Abhidhamma historical origins

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Ceisiwr
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Re: Abhidhamma historical origins

Post by Ceisiwr »

That said it's very possibly the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma that it has in mind, since it quotes a discussion about the mind moving due to the air element. I'm obviously not an expert on the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma, but I'm not aware that they taught that ultimately the dhammas are empty of sabhāva.

"Lower you head or raise it up,
Bend (samiñite) or stretch (prasārite),
Stand up (sthite), go forth (pratikrānte) or return (abhikrānte),
Look straight ahead (ālokite) or to the side (vilokite),
Speak or babble:
In all of that, there is nothing true.
It is because the wind moves the vijñāna
That these activities take place.
But this vijñāna is of temporary nature (kṣayadharman)
And it exists no longer from one moment to the next moment."
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Re: Abhidhamma historical origins

Post by Ceisiwr »

This was also interesting, as it relates to some of the conversation here
I. The two types of characteristics
Emptiness of specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇaśūnyatā). – All dharmas have two kinds of characteristics (lakṣaṇa), i) shared characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) and ii) specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇa). These two kinds of characteristics being empty, the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra speaks here of the ‘emptiness of characteristics’ (lakṣanaśūnyatā).

Question. – What are the shared characteristics and what are the specific characteristics?

Answer. – The shared characteristics are impermanence (anityatā), etc., for example.

The specific characteristics, in the sense that dharmas, although they are impermanent, each possess their own specific characteristic. Thus, for the earth (pṛthivī), it is solidity (khakkhaṭatva), for fire, it is heat (uṣṇatva).

II. Connections between characteristics and essences
Question. – Above you hve already spoken about essences (prakṛti) and here you are speaking about characteristics (lakṣaṇa). Are essences and [293b] characteristics the same or different?

Answer. – 1) Some say that their reality (tattva) is not different but that their names (nāman) show differences (viśeṣa). To talk about essence (prakṛti) is to talk about characteristic, and to talk about characteristic is to talk about essence. For example, we say that the essence of fire (tejaḥprakṛti) is the characteristic of heat (uṣṇatvalakṣaṇa) and that the characteristic of heat is the essence of fire.

2) Others say that between essence (prakṛti) and characteristic (lakṣaṇa) there are slight differences: the essence concerns the very nature (kāya) of the thing, whereas the characteristic is its indication or sign (vijñeya).

Thus, in the follower of the Buddha (Śākyaputrīya), the taking of the precepts (śīlamādāna) constitutes the essence whereas the shaving of the head (muṇḍana) and the wearing of the yellow robe (kāṣāyavastra) constitute the characteristics. In a brahmacārin, the religious vows (dharmasamādāna) constitute the essence whereas the tuft of hair at the top of the head (cūḍā) and the carrying of the staff (tridaṇḍa)[1] constitute the characteristics. Fire (tejas) has heat as its essence and smoke (dhūma) as its characteristic. Proximity is essence while distance is characteristic.

The characteristics are not fixed (aniyata) and leave the body; the essence expresses the reality (tattva) of the thing. Thus when one sees a yellow (pīta) substance, one thinks it is gold (suvarṇa), but in itself it is copper (tāmra): in melting it or rubbing it with a stone, one recognizes that it does not have gold as its essence. The person who shows respect (gurukāra) and veneration (satkāra) seems to be an honest man, but that is only a superficial characteristic: abuse, criticism, anger and rage are his true essence.

These are the differences (viśeṣa) between essence and characteristic, interior and exterior, distance and proximity, anteriority and posteriority. All these characteristics beings empty, the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra speaks here about ‘emptiness of characteristics’ (lakṣaṇaśūnyatā)...

IV. Specific characteristics
Earth (pṛthivī) has as characteristic solidity (khakkhaṭatva); fire (tejas) has as characteristic heat (uṣṇatva); water has as characteristic moistness (dravatva); wind (vāyu) has as characteristic motion (īraṇa).

The eye (cakṣus) has as characteristic being the support of the visual consciousness (cakusurvijñāna); and [mutates mutandis] it is the same for the ear (śrotra), nose (ghrāṇa), tongue (jihva) and body (kāya).

Consciousness (vijñāna) has as characteristic investigation (vitarka); knowledge (jñāna) has as characteristic wisdom (prajñā); generosity (dāna) has as characteristic renunciation (parityāga); morality (śīla) has as characteristic absence of regret (akaukṛtya) and absence of violence (avihiṃsā); patience (kṣānti) has as characteristic absence of irritation (akopana); exertion (vīrya) has as characteristic effort (abhyutsāha); trance (dhyāna) has as characteristic concentration of the mind (cittasaṃgraha); wisdom (prajñā) has as characteristic mental detachment (asaṅga), skillful means (upāya) has as characteristic the creation of objects (vastusaṃpādana); saṃsāra has as characteristic the weaving of births and deaths (cyutyupapāda); nirvāṇa has as characteristic non-weaving.[3]

Such dharmas each has its own specific characteristic and we should know that these characteristics are empty: this is what is called ‘emptiness of specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇaśūnyatā). For other meanings, refer to what has been said about the emptiness of essences (prakṛtiśūnyatā, no. 12) since essence (prakṛti) and characteristic (lakṣaṇa) are synonyms.

V. Why insist on the emptiness of ‘specific’ characteristics?
Question. – Why does [the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] not simply say ‘emptiness of characteristics’ (lakṣaṇaśūnyatā) but says ‘emptiness of specific characteristics’ (svalakṣaṇaśūnyatā)?

Answer. – To say just emptiness of characteristics is to pass over in silence the fundamental emptiness of dharmas; to speak of the emptiness of specific characteristics is to deal with the fundamental emptiness of dharmas.

Moreover, every dharma, arising from a group of causes and conditions, is an empty dharma and thus each dharma taken individually is empty. The grouped causes and conditions forming a succession of dharmas (dharmaparaṃparā) is itself empty as well. Thus all dharmas are each empty of specific characteristic. This is why the emptiness of specific characteristics is spoken of here.[4]

VI. Why carry on about empty dharmas?
Question. – If all dharmas are each empty of intrinsic characteristics, why talk about it again?

Answer. – As a result of mistakes (viparyāsa), beings become attached (abhiniviśante) to these dharmas by finding in them characteristics of identity (ekatva) or difference (anyatva), shared characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) or specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇa). It is in order to destroy them that we speak of them here. For all these reasons, the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra asserts an emptiness of specific characteristics.
https://www.wisdomlib.org/buddhism/book ... 26210.html
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understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Re: Abhidhamma historical origins

Post by sphairos »

Ceisiwr wrote: Sun Sep 12, 2021 1:34 am
sphairos wrote: Sat Sep 11, 2021 10:59 pm Moreover, it is the position of the magnum śāstric opus of prajñāpāramitā guys / Śūnyavādins / Madhyamikas, Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, that in actual fact Śrāvaka sūtras already speak about the "absolute emptiness":

I. Great emptiness in the two vehicles
This is about the great emptiness (mahāśūnyatā).

1) In the śrāvaka system, it is the emptiness of dharmas (dharmaśūnyatā) that is the great emptiness (mahāśūnyatā).

https://www.wisdomlib.org/buddhism/book ... 26203.html

Not that one should look for their approvement, but I find it very interesting.
That is interesting, but it's difficult to know who they had in mind there.
Not at all, everything in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa which is said to belong to Śrāvaka is par excellence Sarvāstivāda, the whole scripture is based on the Sarvāstivādin recension of canon, but it specifically says that ALL śrāvaka schools teach and realize dharma-śūnyatā / dharma-nairātmya / mahāśūnyatā, it quotes for illustration a Saṃyukta sūtra from the Sarvāstivādin canonical collection.

Lamotte specifically writes that the Traite recognizes Śrāvaka emptiness as dharma-nairātmya
Last edited by sphairos on Sun Sep 12, 2021 10:25 am, edited 3 times in total.
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Re: Abhidhamma historical origins

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Ceisiwr wrote: Sun Sep 12, 2021 1:21 am This is the relevant section
I know, but the caveat is that the commentarial literature doesn't contradict the mūla , canonical writings.

Everything it says implies that "all dhammas are expressions", that the language itself if conventional, and it is as well well-implied in its turn by their being suñña.

"Saccato" is Ablative and means "from [their] true [state]", and nowhere in the commentarial literature it is said that dhammas are "real" (the closest word to "real" is bhūta, but it is also never employed).

Enough was said, I am not going to "compete" further. An insightful person will understand that the dhammas even in post-canonical literature are very hardly "real".
Last edited by sphairos on Sun Sep 12, 2021 12:10 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Abhidhamma historical origins

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I did more Abhidhamma research today.

The Suttas say about Dependent Origination: :sage:
And what is becoming?
Katamo ca, bhikkhave, bhavo?

There are these three types of becoming.
Tayome, bhikkhave, bhavā—

Sensual becoming, form becoming, formless becoming.
kāmabhavo, rūpabhavo, arūpabhavo.

This is called becoming.
Ayaṁ vuccati, bhikkhave, bhavo.

SN 12.2; MN 9
Abhidhamma says about Dependent Origination: :cry:
Tattha katamo upādānapaccayā bhavo? Ṭhapetvā upādānaṁ, vedanākkhandho saññākkhandho saṅkhārakkhandho viññāṇakkhandho— ayaṁ vuccati “upādānapaccayā bhavo”.

Herein, what is ‘with attachment as condition: becoming?’ Except for attachment, (it is) the feeling aggregate, the perception aggregate, the mental formations aggregate, the consciousness aggregate: this is said to be ‘with attachment as condition: becoming’.

Paṭiccasamuppādavibhaṅga
:jawdrop: :spy:
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Re: Abhidhamma historical origins

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Ontheway wrote: Fri Sep 03, 2021 5:43 pm IMO, Abhidhamma is truly important to understand the fundamental teachings of Buddha ...
IMO, Abhidhamma is fake. Refer to my previous post.

From the above redefinition of "bhava"; the Abhidhamma then redefines "jati" as the birth of "things" ("dhammam") rather than the birth of "beings" ("sattanam").

This distortion is then carried through into the Visuddhimagga, as follows:
Vsm wrote:Kathaṃ? Idhekacco kāme paribhuñjissāmīti kāmupādānapaccayā kāyena duccaritaṃ carati, vācāya duccaritaṃ carati, manasā duccaritaṃ carati, duccaritapāripūriyā apāye upapajjati. Tatthassa upapattihetubhūtaṃ kammaṃ kammabhavo, kammanibbattā khandhā upapattibhavo, khandhānaṃ nibbatti jāti, paripāko jarā, bhedo maraṇaṃ.

19. Yet another thinks, “I shall enjoy the delights of immaterial becoming,” and with the same condition he develops the attainments beginning with the base consisting of boundless space. Owing to the fulfilment of the development he is reborn in one of these states. The kamma that is the cause of his rebirth there is kamma-process becoming, the aggregates generated by the kamma are rebirth process becoming (upapattibhavo), the generating (nibbatti) of the aggregates is birth, their maturing is ageing, their dissolution is death....
So for Abhidhamma, "jati & marana" are the birth & death of the five aggregates. But the Suttas never say this. The Suttas refer to birth & death of "beings" ("sattanam") mentally produced "abhinibbatti" from the manifestation of their aggregates.

For example, the Suttas say in many places Arahants are not subject to "birth & death" yet the Suttas say the ending of the life of an Arahant is the ending of the aggregates (SN 22.85). It follows what the Abhidhamma & Visuddhimagga say about "birth & death" is contrary to Sutta.

:reading:
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Re: Abhidhamma historical origins

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Ceisiwr wrote: Sun Sep 12, 2021 1:34 amPerhaps Coëmgenu can help us?
So the Coles Notes of what I know about Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa pretty much lines up with what Sphairos said. Traditionally, authorship of the work is ascribed to Venerable Nāgārjuna. I was not aware that apparently the sūtras cited are Sarvāstivādin. I had thought that many were from untraced recensions. The real unknown author is some kind of ex- or post-Vaibhāṣika who is "Mahāyānizing" the Sarvāstivāda. What I ask is "From where does 'Mahāyānizing' come?" which is the same golden question that no one can answer on account of a dearth of information. If Mahāyānization necessarily means the importing of non-Sarvāstivādin material, where does this anomalous material come from? Mahāsāṃghika Abhidharma? Something else? I will admit that I still entertain dated theories that the Mahāyāna originated in a series of Mahāsāṃghika sects and then spread to Sthaviravādin ones. That's a very dated theory. In Walser's recent "Genealogies of Mahāyāna" he throws a lot of that (mostly Japanese) theorizing out and implies that the ur-prajñāpāramitā sūtra was written by a Sarvāstivādin who was highly influenced by Hindu scriptures. I often cast shade on this thesis, but Walter goes to length to try to establish it. I think that he devalues too much Japanese scholarship identifying the seeds of many Mahāyāna scriptures as coming from different śrāvaka sects, like the early Prajñāpāramitā from Āndhraka communities.
Last edited by Coëmgenu on Sun Sep 12, 2021 12:43 pm, edited 2 times in total.
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Re: Abhidhamma historical origins

Post by Ontheway »

DooDoot wrote: Sun Sep 12, 2021 11:06 am
Ontheway wrote: Fri Sep 03, 2021 5:43 pm IMO, Abhidhamma is truly important to understand the fundamental teachings of Buddha ...
IMO, Abhidhamma is fake. Refer to my previous post.

From the above redefinition of "bhava"; the Abhidhamma then redefines "jati" as the birth of "things" ("dhammam") rather than the birth of "beings" ("sattanam").

This distortion is then carried through into the Visuddhimagga, as follows:
Vsm wrote:Kathaṃ? Idhekacco kāme paribhuñjissāmīti kāmupādānapaccayā kāyena duccaritaṃ carati, vācāya duccaritaṃ carati, manasā duccaritaṃ carati, duccaritapāripūriyā apāye upapajjati. Tatthassa upapattihetubhūtaṃ kammaṃ kammabhavo, kammanibbattā khandhā upapattibhavo, khandhānaṃ nibbatti jāti, paripāko jarā, bhedo maraṇaṃ.

19. Yet another thinks, “I shall enjoy the delights of immaterial becoming,” and with the same condition he develops the attainments beginning with the base consisting of boundless space. Owing to the fulfilment of the development he is reborn in one of these states. The kamma that is the cause of his rebirth there is kamma-process becoming, the aggregates generated by the kamma are rebirth process becoming (upapattibhavo), the generating (nibbatti) of the aggregates is birth, their maturing is ageing, their dissolution is death....
So for Abhidhamma, "jati & marana" are the birth & death of the five aggregates. But the Suttas never say this. The Suttas refer to birth & death of "beings" ("sattanam") mentally produced "abhinibbatti" from the manifestation of their aggregates.

For example, the Suttas say in many places Arahants are not subject to "birth & death" yet the Suttas say the ending of the life of an Arahant is the ending of the aggregates (SN 22.85). It follows what the Abhidhamma & Visuddhimagga say about "birth & death" is contrary to Sutta.

:reading:
The quote of Visuddhi Magga above clearly stated "the generating of aggregates is birth", which doesn't contradict Suttanta such as Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, Saccavibhanga Sutta, and Abhidhamma Pitaka: Vibhanga, etc. No contradiction.

"So for Abhidhamma, "jati & marana" are the birth & death of the five aggregates."
So it is, the birth & death of "beings"is combination and breakup of five aggregates, arising and ceasing, exhibits the characteristics such as Anicca, Dukkha and Anatta.

The designation "Being" is mere conventional term, while ultimate sense is the "Five Aggregates". For a being's constituents, are non other than the Five Aggregates, which manifested the characteristics such as Anicca, Dukkha, and Anatta.

"...the Suttas say in many places Arahants are not subject to "birth & death" yet the Suttas say the ending of the life of an Arahant is the ending of the aggregates (SN 22.85). "

This is correct, birth & death of "Being" is the appearance and disappearance of five aggregates. And Arahants managed to stop the future reappearance in all realms and escape the Samsara. There is no contradiction whatsoever.

"SN 22.85"
So this Sutta is a good one to show "Beings" are mere five aggregates, subject to arising and ceasing, is fitting to say: "This is not mine, not me, not my Self." But, Ven. Yamaka made a mistake in the beginning, thinking that there is a "Personality" or "Self" to be annihilated.

But soon Lord Buddha and Ven. Sariputta Thera advised him, Ven. Yamaka dropped the wrong view, and finally sees the reality: Five Aggregates are Anicca, Dukkha, and Anatta.

The teachings are integrated, well presented and pertain for wisdom. :buddha1:
Hiriottappasampannā,
sukkadhammasamāhitā;
Santo sappurisā loke,
devadhammāti vuccare.

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Re: Abhidhamma historical origins

Post by sphairos »

Coëmgenu wrote: Sun Sep 12, 2021 12:14 pm What I ask is "From whence does 'Mahāyānizing' come?" which is the same golden question no one can answer on account of a dearth of information.
Yes, it's indeed a very interesting question. To be published this year is A. Schlosser's edition, translation and study of the Gāndhārī Kharoṣṭhī Fragments from Bajaur in the "Gandharan Buddhist Texts"

https://uwapress.uw.edu/search-results/ ... hdate-desc

I was lucky to have consulted the work prior to publication, and the material is fascinating: it is proto-Mahāyāna, proto-prajñāpāramitā texts of otherwise unknown type and "genre", something like preaching to an auditory, sometimes they throw in some Sarvāstivāda-like elements, sometimes not, but they seem to stress that all dharmas are meaningless/useless (anartha) and painful, and that one should realize their emptiness here and now.
Last edited by sphairos on Sun Sep 12, 2021 12:57 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Abhidhamma historical origins

Post by Ontheway »

Wasn't related to OP, but seeing some posts here discussing topic related to early schools and Mahayana, I would like to share a Bhikkhu Bodhi's Dhamma sharing video:



In this video, he talks about the interaction between Nagarjuna and Sarvastivada, and also discuss some Mahayana scriptures such as Heart Sutra.
Hiriottappasampannā,
sukkadhammasamāhitā;
Santo sappurisā loke,
devadhammāti vuccare.

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Re: Abhidhamma historical origins

Post by Ceisiwr »

sphairos wrote: Sun Sep 12, 2021 10:22 am
Ceisiwr wrote: Sun Sep 12, 2021 1:21 am This is the relevant section
I know, but the caveat is that the commentarial literature doesn't contradict the mūla , canonical writings.

Everything it says implies that "all dhammas are expressions", that the language itself if conventional, and it is as well well-implied in its turn by their being suñña.

"Saccato" is Ablative and means "from [their] true [state]", and nowhere in the commentarial literature it is said that dhammas are "real" (the closest word to "real" is bhūta, but it is also never employed).

Enough was said, I am not going to "compete" further. An insightful person will understand that the dhammas even in post-canonical literature are very hardly "real".
I'm not sure why you think a conversation is a competition? I don't care if you are right or if I am right. I'm just interested in what is true. Regarding the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, my Pāli and general knowledge of the text isn't up to the level where I can assess if it states that dhammas are conventional (and so empty). Perhaps Ven. Dhammanando can give us his understanding when he returns. Still, even if it does say that that isn't how the text was interpreted by the Theras. When discussing this section in the Atthasālinī Ven. Buddhaghosa seems to make a distinction between feeling, concept and name. There is feeling and a name arises with it, answering to the spontaneously arising concept. The interesting thing here is that he said that concepts arise. I've attached a picture of the relevant section for you.
Not at all, everything in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa which is said to belong to Śrāvaka is par excellence Sarvāstivāda, the whole scripture is based on the Sarvāstivādin recension of canon, but it specifically says that ALL śrāvaka schools teach and realize dharma-śūnyatā / dharma-nairātmya / mahāśūnyatā, it quotes for illustration a Saṃyukta sūtra from the Sarvāstivādin canonical collection.

Lamotte specifically writes that the Traite recognizes Śrāvaka emptiness as dharma-nairātmya
You might have missed my post where I said it does look like it's familiar with the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma. However, how accurate is the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa here? Is it actually representing the Vaibhāṣika position? To a Vaibhāṣika the dhammas are substantially existent in the 3 times (dravyasat). Liberation then comes from "decoupling" from these substantial existents, at which point one cognises nibbāna which is itself another substantial existent. Now like Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika views the signless, desirelessness and emptiness as being 3 aspects of nibbāna. In Theravāda that doesn't seem to then mean that the dhammas are empty, only that nibbāna is empty of those dhammas. I'll assume it is the same for Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika. With all that in mind, and based on having limited access to their texts, I don't see how to an orthodox Vaibhāṣika like Ven. Saṃghabhadra dharmas are ultimately empty. In fact Ven. Saṃghabhadra actually argues against the proposition that the dharmas are empty of sabhāva.
"Saccato" is Ablative and means "from [their] true [state]", and nowhere in the commentarial literature it is said that dhammas are "real" (the closest word to "real" is bhūta, but it is also never employed).
In the Visuddhimagga, without checking the pāli, Ven. Buddhaghosa seems to be saying that the dhammas are real.
24. 4. As to meaning, 5. tracing out the meaning: as to “meaning” firstly, what is the “meaning of truth” (saccattha)? It is that which, for those who examine it with the eye of understanding, is not misleading like an illusion, deceptive like a mirage, or undiscoverable like the self of the sectarians, but is rather the domain of noble knowledge as the real unmisleading actual state with its aspects of affliction, production, quiet, and outlet. It is this real unmisleading actualness that should be understood as the “meaning of truth” just as [heat is] the characteristic of fire, and just as [it is] in the nature of the world [that things are subject to birth, ageing and death], according as it is said, “Bhikkhus, this suffering is real, not unreal, not otherwise” (S V 430), and so on, in detail. 25. Furthermore:

There is no pain but is affliction.
And naught that is not pain afflicts:
This certainty that it afflicts
Is what is reckoned here as truth.

No other source of pain than craving.
Nor aught that source provides but pain:
This certainty in causing pain
Is why it is considered truth.

There is no peace except Nibbána,
Nibbána cannot but be peace:
This certainty that it is peace
Is what is reckoned here as truth.

No outlet other than the path.
Nor fails the path to be the outlet:
Its status as the very outlet
Has made it recognized as truth.

This real infallibility.
Which is their true essential core.
Is what the wise declare to be
Truth’s meaning common to all four.
CHAPTER XVI The Faculties and Truths

Certainly modern Ābhidhammikas also take them to be real. In his introduction to the Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha Ven. Bodhi writes
From the standpoint of ultimate reality (paramatthato): According to the Abhidhamma philosophy, there are two kinds of realities— the conventional (sammuti) and the ultimate (paramattha). Conventional realities are the referents of ordinary conceptual thought (paññatti) and conventional modes of expression (voh±ra). They include such entities as living beings, persons, men, women, animals, and the apparently stable persisting objects that constitute our unanalyzed picture of the world. The Abhidhamma philosophy maintains that these notions do not possess ultimate validity, for the objects which they signify do not exist in their own right as irreducible realities. Their mode of being is conceptual, not actual. They are products of mental construction (parikappan±), not realities existing by reason of their own nature. Ultimate realities, in contrast, are things that exist by reason of their own intrinsic nature (sabh±va). These are the dhammas: the final, irreducible components of existence, the ultimate entities which result from a correctly performed analysis of experience. Such existents admit of no further reduction, but are themselves the final terms of analysis, the true constituents of the complex manifold of experience. Hence the word paramattha is applied to them, which is derived from parama = ultimate, highest, final, and attha = reality, thing. The ultimate realities are characterized not only from the ontological angle as the ultimate existents, but also from the epistemological angle as the ultimate objects of right knowledge. As one extracts oil from sesame seed, so one can extract the ultimate realities from the conventional realities. For example “being,” and “man,” and “woman” are concepts suggesting that the things they signify possess irreducible ultimate unity. However, when we wisely investigate these things with the analytical tools of the Abhidhamma, we find that they do not possess the ultimacy implied by the concepts, but only a conventional reality as an assemblage of impermanent factors, of mental and physical processes. Thus by examining the conventional realities with wisdom, we eventually arrive at the objective actualities that lie behind our conceptual constructs. It is these objective actualities—the dhammas, which maintain their intrinsic natures independently of the mind’s constructive functions— that form the ultimate realities of the Abhidhamma.

Although ultimate realities exist as the concrete essences of things, they are so subtle and profound that an ordinary person who lacks training cannot perceive them. Such a person cannot see the ultimate realities because his mind is obscured by concepts, which shape reality into conventionally defined appearances. Only by means of wise or thorough attention to things (yoniso manasik±ra) can one see beyond the concepts and take the ultimate realities as one’s object of knowledge. Thus paramattha is described as that which belongs to the domain of ultimate or supreme knowledge.1
I suppose it is possible that Ven. Bodhi is misinterpreting things but if all of the Sthavira's were also teaching that dhammas are ultimately empty, and so their various Abhidharmas were, just who then were the Prajñāpāramitā texts and Ven. Nāgārjuna's MMK arguing against if not Ābhidhammikas? Those texts argue strongly for dhammas being empty in opposition to those who undoubtedly take the opposite view. Some of them are non-Buddhists, but mostly they seem to have other Buddhists in mind.
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Last edited by Ceisiwr on Sun Sep 12, 2021 1:25 pm, edited 4 times in total.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Ceisiwr
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Re: Abhidhamma historical origins

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Coëmgenu wrote: Sun Sep 12, 2021 12:14 pm
Ceisiwr wrote: Sun Sep 12, 2021 1:34 amPerhaps Coëmgenu can help us?
So the Coles Notes of what I know about Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa pretty much lines up with what Sphairos said. Traditionally, authorship of the work is ascribed to Venerable Nāgārjuna. I was not aware that apparently the sūtras cited are Sarvāstivādin. I had thought that many were from untraced recensions. The real unknown author is some kind of ex- or post-Vaibhāṣika who is "Mahāyānizing" the Sarvāstivāda. What I ask is "From where does 'Mahāyānizing' come?" which is the same golden question that no one can answer on account of a dearth of information. If Mahāyānization necessarily means the importing of non-Sarvāstivādin material, where does this anomalous material come from? Mahāsāṃghika Abhidharma? Something else? I will admit that I still entertain dated theories that the Mahāyāna originated in a series of Mahāsāṃghika sects and then spread to Sthaviravādin ones. That's a very dated theory. In Walser's recent "Genealogies of Mahāyāna" he throws a lot of that (mostly Japanese) theorizing out and implies that the ur-prajñāpāramitā sūtra was written by a Sarvāstivādin who was highly influenced by Hindu scriptures. I often cast shade on this thesis, but Walter goes to length to try to establish it. I think that he devalues too much Japanese scholarship identifying the seeds of many Mahāyāna scriptures as coming from different śrāvaka sects, like the early Prajñāpāramitā from Āndhraka communities.
Very interesting. Thanks. What are your thoughts regarding Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika actually teaching that ultimately dhammas are all empty?
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Ceisiwr
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Re: Abhidhamma historical origins

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Ontheway wrote: Sun Sep 12, 2021 12:57 pm Wasn't related to OP, but seeing some posts here discussing topic related to early schools and Mahayana, I would like to share a Bhikkhu Bodhi's Dhamma sharing video:



In this video, he talks about the interaction between Nagarjuna and Sarvastivada, and also discuss some Mahayana scriptures such as Heart Sutra.
Can you tell us which bit in the video he discusses these things?
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Re: Abhidhamma historical origins

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Ceisiwr wrote: Sun Sep 12, 2021 1:16 pmWhat are your thoughts regarding Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika actually teaching that ultimately dhammas are all empty?
I don't consider myself an expert on either of those kinds of Buddhism. Maybe it depends on the particular Theravādin or Vaibhāṣika? The issue is further clouded by the fact that most Mahāyāna literature after a certain time period is more interested in polemicizing against the supposed deficiencies of Śrāvaka Buddhism and in particular the deficient framing of emptiness than treating them on equal grounds. I know the founder of the Tibetan Gelug tradition, Ven Je Tsongkhapa, believed that the śrāvakas and bodhisattvas, and further the pratyekabuddhas, realized the same emptiness.

The old sayings go, loosely, "The śrāvaka realizes emptiness of the person, the bodhisattva realizes twofold emptiness of persons and the dharmas." Whether that's true or not is another story. In the Pāli suttas, the Buddha describes "rūpa" as "asāraka," or essenceless, insubstantial, etc., which seems to already be a complication of Ābhidharmika Buddhism as I know it, which is largely as a tourist. It is important to remember that the true function of Abhidharma texts is as manuals of Buddhist practice, not compendia of Buddhist doctrinal trivia, which is how a tourist like me largely treats Abhidharma when they don't practice a kind of Buddhism substantially predicated upon it. Either way, if rūpa is asāraka, how is it paramārtha? "Sāra," as we all likely know here, is also" heartwood" or "the core of the wood," and Buddhist literature puns between this and "saṃsāra." Relating to the "wood punning" is Nirvāṇa as "escape from the forest," vāna being read as "forest." The a- is simply a negation prefix.
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
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Ceisiwr
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Re: Abhidhamma historical origins

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Coëmgenu wrote: Sun Sep 12, 2021 1:54 pm
Ceisiwr wrote: Sun Sep 12, 2021 1:16 pmWhat are your thoughts regarding Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika actually teaching that ultimately dhammas are all empty?
I don't consider myself an expert on either of those kinds of Buddhism. Maybe it depends on the particular Theravādin or Vaibhāṣika? The issue is further clouded by the fact that most Mahāyāna literature after a certain time period is more interested in polemicizing against the supposed deficiencies of Śrāvaka Buddhism and in particular the deficient framing of emptiness than treating them on equal grounds. I know the founder of the Tibetan Gelug tradition, Ven Je Tsongkhapa, believed that the śrāvakas and bodhisattvas, and further the pratyekabuddhas, realized the same emptiness.
I think it's true that not all those ordained in the Sarvāstivādin or Theravādin lineage would have subscribed to their school's interpretation of things. Looking at their texts though, the doctrinal line always seems to be that dhammas are empty of atta but not empty of sabhāva and so they are ontologically existent/real. The Prajñāpāramitā texts themselves certainly look like a reaction to this interpretation.
The old sayings go, loosely, "The śrāvaka realizes emptiness of the person, the bodhisattva realizes twofold emptiness of persons and the dharmas." Whether that's true or not is another story. In the Pāli suttas, the Buddha describes "rūpa" as "asāraka," or essenceless, insubstantial, etc., which seems to already be a complication of Ābhidharmika Buddhism as I know it, which is largely as a tourist. It is important to remember that the true function of Abhidharma texts is as manuals of Buddhist practice, not compendia of Buddhist doctrinal trivia, which is how a tourist like me largely treats Abhidharma when they don't practice a kind of Buddhism substantially predicated upon it. Either way, if rūpa is asāraka, how is it paramārtha? "Sāra," as we all likely know here, is also" heartwood" or "the core of the wood," and Buddhist literature puns between this and "saṃsāra." Relating to the "wood punning" is Nirvāṇa as "escape from the forest," vāna being read as "forest." The a- is simply a negation prefix.
I've attached Ven. Bodhi's notes on this sutta. Whilst rūpa is empty of substance, which is taken to be a permanent core or atta, it is still ultimately true/real as it is irreducible. That's my understanding of the orthodox position.
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Last edited by Ceisiwr on Sun Sep 12, 2021 2:27 pm, edited 2 times in total.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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