And it quite literally goes on and on like this…Points of Controversy
1.1 Of the Existence of a Personal Entity
Honour to the Exalted One Arahant Buddha Supreme
Controverted Point: That the “person” is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.
The Eight Refutations
The First Refutation
The Fivefold Affirmative Presentation
Theravādin: Is “the person” known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?
Puggalavādin: Yes.
Theravādin: Is the person known in the same way as a real and ultimate fact is known?
Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Theravādin: Acknowledge your refutation:
If the person be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should also say, the person is known in the same way as any other real and ultimate fact is known.
That which you say here is wrong, namely, (1) that we ought to say, “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”, but (2) we ought not to say, the person is known in the same way as any other real and ultimate fact is known.
If the latter statement (2) cannot be admitted, then indeed the former statement (1) should not be admitted.
In affirming the former statement (1), while
denying the latter (2), you are wrong.
The Fourfold Rejoinder
Puggalavādin: Is the “person” not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?
Theravādin: No, it is not known.
Puggalavādin: Is it unknown in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is known?
Theravādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Puggalavādin: Acknowledge the rejoinder: (1) If the person be not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should also say: not known in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is known. (2) That which you say here is wrong, namely, that (1) we ought to say “the person is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”, and (2) we ought not to say: “not known in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is known”.
If the latter statement (2) cannot be admitted, then indeed the former statement (1) should not be admitted either.
In affirming (2), while denying (1), you are wrong.
The Fourfold Refutation
Puggalavādin (continues): But if you imagine we ought to affirm that (1) the person is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, but we ought not also to affirm that (2) the “person” is not known in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is known, then you, who have actually assented to the very proposition contained in that negative question, must certainly be refuted in the following manner: let us then refute you, for you are well refuted!
If (1) the “person” is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should have said as well that (2) the “person” is not known in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is known.
What you affirm is false, namely, that the former statement (1) should be affirmed, but that the latter (2) should not be affirmed.
If the latter statement (2) is not to be affirmed, then neither truly can the former (1) be affirmed.
That which you say here—(1) should be affirmed, but not (2); this statement of yours is wrong.
The Fourfold Application
Puggalavādin (continues): If this be a faulty refutation, look at the parallel procedure in your own argument (PTS CS 1.1.1). Thus, according to us (1) was true (the person is known, etc.); but (2) was not true (… known in the same way, etc.). Now we, who admitted these propositions, do not consider ourselves to have been refuted. You say you have refuted us; anyway we are not well refuted. Your argument ran that if we affirmed (1), we must also affirm (2); that if we did not admit the truth of (2), neither could we admit the truth of (1); that we were wrong in assenting to (1), while denying (2).
The Fourfold Conclusion
Puggalavādin (continues): Nay (I repeat), we are not to be refuted thus,
namely, that my proposition compels me to assent to your “known in the same way”, etc.;
your pronouncement that my proposition (1) coupled with my rejection (2) is wrong;
that if I reject (2), I must also reject (1);
that I must affirm both or none.
This refutation of yours is badly done. I maintain, on the other hand, that my rejoinder was well done, and that my sequel to the argument was well done.
The Second Refutation
The Fivefold Adverse Controversy
Puggalavādin: Is the person not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?
Theravādin: No, it is not known …continue as in PTS CS 1.1.1, reversing the speakers, and substituting “not known” for “known”.
The Fourfold Rejoinder
Theravādin: Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?
Puggalavādin: Yes …continue as in PTS CS 1.1.2, reversing the speakers, and substituting “known” for “not known”.
The Fourfold Refutation
Theravādin: But if you imagine we ought to affirm that “the person” is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, but that we ought not to affirm as well that the person is known in the same way as any other real and ultimate fact is known, etc.…continue as in PTS CS 1.1.3, reversing the speakers, and substituting “known” for “not known”.
The Fourfold Application
Theravādin (continues): If this be a faulty refutation, look at the parallel procedure in your own argument (PTS CS 1.1.6). Thus, according to us (a) was true (a soul is not known, etc.); but (b) was not true (… not known in the same way, etc.). Now we, who admitted these propositions, do not consider ourselves to have been refuted, etc.
The Fourfold Conclusion.
Theravādin: (continues): Nay, I repeat, we are not to be refuted as you claim to have refuted us … wherefore your refutation was ill done, etc.
The Third Refutation
Theravādin: Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?
Puggalavādin: It is.
Theravādin: Is the person known everywhere in that sense?
Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Theravādin: Acknowledge the refutation: If the person be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you ought to admit that the person is known in that sense everywhere. You are wrong to admit the one proposition (A) and deny the other (C). If (C) is false, (A) is also false.
The Fourth Refutation
Theravādin: Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?
Puggalavādin: It is.
Theravādin: Is the person known always in that sense?
Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said … continue as above, substituting “always” for “everywhere”.
The Fifth Refutation
Theravādin: Is the person known … as in PTS CS 1.1.11 …in everything in the sense of a real and ultimate fact? continue as in PTS CS 1.1.11, substituting “in everything” for “everywhere”.
The Sixth Refutation
Puggalavādin: Is the person not known … otherwise as in PTS CS 1.1.11 … everywhere in that sense? … substituting “not known” for “known”.
The Seventh Refutation
Puggalavādin: Is the person not known … always in that sense? …
The Eighth Refutation
Puggalavādin: Is the person not known … in everything that sense? …
Comparative Inquiry
Comparison with other Realities, simply treated
Theravādin: Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, and is material quality also known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?
Puggalavādin: Yes.
Theravādin: Is material quality one thing and the person another?
Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Theravādin: Acknowledge the refutation: If the person and material quality be each known in the sense of real and ultimate facts, then indeed, good sir, you should also have admitted that they are distinct things. You are wrong to admit the former proposition and not the latter. If the latter cannot be admitted, neither should the former be affirmed. To say that the person and material quality are both known in the sense of real and ultimate facts, but that they are not mutually distinct things, is false.
The same form of controversy is then pursued concerning fifty-five other real and ultimate facts, or aspects of them, namely:
feeling
perception & & the other aggregates
coefficients (sankhāras)
consciousness
the organ of sight
the organ of hearing
the organ of smell
the organ of taste
the organ of touch
visible object
sound
odour
taste
tangible object
mind (sensus communis)
cognizable object
eye as subjective element
ear, nose, tongue, body as subjective element
sights, sounds, odours, tastes, touches as objective element
visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile cognition as subjective element
mind as subjective element
mind-cognizing as subjective element
cognizables as objective element
the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind as controlling power
female sex, male sex, life as controlling power
pleasure, pain, joy, grief, hedonic indifference as controlling power
the controlling powers: faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding
the controlling powers known as (i.) the thought, “I shall come to know the unknown”, (ii.) the coming to know, (iii.) the having known
Puggalavādin: Is the person not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?
Theravādin: It is not.
Puggalavādin: Did the Exalted One say: “There is the person who works for his own good”? And is material quality known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?
Theravādin: Yes.
Puggalavādin: Is material quality one thing and the person another?
Theravādin: Nay, that cannot be truly said.
Puggalavādin: Acknowledge this rejoinder: If the Exalted One said: “There is the person who works for his own good”, and if material quality be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should also have admitted that material quality and the person are two distinct things. You are wrong in admitting the truth of the former statement while you deny that of the latter. If material quality and person are not two distinct facts, then neither can you also say that the Exalted One predicated anything concerning a “person”. Your position is false.
The controversy is now repeated with the successive substitution of each of the real and ultimate facts named in PTS CS 1.1.18–PTS CS 1.1.73 for “material quality”.
Comparison with other Realities continued by Way of Analogy
Theravādin: Material quality is (you have admitted) known as a real and ultimate fact. Feeling, too, is known as such. Now, is material quality one thing and feeling another?
Puggalavādin: Yes.
Theravādin: Is the person known also in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, as material quality is known?
Puggalavādin: Yes.
Theravādin: Then, is material quality one thing, person another thing?
Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.
Theravādin: Acknowledge the refutation: If material quality and feeling are both known as real and ultimate facts, and yet are two different things, then analogously, if the person and material quality are both known as real and ultimate facts, they, good sir, can equally be two different things. Your position in admitting the first pair of propositions, but not the second pair, is false. If you cannot admit the second pair, neither should you have admitted the first pair. Your position is false.
The same argument is then applied to the case of each of the other three khandhas, substituted for feeling.
The permutations of the five aggregates (khandhas) are proceeded with as in PTS CS 1.1.130, thus:
Material quality and feeling
the person and material quality
are replaced by:
feeling and perception
The person and feeling
next by:
feeling and the coefficients
the person and feeling
next by:
feeling and consciousness
the person and feeling
after which perception, coefficients, and consciousness in their turn replace feeling.
Next each of the 12 Āyatanas, the 18 Dhātus, and the 22 Indriyas is used in turn to illustrate the analogy, thus:
organ of sight and organ of hearing
the person and organ of sight
etc. is the first grouping in the Āyatana-analogies, the last grouping in the Indriya-analogies being:
the controlling power of “one who has come to know,” and that of “the coming to know,”
the person and the controlling power of “one who has come to know.”
Puggalavādin: Material quality is known you have admitted in the sense of a real and ultimate fact. Is material quality one thing, feeling another thing?
Theravādin: Yes.
Puggalavādin: Was it said by the Exalted One: “There is the person who works for his own good”? And is material quality known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?
Theravādin: Yes.
Puggalavādin: Well then, is material quality one thing, the person another?
Theravādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Puggalavādin: Acknowledge the rejoinder: If material quality and feeling are known as real, ultimate facts, and are different things, then why are not “the person”—a term used by the Exalted One—and material quality also two different things? Your position is false. You admit the truth of the first pair of propositions, but not that of the analogous second pair. If you deny the truth of the second pair, you should not admit the truth of the analogous first pair.
The discourse may be completed as in PTS CS 1.1.3–PTS CS 1.1.6.
The “wheel” (cakka) of all the other ultimate facts—other khandhas, āyatanas, etc.—now revolves about this quotation, as it revolved in PTS CS 1.1.131–PTS CS 1.1.135.
Comparison by the Fourfold Method
Theravādin: Is “the person” known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?
Puggalavādin: Yes.
Theravādin: (i.) Is material quality the person?
Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Theravādin: Acknowledge the refutation: If the former proposition is true, you should also, good sir, have admitted the latter. If you cannot affirm that material quality is the person, neither should you have admitted that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact. Your position is false.
Theravādin: You admit the former proposition, (ii.) Now, is the person known as being in material quality? (iii.) Is it known as being apart from material quality? (iv.) Is material quality known as being in the person?
Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Theravādin: Acknowledge the refutation: If the person is indeed known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then, good sir, you should also have admitted one of these other three propositions. Your position is false. If you cannot admit any one of those three propositions as to where or how the person is known, then indeed, good sir, you should not assent to the original proposition—that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.
The “wheel” is then turned for all the remaining “real and ultimate facts” in relation to “person”… is feeling the person? … is the person … in feeling? … apart from feeling? … is feeling … in the person? … is the organ of sight the person? … and so on.
Puggalavādin: Is the person not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?
Theravādin: It is not so known.
Puggalavādin: (i.) Is material quality the person?
Theravādin: Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.
Puggalavādin: Acknowledge the rejoinder: If the person is not so known as you state, then you should have admitted that material quality and person are the same. If you cannot admit the latter proposition, neither can you assert the former … .
Puggalavādin: Is the person not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?
Theravādin: It is not so known.
Puggalavādin: (ii.) Is the person known as being in material quality? (iii.) Or as being apart from material quality? (iv.) Or is material quality known as being in the person?
Theravādin: Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.
Puggalavādin: Acknowledge the rejoinder: If the person is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then, good sir, you should admit that it is known in association with material quality as advanced in the other propositions. If one of these cannot be admitted, neither should you have asserted the first proposition.
This and the preceding paragraph may be completed as in PTS CS 1.1.3–PTS CS 1.1.6.
The “wheel” is then turned as indicated in PTS CS 1.1.140–PTS CS 1.1.141.
Associated Characteristics
Theravādin: Is “the person” known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?
Puggalavādin: Yes.
Theravādin: Is “the person” related, or is it absolute? Is “the person” conditioned, or is it unconditioned? Is it eternal? or is it temporal? Has it external features? or is it without any?
Puggalavādin: Nay, these things cannot truly be predicated about it … Continue as in PTS CS 1.1.1: “Acknowledge the refutation”, etc.
Puggalavādin: Is “the person” unknown in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?
Theravādin: It is.
Puggalavādin: Was it said by the Exalted One: “There is the person who works for his own good” …?
Theravādin: Yes.
Puggalavādin: Is the person related, or is it absolute? conditioned or unconditioned? eternal or temporal? with the marks or without them?
Theravādin: Nay, these things cannot truly be predicated about it.
Puggalavādin: Acknowledge, etc.… complete as in PTS CS 1.1.2 and in PTS CS 1.1.3–PTS CS 1.1.6.
To clear the Meaning of the Terms
Theravādin: Is “the person” known, and conversely, is that which is known the person?
Puggalavādin: The person is known. Conversely, of that which is known some is “person”, some is not “person”.
Theravādin: Do you admit this with respect to the subject also: of that which is person, is some known and some not known?
Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said. continue as before.
Theravādin: Does “person” mean a reality and conversely?
Puggalavādin: “Person” is a reality. Conversely, reality means in part person, in part not person.
Theravādin: Do you admit this with respect to the subject also: that “person means in part reality, in part non-reality”?
Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Theravādin: Does the person exist, and conversely?
Puggalavādin: The person exists. Conversely, of the existent some is person, some is not person.
Theravādin: Of the person is some existent, some non-existent?
Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Query repeated with an equivalent major term.
Theravādin: Is person something that is, and conversely?
Reply similar to the foregoing.
Theravādin: Does the person exist, and conversely, is that which exists not all person?
Puggalavādin: Yes.
Theravādin: Can you substitute “not exist(s)” for “exist(s)”?
Puggalavādin: No …
Inquiry into Term-or-Concept
Theravādin: Is one who has material quality in the sphere of matter a “person”?
Puggalavādin: Yes.
Theravādin: Is one who experiences desires of sense in the sphere of sense-desire “a person”?
Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Theravādin: Are those who have material qualities in the sphere of matter “persons”?
Puggalavādin: Yes.
Theravādin: Are those who experience desires of sense in the sphere of sense-desire “persons”?
Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Theravādin: Is one who is without material qualities in the sphere of the Immaterial a “person”?
Puggalavādin: Yes.
Theravādin: Is one who experiences desires of sense in the sphere of sense-desire a person?
Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Theravādin: Are those who have no material qualities in the Immaterial sphere “persons”?
Puggalavādin: Yes.
Theravādin: Are those who experience sense-desires in the sphere of of sense-desire “persons”?
Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.
Theravādin: According to you one who has material qualities in the sphere of matter is a “person”; one who has no material qualities in the Immaterial sphere is a “person”: does anyone deceasing from the Rūpa sphere get reborn in the Immaterial sphere?
Puggalavādin: Yes.
Theravādin: Is the “person” who had material qualities then annihilated, and does the person with no material qualities come into being?
Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.
Queries repeated, substituting “being” for “person”.
Theravādin: Applying the terms “physical frame” and “body” indiscriminately to our body, are these identical, one in meaning, the same, the same in denotation, the same in origin?
Puggalavādin: Yes.
Theravādin: Are the terms “personal entity”, or “soul”, as applied without distinction to the individual, identical, one in meaning, the same, the same in denotation, the same in origin?
Puggalavādin: Yes.
Theravādin: Is “physical frame” different from “personal entity” (or “individual”)?
Puggalavādin: Yes.
Theravādin: Is “soul” one thing, “body” another?
Puggalavādin: Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Theravādin: Acknowledge the refutation: If there be this identity and coincidence between “physical frame” and “body”; and if there be this identity and coincidence between “individual” (or personal entity) and “soul”; if, further, “physical frame” is different from “individual” (or personal entity), then indeed, good sir, it should also have been admitted that “soul” is different from “body”.
You are wrong in
admitting the identity between “physical frame” and “body”,
admitting the identity between “personal entity” and “soul”,
admitting the difference between “physical frame” and “personal entity”, while
you deny the difference between “body” and “soul”.
If you cannot admit (4), neither should you have admitted (1), (2), (3). You cannot admit (1), (2), (3), while denying (4).
Puggalavādin: Are the terms “physical frame” and “body” applied to body without distinction of meaning, identical, one in meaning, the same, the same in denotation, the same in origin?
Theravādin: Yes.
Puggalavādin: Was it said by the Exalted One: “There is the individual or person who works for his own good”?
Theravādin: Yes.
https://suttacentral.net/kv1.1/en/aung-rhysdavids
Read the whole thing! I dare you!
Then consider SN 44.10 - words ACTUALLY spoken by the Buddha. Note the slight difference in delivery.
SN 44.10Then the wanderer Vacchagotta went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, exchanged courteous greetings with him. After an exchange of friendly greetings & courtesies, he sat to one side. As he was sitting there he asked the Blessed One: "Now then, Venerable Gotama, is there a self?"
When this was said, the Blessed One was silent.
"Then is there no self?"
A second time, the Blessed One was silent.
Then Vacchagotta the wanderer got up from his seat and left.
Then, not long after Vacchagotta the wanderer had left, Ven. Ananda said to the Blessed One, "Why, lord, did the Blessed One not answer when asked a question by Vacchagotta the wanderer?"
"Ananda, if I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is a self — were to answer that there is a self, that would be conforming with those brahmans & contemplatives who are exponents of eternalism [the view that there is an eternal, unchanging soul]. If I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self — were to answer that there is no self, that would be conforming with those brahmans & contemplatives who are exponents of annihilationism [the view that death is the annihilation of consciousness]. If I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is a self — were to answer that there is a self, would that be in keeping with the arising of knowledge that all phenomena are not-self?"
"No, lord."
"And if I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self — were to answer that there is no self, the bewildered Vacchagotta would become even more bewildered: 'Does the self I used to have now not exist?'"
Vacchagotta of course was referred to the Kathavatthu argument and all his concerns were addressed in this unbelievably long, and boring, and shabby, trivial piece of amateur writing.