A touchstone for Classical Theravadins

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Ceisiwr
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Re: A touchstone for Classical Theravadins

Post by Ceisiwr »

Coëmgenu wrote: Thu Jun 17, 2021 7:04 pm
Returning to the OP somewhat, I have read that there might be some things in common between Yogācāra and the Abhidhamma. For example, the Bhavaṅga and ālayavijñāna look quite similar.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Re: A touchstone for Classical Theravadins

Post by Coëmgenu »

IMO, Yogācāra is "Mahāyāna-ized" Sarvāstivādin Buddhism with untold untraceable influence from other minority schools. I once disagreed with another user on this but have since come around to admit that we can't really trace any Vibhajyavādin influence on Yogācāra despite Ven Maitreyanātha's comparison.
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
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Ceisiwr
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Re: A touchstone for Classical Theravadins

Post by Ceisiwr »

Coëmgenu wrote: Thu Jun 17, 2021 9:48 pm IMO, Yogācāra is "Mahāyāna-ized" Sarvāstivādin Buddhism with untold untraceable influence from other minority schools. I once disagreed with another user on this but have since come around to admit that we can't really trace any Vibhajyavādin influence on Yogācāra despite Ven Maitreyanātha's comparison.
There is a difference between being influenced and reaching the same conclusions.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Coëmgenu
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Re: A touchstone for Classical Theravadins

Post by Coëmgenu »

Two last bits of random trivia: the continental Vibhajyavādins in India as attested to in sectarian documents like Abhidharmakośa are not identical to the insular Vibhajyavādins of Sri Lanka who are the forerunners of modern Theravāda. Sometimes completely different Abhidharma jurisprudence is attributed to the continental Vibhajyavādins than what we find in the Pāli Abhidhamma and Theravādin commentarial tradition.

Also, Yogācāra does not have niḥsvabhāva as a major doctrine in a comparable position to what it occupies in Madhyamaka. Instead, they have the trisvabhāva, or three pseudo-universal svabhāvas associated with cognition.
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
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Re: A touchstone for Classical Theravadins

Post by asahi »

Ceisiwr wrote: Thu Jun 17, 2021 5:07 pm An ultimate reality is an irreducible aspect of experience which bears an intrinsic nature, or is born from its unique conditions. That which is actually experienced, rather than what is conceptualised.
How do you differentiate between conceptualised and experienced ? Can you experience something and dont conceptualise it ? If there is a so called experience without conceptualise it you wouldnt know it or would you ? :shrug:
Is there a formation of concept without experiencing first ? :roll:
If Ultimate Reality is irreducible , at the time of cessation , ie nibbana , where are your experiences ? :thinking:


:thanks:
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zan
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Re: A touchstone for Classical Theravadins

Post by zan »

I should also point out, again, Yogacara, the strictly "mind only" school was defeated in debate by Madhyamaka and was absorbed by, and retooled to be compatible with, Madhyamaka. Since Madhyamaka is actually realist, that means there is no dominant "mind only" school that has been able to stand against Madhyamaka logic. The Yogacara as an independent school is nearly extinct, as it could not stand alone. What is left is a wiggly ghost of Yogacara that carefully avoids making firm statements and redefines existing firm statements about all being mind, because Madhyamaka demonstrated that the original Yogacara formulation was entirely untenable. So we now have Madhyamaka-Yogacara, where all Yogacara terms really just are a facade on top of Madhyamaka teachings.

"All is mind" now means "Mind doesn't exist." which is the Madhyamaka teaching. Whereas in original Yogacara, "All is mind" was an astika statement, affirming an existent mind. Chandrakirti, and others, utterly destroyed the logic that ostensibly propped up this Yogacara idea. So now, Yogacara is a self refuting ghost of its former self, where "All is mind" means "mind doesn't exist."
Yogacara as a distinct institutional school of Buddhism is almost totally extinct. There are two temples of the Hosso sect (which is the only remaining sect of Buddhism that calls itself Yogacara) of Buddhism in Japan ( Kōfuku-ji and Yakushi-ji) but that's really about it.

-Bakmoon, from another forum
Āstika derives from the Sanskrit asti, "there is, there exists", and means one who believes in the existence of a Self/Soul[disambiguation needed] or Brahman, etc. and nāstika means the one who doesn't believe in existence of a Soul or Self. These have been concepts used to classify Indian philosophies by modern scholars, and some Hindu, Buddhist and Jaina texts.

...

According to Andrew Nicholson, later Buddhists understood Asanga to be targeting Madhyamaka Buddhism as nastika, while considering his own Yogacara Buddhist tradition to be astika.

-Wiki page on Astika and Nastika
Some selections from a relevant work translated by C. W. Huntington, Jr. (Vijnanavada is the Yogacara or Mind Only school):

Candrakirti's Madhyamakavatarabhasya 6.86-97

A Madhyamaka Critique of Vijnanavada Views of Consciousness

C. W. Huntington, Jr.

(68)An opponent is refuted by perceiving that each and every response he offers is nothing but an unsubstantiated thesis. The buddhas did not teach that any entity whatsoever [ultimately] exists.

(69) The meditator who follows his teacher's instructions sees the surrounding area to be filled with skeletons. In this case it is obvious that all three [factors of sensation] are unproduced, because this is an exercise in artificial mentation.

(70) According to our opponent, even these impure mental [visualizations] are just like [conventional] objects of sense perception. If this were so, then anyone else [besides the meditator] who looked at the place where they appear should perceive the skeletons. They are fictitious, however and are not [perceived by anyone other that the meditator].

[Refutation of a noncognized entity (reflexive awareness) as the ultimate truth]

(72) If this "dependent entity" exists in the absence of both subject and object, then who is aware of its existence? It would be unacceptable to assert that it exists unapprehended.

(73) It is not proven that [a cognition] is aware of itself. Nor can this be proven by using the subsequent memory [of a previous event as evidence], for in this case the thesis intended to substantiate your claim itself embodies an unproven premise, and therefore it cannot be admitted [as valid proof].

(76) Therefore, without [this notion of] reflexive awareness who (or what) will apprehend your dependent [form]? The actor, the object [of the action], and the action are not identical, and for this reason it is illogical to maintain that [a cognition] apprehends itself.

(77) However, if the entity which is [a manifestation of this] dependent form (paratantrarupavastu) exists without ever having been produced or cognized, then why should our opponent insist that [belief in] the son of a barren woman is irrational? What harm could the son of a barren woman inflict on him [that he has not already suffered through belief in his concept of dependent form]?

(78) And in the event that this dependent [form] in no way whatsoever exists, then what will function as the cause for the screen [of conventional truth]? All the ordered structure of everyday experience is laid waste by this clinging to a real substance inherent in our opponents philosophical views.

[The true meaning of teachings on "mind alone"]

(79) There is no means of finding peace for those walking outside the path trodden by the master Nagarjuna. Such people have strayed from the truth of the screen and from the reality [expressed in the truth of the highest meaning], and on account of this they will never be free.

(80) Conventional truth is the means, the truth of the highest meaning is the goal, and one who does not appreciate the distinction between these two treads a wrong path through his reified concepts.

(81) We [Madhyamikas] do not have the same attitude toward our [concept of] the screen as you [Yogacarins] have toward your [concept of] dependent being (paratantrabhava). With reference to the nature of everyday experience, we say: "Even though things do not exist, they exist" - and this is done for a specified purpose.

(82) [The things of the world] do not exist for the saints who have abandoned the pyschophysical aggregates and found peace. If, in a similar manner, they did not exist in the context of everyday experience, then we would not maintain that they do - even in this qualified sense.

(83) If everyday experience poses no threat to you, then you may persist in this denial of the evidence provided by such experience. Quarrel with the evidence of everyday experience, and afterward we will rely on the winner.

...

The word “only” has no capacity to negate the objective component of knowledge (jneya).

"(87)...the Lankavatara sutra substitutes "mind alone" for "mind alone is preeminent in the context of everyday experience." The meaning of this scripture is not to be understood as a negation of form.”

...When the scripture says "mind alone exists; form does not," this is taught to deny the importance of form and so forth, not to negate their very existence....

(88) If he intended to deny the existence of objective reality wen he said that [the world] is mind alone, then why would the mahatma declare, in the same text, that mind is produced from delusion (moha) and volitional action (karman)?

What sensible person would look at a passage from this same [Dasabhumikasutra] and imagine that consciousness exists as an independent thing (vastutah)? A notion like this is nothing more than dogmatic opinion. It follows that the expression "mind only" serves only to clarify that mind is the most significant element [in experience] This text should not be understood to assert that there is no objective form (rupa).

(90a-b) Even though objective form does indeed exist, it is not, like mind, an agent


This means that objective form is inert.


(90c-d) Therefore, denying any other agent besides mind is not the same as negating objective form altogether.


Some people take (the Samkhya) idea of "matter" (pradhana) and such things as agent, others believe it is mind, but everyone agrees that objective form is not an agent. To prevent pradhana and so forth from being taken as agent, it is explained that they do not have any such characteristic. Seeing that it has the capacity to serve as agent, one declares that mind alone is the agent, and in doing so one gains the high ground in any debate concerning the agency of pradhana and so forth. It is as if two kings desire power in a single land, and one of the two rivals is expelled while the other assumes control of the country. No matter who wins, the citizens are indispensable and would suffer no harm. So it is here, because objective form is indispensable to both, it suffers no loss. One can certainly maintain that objective form exists. Therefore, continuing in the same manner, the text declares:


(91) Within the context of everyday affairs, all five psychophysical constituents taken for granted in the world do exist. However, none of the five appears to a yogi who pursues illuminating knowledge of reality.


Therefore, seeing as this is so,


(92a-b) If form does not exist, then do not cling to the existence of mind; and if mind exists, then do not cling to the nonexistence of form.


When, for some reason, one does not admit the existence of form, then the existence of both is equally unreasonable and one must admit the nonexistence of mind, as well. And when one admits the existence of mind, then it is necessary to admit the existence of form, for both are conventionally real.

"O Subhuti, objective form is empty of inherent existence." The same is said concerning the others, including consciousness. This is established both in scripture and through recourse to reason.


(93a-b) You destroy the relationship of the two truths, and even then your "real thing" (vastu) [i.e. mind] is not established, because it has been refuted.


In arguing that consciousness alone exists, without objective form, you destroy the relationship between conventional and ultimate truth as it has been explained. And even when you have destroyed this relationship between the two truths, your absolute reality will not be established. Why not? Once the reality [of form] is denied, your efforts [to establish consciousness] are pointless.

(93c-d) It would be better to hold, in conformity with this relationship, that in reality nothing arises; the arising of things is merely conventional.

(94a-b) Where a scripture declares that there is no external object and that mind (citta) alone appears as various things,


This scripture requires interpretation:


(94c-d) the refutation of form is provisional, directed specifically at those who are overly attached to it.


The meaning of such a text is strictly provisional. There are those who have lost themselves in clinging or anger or pride that is rooted in an extreme attachment to form; such people commit grievous errors and fail to cultivate merit or understanding. It is for these people, who are clinging, that the Blessed One taught "mind alone" even though it is not actually so. He did this in order to destroy the afflictions that are rooted in material form.
But how do you know this scripture is provisional, and not definitive?
Through both textual evidence and reason. The master has said precisely this:

(95a-b) The master has said that this [scripture] is of strictly provisional meaning; reason [as well] dictates it is of provisional meaning.

Not only is this scripture of provisional meaning, but also

(95c-d) This text makes it clear that other scriptures of this type are of provisional meaning.

And if one inquires which scriptures are of “of this type,” there is the following passage from the Sandhinirmocanasutra, explaining the “three natures”-the imaginary, the dependent, and the perfected:

The imaginary is nonexistent, only what is dependent exists.

(96) The Buddhas teach that the subject, or knower (jnatr), may easily be dispensed with once the object of knowledge, or the known (jneya), is no longer present. For this reason they begin by refuting the object of knowledge, for, when it is no longer present, refutation of the subject is already accomplished.
Last edited by zan on Mon Jul 26, 2021 4:18 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
zan
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Re: A touchstone for Classical Theravadins

Post by zan »

Bhikkhu Pesala wrote: Thu Jun 17, 2021 7:44 pm The Pasūra Sutta

“Only here is purity,” they declare, “Purity is not in the teachings of others,” they say.
Whatever they depend on, they say is excellent and thus have settled on diverse truths.

“Desiring debate, entering into an assembly, they call each other fools;
Boasting about their clung to doctrines, desiring praise, calling themselves the experts.

“Ready to speak in the midst of a gathering, wishing for praise, he fears defeat.
If refuted he is discontented and seeks faults in others, being agitated.

“When his view is refuted by the judges,
he laments and grieves his inferior argument crying, ‘He has defeated me!’

“These disputes arise among recluses, resulting in victor or defeat.
Seeing this, avoid disputing. There is no benefit other than gaining praise.“

“He who is praised in the midst of an assembly, having successfully defended his view,
Will be elated and haughty, having attained what he wished.

“That elation is the basis for his downfall; still he talks with pride and excessive conceit.
Seeing this, avoid disputing; the skilful do not say that purity is achieved by that.

“Like the king’s champion nourished by good food, goes out roaring, seeking for a rival.
Where there is a rival you may go there, here is nothing left to fight over.

“Those who grasp a doctrine and argue that it alone is the truth,
You may debate with them, but here there is no opponent to dispute with.

“Those who wander without any enemy, who do not oppose one doctrine with another,
What would you gain from them, Pasūra? They who grasp nothing as the highest.

“You have come speculating, thinking about different views,
However, with one who is purified, it is not possible for you to proceed.”
Venerable Pesala,

As always I appreciate your words. I agree with you entirely. Thus, what I have been doing with this and the thread following it (Classical Theravada, the realist Buddhism) is closing up a long standing debate without arguing, looking for praise, and not even looking to see if I was "defeated". I haven't responded hardly at all to anyone debating me, because I am not trying to convert those mired deep in their views (although if by chance I do, then this is great, too). I haven't checked to see if I'm winning or losing, either, because I've written all of this purely as a help to any who seek support for Theravada realism, to support the pure, original teaching of the Buddha, in the face of constant attacks and even a general acceptance of Mahayana views to the detriment, and the making irrelevant of the suttas and dhamma (if the suttas and dhamma are imaginary, or unreal, it would seem they are irrelevant). I have offered it with zero hope for praise, and zero fear of defeat, in the hopes that it will be helpful to even one person, and hopefully more.

I nonetheless do take seriously your suggestion to read that sutta, have done so, and am moving on to study the dhamma closely, and put this silly debate behind me. I have debated it for years, repeated myself for the umpteenth time, tired of my own verbose writing, and finally decided to end it with a final recap, purely for informational purposes, and be done with it.


Thank you, always, for your teachings. They are a light in the dark.
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
zan
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Re: A touchstone for Classical Theravadins

Post by zan »

A selection from Taking Conventional Truth Seriously (sorry, I meant to post this along with the op but never got around to it):
A Message from our Sponsors: Candrakirti and Tsong khapa

Let's now consider a few crucial passages from the relevant texts to get a better
sense of the constraints that an account of Mãdhyamaka theory of conventional
truth must satisfy. Tsong khapa, in his discussion of the status of arising and ceasing, et cetera, in the context of the negations presented in the Homage verses for Mulamadhyamakakãrikã, remarks:

If there were no place for conventional phenomena, the existence of which is established by the epistemic instruments, these phenomena would be like the snake - that is, the rope grasped as a snake - of which no cause or effect is possible. . . .

If one were forced to maintain that there is no place for bondage, liberation, etc in the meaning of "conventional existence,' and that these must be placed only in the erroneous perspective, that would be a great philosophical error.

Even worse, as long as convention is conceived [as entirely nonexistent], since there
would be no role for the epistemic instruments, neither the proposition maintained nor
the person who maintains it nor the proof - including scriptural sources and reasoning could be established by epistemic instruments. So it would be ridiculous to maintain that there are no genuine phenomena delivered by the epistemic instruments. (Ocean 30-31 )

Tsong khapa makes it plain here that conventional phenomena, unlike the snake thought to be perceived when one sees a rope, have causes and effects, and are actual. Moreover, he argues that the repudiation of the reality of the conventional would undermine the possibility of epistemic authority, undermining even the ability to argue cogently that the conventional does not exist. Such a position would be self-refuting.

-Taking Conventional Truth Seriously, Jay Garfield, pages 345-346
This is relevant, too:
Some selections from a relevant work translated by C. W. Huntington, Jr. (Vijnanavada is the Yogacara or Mind Only school):

Candrakirti's Madhyamakavatarabhasya 6.86-97

A Madhyamaka Critique of Vijnanavada Views of Consciousness

C. W. Huntington, Jr.

(68)An opponent is refuted by perceiving that each and every response he offers is nothing but an unsubstantiated thesis. The buddhas did not teach that any entity whatsoever [ultimately] exists.

(69) The meditator who follows his teacher's instructions sees the surrounding area to be filled with skeletons. In this case it is obvious that all three [factors of sensation] are unproduced, because this is an exercise in artificial mentation.

(70) According to our opponent, even these impure mental [visualizations] are just like [conventional] objects of sense perception. If this were so, then anyone else [besides the meditator] who looked at the place where they appear should perceive the skeletons. They are fictitious, however and are not [perceived by anyone other that the meditator].

[Refutation of a noncognized entity (reflexive awareness) as the ultimate truth]

(72) If this "dependent entity" exists in the absence of both subject and object, then who is aware of its existence? It would be unacceptable to assert that it exists unapprehended.

(73) It is not proven that [a cognition] is aware of itself. Nor can this be proven by using the subsequent memory [of a previous event as evidence], for in this case the thesis intended to substantiate your claim itself embodies an unproven premise, and therefore it cannot be admitted [as valid proof].

(76) Therefore, without [this notion of] reflexive awareness who (or what) will apprehend your dependent [form]? The actor, the object [of the action], and the action are not identical, and for this reason it is illogical to maintain that [a cognition] apprehends itself.

(77) However, if the entity which is [a manifestation of this] dependent form (paratantrarupavastu) exists without ever having been produced or cognized, then why should our opponent insist that [belief in] the son of a barren woman is irrational? What harm could the son of a barren woman inflict on him [that he has not already suffered through belief in his concept of dependent form]?

(78) And in the event that this dependent [form] in no way whatsoever exists, then what will function as the cause for the screen [of conventional truth]? All the ordered structure of everyday experience is laid waste by this clinging to a real substance inherent in our opponents philosophical views.

[The true meaning of teachings on "mind alone"]

(79) There is no means of finding peace for those walking outside the path trodden by the master Nagarjuna. Such people have strayed from the truth of the screen and from the reality [expressed in the truth of the highest meaning], and on account of this they will never be free.

(80) Conventional truth is the means, the truth of the highest meaning is the goal, and one who does not appreciate the distinction between these two treads a wrong path through his reified concepts.

(81) We [Madhyamikas] do not have the same attitude toward our [concept of] the screen as you [Yogacarins] have toward your [concept of] dependent being (paratantrabhava). With reference to the nature of everyday experience, we say: "Even though things do not exist, they exist" - and this is done for a specified purpose.

(82) [The things of the world] do not exist for the saints who have abandoned the pyschophysical aggregates and found peace. If, in a similar manner, they did not exist in the context of everyday experience, then we would not maintain that they do - even in this qualified sense.

(83) If everyday experience poses no threat to you, then you may persist in this denial of the evidence provided by such experience. Quarrel with the evidence of everyday experience, and afterward we will rely on the winner.

...

The word “only” has no capacity to negate the objective component of knowledge (jneya).

"(87)...the Lankavatara sutra substitutes "mind alone" for "mind alone is preeminent in the context of everyday experience." The meaning of this scripture is not to be understood as a negation of form.”

...When the scripture says "mind alone exists; form does not," this is taught to deny the importance of form and so forth, not to negate their very existence....

(88) If he intended to deny the existence of objective reality wen he said that [the world] is mind alone, then why would the mahatma declare, in the same text, that mind is produced from delusion (moha) and volitional action (karman)?

What sensible person would look at a passage from this same [Dasabhumikasutra] and imagine that consciousness exists as an independent thing (vastutah)? A notion like this is nothing more than dogmatic opinion. It follows that the expression "mind only" serves only to clarify that mind is the most significant element [in experience] This text should not be understood to assert that there is no objective form (rupa).

(90a-b) Even though objective form does indeed exist, it is not, like mind, an agent


This means that objective form is inert.


(90c-d) Therefore, denying any other agent besides mind is not the same as negating objective form altogether.


Some people take (the Samkhya) idea of "matter" (pradhana) and such things as agent, others believe it is mind, but everyone agrees that objective form is not an agent. To prevent pradhana and so forth from being taken as agent, it is explained that they do not have any such characteristic. Seeing that it has the capacity to serve as agent, one declares that mind alone is the agent, and in doing so one gains the high ground in any debate concerning the agency of pradhana and so forth. It is as if two kings desire power in a single land, and one of the two rivals is expelled while the other assumes control of the country. No matter who wins, the citizens are indispensable and would suffer no harm. So it is here, because objective form is indispensable to both, it suffers no loss. One can certainly maintain that objective form exists. Therefore, continuing in the same manner, the text declares:


(91) Within the context of everyday affairs, all five psychophysical constituents taken for granted in the world do exist. However, none of the five appears to a yogi who pursues illuminating knowledge of reality.


Therefore, seeing as this is so,


(92a-b) If form does not exist, then do not cling to the existence of mind; and if mind exists, then do not cling to the nonexistence of form.


When, for some reason, one does not admit the existence of form, then the existence of both is equally unreasonable and one must admit the nonexistence of mind, as well. And when one admits the existence of mind, then it is necessary to admit the existence of form, for both are conventionally real.

"O Subhuti, objective form is empty of inherent existence." The same is said concerning the others, including consciousness. This is established both in scripture and through recourse to reason.


(93a-b) You destroy the relationship of the two truths, and even then your "real thing" (vastu) [i.e. mind] is not established, because it has been refuted.


In arguing that consciousness alone exists, without objective form, you destroy the relationship between conventional and ultimate truth as it has been explained. And even when you have destroyed this relationship between the two truths, your absolute reality will not be established. Why not? Once the reality [of form] is denied, your efforts [to establish consciousness] are pointless.

(93c-d) It would be better to hold, in conformity with this relationship, that in reality nothing arises; the arising of things is merely conventional.

(94a-b) Where a scripture declares that there is no external object and that mind (citta) alone appears as various things,


This scripture requires interpretation:


(94c-d) the refutation of form is provisional, directed specifically at those who are overly attached to it.


The meaning of such a text is strictly provisional. There are those who have lost themselves in clinging or anger or pride that is rooted in an extreme attachment to form; such people commit grievous errors and fail to cultivate merit or understanding. It is for these people, who are clinging, that the Blessed One taught "mind alone" even though it is not actually so. He did this in order to destroy the afflictions that are rooted in material form.
But how do you know this scripture is provisional, and not definitive?
Through both textual evidence and reason. The master has said precisely this:

(95a-b) The master has said that this [scripture] is of strictly provisional meaning; reason [as well] dictates it is of provisional meaning.

Not only is this scripture of provisional meaning, but also

(95c-d) This text makes it clear that other scriptures of this type are of provisional meaning.

And if one inquires which scriptures are of “of this type,” there is the following passage from the Sandhinirmocanasutra, explaining the “three natures”-the imaginary, the dependent, and the perfected:

The imaginary is nonexistent, only what is dependent exists.

(96) The Buddhas teach that the subject, or knower (jnatr), may easily be dispensed with once the object of knowledge, or the known (jneya), is no longer present. For this reason they begin by refuting the object of knowledge, for, when it is no longer present, refutation of the subject is already accomplished.
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
bpallister
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Re: A touchstone for Classical Theravadins

Post by bpallister »

SDC wrote: Tue Jun 15, 2021 7:23 pm
zan wrote: Tue Jun 15, 2021 6:01 pm So, it becomes quite clear that the idea that the suttas teach that nothing exists or that all is imaginary is entirely false.
Of course it’s false.

how does one come to the conclusion that nothing exist or that all is imaginary after reading the suttas?
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Ceisiwr
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Re: A touchstone for Classical Theravadins

Post by Ceisiwr »

bpallister wrote: Fri Aug 27, 2021 1:37 am
SDC wrote: Tue Jun 15, 2021 7:23 pm
zan wrote: Tue Jun 15, 2021 6:01 pm So, it becomes quite clear that the idea that the suttas teach that nothing exists or that all is imaginary is entirely false.
Of course it’s false.

how does one come to the conclusion that nothing exist or that all is imaginary after reading the suttas?
I don’t believe you can. I don’t think any Buddhist tradition even teaches this. Yogāacara teaches there is something but it’s beyond words and conceptual thought, whilst Madhyamaka doesn’t come down on the side of either existence or non-existence, these two traditions being the main ones the OP has in mind. The OP doesn’t seem to know what it is he is criticising. So far it looks like a massive :strawman:
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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SDC
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Re: A touchstone for Classical Theravadins

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bpallister wrote: Fri Aug 27, 2021 1:37 am
SDC wrote: Tue Jun 15, 2021 7:23 pm
zan wrote: Tue Jun 15, 2021 6:01 pm So, it becomes quite clear that the idea that the suttas teach that nothing exists or that all is imaginary is entirely false.
Of course it’s false.

how does one come to the conclusion that nothing exist or that all is imaginary after reading the suttas?
People usually come to the conclusion that nothing exists based on secondary writings. The suttas don’t support it imo
“Life is swept along, short is the life span; no shelters exist for one who has reached old age. Seeing clearly this danger in death, a seeker of peace should drop the world’s bait.” SN 1.3
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