A touchstone for Classical Theravadins

[retrofuturist]

Greetings,

Seems clear that things can be “there” without even broaching the question of whether or not there is existence/non-existence/both/neither.

Metta,
Paul.

[SDC]

Greetings,

Seems clear that things can be “there” without even broaching the question of whether or not there is existence/non-existence/both/neither.

Metta,
Paul.

[sphairos]

Madhyamaka avoids asserting either existence or non-existence. Nagarjuna was at pains to make it clear that he was putting forward no metaphysics. So the point is not that something exists or does not, but firstly to even understand what is meant when we say "it exists".

Siderits says: " [according to] the Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness, the claim [is] that all dharmas are devoid of svabhāva or intrinsic nature." Moreover, no actual existence (or non-existence) can be established. The Buddha summed it all neatly in the Sabba Sutta. Beyond the range.

That's not the position of Siderits.

I think it is. If it isn't, please cite him to support this. His position is made clear here:

Well, I know his position directly from him, so I am not interested in arguing or discussing that. Its exactly in his "semantic interpretation".

Check here, for example:

"For Siderits there is no ultimate reality independent of mind, so the ultimate reality of things is
their being dependent upon mind. In other words, the ultimate reality of things is their
conventional reality. Rejecting any form of ultimate truth, Siderits suggest that all truths and all
existing things are ultimately conventional."

p. 71

https://kar.kent.ac.uk/54341/1/85The%20 ... 20West.pdf

This "absolute nihilist" (contra "metaphysical nihilist" one) interpretation is actually a traditional ancient understanding of Madhyamaka:

"It is interesting that Yijing wrote about the real situation of Mahāyāna Buddhism in India as follows: “Thereare but two kinds of so-called Mahāyāna. First, the Madhyamika; second, the Yoga. The former professes that what is commonly called existence is, in reality
, non-existence, and every object is but an empty show, like an illusion, whereas the latter affirms that there exist no outer things
in reality, but only inward thoughts, and all things exist only in the mind.” (cf. NHJ[tr] 15); NHJ. 205c14~16. 
Later, the two traditions were fused together, and hence, the Yogācāra-Svatantrika-Madhyamika school was founded by
Śāntarakṣita (725~788). In China, the Madhyamaka school was called  (“School of Emptiness”), while the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra = Vijñānavāda schools were named  (“School of Existence”). The latter designation for the Yogācāra = Vijñānavāda school shows its origin clearly."

pp. 148-149
https://www.academia.edu/12854001/Who_C ... Scriptures

[Coëmgenu]

The skandhas, though devoid of a self, are ultimately real in Theravāda, as far as I understand.

If the OP can square Theravāda and the Prajñāpāramitā cited by Ven Nagarjuna based on the fact that things are "like X" and are not "X" in the MMK, then fair enough.

Ultimately Real in Theravada means what ? Do you mean that the five aggregates exists ? Did the Buddha taught dhamma in terms of existence or real ?

I don't exactly know what they mean. Theravāda observes a differentiation between "unconditioned" and "ultimate" that is incoherent to the Madhyamaka. These are one and the same from that perspective. To the Theravādin, however "form" and "mind" etc. are "ultimate" but are not "unconditioned." That the aggregates supposedly "exist ultimately" is just something that I've heard Theravādins say. I have my theories as to how they supposedly exist ultimately. I think the aggregates are lined up with the four paramarthas and two of those aggregates do double-duty as "cetasikas." That is just my suspicion. I don't know for sure.

[Ceisiwr]

The skandhas, though devoid of a self, are ultimately real in Theravāda, as far as I understand.

If the OP can square Theravāda and the Prajñāpāramitā cited by Ven Nagarjuna based on the fact that things are "like X" and are not "X" in the MMK, then fair enough.

Ultimately Real in Theravada means what ? Do you mean that the five aggregates exists ? Did the Buddha taught dhamma in terms of existence or real ?

I don't exactly know what they mean. Theravāda observes a differentiation between "unconditioned" and "ultimate" that is incoherent to the Madhyamaka. These are one and the same from that perspective. To the Theravādin, however "form" and "mind" etc. are "ultimate" but are not "unconditioned." That the aggregates supposedly "exist ultimately" is just something that I've heard Theravādins say. I have my theories as to how they supposedly exist ultimately. I think the aggregates are lined up with the four paramarthas and two of those aggregates do double-duty as "cetasikas." That is just my suspicion. I don't know for sure.

An ultimate reality is an irreducible aspect of experience which bears an intrinsic nature, or is born from its unique conditions. That which is actually experienced, rather than what is conceptualised.

[Coëmgenu]

Well, I suppose therein lies the controverted point: is experience/cognition itself, sañña, "irreducible" like an atom? Theravāda in claiming that finds itself closer to the Yogācārins than to the Madhyamakas, but obviously it is not fair to draw any more equivalence than that.

[Ceisiwr]

Well, I suppose therein lies the controverted point: is experience/cognition itself, sañña, "irreducible" like an atom? Theravāda in claiming that finds itself closer to the Yogācārins than to the Madhyamakas, but obviously it is not fair to draw any more equivalence than that.

When experience is reduced there is citta and sañña. Or, to say it another way, citta and sañña are fundamental aspects of direct experience.

Behind the concept “house” there is nothing. It doesn’t apply to anything. Behind the concept “citta” there is something, namely a moment of cognition. The same with the concept of a self, a dog whatever. Nothing exists behind those concepts. Only the direct qualities of experience can be said to exist.

[Coëmgenu]

When experience is reduced there is citta and sañña.

Can it actually be reduced so? Is this a valid reduction? For instance, can we say that sañña is an irreducible aspect of experience if we cannot actually reduce experience to "sañña" and "citta" components that are separate and discrete? A deeply related point: there is no caitasika outside of the mind. They are always together. If an autonomous caitasika, a differentiation in a moment of citta versus a moment of sañña, cannot be demonstrated, then there is no ground to consider it a discrete element, let alone an irreducible element, of reducible experience, one could argue. Now, Theravāda doesn't posit ultimate cetasikas, but if there are universal cetasikas and citta and sañña are ultimate, I think it applies all the same.

The dialogue is now off-topic for the forum, but on-topic for the OP, so I don't know where it goes or if a new thread gets started or what.

[Ceisiwr]

Can it actually be reduced so? Is this a valid reduction? For instance, can we say that sañña is an irreducible aspect of experience if we cannot actually reduce experience to "sañña" and "citta" components that are separate and discrete?

I would say so. When I eat an apple, what is actually experienced? Citta, sañña, taste and so on, but clearly distinguishing dhammas comes with meditation.

A deeply related point: there is no caitasika outside of the mind. They are always together. If an autonomous caitasika, a differentiation in a moment of citta versus a moment of sañña, cannot be demonstrated, then there is no ground to consider it a discrete element, let alone an irreducible element, of reducible experience, one could argue.

They arise together, as a cluster. Their sabhava distinguishes them.

Now, Theravāda doesn't posit ultimate cetasikas, but if there are universal cetasikas and citta and sañña are ultimate, I think it applies all the same.

No cetasikas are also ultimate realities.

[sphairos]

Regarding "ultimately real" in Theravāda/early Buddhism I wouldn't be so sure:

"And what should the man do in order to be doing what should be done with the raft? There is the case where the man, having crossed over, would think, 'How useful this raft has been to me! For it was in dependence on this raft that, making an effort with my hands & feet, I have crossed over to safety on the further shore. Why don't I, having dragged it on dry land or sinking it in the water, go wherever I like?' In doing this, he would be doing what should be done with the raft. In the same way, monks, I have taught the Dhamma compared to a raft, for the purpose of crossing over, not for the purpose of holding onto. Understanding the Dhamma as taught compared to a raft, you should let go even of Dhammas, to say nothing of non-Dhammas."

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitak ... .than.html

(nobody knows what are exactly dhammas and adhammas here)

And compare this with the ending of the Dīghanakhasutta, where the Buddha endorses no-view without craving, and says that he does not get attached to the words used in the world.

The point of view of Theravāda is the point of view of an Enlightened Mind, and an Enlightened Mind does not have views, cravings, dhammas and adhammas. Does this Enlightened Mind operate, endorse categories such as "ultimately real" or just "real"? There is a high chance that it doesn't.

And in any way the Buddhist "world" is traidhātuka, in Pāli tedhātuka, "a three-elemented". It's nothing like the world of an average worldling, which is just a rehash of the sense-data from six doors of perception. The Buddhist world is at the same time kāma-dhātu, rūpa-dhātu and arūpa-dhātu. Right now, in the next second I can be in ārupa-dhātu, then transfer to kāma-dhātu, then again to arūpa-dhātu and next to rūpa-dhātu. The three dhātus are inextricably interwoven into a whole and one transfers between the layers via their mind. It has nothing to do with what we call in Western languages and philosophies "a world". What an usual person calls a world is just a belief that some very crude form of kāma-dhātu is an absolute form of experience. But it's just a tiny possibility in the ocean of experiences. Such ordinary perception is something akin an illusion or delusion.

But when someone gets Enlightened they hardly grasp on any of the multiple layers of traidhātuka, and as such they are "untraceable"...

[Coëmgenu]

They arise together, as a cluster. Their sabhava distinguishes them.

The argument between the two perspectives of svabhāvavāda and niḥsvabhāva are too much for the thread, but I get that that's the Theravādin perspective. Niḥsvabhāva is why the OP is on shaky grounds and why, as far as I understand, those who want to draw a line from Madhyamaka to Theravāda and say "compatible" must do so while either devaluing the Theravādin Abhidhamma or radically reinterpreting it.

Now, Theravāda doesn't posit ultimate cetasikas, but if there are universal cetasikas and citta and sañña are ultimate, I think it applies all the same.

No cetasikas are also ultimate realities.

Cetasikas are sankharas... Yep, there it is, in Abhidhammatthasangaha. I quoted that passage not a day ago and should have remembered. I got turned around thinking the four ultimates were citta, sañña, rūpa, nibbāna, and that was just so incoherent.

The objection still stands IMO and the point is still controverted, but I don't expect we'll reach a conclusion in this thread, as alluded to above.

The Dārṣṭāntikas (another name for the Sautrāntikas) were so-named because they relied on the examples, the parables and the illustrative comparisons, of the Buddha over the scholastic elaborations. In one of these, the Buddha likened the mind to a monkey who grabs branches, swinging through the trees. The suggestions of the fourfold paramatthas is that, actually, this monkey is an ultimate monkey who swings through the forest of reality by grabbing the ultimate branches that are the paramattha dhammas. The ultimate monkey misconcieves both himself and the branch, misidentifing the ultimate branches as things like "cats," "trees," "boxes," what-have-you, but they are ultimate branches grasped by an ultimate monkey nonetheless.

[Ceisiwr]

The argument between the two perspectives of svabhāvavāda and niḥsvabhāva are too much for the thread, but I get that that's the Theravādin perspective. Niḥsvabhāva is why the OP is on shaky grounds and why, as far as I understand, those who want to draw a line from Madhyamaka to Theravāda and say "compatible" must do so while either devaluing the Theravādin Abhidhamma or radically reinterpreting it.

Indeed yes. From a Theravādin perspective awakening comes from insight into the conditionality of the ultimate realities, and the difference between them and concepts. To a Madhyamaka insight, as far as I understand it, is that the dhammas aren’t ultimately real. A Theravādin would emerge from jhāna, review it and have insight into the impermanence etc of those dhammas. A follower of Madhyamaka would emerge, review and have insight that said dhammas don’t really exist. Two very different outlooks and methods.

[Coëmgenu]

To a Madhyamaka insight, as far as I understand it, is that the dhammas aren’t ultimately real. A Theravādin would emerge from jhāna, review it and have insight into the impermanence etc of those dhammas. A follower of Madhyamaka would emerge, review and have insight that said dhammas don’t really exist.

Other than the metaphysical quandary of "ultimately real" versus "really exist," I agree that realism does seem to a major definining factor of Theravāda when Theravāda is specifically being defined in relation to Madhyamaka. The dhammas can be real in Madhyamaka, but not in an ultimate sense.

[Ceisiwr]

To a Madhyamaka insight, as far as I understand it, is that the dhammas aren’t ultimately real. A Theravādin would emerge from jhāna, review it and have insight into the impermanence etc of those dhammas. A follower of Madhyamaka would emerge, review and have insight that said dhammas don’t really exist.

Other than the metaphysical quandary of "ultimately real" versus "really exist," I agree that realism does seem to a major definining factor of Theravāda when Theravāda is specifically being defined in relation to Madhyamaka. The dhammas can be real in Madhyamaka, but not in an ultimate sense.

Yes, mere concepts.

[Bhikkhu Pesala]

The Pasūra Sutta

“Only here is purity,” they declare, “Purity is not in the teachings of others,” they say.
Whatever they depend on, they say is excellent and thus have settled on diverse truths.

“Desiring debate, entering into an assembly, they call each other fools;
Boasting about their clung to doctrines, desiring praise, calling themselves the experts.

“Ready to speak in the midst of a gathering, wishing for praise, he fears defeat.
If refuted he is discontented and seeks faults in others, being agitated.

“When his view is refuted by the judges,
he laments and grieves his inferior argument crying, ‘He has defeated me!’

“These disputes arise among recluses, resulting in victor or defeat.
Seeing this, avoid disputing. There is no benefit other than gaining praise.“

“He who is praised in the midst of an assembly, having successfully defended his view,
Will be elated and haughty, having attained what he wished.

“That elation is the basis for his downfall; still he talks with pride and excessive conceit.
Seeing this, avoid disputing; the skilful do not say that purity is achieved by that.

“Like the king’s champion nourished by good food, goes out roaring, seeking for a rival.
Where there is a rival you may go there, here is nothing left to fight over.

“Those who grasp a doctrine and argue that it alone is the truth,
You may debate with them, but here there is no opponent to dispute with.

“Those who wander without any enemy, who do not oppose one doctrine with another,
What would you gain from them, Pasūra? They who grasp nothing as the highest.

“You have come speculating, thinking about different views,
However, with one who is purified, it is not possible for you to proceed.”