Classical Theravada, the Realist Buddhism

A discussion on all aspects of Theravāda Buddhism
User avatar
Ceisiwr
Posts: 22410
Joined: Sun Jan 11, 2009 2:36 am
Location: Wales

Re: Classical Theravada, the Realist Buddhism

Post by Ceisiwr »

waryoffolly wrote: Sun Jul 25, 2021 8:45 pm
But MN 1 clearly states to not 'mannati' about nibbana (https://suttacentral.net/mn1/en/bodhi). From what I can tell you limit 'mannati' to 'conceive as self' although the word seems to generally mean 'to think' or 'to imagine'.
Yes, imagining a self. This is how the Buddha used the word, contrary to what Ven. Ñāṇananda taught.

‘Asmī’ti, bhikkhave, maññitametaṁ, ‘ayamahamasmī’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘na bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘rūpī bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘arūpī bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘saññī bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘asaññī bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘nevasaññīnāsaññī bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ.

“Bhikkhus, ‘I am’ is a conceiving; ‘I am this’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall not be’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall consist of form’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be formless’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be percipient’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be nonpercipient’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be neither percipient nor nonpercipient’ is a conceiving. Conceiving is a disease, conceiving is a tumour, conceiving is a dart. Therefore, bhikkhus, you should train yourselves thus: ‘We will dwell with a mind devoid of conceiving.’
- SN 35.248
Regardless, using your interpretation wouldn't not conceiving of nibbana as me/mine/self in any way shape or form be effectively equivalent to letting go of even the idea of (owning) nibbana? For all practical purposes that is 'casting off' even nibbana, at the very least in the sense of complete non-clinging to the idea of nibbana.
If someone wants to talk about "casting off nibbāna" in terms of not clinging to it then I don't see much of an issue, but the OP seemed to have a different idea in mind.
And moreover not conceiving of nibbana as self in any sense naturally leads to the cessation of concerns about whether or not nibbana 'substantially exists or substantially doesn't exist'-the self view is the root cause of other speculative viewpoints: https://suttacentral.net/sn44.7/en/bodhi)
No one here is a Vaibhāṣika as far as I'm aware so no one is arguing for substantial existence, which would be speculative. Taking nibbāna to be real and true is a different thing. That position is not a speculative view. The Buddha criticised a certain type of thinking and so certain views, rather than him being critical of having a position on anything at all. Since he claimed knowledge he would have committed himself to thinking in terms of true/false, real/unreal, existing and not-existing. Stop buying into the concept of self and you can still say if something is real or not, true or not, exists or not. There isn't a connection that I can see in the Buddha's teachings between those positions and adhering to a sense of self, and so naturally emptiness does not then mean empty of knowledge, of truth or of general non-atta notions of existence or non-existence.
"At Savatthi. “Bhikkhus, I do not dispute with the world; rather, it is the world that disputes with me. A proponent of the Dhamma does not dispute with anyone in the world. Of that which the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, I too say that it does not exist. And of that which the wise in the world agree upon as existing, I too say that it exists.

“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, of which I too say that it does not exist? Form that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, and I too say that it does not exist. Feeling … Perception … Volitional formations … Consciousness that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, and I too say that it does not exist.

“That, bhikkhus, is what the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, of which I too say that it does not exist.

“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists? Form that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists. Feeling … Perception … Volitional formations … Consciousness that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists."
- SN 22.94

There is however a connection between having a sense of self and having views about the existence or non-existence of that self.
How do you avoid eternalism with the above? If nibbana is a substantially existent external dhamma cognized by mental vinnana then doesn't that naturally lead to a description of the post-mortem arahant as eternally being conscious of said substantially existent external dhamma?
It is the Northern Masters, the Vaibhāṣikas, who taught that the sabhāva-dhammas are substantially existent (dravyasat), not the Theras of Theravāda. Theravāda doesn't subscribe to substance metaphysics, and so nibbāna is not an eternal substance. It exists, is real and so is true. The 1 unconditioned dhamma is not the same thing as the Arahant, and so by saying that nibbāna exists, is real and true I in no way commit myself to saying the Arahant exists, is real and is true. The Arahant is a concept. Nibbāna is not. The consciousness of the Arahant cognises Nibbāna. At the end of life consciousness and all of the other aggregates cease without remainder, but nibbāna persists as it always has (not that time applies).

“Bhikkhus, there are these three characteristics that define the conditioned. What three? An arising is seen, a vanishing is seen, and its alteration while it persists is seen. These are the three characteristics that define the conditioned.

“Bhikkhus, there are these three characteristics that define the unconditioned. What three? No arising is seen, no vanishing is seen, and no alteration while it persists is seen. These are the three characteristics that define the unconditioned.”
- AN 3.47
Yet the suttas instruct us not to assume any of positions in the tetralemma applied to the post mortem status of the arahant since they are a 'thicket of views': https://suttacentral.net/mn72/en/thanissaro .
Yes, because they start from a faulty premise.
To smuggle nibbana into 'the all' would be to limit and measure the arahant by a fixed perceptual basis, but no such criteria exists: https://suttacentral.net/sn44.11/en/bodhi .
I'm not sure how that logic works? Regarding the All, which is the epistemological confines of what can be known, if nibbāna were not within the All then it would be outside of the All. This would mean it is totally unknowable, which begs the question then of how anyone knows about it at all? If nibbāna is not cognised at the mind base then how does anyone know about it?
The answer an arahant gives to 'Does something remain with the cessation of the six sense spheres?' isn't 'Nibbana', but instead 'don't say that something remains': https://suttacentral.net/an4.173/en/thanissaro . (And this also applies to the question 'does nothing remain?')
That sutta discusses conceptual proliferation again, and so I read this as Venerable Mahākoṭṭhita reading a self into the whole thing. Once again, starting from a questionable premise.
To be honest, I sometimes wonder if leaving nibbana untranslated was a good idea. Translating nibbana as 'quenching' or 'going out' (of greed, hate, delusion, or of all unskillful states) would've made it far less mysterious.
The position of the Mahavihāravāsins and of the Vaibhāṣikas was that nibbāna was not mere cessation, since this would mean it was nothing. If it is nothing then no one can know anything about it and it can't be the condition for anything, since it is nothing at all. There would then be no Buddhas or Arahants to speak of. This is possibly why they defined nibbāna as unbinding
247. Herein fading away is not mere absence of greed, but rather it is that unformed dhamma which, while given the names “disillusionment of vanity,” etc., in the clause, “that is to say, the disillusionment of vanity, … Nibbána,” is treated basically as fading away.71 It is called disillusionment of vanity because on coming to it all kinds of vanity (intoxication), such as the vanity of conceit, and vanity of manhood, are disillusioned, undone, done away with.72 And it is called elimination of thirst because on coming to it all thirst for sense desires is eliminated and quenched. But it is called abolition of reliance because on coming to its reliance on the five cords of sense desire is abolished. It is called termination of the round because on coming to it the round of the three planes [of existence] is terminated. It is called destruction of craving because on coming to it craving is entirely destroyed, fades away and ceases. It is called Nibbána (extinction) because it has gone away from (nikkhanta), has escaped from (nissaþa), is dissociated from craving, which has acquired in common usage the name “fastening” (vána) because, by ensuring successive becoming, craving serves as a joining together, a binding together, a lacing together, of the four kinds of generation, five destinies, even stations of consciousness and nine abodes of beings
Visuddhimagga - CHAPTER VIII Other Recollections as Meditation Subjects

Of course modern academia takes a different view. In comparison, the Sautrāntikas defined nibbāna as being simply cessation, and so taught that it was indeed nothingness. It wasn't real. It was merely a concept.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
waryoffolly
Posts: 346
Joined: Fri Oct 04, 2013 8:30 pm

Re: Classical Theravada, the Realist Buddhism

Post by waryoffolly »

Ok Ceisiwr, I thought you held a different view then you actually do in my previous post, so some of what I said isn't relevant probably.
Ceisiwr wrote: Sun Jul 25, 2021 9:49 pm Yes, imagining a self. This is how the Buddha used the word, contrary to what Ven. Ñāṇananda taught.

‘Asmī’ti, bhikkhave, maññitametaṁ, ‘ayamahamasmī’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘na bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘rūpī bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘arūpī bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘saññī bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘asaññī bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘nevasaññīnāsaññī bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ.

“Bhikkhus, ‘I am’ is a conceiving; ‘I am this’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall not be’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall consist of form’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be formless’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be percipient’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be nonpercipient’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be neither percipient nor nonpercipient’ is a conceiving. Conceiving is a disease, conceiving is a tumour, conceiving is a dart. Therefore, bhikkhus, you should train yourselves thus: ‘We will dwell with a mind devoid of conceiving.’
- SN 35.248
This single sutta establishes that self-view is a type of conceiving, but it does not establish that mannati is limited to only meaning conceiving of a self. There are many other suttas that uses this word, and there are many contexts where mannati clearly means 'thinks' or 'imagines' in general, for example the first result here and others: https://www.digitalpalireader.online/_d ... 1&rx=false
English translation of the first result: https://suttacentral.net/dn18/en/sujato (ctrl+f for mannati). Here mannati just means 'thinks'. If you look through more of the results I think you'll agree that limiting it to just self-conceiving is incorrect. Although, for practical purposes I don't really care about this point since the root issue is imagining self/belonging to self. All the other types of conceivings and imaginings depend on that, which I'd guess is why it's focused on in this sutta.
Regardless, using your interpretation wouldn't not conceiving of nibbana as me/mine/self in any way shape or form be effectively equivalent to letting go of even the idea of (owning) nibbana? For all practical purposes that is 'casting off' even nibbana, at the very least in the sense of complete non-clinging to the idea of nibbana.
If someone wants to talk about "casting off nibbāna" in terms of not clinging to it then I don't see much of an issue.
That's a good middle ground between us, and from a practical perspective I think it's all that is needed.
No one here is a Vaibhāṣika as far as I'm aware so no one is arguing for substantial existence, which would be speculative. Taking nibbāna to be real and true is a different thing. That position is not a speculative view.
Real and true in the sense that the cessation of greed, hate, and delusion can be directly known for oneself in the here and now. But I think stating that the existence of nibbana is separate from the experience of an individual veers into speculative views.
The Buddha criticised a certain type of thinking and so certain views, rather than him being critical of having a position on anything at all. Since he claimed knowledge he would have committed himself to thinking in terms of true/false, real/unreal, existing and not-existing. Stop buying into the concept of self and you can still say if something is real or not, true or not, exists or not. There isn't a connection that I can see in the Buddha's teachings between those positions and adhering to a sense of self, and so naturally emptiness does not then mean empty of knowledge, of truth or of general non-atta notions of existence or non-existence.
I agree that notions of truth, real/unreal, existing/non-existing are useful conventional designations, but I don't think we have to go beyond that and state that they have some sort of objective referents separate from the experience of individuals. All these are tools and praxis in my view, just 'ideas' that depend on contact.
"At Savatthi. “Bhikkhus, I do not dispute with the world; rather, it is the world that disputes with me. A proponent of the Dhamma does not dispute with anyone in the world. Of that which the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, I too say that it does not exist. And of that which the wise in the world agree upon as existing, I too say that it exists.

“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, of which I too say that it does not exist? Form that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, and I too say that it does not exist. Feeling … Perception … Volitional formations … Consciousness that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, and I too say that it does not exist.

“That, bhikkhus, is what the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, of which I too say that it does not exist.

“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists? Form that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists. Feeling … Perception … Volitional formations … Consciousness that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists."
That's a good quote, thanks. I think we have to be careful here. I looks like the Buddha here is agreeing that the experience of impermanent phenomena exists. Again, that's not the same as saying apart from the experience of a specific individual these phenomena are present, to say that they exist separate from the experience of them is to assert something beyond 'the all' in my view. (And that's not the same as saying they don't exist either! Just that statements about 'thing behind experience' are beyond 'the all'). I'm not actually sure if we even disagree here though.
How do you avoid eternalism with the above? If nibbana is a substantially existent external dhamma cognized by mental vinnana then doesn't that naturally lead to a description of the post-mortem arahant as eternally being conscious of said substantially existent external dhamma?
It is the Northern Masters, the Vaibhāṣikas, who taught that the sabhāva-dhammas are substantially existent (dravyasat), not the Theras of Theravāda. Theravāda doesn't subscribe to substance metaphysics, and so nibbāna is not an eternal substance. It exists, is real and so is true. The 1 unconditioned dhamma is not the same thing as the Arahant, and so by saying that nibbāna exists, is real and true I in no way commit myself to saying the Arahant exists, is real and is true. The Arahant is a concept. Nibbāna is not. The consciousness of the Arahant cognises Nibbāna. At the end of life consciousness and all of the other aggregates cease without remainder, but nibbāna persists as it always has (not that time applies).
Ok, so what's the difference between substantial existence of the Vaibhāṣikas and saying nibbana 'exists, is real, and so is true' and 'persists as it always has' separate from the experience of an Arahant? How is that different from saying nibbana has substantial existence? Could you explain in general the difference between substantial existence of the Vaibhāṣikas and existence of the Theravāda?
To smuggle nibbana into 'the all' would be to limit and measure the arahant by a fixed perceptual basis, but no such criteria exists: https://suttacentral.net/sn44.11/en/bodhi .
I'm not sure how that logic works? Regarding the All, which is the epistemological confines of what can be known, if nibbāna were not within the All then it would be outside of the All. This would mean it is totally unknowable, which begs the question then of how anyone knows about it at all? If nibbāna is not cognised at the mind base then how does anyone know about it?
Yes I'm not sure how that logic works either :lol: . I'm not sure what I was trying to say in the original quote-I think it was based on a misunderstanding of your views.
The answer an arahant gives to 'Does something remain with the cessation of the six sense spheres?' isn't 'Nibbana', but instead 'don't say that something remains': https://suttacentral.net/an4.173/en/thanissaro . (And this also applies to the question 'does nothing remain?')
That sutta discusses conceptual proliferation again, and so I read this as Venerable Mahākoṭṭhita reading a self into the whole thing. Once again, starting from a questionable premise.
If you limit papancha to just self-views then that does make sense, but I don't.
The position of the Mahavihāravāsins and of the Vaibhāṣikas was that nibbāna was not mere cessation, since this would mean it was nothing. If it is nothing then no one can know anything about it and it can't be the condition for anything, since it is nothing at all. There would then be no Buddhas or Arahants to speak of. This is possibly why they defined nibbāna as unbinding
I don't think saying nibbana is a mere cessation implies it is nothing. A cessation is an event which is directly knowable-something ceases and that ceasing is known (and one can reflect that the things which ceased are gone at a later time as well). Why in your view does nibbana need to be a condition for something? Why would there be no Buddhas or Arahants if nibbana can't condition other things?
Of course modern academia takes a different view. In comparison, the Sautrāntikas defined nibbāna as being simply cessation, and so taught that it was indeed nothingness. It wasn't real. It was merely a concept.
It would be nice to see a source quote that the Sautrāntikas believed nibbana was nothingness. I'm ok with saying nibbana is real as long as it's clear we are referring to the experience of the cessation of greed, hatred, and delusion and not some 'behind experience transcendent thing'.

I'm interested in seeing your replies, although I don't think I'll post further in this topic unless there's a direct question/point you'd like a response for. To much philosophizing about nibbana can rot your brain, better to practice abandoning greed, hate, and delusion as they occur in experience.
zan
Posts: 1402
Joined: Sun Aug 28, 2016 1:57 pm

Re: Classical Theravada, the Realist Buddhism

Post by zan »

The following, adding to what I've written above, of course applies to every single anti realist or idealist interpretation of the suttas. For example, many read suttas like the following to declare the dhamma as anti realist or idealist:
“The monk who hasn't slipped past or turned back,
knowing with regard to the world
that "All this is unreal,"
sloughs off the near shore & far —
as a snake, its decrepit old skin.”

Sn 1.1
Okay. Fine. You're right. You win. The dhamma is anti realist, idealist or whatever other thing you please that is opposed to realism.

Well you've won, but you've also completely lost. You've lost the Buddha, you've lost the suttas, you've even lost the sutta that proved you right, because since you're right, none of those things are real! They're all fake, false, unreal. Thus, there is no such thing as an anti realist or idealist interpretation of the dhamma, because such a thing would negate the dhamma itself, and negate itself as well.

The dhamma is either realist, or doesn't exist at all.

And, no, saying all is unreal BUT nibbana is no help here, and does not circumvent this problem, because you'd still be declaring all the suttas, yourself, the Buddha who (re)discovered nibbana, etc. as fake. If all the teachings and practices and everything else that is supposed to lead us to nibbana is fake, it would be absurd to think these fake things point to anything real, or that they could guide you there.

This logic, of course, applies to everything. If you disprove everything, or almost everything, and especially including disproving all your proof, you've proven nothing.

One may prove that things are different than they seem, and that some things are unreal, or that things are beyond these terms entirely, but proving everything as unreal, etc. is decidedly impossible; by its own nature, it rules itself out entirely.

We may assume that the Buddha understood this, and that his words need be interpreted with this in mind. That, coupled with his unequivocal confirmation that reality does exist in SN 22.94, and his constant reaffirmation of this fact throughout the suttas, even underpinning them and his teachings on everything, means the above sutta, and all suttas that some say declare anti realism, etc. cannot be interpreted as such, for to do so is to make the dhamma blathering nonsense.

I suspect many who cling to the anti realism or idealism, etc. interpretation seek to, perhaps even unconsciously, remake some parts of the dhamma that they are uncomfortable with. Otherwise, why is it so important that everything be imaginary or unreal? And if its all fake, why would you waste your time on it?

Anyway, I have zero hope nor intention of converting any idealists or anti realists. Though that would be nice, I think it's unrealistic, they hold these views because they serve them somehow, not because they truly believe them. This is why I've not engaged any of them.

I've written this as a help to any who are struggling to keep the traditional realist Theravada spirit despite the onslaught of anti realism and idealism and whatever else opposes it. I've also no intention of proving Theravada metaphysics. This is purely to support the broad position of realism within Theravada Buddhism, and not any specific teachings. Just that the Buddha said things exist, he was a realist, and common sense and logic are on his side. Any interpretations of him as an anti realist, idealist, etc. are retroactively applied to him through the lens of the Mahayana sutras written hundreds of years after his death.

The end. At least for now. I hope this has helped at least someone.

Apologies, yet again, for my verbose writing and repetition. These topics run circles around themselves and are really just a few statements being spun in different ways, because that's all the opposing positions are, too, and I try to make each post a complete thought, not necessitating rereading other posts, hence, there's some repeated information.
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
Cause_and_Effect
Posts: 1069
Joined: Fri Jul 23, 2021 7:39 am

Re: Classical Theravada, the Realist Buddhism

Post by Cause_and_Effect »

Am not going to get too much into this debate but I will add that Mahayana schools normally have some basis in the early texts which they have elaborated on with sometimes arguable justification.

The first two verses of the Dhammapada:

"All experience is preceded by mind, led by mind, made by mind. Speak or act with a corrupted mind and suffering follows, as the wagon wheel follows the hoof of the Ox."

"All experience is preceded by mind, led by mind, made by mind. Speak or act with a peaceful mind and happiness follows, like a never departing shadow"

Gil Frondfal translation

"All mental phenomena have mind as their forerunner; they have mind as their chief; they are mind-made. If one speaks or acts with an evil mind, dukkha follows him just as the wheel follows the hoofprint of the ox that draws the cart."

"All mental phenomena have mind as their forerunner; they have mind as their chief; they are mind-made. If one speaks or acts with a pure mind, happiness (sukha) follows him like a shadow that never leaves him."

Daw Mya Tin translation


Manopubbangama dhamma
manosettha manomaya
manasa ce padutthena
bhasati va karoti va
tato nam dukkhamanveti
cakkamva vahato padam.

Manopubbangama dhamma
manosettha manomaya
manasa ce pasannena
bhasati va karoti va
tato nam sukha manveti
chayava anapayini.


I'm not proficient to comment on the Pali itself but from the Gil Fronsdal commentary he states that the Pail canon is unique in using the expression 'all phenomena/dhammas are made by mind'. The equivalent in Dhammapada of the Chinese Canon uses a term that can be translated as 'impelled by mind'.
"Therein monks, that Dimension should be known wherein the eye ceases and the perception of forms fades away...the ear... the nose...the tongue... the body ceases and the perception of touch fades away...

That Dimension should be known wherein mentality ceases and the perception of mind-objects fades away.
That Dimension should be known; that Dimension should be known."


(S. IV. 98) - The Dimension beyond the All
User avatar
Ceisiwr
Posts: 22410
Joined: Sun Jan 11, 2009 2:36 am
Location: Wales

Re: Classical Theravada, the Realist Buddhism

Post by Ceisiwr »

waryoffolly wrote: Sun Jul 25, 2021 11:47 pm
This single sutta establishes that self-view is a type of conceiving, but it does not establish that mannati is limited to only meaning conceiving of a self. There are many other suttas that uses this word, and there are many contexts where mannati clearly means 'thinks' or 'imagines' in general, for example the first result here and others: https://www.digitalpalireader.online/_d ... 1&rx=false
English translation of the first result: https://suttacentral.net/dn18/en/sujato (ctrl+f for mannati). Here mannati just means 'thinks'. If you look through more of the results I think you'll agree that limiting it to just self-conceiving is incorrect. Although, for practical purposes I don't really care about this point since the root issue is imagining self/belonging to self. All the other types of conceivings and imaginings depend on that, which I'd guess is why it's focused on in this sutta.
Maññati does mean "imagine" or "thinks", and in the context of suttas like MN 1 or MN 140 it means imagining or thinking about a self in relation to what has been recognised. Naturally from than then comes even more proliferation in terms of views. The commentary to MN 1 is worth a read: https://www.dhammatalks.net/Books11/Bhi ... stence.pdf

‘Asmī’ti, bhikkhu, maññitametaṁ, ‘ayamahamasmī’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘na bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘rūpī bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘arūpī bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘saññī bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘asaññī bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ, ‘nevasaññīnāsaññī bhavissan’ti maññitametaṁ.
“Bhikkhu, ‘I am’ is a conceiving; ‘I am this’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall not be’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be possessed of form’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be formless’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be percipient’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be non-percipient’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be neither-percipient-nor-non-percipient’ is a conceiving.

Maññitaṁ, bhikkhu, rogo maññitaṁ gaṇḍo maññitaṁ sallaṁ.
Conceiving is a disease, conceiving is a tumour, conceiving is a dart.

Sabbamaññitānaṁ tveva, bhikkhu, samatikkamā muni santoti vuccati.
By overcoming all conceivings, bhikkhu, one is called a sage at peace.
https://suttacentral.net/mn140/en/bodhi
Real and true in the sense that the cessation of greed, hate, and delusion can be directly known for oneself in the here and now. But I think stating that the existence of nibbana is separate from the experience of an individual veers into speculative views.
Is it though? The Buddha spoke of external forms, sounds etc. Was that a speculative view?
I agree that notions of truth, real/unreal, existing/non-existing are useful conventional designations, but I don't think we have to go beyond that and state that they have some sort of objective referents separate from the experience of individuals. All these are tools and praxis in my view, just 'ideas' that depend on contact.
The words are of course concepts but if we take impermanent vedanā the Buddha taught that it exists beyond concept and so is real and true.
That's a good quote, thanks. I think we have to be careful here. I looks like the Buddha here is agreeing that the experience of impermanent phenomena exists. Again, that's not the same as saying apart from the experience of a specific individual these phenomena are present, to say that they exist separate from the experience of them is to assert something beyond 'the all' in my view. (And that's not the same as saying they don't exist either! Just that statements about 'thing behind experience' are beyond 'the all'). I'm not actually sure if we even disagree here though.
I think you might be confused as to what the Abhidhamma position is then. An ultimate reality is an irreducible actuality of experience, rather than being a "thing". Actualities which are born from their unique conditions (accept nibbāna, of course). Only these can be said to be real and true since they are directly experienced, and so they are all that can be directly known to be certain and true before reality is distorted by craving, notions a self, concepts and views. A specific form of epistemology is always lurking in the background with the Buddha's Dhamma. With that said, certain actualities are external. The Buddha never denied that there is an external world. He merely reduced what can be known about it to these actualities. The sabhāva=dhammas. To say something exists external to my experience isn't to posit something beyond the All, since external objects are defined as being part of the All. Coming from an empiricist like the Buddha, this makes sense. So, on this basis the Buddha can still say that certain "things" exist and certain things are false without contradicting himself in regard to his position on "views". What he was criticising there was Rationalism, or forms of questionable reasoning such as appeals to authority (the Vedas) or inductive reasoning (I've experienced so many past lives, therefore the universe is eternal). I don't think the Buddha was a sceptic. I think he was closer to the empiricist tradition.
Ok, so what's the difference between substantial existence of the Vaibhāṣikas and saying nibbana 'exists, is real, and so is true' and 'persists as it always has' separate from the experience of an Arahant? How is that different from saying nibbana has substantial existence? Could you explain in general the difference between substantial existence of the Vaibhāṣikas and existence of the Theravāda?
To say that something is substantially existent is to say that there is a thing called substance. Substance is always permanent and eternal, the modalities of which we experience as qualities (redness, hardness etc). It's a Rationalist theory of perception. The ancient schools of Substance Metaphysics the Buddha would have likely been familiar with were Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika and, of course, he definitely knew about Jainism. All of these traditions posited permanent substances in order to explain the world, be it a physical substance such as matter (Prakṛti) or an immaterial substance (Jīva). In modern times René Descartes proposed something similar with his substance dualism of body and mind. Empiricists stand in opposition to this theory, since they point out how speculative it all is since a "substance" is never actually experienced. Only qualities are. The Vaibhāṣikas adopted a theory of substance to support their idea of dhammas existing in the 3 times. The dhammas exist forever as permanent substances. All we experience are their actions. Sadly the Northern Masters fell into the trap that the Buddha warned against. Theravāda did not, and so stuck close to the Buddha's own epistemology (not always, though imo). Substance can't be accepted if there is to be awakening but yet we can still say that nibbāna exists, is real, and so is true because that is the direct experience just like how we can say a painful feeling exists, is real, and so is true because the direct experience of it, without any conceptual distortion, is certain knowledge. It is this epistemological framework that the Blessed One operated it, and it is this which allows him to claim knowledge. It is experienced directly and so really known, unlike speculative theories about substances, eternal universes or souls which are never actually experienced.
If you limit papancha to just self-views then that does make sense, but I don't.
We could add speculative views as well, such as substance theory.
I don't think saying nibbana is a mere cessation implies it is nothing. A cessation is an event which is directly knowable-something ceases and that ceasing is known (and one can reflect that the things which ceased are gone at a later time as well). Why in your view does nibbana need to be a condition for something? Why would there be no Buddhas or Arahants if nibbana can't condition other things?
The difficulty with this reading is that the Buddha was not always "in" nibbāna. It was something he turned back to at different times, in meditation. Does that mean he had to experience the cessation of greed, hatred and delusion again? Also, if nibbāna was simply the cessation of greed, hatred and delusion then it would have a beginning. It would be something brought into existence. On your reading when there is greed, hatred and delusion then there is no nibbāna but when those cease then there is nibbāna, but nibbāna has no arising nor ceasing so how can it be there when it was not before? Regarding your other question, there would be no Buddhas or Arahants if there was no nibbāna to cognise. So, if nibbāna did not exist it could be the condition for the removal of the defilements. Awakening then would become impossible. The best you could hope for would be the formless attainments. Your argument about cessation also seem to be just another way of saying there is nothing. If nibbāna were the mere cessation of everything then it would be nothing. The oblivion of the materialists would also be nibbāna.

"If, monks there were not that unborn, unbecome, unmade, unconditioned, you could not know an escape here from the born, become, made, and conditioned"
It would be nice to see a source quote that the Sautrāntikas believed nibbana was nothingness. I'm ok with saying nibbana is real as long as it's clear we are referring to the experience of the cessation of greed, hatred, and delusion and not some 'behind experience transcendent thing'.
It's quite well attested that that was their position. From Ven. Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa:
iii. The Sautrantikas affirm that the three types of unconditioned things (i.5b) are not real. The three dharmas that it refers to are not distinct and real entities like color, sensation, etc.382 1. What is called "space" (dkdsa) is solely the absence of any tangible thing, that is, the absence of a resistant body. Persons say, in their obscurity, that there is space when they do not encounter any obstacle. 2. What is called pratisarhkhyanirodha or Nirvana is—when both the defilements already produced and the existence already produced are destroye —the absence of any other defilements or any other existence, and that by reason of the force of the consciousness (pratisamkhyd-prajnd).383 3. When, independent of the force of consciousness (pratisamkhyd) and by reason of the mere absence of causes there is an absence of arising dharmas, this is what is called apratisamkhyanirodha. For example, when premature death interrupts existence (nikdyasabhdga, ii.10,14), there is apratisamkhyanirodha of the dharmas which would have arisen in the course of this existence if it had continued...

[2. The Sarvastivadins:] If unconditioned things do not exist, how can the Sutra say "Detachment (viraga) is the best of all conditioned and unconditioned dharmas?" How can a dharma which does not exist be the best among the dharmas which do not exist? 39°

[The Sautrantikas:] We do not say that unconditioned things do not exist. They exist in fact in the manner in which we say that they exist. Let us explain. Before sound is produced, we say "There is non-existence (of sound) prior to the sound;" after the sound has perished, we say "There is non-existence (of sound) after the sound," and yet it had not been proven that non-existence exists:391 the same holds for unconditioned things. Although it is non-existent, one unconditioned thing merits being praised, namely detachement (viraga), the absolute future nonexistence of any wrong. This non-existent thing is the most distinguished of all non-existent things. The Sutra praises it by saying that it is the best, so that believers shall conceive joy and affection with regard to it...

[7. The Sarvastivadins:] The Sutra speaks of the Bhiksu who has obtained Nirvana in this life.393 If Nirvana is non-existence, how could he obtain it?

[The Sautrantikas:] The Bhiksu, through the possession of the adverse force of the antidote, that is, through the possession of the Path, has obtained a personality (asraya) contrary to the defilements, and contrary to a new existence. This is why the Sutra says that he has obtained Nirvana. 8. Moreover we have a text that shows that Nirvana is pure non-existence. The Sutra {Samyukta, TD 2, p. 88a7)394 says, "The complete abandoning, the purification, the exhausting, the detachment, the extinction, the abatement, the definitive passing away of this suffering; and the non-rebirth, the non-grasping, the non-appearance of another suffering—this is calm, this is excellent, namely the rejection of all upadhi, the exhausting of thirst, detachment, extinction, Nirvana/'
The debate then goes on at some length, although with the Vaibhāṣika not being given much of a chance to reply (which is pretty standard).
Last edited by Ceisiwr on Mon Jul 26, 2021 8:55 pm, edited 9 times in total.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
User avatar
Ceisiwr
Posts: 22410
Joined: Sun Jan 11, 2009 2:36 am
Location: Wales

Re: Classical Theravada, the Realist Buddhism

Post by Ceisiwr »

Cause_and_Effect wrote: Mon Jul 26, 2021 4:30 am The first two verses of the Dhammapada:

"All experience is preceded by mind, led by mind, made by mind. Speak or act with a corrupted mind and suffering follows, as the wagon wheel follows the hoof of the Ox."

"All experience is preceded by mind, led by mind, made by mind. Speak or act with a peaceful mind and happiness follows, like a never departing shadow"

Gil Frondfal translation

"All mental phenomena have mind as their forerunner; they have mind as their chief; they are mind-made. If one speaks or acts with an evil mind, dukkha follows him just as the wheel follows the hoofprint of the ox that draws the cart."

"All mental phenomena have mind as their forerunner; they have mind as their chief; they are mind-made. If one speaks or acts with a pure mind, happiness (sukha) follows him like a shadow that never leaves him."

Daw Mya Tin translation
That refers to good and bad mental states, rather than trees or cars.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
User avatar
Ceisiwr
Posts: 22410
Joined: Sun Jan 11, 2009 2:36 am
Location: Wales

Re: Classical Theravada, the Realist Buddhism

Post by Ceisiwr »

waryoffolly wrote: Sun Jul 25, 2021 11:47 pm ...
A bit more but this time from Ven. Dhammajoti's book "Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma", which is fantastic since you actually get to hear the Vaibhāṣika arguments from their own mouths.
16.1.1. The controversial nature of the unconditioned dharma‑s. Various schools have different conceptions of the unconditioned and disagree as to the ontological status of these dharma‑s. In the Sarvāstivāda conception, an unconditioned is:

1. that which transcends arising and ceasing,

2. an ontologically real possessing a unique efficacy — albeit not causal efficacy obtaining in the temporal process.

The Mahāsāmghika upholds the criterion that the notion of an unconditioned entails that which remains unchanged eternally and, from this perspective, includes Conditioned Co-arising and the noble path, representing the eternal principles of causality and liberation respectively, as among the nine unconditioned dharma‑s:

1. pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha;

2. apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha;

3. ākāśa;

4. ākāśānantyāyatana;

5. vijñānānantyāyatana;

6. ākiñcanyāyatana;

7. naiva-saṃjñā-nāsaṃjñāyatana;

8. pratītya-samutpādatva;

9. ārya-mārgatva.3

For the Sautrāntika, the unconditioned is simply a concept (prajñapti) of that which is opposed to the conditioned. All the unconditioned are non entities (sarvam evāsaṃskṛtam adravyam), for they do not exist as distinct existents (bhāvāntara) like rūpa, vedanā, etc.4 Thus, nirvāṇa is nothing more than the absolute absence of unsatisfactoriness. Accordingly, this school categorically denies the reality of all unconditioned dharma‑s.

...

5. Some assert that nirvāṇa is unreal because a knowledge (jñāna) necessarily has an object, and for them the prajñā which perceives nirvāṇa (nirvāཇālambanā prajñā) has name (nāman) as its object. Saṃghabhadra refutes this, pointing out that it would lead to the consequence of mithyā dṛṣṭi and samyag-dṛṣṭi being mutually accomplishing: A samyag-dṛṣṭi comprehending nirvāṇa as being śānta and nitya would become a dṛṣṭy upādāna, since all names are impermanent. A mithyā-dṛṣṭi vilifying nirvāṇa as being impermanent in nature would become a samyagdṛṣṭi, since it would be an understanding in conformity to reality. Those who hold that nirvāṇa is devoid of any essential reality would never concede that name is a non-existent; those who hold that nirvāṇa has an essential nature would never concede that name itself is nirvāṇa.

6. If nirvāṇa were not a real entity, how can the receptive beings give rise to delight in nirvāṇa and disgust towards saṃsāra — there cannot be inferiority or superiority among non-existents. Moreover, it would mean that the Buddha had been deluding the receptive beings, for he would have been speaking of the non-existents in the same manner that he spoke of the existents. A further implication would be that a view that denies the reality of nirvāṇa would be a samyag-dṛṣṭi. (Cf. following argument). In this argument, there is an implicit stress that nirvāṇa, as much as the conditioned dharma‑s, are real forces which can have impact on the mental stream of sentient beings. It is cognizable (vijñeya), even though ordinary worldlings cannot cognize it truly as it is (yathābhūtam). This point is also brought out from the following discussion in the VKŚ:

Can a thought pertaining to the sense sphere (kāmadhātu-pratisaṃyuktacitta) … cognize the dharma‑s which do not pertain to any sphere (apratisaṃyukta) — [namely, the outflow-free dharma‑s]?

Answer: Yes, it can. That is: with regard to cessation, it may [cognize it] as cessation, calm, excellence and escape (the four ākāra‑s of the truth of cessation — § 15.2.2.1). With regard to the path, it may [cognize it] as path, right method, course of practice and being conducive to exit (four ākāra‑s of the truth of the path). … It may be a cognition of the nature of doubt, or of delusion, or of being generated from proper reasoning (yogavihita), or of being generated from improper reasoning (ayoga-vihita).29

7. The opponents argue: The Buddha explicitly states in the sūtra that “all” dharma‑s are comprised in the 12 āyatana‑s (Saṃyutta-nikāya, iv, 13), and also that these 12 āyatana‑s are sa-prapañca and anitya. Now, if nirvāṇa is a real existent and is permanent, the Buddha would have distinguished it from the 12 āyatana‑s. Saṃghabhadra answers:

In the same context, the Buddha further speaks of all the 12 āyatana‑s as being with-burning (sa-dāha) — i.e., having the heat of defilement. Now, surely the ārya-mārga is included in the 12 āyatana‑s and yet it is certainly devoid of the burning of greed, etc. Why then does the Buddha not distinguish it from the other dharma‑s? Thus, it must be understood that the Buddha in this context refers to the 12 āyatana‑s which are with outflow. Hence the opponents, by quoting the above sūtra cannot establish the unreality of nirvāṇa.

8. When duḥkha is ceased, a pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha — distinct from duḥkha and mārga — is acquired. It is this that is called nirvāṇa (432c). If there were no nirodha that exists as a real entity, then an arhat ought to have defilements and one at the śaikṣa stage ought to have been freed from defilements, since the moment (known as vimukti mārga) following that at which the acquisition of the defilement is abandoned (known as ānantarya-mārga) would not be different. In fact, it is this real entity arising at the following moment that functions as a force absolutely preventing the acquisition of the defilement so abandoned from linking up the defilement with the individual series (saṃtati). That is, pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha is not a mere concept; it is a real force that absolutely prevents the re-arising of the defilement.

9. Nirvāṇa, if unreal, could not have been subsumed as one of the noble truths — the nirodha-satya — a non-existent cannot be predicated as ‘true’ or ‘false’. An ārya, in his abhisamaya, sees truly all four truths. Now since prajñā cannot arise with regard to a non-existent object (this is the articulated position of the Vaibhāṣika30), it would be topsy-turvy to say that an ārya sees a non-existent object. Moreover, with regard to a non existent which absolutely defies all verbal qualifications, how can the ārya, in his spiritual realization, say: “This is cessation of duḥkha”? It is observed in the world that the demonstratives ‘this’ and ‘that’ are applicable only to existent things. Furthermore, all this will amount to the denial of the existence of the third truth. Besides, if duḥkhanirodha signifies the mere absence of duḥkha, there need only be the mention of duḥkha nirodha-gāminī-pratipat (the fourth truth) — the mention of mārgasatya suffices to indicate the absence of duḥkha that it counteracts. If it does not result in the absence of duḥkha, why is it said to be a counteractive path?
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
Cause_and_Effect
Posts: 1069
Joined: Fri Jul 23, 2021 7:39 am

Re: Classical Theravada, the Realist Buddhism

Post by Cause_and_Effect »

Ceisiwr wrote: Mon Jul 26, 2021 8:40 pm
Cause_and_Effect wrote: Mon Jul 26, 2021 4:30 am The first two verses of the Dhammapada:

"All experience is preceded by mind, led by mind, made by mind. Speak or act with a corrupted mind and suffering follows, as the wagon wheel follows the hoof of the Ox."

"All experience is preceded by mind, led by mind, made by mind. Speak or act with a peaceful mind and happiness follows, like a never departing shadow"

Gil Frondfal translation

"All mental phenomena have mind as their forerunner; they have mind as their chief; they are mind-made. If one speaks or acts with an evil mind, dukkha follows him just as the wheel follows the hoofprint of the ox that draws the cart."

"All mental phenomena have mind as their forerunner; they have mind as their chief; they are mind-made. If one speaks or acts with a pure mind, happiness (sukha) follows him like a shadow that never leaves him."

Daw Mya Tin translation
That refers to good and bad mental states, rather than trees or cars.
The term is 'all dhammas/phenomena are made by mind'. It doesn't specify although clearly the context is with reference to mental states.

Similar to here

"All phenomena are rooted in desire"

https://accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an ... .than.html

In the Buddha's teaching there is no talking about 'trees and cars' outside of the experience of them within the mind.
The issue of whether trees and cars or the phenomenal universe would exist without the existence of sentient beings is irrelevant as it's purely a speculative view outside of our experiences.

The above quotes are compatible with both views of Idealism and/or Realism, the point being either speculative philosophical position is irrelevant and dwelling on them is a hindrance to practice.

Whether or not their is ultimately an 'independently real tree', your experience is mediated via the sense bases.
"Therein monks, that Dimension should be known wherein the eye ceases and the perception of forms fades away...the ear... the nose...the tongue... the body ceases and the perception of touch fades away...

That Dimension should be known wherein mentality ceases and the perception of mind-objects fades away.
That Dimension should be known; that Dimension should be known."


(S. IV. 98) - The Dimension beyond the All
User avatar
DooDoot
Posts: 12032
Joined: Tue Aug 08, 2017 11:06 pm

Re: Classical Theravada, the Realist Buddhism

Post by DooDoot »

Cause_and_Effect wrote: Mon Jul 26, 2021 4:30 am I'm not proficient ...
:goodpost:
Cause_and_Effect wrote: Mon Jul 26, 2021 4:30 amfrom the Gil Fronsdal commentary he states that the Pail canon is unique in using the expression 'all phenomena/dhammas are made by mind'.
The above is obviously wrong. For example, SN 22.82 says the physical body is caused by the four physical elements (cattāro kho, bhikkhu, mahābhūtā hetu, cattāro mahābhūtā paccayo rūpakkhandhassa paññāpanāya) therefore all phenomena is obviously not made by mind.
Cause_and_Effect wrote: Mon Jul 26, 2021 4:30 amThe equivalent in Dhammapada of the Chinese Canon uses a term that can be translated as 'impelled by mind'.
The above is similarly ridiculous.
Cause_and_Effect wrote: Mon Jul 26, 2021 4:30 amAm not going to get too much into this debate
Generally, debate is best left to the proficient.
Cause_and_Effect wrote: Mon Jul 26, 2021 4:30 amThe first two verses of the Dhammapada:

"All experience is preceded by mind, led by mind, made by mind. Speak or act with a corrupted mind and suffering follows, as the wagon wheel follows the hoof of the Ox."

"All experience is preceded by mind, led by mind, made by mind. Speak or act with a peaceful mind and happiness follows, like a never departing shadow"

Gil Frondfal translation
The Pali translated as "mind" above is "mano". "Mano" is not the forerunner of "experience". The forerunner of experience is vinnana (consciousness).
Cause_and_Effect wrote: Mon Jul 26, 2021 4:30 am"All mental phenomena have mind as their forerunner; they have mind as their chief; they are mind-made. If one speaks or acts with an evil mind, dukkha follows him just as the wheel follows the hoofprint of the ox that draws the cart."

"All mental phenomena have mind as their forerunner; they have mind as their chief; they are mind-made. If one speaks or acts with a pure mind, happiness (sukha) follows him like a shadow that never leaves him."

Daw Mya Tin translation
Posting a 2nd wrong solipsist translation does not make a 1st wrong solipsist translation right.

"Mano" is the "intellect". The Dhammapada verse is obviously about "kamma" or "intention". Thus the verse says the intellect is the forerunner of doctrines/modes of behaviour (aka dhamma); thus with a corrupted or pure "manasā" a person speaks or acts. The verse is literally obviously about speaking & acting rather than "experiencing".

Cause_and_Effect wrote: Mon Jul 26, 2021 4:30 amManopubbangama dhamma
manosettha manomaya
manasa ce padutthena
bhasati va karoti va
tato nam dukkhamanveti
cakkamva vahato padam.

Manopubbangama dhamma
manosettha manomaya
manasa ce pasannena
bhasati va karoti va
tato nam sukha manveti
chayava anapayini.
There is little point ritualistically posting Pali when it is not understood.

The above verse is clearly about kamma (intentional action) rather than about experience. :smile:
There is always an official executioner. If you try to take his place, It is like trying to be a master carpenter and cutting wood. If you try to cut wood like a master carpenter, you will only hurt your hand.

https://soundcloud.com/doodoot/paticcasamuppada
https://soundcloud.com/doodoot/anapanasati
User avatar
Coëmgenu
Posts: 8151
Joined: Mon Jun 13, 2016 10:55 pm
Location: Whitby, Canada

Re: Classical Theravada, the Realist Buddhism

Post by Coëmgenu »

Cause_and_Effect wrote: Mon Jul 26, 2021 4:30 amThe equivalent in Dhammapada of the Chinese Canon uses a term that can be translated as 'impelled by mind'.
There are actually several Dharmapadas of unknown sectarian affiliation in the Taisho Canon in addition to several Udānavargas. Do you know which one you are citing? I suspect that "impelled by" here is "driven forward by" and not "ensorcelled," but I don't know which character you mean or where to search in the Canon.

EDIT: for some reason, I thought this post disappeared. It's off-topic for the subforum anyways. I started a new topic in "Early Buddhism."
Last edited by Coëmgenu on Thu Jul 29, 2021 1:43 pm, edited 1 time in total.
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
Cause_and_Effect
Posts: 1069
Joined: Fri Jul 23, 2021 7:39 am

Re: Classical Theravada, the Realist Buddhism

Post by Cause_and_Effect »

DooDoot wrote: Thu Jul 29, 2021 11:33 am
Cause_and_Effect wrote: Mon Jul 26, 2021 4:30 amThe first two verses of the Dhammapada:

"All experience is preceded by mind, led by mind, made by mind. Speak or act with a corrupted mind and suffering follows, as the wagon wheel follows the hoof of the Ox."

"All experience is preceded by mind, led by mind, made by mind. Speak or act with a peaceful mind and happiness follows, like a never departing shadow"

Gil Frondfal translation
The Pali translated as "mind" above is "mano". "Mano" is not the forerunner of "experience". The forerunner of experience is vinnana (consciousness).
There is no such sharp distinction between vinnana and mano wherebye one could make such assertions that one is the forerunner of experience and one is not.
Mind (Mano) in the forerunner of experience.
And all experience is mind-made.
"Therein monks, that Dimension should be known wherein the eye ceases and the perception of forms fades away...the ear... the nose...the tongue... the body ceases and the perception of touch fades away...

That Dimension should be known wherein mentality ceases and the perception of mind-objects fades away.
That Dimension should be known; that Dimension should be known."


(S. IV. 98) - The Dimension beyond the All
User avatar
Ceisiwr
Posts: 22410
Joined: Sun Jan 11, 2009 2:36 am
Location: Wales

Re: Classical Theravada, the Realist Buddhism

Post by Ceisiwr »

Cause_and_Effect wrote: Tue Jul 27, 2021 2:11 am
The term is 'all dhammas/phenomena are made by mind'. It doesn't specify although clearly the context is with reference to mental states.
The full Dhammapada quote is:

"Verse 1: All mental phenomena have mind as their forerunner; they have mind as their chief; they are mind-made. If one speaks or acts with an evil mind, 'dukkha' 3 follows him just as the wheel follows the hoofprint of the ox that draws the cart."

It is talking about good and bad mental states. The commentary has the same view.
1. manopubbangama dhamma: All mental phenomena have Mind as their forerunner in the sense that Mind is the most dominant, and it is the cause of the other three mental phenomena, namely, Feeling (vedana), Perception (sanna) and Mental Formations or Mental Concomitants (sankhara). These three have Mind or Consciousness (vinnana) as their forerunner, because although they arise simultaneously with Mind they cannot arise if Mind does not arise. (The Commentary)

2. manasa ce padutthena (Verse 1) and manasi ce pasannena (Verse 2): Manasa here means intention or volition (cetana); volition leads one to the performance of volitional actions, both good and evil. This volition and the resultant actions constitute kamma; and kamma always follows one to produce results. Cakkhupala's blindness (Verse 1) was the consequence of his having acted with an evil intention in a previous existence and Matthakundali's happy existence in Tavatimsa celestial world (Verse 2) was the result of his mental devotion (manopasada) to the Buddha.

3. dukkha: In this context, dukkha mens suffering, or physical or mental pain, misfortune, unsatisfactoriness, evil consequences, etc., and rebirth in the lower planes of existence or in the lower strata of human society if born in the human world.
https://www.tipitaka.net/tipitaka/dhp/v ... ?verse=001
"All phenomena are rooted in desire"
That sutta is talking about the enlightenment factors and the hindrances. This is also the view of the commentaries and EBT enthusiasts such as Ven. Sujato and possibly Ven. Anālayo if I recall correctly. If you look at the context of the sutta it's part of a series of suttas that deal with meditation.
In the Buddha's teaching there is no talking about 'trees and cars' outside of the experience of them within the mind.
The issue of whether trees and cars or the phenomenal universe would exist without the existence of sentient beings is irrelevant as it's purely a speculative view outside of our experiences.
Whilst he focused on how we experience the world, he didn't deny that there was an external world. The texts you have quoted also do not support your argument here.
The above quotes are compatible with both views of Idealism and/or Realism, the point being either speculative philosophical position is irrelevant and dwelling on them is a hindrance to practice.
Well yes, because they are nothing to do with either position.
Whether or not their is ultimately an 'independently real tree', your experience is mediated via the sense bases.
Aren't you over looking something? Ultimately nibbāna exists externally and independently, and is not "mediated via the sense bases".
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
User avatar
DooDoot
Posts: 12032
Joined: Tue Aug 08, 2017 11:06 pm

Re: Classical Theravada, the Realist Buddhism

Post by DooDoot »

Cause_and_Effect wrote: Thu Jul 29, 2021 1:28 pm There is no such sharp distinction between vinnana and mano wherebye one could make such assertions that one is the forerunner of experience and one is not.
Mind (Mano) in the forerunner of experience.
And all experience is mind-made.
The above is unsubstantiated and is plainly wrong. I already posted the suttas says: "with a perverted manasa a person thinks & acts". The suttas never say "with a perverted consciousness a person thinks and acts".

There are three types of kamma is the suttas, namely, kāyena vācāya manasā
It is intention that I call deeds.
Cetanāhaṁ, bhikkhave, kammaṁ vadāmi.
For after making a choice one acts
Cetayitvā kammaṁ karoti—
by way of body, speech, and mind.
kāyena vācāya manasā.

https://suttacentral.net/an6.63/en/sujato
The suttas never refer to "vinnana kamma".

Also, the suttas make a sharp distinction between mano (a sense organ that accumulates views & knowledge) and vinnana (consciousness), as follows in relation to the 6th sense base:
Intellect consciousness arises dependent on the intellect and mind-objects. The meeting of the three is contact.

manañca paṭicca dhamme ca uppajjati manoviññāṇaṁ, tiṇṇaṁ saṅgati phasso.
In summary, your ideas are unsubstantiated and the translation of the Dhammapada by Fronsdal is obviously wrong. :smile:
There is always an official executioner. If you try to take his place, It is like trying to be a master carpenter and cutting wood. If you try to cut wood like a master carpenter, you will only hurt your hand.

https://soundcloud.com/doodoot/paticcasamuppada
https://soundcloud.com/doodoot/anapanasati
User avatar
DooDoot
Posts: 12032
Joined: Tue Aug 08, 2017 11:06 pm

Re: Classical Theravada, the Realist Buddhism

Post by DooDoot »

Ceisiwr wrote: Thu Jul 29, 2021 7:45 pm Ultimately nibbāna exists externally and independently, and is not "mediated via the sense bases".
Sounds wrong.
“Master Gotama, it is said: ‘Directly visible nibbāna, directly visible nibbāna.’ In what way is nibbāna directly visible, immediate, inviting one to come and see, applicable, to be personally experienced by the wise?”

https://suttacentral.net/an3.55/en/bodhi
:smile:
There is always an official executioner. If you try to take his place, It is like trying to be a master carpenter and cutting wood. If you try to cut wood like a master carpenter, you will only hurt your hand.

https://soundcloud.com/doodoot/paticcasamuppada
https://soundcloud.com/doodoot/anapanasati
Cause_and_Effect
Posts: 1069
Joined: Fri Jul 23, 2021 7:39 am

Re: Classical Theravada, the Realist Buddhism

Post by Cause_and_Effect »

DooDoot wrote: Thu Jul 29, 2021 8:32 pm
Cause_and_Effect wrote: Thu Jul 29, 2021 1:28 pm There is no such sharp distinction between vinnana and mano wherebye one could make such assertions that one is the forerunner of experience and one is not.
Mind (Mano) in the forerunner of experience.
And all experience is mind-made.
The above is unsubstantiated and is plainly wrong. I already posted the suttas says: "with a perverted manasa a person thinks & acts". The suttas never say "with a perverted consciousness a person thinks and acts".

There are three types of kamma is the suttas, namely, kāyena vācāya manasā
It is intention that I call deeds.
Cetanāhaṁ, bhikkhave, kammaṁ vadāmi.
For after making a choice one acts
Cetayitvā kammaṁ karoti—
by way of body, speech, and mind.
kāyena vācāya manasā.

https://suttacentral.net/an6.63/en/sujato
The suttas never refer to "vinnana kamma".

Also, the suttas make a sharp distinction between mano (a sense organ that accumulates views & knowledge) and vinnana (consciousness), as follows in relation to the 6th sense base:
Intellect consciousness arises dependent on the intellect and mind-objects. The meeting of the three is contact.

manañca paṭicca dhamme ca uppajjati manoviññāṇaṁ, tiṇṇaṁ saṅgati phasso.
In summary, your ideas are unsubstantiated and the translation of the Dhammapada by Fronsdal is obviously wrong. :smile:
Mano is the forerunner of all experience as all the sense bases (ayatana) have the mind-base as their resort. This is mentioned in the suttas.

Rather than brazen assertions that things are 'wrong' based on little reflection, why not consider that there are often different perspectives on a deep subject which by your demeanor it appears you have but scratched the surface of.

If one uses the sense bases as ones primary reflection and model rather than the aggregates, then mano will be the basis of all experience. The dhammpada verse is referring to this.
"Therein monks, that Dimension should be known wherein the eye ceases and the perception of forms fades away...the ear... the nose...the tongue... the body ceases and the perception of touch fades away...

That Dimension should be known wherein mentality ceases and the perception of mind-objects fades away.
That Dimension should be known; that Dimension should be known."


(S. IV. 98) - The Dimension beyond the All
Post Reply