So there can be two truths?

[zan]

You seem to find his position as invalid because it wasn't taught by the Buddha of the suttas. However, the Buddha taught atta (Sanskrit atman) as Buddha nature in the Mahayana sutras, just as he taught Prajnaparamita in the same sutras. Might your position on auto be unfair since you both accept Mahayana teachings?

Well I don’t think the Buddha taught the Mahāyāna sutras for one. That’s just ahistorical, but I do think they contain buddhavacana. I also don’t accept the Tathāgatagarbha idea. From what I know of it I think it’s wrong or simply unnecessary, and I don’t feel any compulsion to accept it. I don’t think someone needs to adopt that idea to follow the middle way of the Perfection of Wisdom and Ven. Nāgārjuna. I’m also not a follower of Mahāyāna.

I've recently begun taking the Prajñāpāramitā sutras seriously, and re-reading the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.

There's no reason for two on the same Bodhisattva path to be at odds.

I’m not a bodhisattva and nor do I intend to take those vows.

I'd recommend either you both agree that each of your positions is valid as Mahayana, or, ideally, and the best path, both give up Mahayana and stick to strictly Theravada. In Theravada there is no self, and no prajnaparamita sutras, so your disagreement would cease to exist.

Not that I am one, but Mahāyānists don’t agree on everything. Buddha-nature being one of those points of disagreements, based on my rather limited understanding.

We don’t need Mahayana nonsense preaching here

It is the nature of conditioned things to change

Well I don’t think the Buddha taught the Mahāyāna sutras for one. That’s just ahistorical, but I do think they contain buddhavacana.

This seems self contradictory. Buddhavacana literally means word of the Buddha. If he didn't teach them, they're not Buddhavacana. The Theravadins even have interesting explanations to keep some late Abhidhamma Buddhavacana because they saw the risk in calling things Buddhavacana that otherwise couldn't be. For example the Kathavatthu is said to have been psychically predicted by the Buddha, to explain it's inclusion as Buddhavacana despite being composed 218 years after his parinibbana.

In Buddhaghosa's reckoning, the Buddha laid down the "matrix" (matika) of this work, foreseeing that 218 years from his death the elder Moggaliputta Tissa would elaborate it into the Kathavatthu
-Voice of the Buddha, Maria Heim, page 43

And, of course, so do the Mahayanists. They taught that Nagarjuna traveled to the Naga realm and brought back the sutras hidden there. So, either you don't believe they were taught by the Buddha, or you find them to be Buddhavacana due to magical circumstances. Otherwise, you're saying you don't believe that they are Buddhavacana but you do think they are Buddhavacana. If you mean they contain direct quotes from the suttas, that would be another story, and they could be late teachings not taught by the Buddha but contain Buddhavacana via direct quotes, but, since they don't, and only contain telephone game versions of the words of the suttas, deliberately or accidentally altered to fit the Mahayana doctrines, this cannot be said to be true. There may be tiny, insignificant fragments that are the same, but they are irrelevant, because they are inextricably bound to the larger Mahayana frame, and more often then not, even the tiny fragments that are the same are redefined in ways to make them utterly dissimilar to the Theravada.

By tradition, the Prajnaparamita sutras were hidden in the Naga realm, to be found by the great sage Nagarjuna somewhere between 150 and 250 AD.
-Buddha Weekly article

Not that I am one, but Mahāyānists don’t agree on everything. Buddha-nature being one of those points of disagreements, based on my rather limited understanding.

No, but Mahayanists have no grounds for criticizing other Mahayanists for believing teachings from their shared corpus of texts. If you accept the validity of a sutra that was written hundreds of years after the parinibbana of the Buddha, you've no grounds for criticizing someone else for doing the same. In other words, if prajnaparamita is valid, so is Buddha nature. They're both texts composed anonymously, hundreds of years after the Buddha's parinibbana, and thus, equally valid. The only distinction we can draw historically is between the suttas, composed closer to his parinibbana, and agreed upon by many historians to possibly go back to his time, and the Mahayana sutras, which are agreed upon to be late, and not go back to his time.

We could say that if it's not firmly, and clearly, directly stated in the suttas, it isn't Buddhavacana. Buddha nature and prajnaparamita are both not found in the suttas. You surely would argue that the principles and ideas behind prajnaparamita are found in the suttas, yes? Well, people who agree with the Buddha nature sutras would do the exact same thing. So, you are on common ground. In the end, neither teaching is clearly, directly, repeatedly and unambiguously found in the suttas, and both teachings can be "found" in the suttas by using word juggling and textual gymnastics.

We don’t need Mahayana nonsense preaching here

It is the nature of conditioned things to change

Precisely, and along with your change in view, from rejection of Mahayana to acceptance, might it be reasonable for there to be a change in your interaction with others who, deliberately or unknowingly, hold Mahayana views?

I'm also not a follower of Mahayana.

Well, you believe the Mahayana interpretation of the dhamma is the correct one, reject the orthodox interpretation, and follow the teachings of Nagarjuna (a Mahayana teacher) and the Mahayana prajnaparamita sutras, so, I'm not sure this is a reasonable statement. One could make the argument that it would be false to say that you do not follow the Mahayana.

My sincere hope and belief is that you will eventually come back to Theravada, though. The Mahayana path you're on is built on deliberate paradoxes to create an Ajnana style suspension of judgement. This is not necessarily a bad thing, and many philosophies have been built on the idea that this is the path to peace. However it is not Buddhism. You'll start to see that all the dharma rules and teachings are all negated, with zero exceptions. Then you'll notice that, once everything is negated, the dharma and the Buddha have no place, and thus, learning them all makes zero sense. Next, you'll notice that the Ajnanas and Pyrhonnists had gotten there long before Nagarjuna and the Mahayana, and their teachings are a short-cut, streamlined version of the Mahayana and that Nagarjuna actually seems to have quite possibly built his philosophy, which came to define much of Mahayana, and all of prajnaparamita, on Ajnana philosophy, which came to him via Pyrrhonism. Then you'll notice that there's simply nothing to any of this, by definition, it is an empty philosophy, and come back to the Theravada.

Scholars including Barua, Jayatilleke, and Flintoff, contend that Pyrrho was influenced by, or at the very least agreed with, Indian scepticism rather than Buddhism or Jainism, based on the fact that he valued ataraxia, which can be translated as "freedom from worry". Jayatilleke, in particular, contends that Pyrrho may have been influenced by the first three schools of Ajñana, since they too valued freedom from worry. If this is true, then the methods of the Ajñanins may be preserved in the extant work by the Pyrrhonist philosopher Sextus Empiricus.
-wikipedia page on Ajnana

Because of the high degree of similarity between Madhyamaka and Pyrrhonism, Thomas McEvilley and Matthew Neale suspect that Nāgārjuna was influenced by Greek Pyrrhonist texts imported into India.
-wikipedia page on Madhyamaka

Also noteworthy is the historical Buddha's position on the schools which negated everything and took no position:

The fourth school of Scepticism described in Brahmajala Sutta is associated with Sanjaya Belatthiputta, whose views are also recorded in the Samaññaphala Sutta, since identical language is used to describe them.[28] Sanjaya is described as a contemporary of the Buddha, as a well-known and celebrated teacher, and as a leader of a sect who was held in high esteem by the common folk. He is said to have taught Sariputta and Moggallana, before their conversion to Buddhism. [28]

In Brahmajala Sutta, this fourth school of Sceptics is described as thus:

Herein a certain recluse or brahmin is dull, stupid. And by reason of his dullness and stupidity, when questioned on this or that matter, he resorts to verbal jugglery or eel-wriggling: "If you ask me whether there is a next world, then if it were to occur to me (iti ce me assa) that there is a next world, I would pronounce that there is a next world. Yet, I do not say so, I do not say thus, I do not say otherwise, I do not say no, I deny the denials. Similarly with regard to the propositions, "there is no next world", "there is and is not a next world", "there neither is nor is not a next world", "there are beings who survive (death)", "there are no beings who survive", "there are and are no beings who survive", "there neither are nor are there no beings who survive", "there is a result and a consequence of good and evil actions", "there is no result or consequence of good or evil actions", "the Perfect One (Tathagato) exists after death", "the Perfect One does not exist after death", "the Perfect One both exists and does not exist after death", "the Perfect One neither exists nor does not exist after death""[29]

A similar account is given in the Samaññaphala Sutta. In both the accounts, the stupidity of this school is emphasised, highlighting the antipathy that the Buddhists felt about this school. In the Brahmajala Sutta, out of sixty-two philosophical schools mentioned, this school is singled out as being "a product of sheer stupidity;" whereas in the Samaññaphala Sutta, Ajatasattu singles out Sanjaya as "the most foolish and stupid."[30]

Notable in this account of the fourth school of Scepticism is the lack of concern for good life and peace of mind, which the previous three schools regarded as desirable, and hence their advocacy of scepticism. Jayatilleke states that Sanjaya may have been a more thorough-going sceptic, to the point of being sceptical about a sceptic's way of life, and as such might have been a more vocal critic of his opponents and their regard for mental tranquillity, valued by the Buddhists as well.[30] Judging by the propositions listed, Sanjaya's scepticism seems to have encompassed both metaphysics and morality. Sanjaya seems to grant the possibility of their truth, while denying the possibility of knowing this.[31
-Wikipedia page on Ajnana

They were specialized in refutation without propagating any positive doctrine of their own.
-wiki page on Ajnana

Compare Nagarjuna:

Nāgārjuna is famous for arguing that his philosophy was not a view, and that he in fact did not take any position (paksa) or thesis (pratijña) whatsoever since this would just be another form of clinging to some form of existence.[77][64] In his Vigrahavyavartani, Nāgārjuna states:

If I had any position, I thereby would be at fault. Since I have no position, I am not at fault at all. If there were anything to be observed through direct perception and the other instances [of valid cognition], it would be something to be established or rejected. However, since no such thing exists, I cannot be criticized.[78]

Likewise in his Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning, Nāgārjuna says: "By taking any standpoint whatsoever, you will be snatched by the cunning snakes of the afflictions. Those whose minds have no standpoint, will not be caught." [79] Randall Collins states that for Nāgārjuna, ultimate reality is simply the idea that "no concepts are intelligible", while Ferrer notes that Nagarjuna criticized those whose mind held any "positions and beliefs", including the view of emptiness, as Nāgārjuna says: "The Victorious Ones have announced that emptiness is the relinquishing of all views. Those who are possessed of the view of emptiness are said to be incorrigible."[80][81] Aryadeva echoes this idea in his Four Hundred Verses:

"First, one puts an end to what is not meritorious. In the middle, one puts an end to identity. Later, one puts an end to all views. Those who understand this are skilled."[82]
-Wikipedia page on Madhyamaka

And compare the Theravada position on nibbana to Nagarjuna:

Again, it should not be said that Nibbána does not exist. Why not? Because it then follows that the way would be futile. [508] For if Nibbána were non- existent, then it would follow that the right way, which includes the three aggregates beginning with virtue and is headed by right understanding, would be futile. And it is not futile because it does reach Nibbána.
-Vism XVI.68

Both samsara and nirvana,
Neither of these two exists;
The thorough understanding of cyclic existence
This is referred to as "nirvana"
-Nagarjuna, Sixty Stanzas, verse 6

Per my previous thread in which you participated, the case can be made conclusively that the Buddha did not promote total viewlessness nor complete suspension of judgement. Rather the opposite: he held true knowledge and promoted right view.

I'll leave off with this, now. It seems your mind is made up on Mahayana being the correct path, but for some reason you can't admit it to yourself, and still see yourself as a Theravadin, positioned to criticize those with Mahayana views, inexplicably. I hope this will resolve itself in you realizing that this is because Theravada is the correct path! There is peace to be found in Ajnana suspension of judgment, but much more peace to be found in Theravada teachings which rely on wisdom and true knowledge, the opposite of Ajnana suspension of judgement. Good luck!

[Ceisiwr]

This seems self contradictory. Buddhavacana literally means word of the Buddha. If he didn't teach them, they're not Buddhavacana. The Theravadins even have interesting explanations to keep some late Abhidhamma Buddhavacana because they saw the risk in calling things Buddhavacana that otherwise couldn't be. For example the Kathavatthu is said to have been psychically predicted by the Buddha, to explain it's inclusion as Buddhavacana despite being composed 218 years after his parinibbana.

I take a more nuanced view. Of course Buddhavacana is the literal worlds of the Buddha, but it's also what was explained by the disciples and that which accords with the meaning IMO.


“Sir, may the Buddha please teach me Dhamma in brief. When I’ve heard it, I’ll live alone, withdrawn, diligent, keen, and resolute.”

“Gotamī, you might know that certain things lead to passion, not dispassion; to being fettered, not to being unfettered; to accumulation, not dispersal; to more desires, not fewer; to lack of contentment, not contentment; to crowding, not seclusion; to laziness, not energy; to being burdensome, not being unburdensome. You should definitely bear in mind that these things are not the teaching, not the training, and not the Teacher’s instructions.

You might know that certain things lead to dispassion, not passion; to being unfettered, not to being fettered; to dispersal, not accumulation; to fewer desires, not more; to contentment, not lack of contentment; to seclusion, not crowding; to energy, not laziness; to being unburdensome, not being burdensome. You should definitely bear in mind that these things are the teaching, the training, and the Teacher’s instructions.”

- AN 8.53

And, of course, so do the Mahayanists. They taught that Nagarjuna traveled to the Naga realm and brought back the sutras hidden there.

Yes. It's nonsense, isn't it. I don't believe that Ven. Nāgārjuna went scuba-diving anymore than the Buddha taught his mother the Theravādin Abhidhamma to his mother, a collection of texts that most Buddhists in history have never even heard of.

No, but Mahayanists have no grounds for criticizing other Mahayanists for believing teachings from their shared corpus of texts. If you accept the validity of a sutra that was written hundreds of years after the parinibbana of the Buddha, you've no grounds for criticizing someone else for doing the same. In other words, if prajnaparamita is valid, so is Buddha nature. They're both texts composed anonymously, hundreds of years after the Buddha's parinibbana, and thus, equally valid. The only distinction we can draw historically is between the suttas, composed closer to his parinibbana, and agreed upon by many historians to possibly go back to his time, and the Mahayana sutras, which are agreed upon to be late, and not go back to his time.

This is a false dichotomy. Mahāyānists can criticise other Mahāyānists for getting things wrong. It's no different to when Theravādins criticised Sarvāstivādins, or when both criticised the Mahāsāṃghika. You accept the Abhidhamma that was written hundreds of years after the Master died. Does that then mean you cannot criticise the Mahāyāna? If I don't think they accord with the meaning, then I don't have to accept them. I don't think the idea of Buddha-nature is in accordance with what the Buddha taught. I don't think you can trace it back in anyway to the suttas and āgamas that we know of. I do think you can with the Perfection of Wisdom.

We could say that if it's not firmly, and clearly, directly stated in the suttas, it isn't Buddhavacana. Buddha nature and prajnaparamita are both not found in the suttas.

Interesting. So you reject the chunks of the Abhidhamma and associated concepts then?

You surely would argue that the principles and ideas behind prajnaparamita are found in the suttas, yes? Well, people who agree with the Buddha nature sutras would do the exact same thing. So, you are on common ground.

I'm sure some would, and I would disagree. Other's might believe it was a secret teaching, transmitted in the sutras, and I would disagree.

In the end, neither teaching is clearly, directly, repeatedly and unambiguously found in the suttas, and both teachings can be "found" in the suttas by using word juggling and textual gymnastics.

I think momentariness is found in the suttas and āgamas, and when understood fully it leads to the Prajñāpāramitā and Ven. Nāgārjuna.

"Monks, all compounded things are as an illusion, a flame, ceasing in an instant; being not real they come (arise) and go (cease)" - SA 273

"The eye is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise; forms are impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. Thus this dyad is moving and tottering, impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise." - SN 35.93

Precisely, and along with your change in view, from rejection of Mahayana to acceptance, might it be reasonable for there to be a change in your interaction with others who, deliberately or unknowingly, hold Mahayana views?

I don't understand the question, but I'm not a Mahāyānist.

My sincere hope and belief is that you will eventually come back to Theravada, though.

That could happen. Who knows.

The Mahayana path you're on is built on deliberate paradoxes to create an Ajnana style suspension of judgement. This is not necessarily a bad thing, and many philosophies have been built on the idea that this is the path to peace. However it is not Buddhism. You'll start to see that all the dharma rules and teachings are all negated, with zero exceptions. Then you'll notice that, once everything is negated, the dharma and the Buddha have no place, and thus, learning them all makes zero sense.

Well, in a way. Ultimately there is no Buddha, path, nibbāna etc. They are just concepts, as too is the concept of emptiness. I wouldn't say it's Ajñāna. Ajñāna was based on fear or stupidity. They didn't have any real understanding of why they were suspending judgement. That is different to seeing how all dhammas are empty because they are dependently originated.

Next, you'll notice that the Ajnanas and Pyrhonnists had gotten there long before Nagarjuna and the Mahayana, and their teachings are a short-cut, streamlined version of the Mahayana and that Nagarjuna actually seems to have quite possibly built his philosophy, which came to define much of Mahayana, and all of prajnaparamita, on Ajnana philosophy, which came to him via Pyrrhonism.

The early Prajñāpāramitā texts pre-date Ven. Nāgārjuna, and I don't think there is any evidence that he was influenced by Pyrrho.

Per my previous thread in which you participated, the case can be made conclusively that the Buddha did not promote total viewlessness nor complete suspension of judgement. Rather the opposite: he held true knowledge and promoted right view.

You do know that in Theravāda paññā (wisdom, knowledge, understanding) is impermanent? This means it is dependently originated. If all dhammas which are dependently originated are empty, then so is paññā. It wouldn't have any existence of it's own. It would be a concept.

I'll leave off with this, now. It seems your mind is made up on Mahayana being the correct path, but for some reason you can't admit it to yourself, and still see yourself as a Theravadin, positioned to criticize those with Mahayana views, inexplicably.

I'm not a follower of Mahāyāna. I don't accept the concept of staying in Saṃsāra to save others. I don't recognise a bodhisattva path. I don't have to accept all that to acknowledge that Ven. Nāgārjuna and the Prajñāpāramitā were onto something. I also never said I'm still a Theravādin. I've argued before that a Theravādin is someone who follows the Abhidhamma and associated commentaries, at least in most respects. Whilst I still find those texts useful, I don't think they are the end point of understanding the Dhamma. As I said though, I don't follow Mahāyāna either so I guess I'm just plodding along in no man's land. Kind of peaceful out here so far

[AlexBrains92]

[SarathW]

here we go again...

Already 5-pages again.

Why is this standard teaching being discussed as if it is a very subjective, mysterious ideal that is totally vague and up for interpretation? Why are Mahayana answers being posted? Seriously, what is happening? The commentators who invented it also explained it perfectly and in depth. There is no mystery, and no interpretation needed. I understand the initial question by op, but it should have been finished by a few replies referencing where this question is already answered conclusively.

I would understand if there was a sutta or two where the Buddha said there are two truths, but didn't explain, and no other reference in the canon. But, quite the opposite, as I said above, the Buddha didn't teach it at all, and the commentarial Abhidhamma created it, and explained it in great detail. This is weird.

What's next? Someone asks "What are the four paramattha dhammas?" And we get five pages of people guessing and posting whatever they think this may mean, and ignoring that the paramatthas are another standardized Abhidhamma teaching with a clear answer? "I think four paramattha dhammas may be Buddha's way of saying four ways to be a nice happy person. Maybe each one is an idea like: 1.) 'Be nice.' 2.) 'Wear a fancy hat.' 3.) 'Eat your vegetables.' 4.) Avoid dragons."

And every time someone answers correctly, "mind, mental factors, matter and nibbana." it will be ignored and wild guesses and extrapolation will go on lol!

This is what I like to know.
Is this an Abhidhamma creation or a Mahayana creation?
If you find this in Sutta please provide the reference with Pali words.

[Ceisiwr]

This is what I like to know.
Is this an Abhidhamma creation or a Mahayana creation?
If you find this in Sutta please provide the reference with Pali words.

Why does the actual words have to be in the sutta? Can't an idea be there without being directly stated as such? Why this hyper literalism?

[AlexBrains92]

I'm not a follower of Mahāyāna. I don't accept the concept of staying in Saṃsāra to save others. I don't recognise a bodhisattva path.

It seems that Mahāyāna hasn't always been characterized by those things. There are some interesting hypotheses about primitive Mahāyāna.

[PeterC86]

For the one who has gone for refuge, there can only be the possibility of there being two truths, when the one who has gone for refuge has realized that the dhamma they have sought refuge in, could not be the true dhamma.

The Theravada tradition is based on the Tipitaka, which is based on the first Buddhist council, which is based on the Buddha's words, right?

And, according to SN 51.15, Ananda knows the path, thereby speaking the words of the Buddha;
https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitak ... .than.html

I have heard that on one occasion Ven. Ananda was staying in Kosambi, at Ghosita's Park. Then the Brahman Unnabha went to where Ven. Ananda was staying and on arrival greeted him courteously. After an exchange of friendly greetings & courtesies, he sat to one side. As he was sitting there, he said to Ven. Ananda: "Master Ananda, what is the aim of this holy life lived under Gotama the contemplative?"

"Brahman, the holy life is lived under the Blessed One with the aim of abandoning desire."

"Is there a path, is there a practice, for the abandoning of that desire?"

"Yes, there is a path, there is a practice, for the abandoning of that desire."

"What is the path, the practice, for the abandoning of that desire?"

"Brahman, there is the case where a monk develops the base of power endowed with concentration founded on desire & the fabrications of exertion. He develops the base of power endowed with concentration founded on persistence... concentration founded on intent... concentration founded on discrimination & the fabrications of exertion. This, Brahman, is the path, this is the practice for the abandoning of that desire."

"If that's so, Master Ananda, then it's an endless path, and not one with an end, for it's impossible that one could abandon desire by means of desire."

"In that case, brahman, let me question you on this matter. Answer as you see fit. What do you think: Didn't you first have desire, thinking, 'I'll go to the park,' and then when you reached the park, wasn't that particular desire allayed?"

"Yes, sir."

"Didn't you first have persistence, thinking, 'I'll go to the park,' and then when you reached the park, wasn't that particular persistence allayed?"

"Yes, sir."

"Didn't you first have the intent, thinking, 'I'll go to the park,' and then when you reached the park, wasn't that particular intent allayed?"

"Yes, sir."

"Didn't you first have [an act of] discrimination, thinking, 'I'll go to the park,' and then when you reached the park, wasn't that particular act of discrimination allayed?"

"Yes, sir."

"So it is with an arahant whose mental effluents are ended, who has reached fulfillment, done the task, laid down the burden, attained the true goal, totally destroyed the fetter of becoming, and who is released through right gnosis. Whatever desire he first had for the attainment of arahantship, on attaining arahantship that particular desire is allayed. Whatever persistence he first had for the attainment of arahantship, on attaining arahantship that particular persistence is allayed. Whatever intent he first had for the attainment of arahantship, on attaining arahantship that particular intent is allayed. Whatever discrimination he first had for the attainment of arahantship, on attaining arahantship that particular discrimination is allayed. So what do you think, brahman? Is this an endless path, or one with an end?"

"You're right, Master Ananda. This is a path with an end, and not an endless one. Magnificent, Master Ananda! Magnificent! Just as if he were to place upright what was overturned, to reveal what was hidden, to show the way to one who was lost, or to carry a lamp into the dark so that those with eyes could see forms, in the same way has Master Ananda — through many lines of reasoning — made the Dhamma clear. I go to Master Gotama for refuge, to the Dhamma, and to the Sangha of monks. May Master Ananda remember me as a lay follower who has gone for refuge, from this day forward, for life."

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


How can Ananda have knowledge of the path, outside of Ananda's desire to have knowledge? For Ananda said:

"Brahman, there is the case where a monk develops the base of power endowed with concentration founded on desire & the fabrications of exertion. He develops the base of power endowed with concentration founded on persistence... concentration founded on intent... concentration founded on discrimination & the fabrications of exertion. This, Brahman, is the path, this is the practice for the abandoning of that desire."

By the words of Ananda, Ananda does not know that Ananda's path is an endless path; Ananda desired to abandon desire by means of desire.

By the words of Ananda, the Brahman started to believe in a holy life under the Blessed One, by thinking the Brahman had heard the words of the Blessed One;

"So what do you think, brahman? Is this an endless path, or one with an end?"

"You're right, Master Ananda. This is a path with an end, and not an endless one. Magnificent, Master Ananda! Magnificent! Just as if he were to place upright what was overturned, to reveal what was hidden, to show the way to one who was lost, or to carry a lamp into the dark so that those with eyes could see forms, in the same way has Master Ananda — through many lines of reasoning — made the Dhamma clear. I go to Master Gotama for refuge, to the Dhamma, and to the Sangha of monks. May Master Ananda remember me as a lay follower who has gone for refuge, from this day forward, for life.""

By the words of Ananda, the Brahman does not know that Ananda's path is an endless path.


Ananda's words are not the words of the Blessed One.

[zan]

Already 5-pages again.

Why is this standard teaching being discussed as if it is a very subjective, mysterious ideal that is totally vague and up for interpretation? Why are Mahayana answers being posted? Seriously, what is happening? The commentators who invented it also explained it perfectly and in depth. There is no mystery, and no interpretation needed. I understand the initial question by op, but it should have been finished by a few replies referencing where this question is already answered conclusively.

I would understand if there was a sutta or two where the Buddha said there are two truths, but didn't explain, and no other reference in the canon. But, quite the opposite, as I said above, the Buddha didn't teach it at all, and the commentarial Abhidhamma created it, and explained it in great detail. This is weird.

What's next? Someone asks "What are the four paramattha dhammas?" And we get five pages of people guessing and posting whatever they think this may mean, and ignoring that the paramatthas are another standardized Abhidhamma teaching with a clear answer? "I think four paramattha dhammas may be Buddha's way of saying four ways to be a nice happy person. Maybe each one is an idea like: 1.) 'Be nice.' 2.) 'Wear a fancy hat.' 3.) 'Eat your vegetables.' 4.) Avoid dragons."

And every time someone answers correctly, "mind, mental factors, matter and nibbana." it will be ignored and wild guesses and extrapolation will go on lol!

This is what I like to know.
Is this an Abhidhamma creation or a Mahayana creation?
If you find this in Sutta please provide the reference with Pali words.

There are two versions: The Mahayana and the Theravada. I don't know who created it first or whether or not they influenced, or were even aware of each other. They are very different teachings. The Theravada is a form of realism. The Mahayana is all over the place, it sometimes openly declares idealism (all is imaginary), sometimes openly declares that nothing exists at all, not even nibbana (extreme nihilism), and other times just vaguely jumps around the issue using paradoxical language and riddling speech, refusing to pick a side.

Theravada:

It is the dhammas alone that possess ultimate reality: determinate existence “from their own side” (sarupato) independent of the minds conceptual processing of the data. Such a conception of the nature of the real seems to be already implicit in the Sutta Pitaka, particularly in the Buddha’s disquisitions on the aggregates, sense bases, elements, dependent arising, etc.,…
-Bhikkhu Bodhi, Acariya Anuruddha, A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, page 3

dhamma theory is best described as dhamma realism
-The Theravada Abhidhamma: Inquiry into the Nature of Conditioned Reality
By Y. Karunadasa, chapter 2

What emerges from this Abhidhammic doctrine of dhammas
is a critical realism, one which (unlike idealism) recognises
the distinctness of the world from the experiencing subject
yet also distinguishes between those types of entities that
truly exist independently of the cognitive act and those that
owe their being to the act of cognition itself.
-Y. Kunadasa, The Dhamma Theory, page 38

Compare Mahayana:

The character of the phenomenal world is declared to be neither real nor unreal, but logically indeterminable. Ultimately, phenomena are empty (sunyata) of an inherent self or essence, but exist depending on other phenomena (Pratītyasamutpāda).[1]
-Wikipedia page on the Two Truths

To my knowledge, there is no such thing as the two truths in the Pali Canon.

According to Chattopadhyaya, although Nagarjuna presents his understanding of the two truths as a clarification of the teachings of the Buddha, the two truths doctrine as such is not part of the earliest Buddhist tradition.[31]
-Wikipedia on Two Truths

[Ceisiwr]

To my knowledge, there is no such thing as the two truths in the Pali Canon.

"The Awakened One, the best of teachers, spoke of two truths, conventional and higher; no third is ascertained; a conventional statement is true because of convention and a higher statement is true as disclosing the true characteristics of events." - Khathāvatthu Aṭṭhakathā

Not in the canon, no. The commentaries, yes. It's in the commentaries because it's strongly implied in the suttas.

[zan]

To my knowledge, there is no such thing as the two truths in the Pali Canon.

"The Awakened One, the best of teachers, spoke of two truths, conventional and higher; no third is ascertained; a conventional statement is true because of convention and a higher statement is true as disclosing the true characteristics of events." - Khathāvatthu Aṭṭhakathā

Not in the canon, no. The commentaries, yes. It's in the commentaries because it's strongly implied in the suttas.

Indeed:

It is the dhammas alone that possess ultimate reality: determinate existence “from their own side” (sarupato) independent of the minds conceptual processing of the data. Such a conception of the nature of the real seems to be already implicit in the Sutta Pitaka, particularly in the Buddha’s disquisitions on the aggregates, sense bases, elements, dependent arising, etc.,…
-Bhikkhu Bodhi, Acariya Anuruddha, A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, page 3

In the suttas, the entire system of perception rests on the assumption that the external world preexists consciousness. See, for example the many suttas that explain the requirement for consciousness being that the physical eye contact an external physical object before consciousness may arise, ditto for the other senses. For example MN 28, which makes abundantly clear that an object may even come in range of the eye without consciousness arising at all. And SN 22.94 where the Buddha declares rupa, and the other aggregates as existent. The Abhidhamma took it further and delineated this into the two truths, separating what entirely is separate from consciousness, and what is not.

“If, friends, internally the eye is intact but no external forms come into its range, and there is no corresponding conscious engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness. If internally the eye is intact and external forms come into its range, but there is no corresponding conscious engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness. But when internally the eye is intact and external forms come into its range and there is the corresponding conscious engagement, then there is the manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness.
-MN 28

At Sāvatthī. “Bhikkhus, I do not dispute with the world; rather, it is the world that disputes with me. A proponent of the Dhamma does not dispute with anyone in the world. Of that which the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, I too say that it does not exist. And of that which the wise in the world agree upon as existing, I too say that it exists
-SN 22.94
This portion of the sutta offers an important counterpoint to the message of the Kaccānagotta Sutta (12:15). Here the Buddha emphasizes that he does not reject all ontological propositions, but only those that transcend the bounds of possible experience. While the Kaccānagotta Sutta shows that the “middle teaching” excludes static, substantialist conceptions of existence and nonexistence, the present text shows that the same “middle teaching” can accommodate definite pronouncements about these ontological issues. The affirmation of the existence of the five aggregates, as impermanent processes, serves as a rejoinder to illusionist theories, which hold that the world lacks real being.
-Commentary by Bhikkhu Bodhi

In other words, the position that mind independent reality does not exist is entirely untenable. The entire dhamma system of perception as explained by the Buddha relies on the physical sense organs contacting external physical objects, and only then does it allow for mind to come into play. Hence, the ultimate truth is that these things exist regardless of consciousness, the other truth is that we perceive them and make pannatti with them, on top of what is ultimately there. The Abhidhamma elaborates that these ultimates are called dhammas and so on, and delineates them from the conventional pannatti, but the core of this teaching, namely that there are objects that preexist consciousness, and that that these things are required to exist in order to say that one is conscious at all, is in the suttas already.

It was only after the Mahayana arrived and developed their own systems that this was thrown out and they invented a two truths system that refuses to admit the realities necessitated by the Buddha himself in the Pali Canon. This was undoubtedly due to them using later sutras that were not from the Buddha, and were composed anonymously and posthumously attributed to him, hundreds of years after his parinibbana, but nonetheless had him declaring that everything is imaginary, etc. and thus contradicting the suttas, and leading to the Mahayana paradoxical, riddling two truths.

On the contrary my teaching is based upon the recognition that the objective world, like a vision, is a manifestation of the mind itself
-Lankavatara sutra

The character of the phenomenal world is declared to be neither real nor unreal, but logically indeterminable. Ultimately, phenomena are empty (sunyata) of an inherent self or essence, but exist depending on other phenomena (Pratītyasamutpāda).[1]
-Wikipedia page on the Two Truths

According to Chattopadhyaya, although Nagarjuna presents his understanding of the two truths as a clarification of the teachings of the Buddha, the two truths doctrine as such is not part of the earliest Buddhist tradition.[31]
-Wikipedia on Two Truths

Side note: Ceisiwr, and everyone, I have to pause, here, for my periodic apology for those who read many of my posts, especially each post in one thread! I write each post so that, within reason, they are complete for anyone who didn't read previous posts. Hence, for those who are reading each post, there is repetition, especially of quoted material. Apologies, for this. I want to make things clear for everyone, in each post, so that even if someone reads only that one, they have the full idea. I am not necessarily always repeating the information for the person tagged in the post, but rather for everyone in general. For example, Ceisiwr, I've quoted the above Bodhi selection in several of our conversations, I know you know it, but for clarity, I just tack it on, rather than ambiguously alluding to it. Perhaps I should be less verbose, and assume users will read entire threads, and track down older threads to understand what is being referenced, but I just don't think that's particularly likely. Anyway, thanks for reading along with me, everyone

[SarathW]

To my knowledge, there is no such thing as the two truths in the Pali Canon.

"The Awakened One, the best of teachers, spoke of two truths, conventional and higher; no third is ascertained; a conventional statement is true because of convention and a higher statement is true as disclosing the true characteristics of events." - Khathāvatthu Aṭṭhakathā

Not in the canon, no. The commentaries, yes. It's in the commentaries because it's strongly implied in the suttas.

Thanks could you give me the link to this Kathavatthu, please?

[Ceisiwr]

To my knowledge, there is no such thing as the two truths in the Pali Canon.

"The Awakened One, the best of teachers, spoke of two truths, conventional and higher; no third is ascertained; a conventional statement is true because of convention and a higher statement is true as disclosing the true characteristics of events." - Khathāvatthu Aṭṭhakathā

Not in the canon, no. The commentaries, yes. It's in the commentaries because it's strongly implied in the suttas.

Thanks could you give me the link to this Kathavatthu, please?

It’s the commentary to it: https://thienvipassana.net/wp-content/u ... entary.pdf

[Ceisiwr]

[ And SN 22.94 where the Buddha declares rupa, and the other aggregates as existent.

That can be read as agreeing with worldly convention. The translation of the parallel is interesting. We are discussing it here: viewtopic.php?f=29&t=41316&p=644463#p644463

[Ceisiwr]

[According to Chattopadhyaya, although Nagarjuna presents his understanding of the two truths as a clarification of the teachings of the Buddha, the two truths doctrine as such is not part of the earliest Buddhist tradition.

Well, even according to Theravada that’s nonsense. As I say, it’s heavily implied IMO.

On the contrary my teaching is based upon the recognition that the objective world, like a vision, is a manifestation of the mind itself
-Lankavatara sutra

That sutra is heavily influenced by Yogacara, although it’s questionable if Yogacara really is a form of immaterialism. The highest in that system is beyond words, rather than it being mind.

[Ceisiwr]

[The Abhidhamma elaborates that these ultimates are called dhammas and so on, and delineates them from the conventional pannatti, but the core of this teaching, namely that there are objects that preexist consciousness, and that that these things are required to exist in order to say that one is conscious at all, is in the suttas already.

Hmm. The earth element is defined as “hardness”. Apart from hardness there is no earth element. Hardness is a phenomenal quality, so how is it external and mind independent? The same with other “material” sabhāva-dhammas such as colour and sound. These are perceptual qualities in the mind. Now you might want to say that these qualities belong to some substance and so that’s how they are external, but that is of course anathema to both the Buddha and the Abhidhamma.