Abhidhamma historical origins

[Ceisiwr]

I believe that to say these things are "absolute exist" or "absolute empty" are not the proper way to tackle the issue. It is better to see them in the way of Dependent Origination.

I think Ven. Nāgārjuna would agree with you here.

[Ontheway]

I believe that to say these things are "absolute exist" or "absolute empty" are not the proper way to tackle the issue. It is better to see them in the way of Dependent Origination.

I think Ven. Nāgārjuna would agree with you here.

If that is so, that's good.
But aren't Nagarjuna a Sarvastivadin ?

[Ceisiwr]

I believe that to say these things are "absolute exist" or "absolute empty" are not the proper way to tackle the issue. It is better to see them in the way of Dependent Origination.

I think Ven. Nāgārjuna would agree with you here.

If that is so, that's good.
But aren't Nagarjuna a Sarvastivadin ?

He was familiar with either the Sarvāstivādin or Pudgalavādin sutras, but he was a Mahāyānist.

[Coëmgenu]

He could have been some kind of Mahāsāṁghika. Who knows? Some people think he was a "Theravādin," but that's an extreme fringe minority.

[Ceisiwr]

He could have been some kind of Mahāsāṁghika. Who knows? Some people think he was a "Theravādin," but that's an extreme fringe minority.

Yes that is quite possible too. Personally it doesn't bother me much which tradition he belonged to. I don't think his ideas are sect specific.

[Ontheway]

I think Ven. Nāgārjuna would agree with you here.

If that is so, that's good.
But aren't Nagarjuna a Sarvastivadin ?

He was familiar with either the Sarvāstivādin or Pudgalavādin sutras, but he was a Mahāyānist.

Just googled it, it seems he founded a school by himself and argued a lot of things about Svabhava.

Well, my thought for Nagarjuna school will derive from this:

"According to Peter Harvey, svabhava in the Theravada Abhidhamma is something conditional and interdependent:

"They are dhammas because they uphold their own nature [sabhava]. They are dhammas because they are upheld by conditions or they are upheld according to their own nature". Here 'own-nature' would mean characteristic nature, which is not something inherent in a dhamma as a separate ultimate reality, but arise due to the supporting conditions both of other dhammas and previous occurrences of that dhamma. This is of significance as it makes the Mahayana critique of the Sarvastivadin's notion of own-nature largely irrelevant to the Theravada."

- Wikipedia https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Svabhava

And since he was a Mahayanist, I don't want to comment much on him. As seeing the historical account of Sanghabheda, Mahayana is really unattractive to me.

or maybe Maha Patthana can shed lights on Sabhava ideas. I memorised the formula but never got a chance to read the exposition...

[Ceisiwr]

Just googled it, it seems he founded a school by himself and argued a lot of things about Svabhava.

Well, my thought for Nagarjuna school will derive from this:

"According to Peter Harvey, svabhava in the Theravada Abhidhamma is something conditional and interdependent:

"They are dhammas because they uphold their own nature [sabhava]. They are dhammas because they are upheld by conditions or they are upheld according to their own nature". Here 'own-nature' would mean characteristic nature, which is not something inherent in a dhamma as a separate ultimate reality, but arise due to the supporting conditions both of other dhammas and previous occurrences of that dhamma. This is of significance as it makes the Mahayana critique of the Sarvastivadin's notion of own-nature largely irrelevant to the Theravada."

- Wikipedia https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Svabhava

And since he was a Mahayanist, I don't want to comment much on him. As seeing the historical account of Sanghabheda, Mahayana is really unattractive to me.

or maybe Maha Patthana can shed lights on Sabhava ideas. I memorised the formula but never got a chance to read the exposition...

I don't think Peter Harvey's defence holds. To say that a dhamma is ultimately real, even for a moment, is to say that at least for a moment it is independent. If it is independent then it would never cease. It's also not just sabhāva which Ven. Nāgārjuna negates, but also causality. How exactly can a real dhamma bring about another real dhamma? The Abhidhamma says it's due to the dhammas "power", but this doesn't actually answer anything. Also, according to the traditional definition as soon as a dhamma changes it ceases to exist. If then there is only arising and ceasing, which an ancient Theravādin master argued for, then dhammas are ultimately empty. If there is arising, change while persisting and then ceasing, then ultimately dhammas are empty.

[Coëmgenu]

He could have been some kind of Mahāsāṁghika. Who knows? Some people think he was a "Theravādin," but that's an extreme fringe minority.

Yes that is quite possible too. Personally it doesn't bother me much which tradition he belonged to. I don't think his ideas are sect specific.

Agreed. Because many of the salient features of the dharma theory are shared between the early schools, he needs but dissent with one group of Ābhidharmikas, presumably those of whichever sect he came from. Peter Harvey isn't the only one to argue that Ven Nāgārjuna's niḥsvabhāva thought only really critiques non-Theravādin Abhidharma. You also in the past argued this, no? Who else did you encounter arguing similarly? I know that many, including a particularly famous monk, used to think that he only dissented from Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma.

[Ceisiwr]

Agreed. Because many of the salient features of the dharma theory are shared between the early schools, he needs but dissent with one group of Ābhidharmikas, presumably those of whichever sect he came from. Peter Harvey isn't the only one to argue that Ven Nāgārjuna's niḥsvabhāva thought only really critiques non-Theravādin Abhidharma. You also in the past argued this, no? Who else did you encounter arguing similarly? I know that many, including a particularly famous monk, used to think that he only dissented from Sarvāstivāsa Abhidharma.

I did yes. None that I can recall. Which monk was that?

[Coëmgenu]

I think it was Ven Ñāṇavīra, but I might be confusing him with Vens Ñāṇamoli or Ñāṇananda, which I often do because of their similar names.

[Ontheway]

Just googled it, it seems he founded a school by himself and argued a lot of things about Svabhava.

Well, my thought for Nagarjuna school will derive from this:

"According to Peter Harvey, svabhava in the Theravada Abhidhamma is something conditional and interdependent:

"They are dhammas because they uphold their own nature [sabhava]. They are dhammas because they are upheld by conditions or they are upheld according to their own nature". Here 'own-nature' would mean characteristic nature, which is not something inherent in a dhamma as a separate ultimate reality, but arise due to the supporting conditions both of other dhammas and previous occurrences of that dhamma. This is of significance as it makes the Mahayana critique of the Sarvastivadin's notion of own-nature largely irrelevant to the Theravada."

- Wikipedia https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Svabhava

And since he was a Mahayanist, I don't want to comment much on him. As seeing the historical account of Sanghabheda, Mahayana is really unattractive to me.

or maybe Maha Patthana can shed lights on Sabhava ideas. I memorised the formula but never got a chance to read the exposition...

I don't think Peter Harvey's defence holds. To say that a dhamma is ultimately real, even for a moment, is to say that at least for a moment it is independent. If it is independent then it would never cease. It's also not just sabhāva which Ven. Nāgārjuna negates, but also causality. How exactly can a real dhamma bring about another real dhamma? The Abhidhamma says it's due to the dhammas "power", but this doesn't actually answer anything. Also, according to the traditional definition as soon as a dhamma changes it ceases to exist. If then there is only arising and ceasing, which an ancient Theravādin master argued for, then dhammas are ultimately empty. If there is arising, change while persisting and then ceasing, then ultimately dhammas are empty.

If you said "ultimately Dhammas are empty", wouldn't that be an extreme of view?

From what I understand here, Sarvastivada argued for "Everything exists", past-present-future is all real.

Mahayana Nagarjuna argued for "Everything (ultimately) empty".

But, Theravada stated that "Only here and now, exists" in Kathavathu.

Imo, when states arose due to conditionality, they demonstrate Sabhava quality, which in turn will cease during falling away due to conditionality.

[Ceisiwr]

If you said "ultimately Dhammas are empty", wouldn't that be an extreme of view?

From what I understand here, Sarvastivada argued for "Everything exists", past-present-future is all real.

Mahayana Nagarjuna argued for "Everything (ultimately) empty".

But, Theravada stated that "Only here and now, exists" in Kathavathu.

Imo, when states arose due to conditionality, they demonstrate Sabhava quality, which in turn will cease during falling away due to conditionality.

No, because emptiness is also empty. In other words, it's also just a concept. Ven. Nāgārjuna's position isn't that ultimately there is nothing. It's to stop thinking in terms of existence and non-existence. We can still say "Today I feel sad" or "There is nibbāna" , but without buying into anything substantial or not in that statement. It's just a conventional mode of expression.

The Sarvāstivādins, like Theravāda, argued that if we reduce everyday objects to their irreducible parts then we arrive at ultimate reality. These ultimate dhammas then, being irreducible, each have 1 quality only. This is their sabhāva. The difference was that for the Sarvāstivādins these qualities never cease, and so all dhammas exist in the 3 times. What differs is their actions, which can only be brought about with the aid of the other eternal dhammas in a complex theory of causality. This was their answer to how we are aware of the past, and how kamma can have effects across time. Theravāda instead choose the Bhavaṅga to answer this problem, whilst the Pudgalavādins promoted these eternal dhammas and the "person" as a solution. Theravāda also recognises these ultimate constituents out of which the everyday world is fashioned. Each dhamma too then has 1 quality, but for Theravāda when that particular quality changes then that dhamma ceases forever. A new dhamma might arise with the same quality, but it's not the exact same dhamma. The problem of course still remains, in that Theravāda makes use of causality to explain this process (rather than just conditionality) and so is still open to the Madhyamaka attack. Theravāda also argues that the dhammas arises from nothing and return to nothing, but if this is so how can they come to be since from nothing nothing comes? Further still, if Theravāda does overcome these Madhyamaka critiques it is faced with a further problem. If a dhamma comes into existence and exists "from it's own side", how can it ever cease? If it's own intrinsic quality is what guarantees it's mind-independent reality, what need does it have of causes?

Apart from this we also have the problems from the theory of momentariness itself. As mentioned, according the the commentaries a dhamma only exists when it has sabhāva. If then there is only arising and ceasing, there is never any moment of sabhāva. The dhamma then cannot be said to exist or not exist. If instead there is arising, ceasing and change while it persists then it cannot have a moment of sabhāva either, since any change negates the dhamma. And so, the dhamma cannot be said to exist or not exist. Trying to find real dhammas then amongst the ever changing flux of experience would become impossible. They could only be said to exist then if we name a certain experience as being X, and impute some reality to that moment which, by the time we have, has already gone. Real dhammas then would not just slip through your hand like sand. You wouldn't be even able to find them to begin with.

"Like a tiny drop of dew, or a bubble floating in a stream;
Like a flash of lightning in a summer cloud,
Or a flickering lamp, an illusion, a phantom, or a dream.
So is all conditioned existence to be seen."

Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra

[sphairos]

...

You should understand, that according to Theravāda Abhidhamma dhammas are empty (prof. Karunadasa writes about that). They are essentially hollow, insubstantial , insignificant etc. (these are meanings of the words suñña, ritta, tuccha etc. which are applied to dhammas)

[Ceisiwr]

...

You should understand, that according to Theravāda Abhidhamma dhammas are empty (prof. Karunadasa writes about that). They are essentially hollow, insubstantial , insignificant etc. (these are meanings of the words suñña, ritta, tuccha etc. which are applied to dhammas)

Whilst they would recognise that the dhammas are empty of a substance, they wouldn't recognise that the dhammas are empty of their characteristics. Since the dhammas have 1 characteristic which can't be reduced, they are said to be real. This leaves Theravāda with a phenomenalism. Theravāda doesn't always stay there of course. Not all dhammas can be said to be phenomenal qualities (nutritive essence and the life-forces are examples), and so it becomes a rather strange theory when discussing those dhammas and edges more into proto-science. If though we ignore those anomalies, we can say that Theravāda has a phenomenalism which sometimes resembles the theories of Ernst Mach yet, at other times, verges closer to Berkley in that "hardness" etc exist externally. Since "hardness" is a sense quality, this would strongly lean towards immaterialism. Idealism of this kind though is rejected. Instead Theravāda prefers some kind of phenomenalist realism, if we can talk of such a thing, and so once again we have an apparent anomaly. Regardless, a Theravādin would agree that earth is empty of substance yet it is still real.

[sphairos]

...

You should understand, that according to Theravāda Abhidhamma dhammas are empty (prof. Karunadasa writes about that). They are essentially hollow, insubstantial , insignificant etc. (these are meanings of the words suñña, ritta, tuccha etc. which are applied to dhammas)

...

Again, it's not "Theravādin", "Theravāda", but it's your personal, an English lad's of XXI century London, views, understanding and imagination.

There is not English word "real" in the Pāli scriptures, and I argue no Pāli equivalent to the word exists at all.

In reality dhammas are seen at the uttermost level as "empty", "hollow" etc., and even without "sabhāva" sometimes.

And "empty" doesn't go well together with "real" or etc.