Metta,
Paul.
Well, I know his position directly from him, so I am not interested in arguing or discussing that. Its exactly in his "semantic interpretation".Dan74 wrote: ↑Wed Jun 16, 2021 8:33 pmI think it is. If it isn't, please cite him to support this. His position is made clear here:sphairos wrote: ↑Wed Jun 16, 2021 8:32 pmThat's not the position of Siderits.Dan74 wrote: ↑Wed Jun 16, 2021 8:11 pm
Madhyamaka avoids asserting either existence or non-existence. Nagarjuna was at pains to make it clear that he was putting forward no metaphysics. So the point is not that something exists or does not, but firstly to even understand what is meant when we say "it exists".
Siderits says: " [according to] the Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness, the claim [is] that all dharmas are devoid of svabhāva or intrinsic nature." Moreover, no actual existence (or non-existence) can be established. The Buddha summed it all neatly in the Sabba Sutta. Beyond the range.
I don't exactly know what they mean. Theravāda observes a differentiation between "unconditioned" and "ultimate" that is incoherent to the Madhyamaka. These are one and the same from that perspective. To the Theravādin, however "form" and "mind" etc. are "ultimate" but are not "unconditioned." That the aggregates supposedly "exist ultimately" is just something that I've heard Theravādins say. I have my theories as to how they supposedly exist ultimately. I think the aggregates are lined up with the four paramarthas and two of those aggregates do double-duty as "cetasikas." That is just my suspicion. I don't know for sure.asahi wrote: ↑Wed Jun 16, 2021 11:48 pmUltimately Real in Theravada means what ? Do you mean that the five aggregates exists ? Did the Buddha taught dhamma in terms of existence or real ?Coëmgenu wrote: ↑Wed Jun 16, 2021 9:52 pm The skandhas, though devoid of a self, are ultimately real in Theravāda, as far as I understand.
If the OP can square Theravāda and the Prajñāpāramitā cited by Ven Nagarjuna based on the fact that things are "like X" and are not "X" in the MMK, then fair enough.
An ultimate reality is an irreducible aspect of experience which bears an intrinsic nature, or is born from its unique conditions. That which is actually experienced, rather than what is conceptualised.Coëmgenu wrote: ↑Thu Jun 17, 2021 3:29 pmI don't exactly know what they mean. Theravāda observes a differentiation between "unconditioned" and "ultimate" that is incoherent to the Madhyamaka. These are one and the same from that perspective. To the Theravādin, however "form" and "mind" etc. are "ultimate" but are not "unconditioned." That the aggregates supposedly "exist ultimately" is just something that I've heard Theravādins say. I have my theories as to how they supposedly exist ultimately. I think the aggregates are lined up with the four paramarthas and two of those aggregates do double-duty as "cetasikas." That is just my suspicion. I don't know for sure.asahi wrote: ↑Wed Jun 16, 2021 11:48 pmUltimately Real in Theravada means what ? Do you mean that the five aggregates exists ? Did the Buddha taught dhamma in terms of existence or real ?Coëmgenu wrote: ↑Wed Jun 16, 2021 9:52 pm The skandhas, though devoid of a self, are ultimately real in Theravāda, as far as I understand.
If the OP can square Theravāda and the Prajñāpāramitā cited by Ven Nagarjuna based on the fact that things are "like X" and are not "X" in the MMK, then fair enough.
When experience is reduced there is citta and sañña. Or, to say it another way, citta and sañña are fundamental aspects of direct experience.Coëmgenu wrote: ↑Thu Jun 17, 2021 5:18 pm Well, I suppose therein lies the controverted point: is experience/cognition itself, sañña, "irreducible" like an atom? Theravāda in claiming that finds itself closer to the Yogācārins than to the Madhyamakas, but obviously it is not fair to draw any more equivalence than that.
Can it actually be reduced so? Is this a valid reduction? For instance, can we say that sañña is an irreducible aspect of experience if we cannot actually reduce experience to "sañña" and "citta" components that are separate and discrete? A deeply related point: there is no caitasika outside of the mind. They are always together. If an autonomous caitasika, a differentiation in a moment of citta versus a moment of sañña, cannot be demonstrated, then there is no ground to consider it a discrete element, let alone an irreducible element, of reducible experience, one could argue. Now, Theravāda doesn't posit ultimate cetasikas, but if there are universal cetasikas and citta and sañña are ultimate, I think it applies all the same.
I would say so. When I eat an apple, what is actually experienced? Citta, sañña, taste and so on, but clearly distinguishing dhammas comes with meditation.
They arise together, as a cluster. Their sabhava distinguishes them.A deeply related point: there is no caitasika outside of the mind. They are always together. If an autonomous caitasika, a differentiation in a moment of citta versus a moment of sañña, cannot be demonstrated, then there is no ground to consider it a discrete element, let alone an irreducible element, of reducible experience, one could argue.
No cetasikas are also ultimate realities.Now, Theravāda doesn't posit ultimate cetasikas, but if there are universal cetasikas and citta and sañña are ultimate, I think it applies all the same.
The argument between the two perspectives of svabhāvavāda and niḥsvabhāva are too much for the thread, but I get that that's the Theravādin perspective. Niḥsvabhāva is why the OP is on shaky grounds and why, as far as I understand, those who want to draw a line from Madhyamaka to Theravāda and say "compatible" must do so while either devaluing the Theravādin Abhidhamma or radically reinterpreting it.
Cetasikas are sankharas... Yep, there it is, in Abhidhammatthasangaha. I quoted that passage not a day ago and should have remembered. I got turned around thinking the four ultimates were citta, sañña, rūpa, nibbāna, and that was just so incoherent.
Indeed yes. From a Theravādin perspective awakening comes from insight into the conditionality of the ultimate realities, and the difference between them and concepts. To a Madhyamaka insight, as far as I understand it, is that the dhammas aren’t ultimately real. A Theravādin would emerge from jhāna, review it and have insight into the impermanence etc of those dhammas. A follower of Madhyamaka would emerge, review and have insight that said dhammas don’t really exist. Two very different outlooks and methods.Coëmgenu wrote: ↑Thu Jun 17, 2021 6:46 pm
The argument between the two perspectives of svabhāvavāda and niḥsvabhāva are too much for the thread, but I get that that's the Theravādin perspective. Niḥsvabhāva is why the OP is on shaky grounds and why, as far as I understand, those who want to draw a line from Madhyamaka to Theravāda and say "compatible" must do so while either devaluing the Theravādin Abhidhamma or radically reinterpreting it.
Other than the metaphysical quandary of "ultimately real" versus "really exist," I agree that realism does seem to a major definining factor of Theravāda when Theravāda is specifically being defined in relation to Madhyamaka. The dhammas can be real in Madhyamaka, but not in an ultimate sense.Ceisiwr wrote: ↑Thu Jun 17, 2021 6:55 pmTo a Madhyamaka insight, as far as I understand it, is that the dhammas aren’t ultimately real. A Theravādin would emerge from jhāna, review it and have insight into the impermanence etc of those dhammas. A follower of Madhyamaka would emerge, review and have insight that said dhammas don’t really exist.
Yes, mere concepts.Coëmgenu wrote: ↑Thu Jun 17, 2021 7:04 pmOther than the metaphysical quandary of "ultimately real" versus "really exist," I agree that realism does seem to a major definining factor of Theravāda when Theravāda is specifically being defined in relation to Madhyamaka. The dhammas can be real in Madhyamaka, but not in an ultimate sense.Ceisiwr wrote: ↑Thu Jun 17, 2021 6:55 pmTo a Madhyamaka insight, as far as I understand it, is that the dhammas aren’t ultimately real. A Theravādin would emerge from jhāna, review it and have insight into the impermanence etc of those dhammas. A follower of Madhyamaka would emerge, review and have insight that said dhammas don’t really exist.