Retrofuturist's Brief Sutta-Based Refutation of Abhidhamma

[robertk]

Common Abhidhamma Argument #1 - Mentality and materiality are paramattha dhammas (i.e. ultimate dhammas)

Sutta Reponse: Never in the Suttas are materiality referred to as "dhammas".

Satipatthana sutta Majjhima Nikaya sutta 10
Dhammānupassanā khandhapabbaṃ
116. ‘‘Puna caparaṃ, bhikkhave, bhikkhu dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu. Kathañca pana, bhikkhave, bhikkhu dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu? Idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu – ‘iti rūpaṃ, iti rūpassa samudayo, iti rūpassa atthaṅgamo; iti vedanā, iti vedanāya samudayo, iti vedanāya atthaṅgamo; iti saññā, iti saññāya samudayo, iti saññāya atthaṅgamo; iti saṅkhārā, iti saṅkhārānaṃ samudayo, iti saṅkhārānaṃ atthaṅgamo; iti viññāṇaṃ, iti viññāṇassa samudayo, iti viññāṇassa atthaṅgamo’ti; iti ajjhattaṃ vā dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati, bahiddhā vā dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati, ajjhattabahiddhā vā dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati; samudayadhammānupassī vā dhammesu viharati, vayadhammānupassī vā dhammesu viharati, samudayavayadhammānupassī vā dhammesu viharati. ‘Atthi dhammā’ti vā panassa sati paccupaṭṭhitā hoti. Yāvadeva ñāṇamattāya paṭissatimattāya anissito ca viharati, na ca kiñci loke upādiyati. Evampi kho, bhikkhave, bhikkhu dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu.
(2. The Five Aggregates)
38. "Again, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu abides contemplating mindobjects
as mind-objects [61] in terms of the five aggregates
affected by clinging.159 And how does a bhikkhu abide contemplating
mind-objects as mind-objects in terms of the five
aggregates affected by clinging? Here a bhikkhu understands:
'Such is material form, such its origin, such its disappearance;
such is feeling, such its origin, such its disappearance; such is
perception, such its origifi, such its disappearance; such are
the formations, such their origin, such their disappearance;
such is consciousness, such its origin, such its disappearance.'
39. "In this way he abides contemplating mind-objects as
mind-objects internally, externally, and both internally and
externally...And he abides independent, not clinging to anything
in the world. That is how a bhikkhu abides contemplating
mind-objects as mind-objects in terms of the five aggregates
affected by clinging.

[Srilankaputra]

Greetings,

And what is the sutta term for noumena?

For all intents and purposes it is mahabhuta, since they are the great elements recognised in this Dhamma. I am unsure of whether the Buddha introduced a specific technical term directly corresponding to the noumenic quality of the mahabhuta.

How is this based on Suttas?

What is it that perceives Rupa?

"Feeling, perception, intention, contact, & attention" (SN12.2) which form nama.

But according to your presentation the above and even vinnana are 'phenemona' in the following sense

noumenon means a thing as it is independent of conceptualization or perception by the human mind, postulated by practical reason but existing in a condition which is in principle unknowable and unexperienceable, whereas phenomenon means a thing or being, event or process, perceptible through senses.

What i am asking is where does these phenemona occur? In the human mind?

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Spiny,

So in the nama-rupa nidana description, rupa only refers to experienced phenomena?

Yes, since it, like all sankhata-dhammas, is dependent upon avijja. Shards of rock floating around Saturn's rings are not dependent upon avijja, and they do not cease with the cessation of avijja. So too with any other materiality/noumena. If you have an alternative explanation for the relationship between avijja and materiality/noumena, then by all means please present it.

If that were so, there would be no need to include the four great elements in the description. "The form based on them" would be sufficient.

This is already been explained. If you believe you have an explanation for how the four great elements can be experienced independently of the constituents of nama, then do please present your explanation for that experience.

Your assertion here seems more to do with a particular DO interpretation than with sutta/Abhidhamma distinctions.

My assertions are presented for the reasons in the preface of the opening post.

Metta,
Paul.

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Srilankaputra,

How is this based on Suttas?

How is it not? MN 28 quoted above to Ceisiwr is quite clear and unambiguous about the nature of the mahabhuta.

What i am asking is where does these phenemona occur? In the human mind?

I don't consider "where" to be a particular useful means of assessing Dhamma, but in the mind is as good an answer as any, since that's where the avijja is.

Metta,
Paul.

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Robert,

"Such is material form..."

Such is the gratuitous translation of a translator who translates rupa as "materiality" rather than as "form", informed most likely by the Abhidhamma tradition.

Metta,
Paul.

[atipattoh]

Greetings Paul,

Very much so, hence their usage, and my comment to Sarath above that the rūpa of nama-rupa is always rupasañña (phenomena) and not materiality (nounemena)

Can you give an example that you clarified as
1. rupasañña (phenomena)

2. materiality description that is noumena in abhidhamma?
Thanks!

[Spiny Norman]

Greetings Spiny,

So in the nama-rupa nidana description, rupa only refers to experienced phenomena?

Yes, since it, like all sankhata-dhammas, is dependent upon avijja. Shards of rock floating around Saturn's rings are not dependent upon avijja, and they do not cease with the cessation of avijja. So too with any other materiality/noumena. If you have an alternative explanation for the relationship between avijja and materiality/noumena, then by all means please present it.

If that were so, there would be no need to include the four great elements in the description. "The form based on them" would be sufficient.

This is already been explained. If you believe you have an explanation for how the four great elements can be experienced independently of the constituents of nama, then do please present your explanation for them.

Your assertion here seems more to do with a particular DO interpretation than with sutta/Abhidhamma distinctions.

My assertions are presented for the reasons in the preface of the opening post.

Metta,
Paul.

So the four great elements aren't experienced directly. What is experienced is the form derived from them - sense-objects.
So then why are the four great elements included in the description? Why are the elements even mentioned, when with your interpretation you could just refer to sense-objects?

[Srilankaputra]

What i am asking is where does these phenemona occur? In the human mind?

I don't consider "where" to be a particular useful means of assessing Dhamma, but in the mind is as good an answer as any, since that's where the avijja is.

Ah, now we finally cut to the chase. I don't know if you realise this, what you are proposing is a form of idealism. Well, a strange mixture Suttas, phenomenology and idealism.

[Spiny Norman]

Greetings Paul,

Very much so, hence their usage, and my comment to Sarath above that the rūpa of nama-rupa is always rupasañña (phenomena) and not materiality (nounemena)

Can you give an example that you clarified as
1. rupasañña (phenomena)

2. materiality description that is noumena in abhidhamma?
Thanks!

Stock descriptions of rupa in the suttas include both the four great elements, and the form derived from them (derived form). Some interpret this distinction as similar to that between noumena and phenomena, though I'm not sure this is accurate.

[robertk]

Common Abhidhamma Argument #1 - Mentality and materiality are paramattha dhammas (i.e. ultimate dhammas)

Sutta Reponse: Never in the Suttas are materiality referred to as "dhammas".

Satipatthana sutta Majjhima Nikaya sutta 10
Dhammānupassanā khandhapabbaṃ


3. The Six Bases)
40. "Again, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu abides contemplating mindobjects
as mind-objects in terms of the six internal and external
bases.160 And how does a bhikkhu abide contemplatingmind-objects as mind-objects in terms of the six internal and
external bases? Here a bhikkhu understands the eye, he understands
forms, and he understands the fetter that arises dependent
on both; and he also understands how there comes to be
the arising of the unarisen fetter, and how there comes to be the
abandoning of the arisen fetter, and how there comes to be the
future non-arising of the abandoned fetter.
"He understands the ear, he understands sounds...He understands
the nose, he understands odours...He understands the
tongue, he understands flavours...He understands the body, he
understands tangibles...He understands the mind, he understands
mind-objects, and he understands the fetter that arises
dependent on both; and he also understands how there comes to
be the arising of the unarisen fetter, and how there comes to be
the abandoning of the arisen fetter, and how there comes to be
the future non-arising of the abandoned fetter.
41. "In this way he abides contemplating mind-objects as
mind-objects internally, externally, and both internally and
externally...And he abides independent, not clinging to anything
in the world. That is how a bhikkhu abides contemplating
mind-objects as mind-objects in terms of the six internal and
external bases.
Dhammānupassanā āyatanapabbaṃ
117. ‘‘Puna caparaṃ, bhikkhave, bhikkhu dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati chasu ajjhattikabāhiresu āyatanesu. Kathañca pana, bhikkhave, bhikkhu dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati chasu ajjhattikabāhiresu āyatanesu?
‘‘Idha , bhikkhave, bhikkhu cakkhuñca pajānāti, rūpe ca pajānāti, yañca tadubhayaṃ paṭicca uppajjati saṃyojanaṃ tañca pajānāti, yathā ca anuppannassa saṃyojanassa uppādo hoti tañca pajānāti, yathā ca uppannassa saṃyojanassa pahānaṃ hoti tañca pajānāti, yathā ca pahīnassa saṃyojanassa āyatiṃ anuppādo hoti tañca pajānāti.
‘‘Sotañca pajānāti, sadde ca pajānāti, yañca tadubhayaṃ paṭicca uppajjati saṃyojanaṃ tañca pajānāti, yathā ca anuppannassa saṃyojanassa uppādo hoti tañca pajānāti, yathā ca uppannassa saṃyojanassa pahānaṃ hoti tañca pajānāti, yathā ca pahīnassa saṃyojanassa āyatiṃ anuppādo hoti tañca pajānāti.
‘‘Ghānañca pajānāti, gandhe ca pajānāti, yañca tadubhayaṃ paṭicca uppajjati saṃyojanaṃ tañca pajānāti, yathā ca anuppannassa saṃyojanassa uppādo hoti tañca pajānāti, yathā ca uppannassa saṃyojanassa pahānaṃ hoti tañca pajānāti, yathā ca pahīnassa saṃyojanassa āyatiṃ anuppādo hoti tañca pajānāti.
‘‘Jivhañca pajānāti, rase ca pajānāti, yañca tadubhayaṃ paṭicca uppajjati saṃyojanaṃ tañca pajānāti, yathā ca anuppannassa saṃyojanassa uppādo hoti tañca pajānāti, yathā ca uppannassa saṃyojanassa pahānaṃ hoti tañca pajānāti, yathā ca pahīnassa saṃyojanassa āyatiṃ anuppādo hoti tañca pajānāti.
‘‘Kāyañca pajānāti, phoṭṭhabbe ca pajānāti, yañca tadubhayaṃ paṭicca uppajjati saṃyojanaṃ tañca pajānāti, yathā ca anuppannassa saṃyojanassa uppādo hoti tañca pajānāti, yathā ca uppannassa saṃyojanassa pahānaṃ hoti tañca pajānāti, yathā ca pahīnassa saṃyojanassa āyatiṃ anuppādo hoti tañca pajānāti.
‘‘Manañca pajānāti, dhamme ca pajānāti, yañca tadubhayaṃ paṭicca uppajjati saṃyojanaṃ tañca pajānāti, yathā ca anuppannassa saṃyojanassa uppādo hoti tañca pajānāti, yathā ca uppannassa saṃyojanassa pahānaṃ hoti tañca pajānāti, yathā ca pahīnassa saṃyojanassa āyatiṃ anuppādo hoti tañca pajānāti.
‘‘Iti ajjhattaṃ vā dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati, bahiddhā vā dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati, ajjhattabahiddhā vā dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati; samudayadhammānupassī vā dhammesu viharati, vayadhammānupassī vā dhammesu viharati, samudayavayadhammānupassī vā dhammesu viharati. ‘Atthi dhammā’ti vā panassa sati paccupaṭṭhitā hoti. Yāvadeva ñāṇamattāya paṭissatimattāya anissito ca viharati na ca kiñci loke upādiyati. Evampi kho, bhikkhave, bhikkhu dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati chasu ajjhattikabāhiresu āyatanesu.

[Ceisiwr]

...

I’ll quote Sylvester shortly where he convincingly shows, in my opinion, that this sutta also deals in qualities. In other words, it’s better translated as “solidity” rather than “solid”, although I think we could possibly make the same argument with “solid”. The question I will have to ask you is why would the empiricist Buddha suddenly adopt the Rationalist theory of noumena, which is but a stone’s throw away from Substance, with Substance itself being concerned with permanent hidden realities and so easily lends itself to various atta theories? Schopenhauer took Kant’s theory of noumena and turned it into a metaphysical “Will” which underlies reality. Interestingly Schopenhauer saw many parallels between noumena and his philosophy with what is in the Upanishads. Can you guess what noumena he was thinking of in the Upanishads? Brahman of course. The metaphysical reality that exists behind all phenomena. A noumenon. A thing in itself.

So, why would the Buddha suddenly switch his epistemology? I would propose that he didn’t. That the Buddha was a consistent thinker, and so never adopted Rationalist theories such as noumena or Substance. This is of course pertinent to our discussion, since the Abhidhamma and the commentaries systematically erase both Substance and Atta in even the smallest moment of conscious experience.

[retrofuturist]

Greetings,

Ah, now we finally cut to the chase. I don't know if you realise this, what you are proposing is a form of idealism. Well, a strange mixture Suttas, phenomenology and idealism.

The (English) philosophical terms mean little to me. I'm just presenting what is in the Sutta and how I understand it. I've not seen anyone refute what I've said using Sutta, so to that end, whatever terms you may wish to affix to it, I can say it has not been countered and overwhelmed by Sutta and that is my only concern. Were another view, rooted in Sutta more compelling to me, I would adopt that instead.

Metta,
Paul.

[atipattoh]

Stock descriptions of rupa in the suttas include both the four great elements, and the form derived from them (derived form). Some interpret this distinction as similar to that between noumena and phenomena, though I'm not sure this is accurate.

I take both as phenomena. Great elements as in hardness... .
I am just curious as to which part of abhidhamma pitaka describe materiality as noumena, or imply that it is. If I were to express noumena nature on Rupa, i would then say material.

on your previous post.

[Srilankaputra]

I'm just presenting what is in the Sutta and how I understand it.

[robertk]

Common Abhidhamma Argument #3 - Dhammas exist, independent of observation

Sutta Reponse: This may be true of noumena such as mahabhuta, which are not phenomena (dhammas) but as it applies to dhammas, it is refuted by the Suttas, which state...
SN 47.42 wrote:
With the arising of attentiveness there is the arising of dhammas. With the cessation of attentiveness there is the cessation of dhammas

"With the arising of attentiveness there is the arising of dhammas"
Manisikarasamudaya dhammanam samudayo.
The dhamma(s) here is referring to actual realities, which Bodhi translates as phenomena.
the Commentary says this:

Spk: The phenomena
of the enlightenment factors originate through
careful attention; the phenomena of the hindrances
through careless attention.