Yes, imagining a self. This is how the Buddha used the word, contrary to what Ven. Ñāṇananda taught.waryoffolly wrote: ↑Sun Jul 25, 2021 8:45 pm
But MN 1 clearly states to not 'mannati' about nibbana (https://suttacentral.net/mn1/en/bodhi). From what I can tell you limit 'mannati' to 'conceive as self' although the word seems to generally mean 'to think' or 'to imagine'.
‘Asmī’ti, bhikkhave, maññitametaṁ, ‘ayamahamasmī’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘na bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘rūpī bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘arūpī bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘saññī bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘asaññī bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘nevasaññīnāsaññī bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ.
“Bhikkhus, ‘I am’ is a conceiving; ‘I am this’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall not be’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall consist of form’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be formless’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be percipient’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be nonpercipient’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be neither percipient nor nonpercipient’ is a conceiving. Conceiving is a disease, conceiving is a tumour, conceiving is a dart. Therefore, bhikkhus, you should train yourselves thus: ‘We will dwell with a mind devoid of conceiving.’ - SN 35.248
If someone wants to talk about "casting off nibbāna" in terms of not clinging to it then I don't see much of an issue, but the OP seemed to have a different idea in mind.Regardless, using your interpretation wouldn't not conceiving of nibbana as me/mine/self in any way shape or form be effectively equivalent to letting go of even the idea of (owning) nibbana? For all practical purposes that is 'casting off' even nibbana, at the very least in the sense of complete non-clinging to the idea of nibbana.
No one here is a Vaibhāṣika as far as I'm aware so no one is arguing for substantial existence, which would be speculative. Taking nibbāna to be real and true is a different thing. That position is not a speculative view. The Buddha criticised a certain type of thinking and so certain views, rather than him being critical of having a position on anything at all. Since he claimed knowledge he would have committed himself to thinking in terms of true/false, real/unreal, existing and not-existing. Stop buying into the concept of self and you can still say if something is real or not, true or not, exists or not. There isn't a connection that I can see in the Buddha's teachings between those positions and adhering to a sense of self, and so naturally emptiness does not then mean empty of knowledge, of truth or of general non-atta notions of existence or non-existence.And moreover not conceiving of nibbana as self in any sense naturally leads to the cessation of concerns about whether or not nibbana 'substantially exists or substantially doesn't exist'-the self view is the root cause of other speculative viewpoints: https://suttacentral.net/sn44.7/en/bodhi)
- SN 22.94"At Savatthi. “Bhikkhus, I do not dispute with the world; rather, it is the world that disputes with me. A proponent of the Dhamma does not dispute with anyone in the world. Of that which the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, I too say that it does not exist. And of that which the wise in the world agree upon as existing, I too say that it exists.
“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, of which I too say that it does not exist? Form that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, and I too say that it does not exist. Feeling … Perception … Volitional formations … Consciousness that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, and I too say that it does not exist.
“That, bhikkhus, is what the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, of which I too say that it does not exist.
“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists? Form that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists. Feeling … Perception … Volitional formations … Consciousness that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists."
There is however a connection between having a sense of self and having views about the existence or non-existence of that self.
It is the Northern Masters, the Vaibhāṣikas, who taught that the sabhāva-dhammas are substantially existent (dravyasat), not the Theras of Theravāda. Theravāda doesn't subscribe to substance metaphysics, and so nibbāna is not an eternal substance. It exists, is real and so is true. The 1 unconditioned dhamma is not the same thing as the Arahant, and so by saying that nibbāna exists, is real and true I in no way commit myself to saying the Arahant exists, is real and is true. The Arahant is a concept. Nibbāna is not. The consciousness of the Arahant cognises Nibbāna. At the end of life consciousness and all of the other aggregates cease without remainder, but nibbāna persists as it always has (not that time applies).How do you avoid eternalism with the above? If nibbana is a substantially existent external dhamma cognized by mental vinnana then doesn't that naturally lead to a description of the post-mortem arahant as eternally being conscious of said substantially existent external dhamma?
“Bhikkhus, there are these three characteristics that define the conditioned. What three? An arising is seen, a vanishing is seen, and its alteration while it persists is seen. These are the three characteristics that define the conditioned.
“Bhikkhus, there are these three characteristics that define the unconditioned. What three? No arising is seen, no vanishing is seen, and no alteration while it persists is seen. These are the three characteristics that define the unconditioned.” - AN 3.47
Yes, because they start from a faulty premise.Yet the suttas instruct us not to assume any of positions in the tetralemma applied to the post mortem status of the arahant since they are a 'thicket of views': https://suttacentral.net/mn72/en/thanissaro .
I'm not sure how that logic works? Regarding the All, which is the epistemological confines of what can be known, if nibbāna were not within the All then it would be outside of the All. This would mean it is totally unknowable, which begs the question then of how anyone knows about it at all? If nibbāna is not cognised at the mind base then how does anyone know about it?To smuggle nibbana into 'the all' would be to limit and measure the arahant by a fixed perceptual basis, but no such criteria exists: https://suttacentral.net/sn44.11/en/bodhi .
That sutta discusses conceptual proliferation again, and so I read this as Venerable Mahākoṭṭhita reading a self into the whole thing. Once again, starting from a questionable premise.The answer an arahant gives to 'Does something remain with the cessation of the six sense spheres?' isn't 'Nibbana', but instead 'don't say that something remains': https://suttacentral.net/an4.173/en/thanissaro . (And this also applies to the question 'does nothing remain?')
The position of the Mahavihāravāsins and of the Vaibhāṣikas was that nibbāna was not mere cessation, since this would mean it was nothing. If it is nothing then no one can know anything about it and it can't be the condition for anything, since it is nothing at all. There would then be no Buddhas or Arahants to speak of. This is possibly why they defined nibbāna as unbindingTo be honest, I sometimes wonder if leaving nibbana untranslated was a good idea. Translating nibbana as 'quenching' or 'going out' (of greed, hate, delusion, or of all unskillful states) would've made it far less mysterious.
Visuddhimagga - CHAPTER VIII Other Recollections as Meditation Subjects247. Herein fading away is not mere absence of greed, but rather it is that unformed dhamma which, while given the names “disillusionment of vanity,” etc., in the clause, “that is to say, the disillusionment of vanity, … Nibbána,” is treated basically as fading away.71 It is called disillusionment of vanity because on coming to it all kinds of vanity (intoxication), such as the vanity of conceit, and vanity of manhood, are disillusioned, undone, done away with.72 And it is called elimination of thirst because on coming to it all thirst for sense desires is eliminated and quenched. But it is called abolition of reliance because on coming to its reliance on the five cords of sense desire is abolished. It is called termination of the round because on coming to it the round of the three planes [of existence] is terminated. It is called destruction of craving because on coming to it craving is entirely destroyed, fades away and ceases. It is called Nibbána (extinction) because it has gone away from (nikkhanta), has escaped from (nissaþa), is dissociated from craving, which has acquired in common usage the name “fastening” (vána) because, by ensuring successive becoming, craving serves as a joining together, a binding together, a lacing together, of the four kinds of generation, five destinies, even stations of consciousness and nine abodes of beings
Of course modern academia takes a different view. In comparison, the Sautrāntikas defined nibbāna as being simply cessation, and so taught that it was indeed nothingness. It wasn't real. It was merely a concept.