisīdati = to calm, to quite. Caus. II. sannisīdāpeti to cause to halt.

So kho ahaṁ, bhikkhave, ajjhattameva cittaṁ saṇṭhapemi sannisādemi ekodiṁ karomi samādahāmi.

"So I steadied my mind internally, stilled it, brought it to singleness, and concentrated it."

MN 19

You can't have a still mind if there is normal thinking and pondering going on. It is a good thing to still the mind and cut off thoughts, for it leads to Jhāna.

[Pondera]

This is mistaken. From the “Jhana Sutta”...The “phenomenon” are “there” in the Jhana. He regards them by the three marks and, having achieved “disenchantment” he “turns away from those phenomenon”.

so yadeva tattha hoti

He whatever in that place exists.

He regards whatever exists in that place.

Nothing in the grammar suggests this is occurring whilst in the jhāna.

“Regards” = verb —-> implies there is something to view or consider “in that place” (ie. the jhana)

“Exists” = verb ——> implies there is something to view or consider “in that place” (ie. the jhana)

“Place” = noun ——> implies there is something to view or consider ”in that place” (ie. the jhana)

IMO, almost every word in that sentence implies that the regarding of those phenomena happen in the jhana.

It is quite paradoxical that you think the rapture and pleasure of the jhana are too “extreme” and “refined” to do any insight, and at the same time think that the memory of it should suffice to point out the three marks.

Why use memory, when you have direct experience?

The “phenomenon” are “there” in the Jhana. He regards them by the three marks and, having achieved “disenchantment” he “turns away from those phenomenon”.

To see it as an affliction you need to see it as impermanent and disintegrating, since the jhāna itself is an extremely blissful and refined state (speaking of the 1st for arguments sake here). You can't do any of that whilst actually in jhāna.

Out of curiosity, why do you think sukha is a prerequisite for samadhi?

Out of curiosity, if sukha is so “extreme” and “refined” why is it called “gross” when abandoned in the fourth jhana?

Samadhi is only developed to produce “knowledge and vision of things as they are” (and that is from transcendental DO).

So, one observes the skhandas in the present moment and understands all three marks at the same time.

Impermanence can be viewed as an insight - not something that falls out of logic.

You can't see the jhāna as an affliction until it has fallen away. If it has fallen away, you aren't in jhāna. Part of the "knowledge of how things are" is in seeing the conditionality of the jhāna. You can't do that until it has disintegrated due to conditions.

So you keep saying. IMO there’s nothing about the jhana that leads to higher knowledge than the penetrating power of concentration and the presence of the skhandas.

Out of curiosity - what happens to samadhi when one exits the jhana?

Out of curiosity - is MN 111 a “fake sutta”? In your opinion, of course.

Out of curiosity - that other post (the one where I figuratively drag you through the mud) ... would you like to comment on it?

Pondera