The text is saying that the external kāmā are not lust, but greedy intention is. The external kāmā stay as they are, but a wise person removes lust for them. The removal of lust for the external kāmā comes with the experience of Jhāna, which involves an otherworldly rapture and pleasure that is the result of being secluded (away from) the external kāmā. Only the experience of Jhāna removes lust for the kāmā, as per MN 14 and AN 2.31.Coëmgenu wrote: ↑Sat Oct 23, 2021 1:11 am The text in question denies that the sage removes the external objects (from his perception/from himself). It says that it is actually the "saṅkapparāgo" which is the desire that is removed. The question is actually whether or not this is properly applied toward the appearance of "desires," with plurality, in the jhāna pericope. The appearance in the Nasantisutta at SN 1.34 is a definition for "desire" and thus also "desires," and it is a definition that specifies "not" the world's external pretty things.
Ven. Anālayo uses circular reasoning, to assert that jhāna is not possible while walking
Re: Ven. Anālayo uses circular reasoning, to assert that jhāna is not possible while walking
Last edited by Ceisiwr on Sat Oct 23, 2021 1:31 am, edited 1 time in total.
“The teacher willed that this world appear to me
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
Re: Ven. Anālayo uses circular reasoning, to assert that jhāna is not possible while walking
"Before my awakening—when I was still unawakened but intent on awakening—I too clearly saw with right wisdom that: ‘Sense objects give little gratification and much suffering and distress, and they are all the more full of drawbacks.’ But so long as I didn’t achieve the rapture and bliss that are apart from sense objects and unskillful qualities, or something even more peaceful than that, I didn’t announce that I would not return to sense objects. But when I did achieve that rapture and bliss, or something more peaceful than that, I announced that I would not return to sense objects."- MN 14
“When serenity is developed, what purpose does it serve? The mind is developed. And when the mind is developed, what purpose does it serve? Lust is abandoned.”
“When insight is developed, what purpose does it serve? Wisdom is developed. And when wisdom is developed, what purpose does it serve? Ignorance is abandoned."
AN 2.31
“When serenity is developed, what purpose does it serve? The mind is developed. And when the mind is developed, what purpose does it serve? Lust is abandoned.”
“When insight is developed, what purpose does it serve? Wisdom is developed. And when wisdom is developed, what purpose does it serve? Ignorance is abandoned."
AN 2.31
Last edited by Ceisiwr on Sat Oct 23, 2021 2:04 am, edited 2 times in total.
“The teacher willed that this world appear to me
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
Re: Ven. Anālayo uses circular reasoning, to assert that jhāna is not possible while walking
Well, the other way to frame it is "The text is saying that the external kāmā are not lust, but greedy intention is. The external kāmā stay as they are, but a wise person removes lust for them. The removal of lust for the external kāmā comes with the experience of Jhāna, which involves an otherworldly rapture and pleasure that is the result of being secluded (away from) greedy thoughts/intentions. Only the experience of Jhāna removes lust for the kāmā, as per MN 14 and AN 2.31." I've changed one term to fit the general conflict. The jhana itself removes the lust. How long it removes it for afterwards is something I'm sure is up for fine scholastic debate. The entire conflict is around the nature of the experience of the jhana, after all, and thus "how" it removes lust.
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
Re: Ven. Anālayo uses circular reasoning, to assert that jhāna is not possible while walking
We just agreed that it is seclusion from sense objects, not lust.Coëmgenu wrote: ↑Sat Oct 23, 2021 1:41 am Well, the other way to frame it is "The text is saying that the external kāmā are not lust, but greedy intention is. The external kāmā stay as they are, but a wise person removes lust for them. The removal of lust for the external kāmā comes with the experience of Jhāna, which involves an otherworldly rapture and pleasure that is the result of being secluded (away from) greedy thoughts/intentions. Only the experience of Jhāna removes lust for the kāmā, as per MN 14 and AN 2.31." I've changed one term to fit the general conflict. The jhana itself removes the lust. How long it removes it for afterwards is something I'm sure is up for fine scholastic debate. The entire conflict is around the nature of the experience of the jhana, after all, and thus "how" it removes lust.
"Before my awakening—when I was still unawakened but intent on awakening—I too clearly saw with right wisdom that: ‘Sense objects give little gratification and much suffering and distress, and they are all the more full of drawbacks.’ But so long as I didn’t achieve the rapture and bliss that are apart from sense objects and unskillful qualities, or something even more peaceful than that, I didn’t announce that I would not return to sense objects. But when I did achieve that rapture and bliss, or something more peaceful than that, I announced that I would not return to sense objects."Coëmgenu wrote: I think everyone is in agreement that the passage is referring to external objects.
“The teacher willed that this world appear to me
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
Re: Ven. Anālayo uses circular reasoning, to assert that jhāna is not possible while walking
We didn't. I was talking about SN 1.34. The text in question specifies that what is removed is not the world's pretty things, but kāma in the form of "saṅkapparāgo." You argue, as I understand it, that this is done as a result of jhāna. I don't contest this. Your interpretation necessitates the removal of the world's pretty things. The contrary assertion is that it is the saṅkapparāgo that is removed instead. It is removed before or during the jhāna and continues after as a result of it for an indeterminate amount of time. I understand that some here are taking "seclusion" to be before the jhāna as a prerequisite, so I'm giving that interpretation credence too by saying "before or during."
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
Re: Ven. Anālayo uses circular reasoning, to assert that jhāna is not possible while walking
You agreed that kāmā are external objects. In doing so you then also agree to kāmā in the jhāna pericope as being external objects.Coëmgenu wrote: ↑Sat Oct 23, 2021 1:51 am We didn't. The text in question specifies that what is removed is not the world's pretty things, but kāma in the form of "saṅkapparāgo." You argue, as I understand it, that this is done as a result of jhāna. I don't contest this. Your interpretation necessitates the removal of the world's pretty things. The contrary assertion is that it is the saṅkapparāgo that is removed instead before and/or during the jhāna.
"idha bhikkhu vivicceva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkaṁ savicāraṁ vivekajaṁ pītisukhaṁ paṭhamaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajja viharati.
‘It’s when a mendicant, quite secluded from sense objects, secluded from unskillful qualities, enters and remains in the first absorption, which has the rapture and bliss born of seclusion, while placing the mind and keeping it connected."
It's after the jhāna.The contrary assertion is that it is the saṅkapparāgo that is removed instead before and/or during the jhāna.
‘Sense objects give little gratification and much suffering and distress, and they are all the more full of drawbacks.’ But so long as I didn’t achieve the rapture and bliss that are apart from sense objects and unskillful qualities, or something even more peaceful than that, I didn’t announce that I would not return to sense objects."
He could only say that he would not return to the kāmā once he had experienced jhāna. In other words his lust for them was only abandoned after experiencing jhāna, not before. Hence why he said the following
“When serenity is developed, what purpose does it serve? The mind is developed. And when the mind is developed, what purpose does it serve? Lust is abandoned.”
“The teacher willed that this world appear to me
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
Re: Ven. Anālayo uses circular reasoning, to assert that jhāna is not possible while walking
Not so. There are two appearances in SN 1.34, one in the plural, kāmā and one in the singular, kāmo. In the context of SN 1.34, it is not the plural kāmā that are removed. It is the kāmo. In the context of the sutta in question, the difference in numeration between these terms has added meaning, because kāmā specified as the "pretty things" in the world, and kāmo as saṅkapparāgo. In Sn 1.34, there is a removal of kāmo. A removal of kāmā as "citrāni loke" is denied. The controverted point, as I see it, is whether this can apply to the jhāna pericope. I don't find the argument that only the plural is used in the jhāna pericope convincing.
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
Re: Ven. Anālayo uses circular reasoning, to assert that jhāna is not possible while walking
All 1.34 is saying is that A) there is a distinction between lust and kāmā and B) lust is the problem, not the external world. It then goes on to say that a wise person removes lust. How this is done is answered in the suttas I quoted. Lust is abandoned through experiencing Jhāna, not before. Since you agreed to kāmā as referring to external objects, you should then read the kāmehi in the Jhāna pericope in the same manner. Putting all of this together we getCoëmgenu wrote: ↑Sat Oct 23, 2021 2:04 amNot so. There are two appearances in SN 1.34, one in the plural, kāmā and one in the singular, kāmo. In the context of SN 1.34, it is not the plural kāmā that are removed. It is the kāmo. In the context of the sutta in question, the difference in numeration between these terms has added meaning, because kāmā specified as the "pretty things" in the world, and kāmo as saṅkapparāgo. In Sn 1.34, there is a removal of kāmo. A removal of kāmā as "citrāni loke" is denied. The controverted point, as I see it, is whether this can apply to the jhāna pericope. I don't find the argument that only the plural is used in the jhāna pericope convincing.
"Lust is the problem, not the things in the world. Therefore, abandon lust. How is lust abandoned? Seclude yourself from unwholesome states and the 5 senses in order to experience a god-like rapture and bliss, for when you do the things in the world won't ever be appealing to you again."
Once lust for sense objects is gone because of Jhāna (because sex, drugs and boyfriends simply do not compare to it) you then work on abandoning ignorance via developing insight. If you do, you fully awaken. If you don't then you become a non-returner. Someone who is stuck on the Jhānas (or formless).
“The teacher willed that this world appear to me
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
Re: Ven. Anālayo uses circular reasoning, to assert that jhāna is not possible while walking
It specifies that one is removed and one is not, in other words what you've summarized in B. One "lust" is removed and one set of "lusts" is not. The issue is in how we connect this to the jhāna pericope, since we've both agreed that the removal is done via jhāna.Ceisiwr wrote: ↑Sat Oct 23, 2021 2:12 amAll 1.34 is saying is that A) there is a distinction between lust and kāmā and B) lust is the problem, not the external world. It then goes on to say that a wise person removes lust.Coëmgenu wrote: ↑Sat Oct 23, 2021 2:04 amNot so. There are two appearances in SN 1.34, one in the plural, kāmā and one in the singular, kāmo. In the context of SN 1.34, it is not the plural kāmā that are removed. It is the kāmo. In the context of the sutta in question, the difference in numeration between these terms has added meaning, because kāmā specified as the "pretty things" in the world, and kāmo as saṅkapparāgo. In Sn 1.34, there is a removal of kāmo. A removal of kāmā as "citrāni loke" is denied. The controverted point, as I see it, is whether this can apply to the jhāna pericope. I don't find the argument that only the plural is used in the jhāna pericope convincing.
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
Re: Ven. Anālayo uses circular reasoning, to assert that jhāna is not possible while walking
Yes. You remove lust, and to do that you need to seclude from the kāmā. Grasping the kāmā is the problem, so you need to let go of them. You do that by replacing the limited pleasure and happiness they give with something better. Then you see how even that is flawed, and let go completely.Coëmgenu wrote: ↑Sat Oct 23, 2021 2:17 am
It specifies that one is removed and one is not, in other words what you've summarized in B. One "lust" is removed and one set of "lusts" is not. The issue is in how we connect this to the jhāna pericope, since we've both agreed that the removal is done via jhāna.
Last edited by Ceisiwr on Sat Oct 23, 2021 2:24 am, edited 1 time in total.
“The teacher willed that this world appear to me
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
Re: Ven. Anālayo uses circular reasoning, to assert that jhāna is not possible while walking
Secluded from the kāma that is saṅkapparāgo. Your assertion that consciousnesses associated with the five rūpa-derived senses are not produced is dependent upon reading kāmā as "the worlds pretty things." It is actually saṅkapparāgo that is removed, because there has been a seclusion from saṅkapparāgo. That is the contrary assertion.
I'm content to have it that way. But, just to be clear, that is why I didn't agree earlier, despite generally agree that one usage of kāmā referred to external sense objects.
I'm content to have it that way. But, just to be clear, that is why I didn't agree earlier, despite generally agree that one usage of kāmā referred to external sense objects.
Last edited by Coëmgenu on Sat Oct 23, 2021 2:26 am, edited 1 time in total.
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
-
- Posts: 346
- Joined: Fri Oct 04, 2013 8:30 pm
Re: Ven. Anālayo uses circular reasoning, to assert that jhāna is not possible while walking
Note that the prose prior to the verse explicitly states that kāmā are not the kāmaguṇā (Ajahn Sujato Translation):
Assuming Sylvester was correct, to translate the way Ceisiwr has it here would contradict the prose passage immediately above as I see it. Why? Because his translation has kāmā being the beautiful things in the world i.e. the kāmaguṇā (which is supposed to be the subset) and not the sense bases. Pulga's translation of citrani as 'varied things' could be made to fit this idea of set/subset for the prose better.
It also looks like the verse is meant to serve as a direct elaboration on the prose, so to ignore this prose statement while translating doesn't make sense either in my opinion.
We also don't need to worry too much about the verse, because later on in AN 6.63 we get more explanations of what kāmā are in this sutta.
First we find that kāmā are born of contact:
An explicit listing of kinds of kāmā is also given (i.e. we have an answer to the question: 'Are the kāmaguṇā included in kāmā?" ). Here it is:
The last part of the section on kāmā is a section which could be interpreted in either way:
Incidentally I do think there are suttas where kāmā must mean the kāmaguṇā (so I personally wouldn't use this sutta alone to claim that the jhana formula is referring to seclusion from sense desires). So it's quite interesting to me how they are explicitly said to not be the same thing in this sutta. Seems kāmā is one of those words that is really context dependent.
Another thing about AN 6.63 is just how odd it is that we are talking about kāmā, then get a definition of kāmaguṇā, and then an explicit explanation that the thing we are supposed to be talking about (kāmā) isn't the kāmaguṇā? Why even list the kāmaguṇā in this sutta at all? It would've made more sense in my opinion to leave out that section altogether, so it seems a bit fishy to me. Perhaps it's just emphasized since there are other cases where the two mean the same thing? Also the "nāmete ariyassa vinaye vuccanti" in the initial prose statement could suggest the Buddha is redefining a commonly used term (kāmā) in his teaching. So this could be one way to explain why other cases exist with kāmā being external sense objects-i.e. that was the common definition, and when speaking to others outside the teaching the Buddha used the common meaning. (This idea could be falsified with a search-can we find an example of kāmā clearly meaning sense desires given to outsiders?)
Those are my thoughts on the somewhat odd discussion of kāmā in AN 6.63.
(Mods-it may or may not be worth moving this post to new dedicated AN 6.63 thread.)
Sylvester claims this is just saying a set (kāmā) is not equal to a subset (kāmaguṇā). (In his interpretation the set kāmā would be the five sense objects, and the kāmaguṇā are the subset of pleasant sense objects.) While theoretically possible, it would be very odd and pedagogically unsound for the Buddha to intend overlap (subsetting) between two things, make this statement saying they are different, and then not clarify the exact nature of the overlap (and none of the proposed translations from experts or from Ceisiwr clarify that the 'type of difference' meant is the difference between a set and a subset which allows overlap.)However, these are not sensual pleasures. In the training of the Noble One they’re called ‘kinds of sensual stimulation’.
Api ca kho, bhikkhave, nete kāmā kāmaguṇā nāmete ariyassa vinaye vuccanti
Assuming Sylvester was correct, to translate the way Ceisiwr has it here would contradict the prose passage immediately above as I see it. Why? Because his translation has kāmā being the beautiful things in the world i.e. the kāmaguṇā (which is supposed to be the subset) and not the sense bases. Pulga's translation of citrani as 'varied things' could be made to fit this idea of set/subset for the prose better.
It also looks like the verse is meant to serve as a direct elaboration on the prose, so to ignore this prose statement while translating doesn't make sense either in my opinion.
We also don't need to worry too much about the verse, because later on in AN 6.63 we get more explanations of what kāmā are in this sutta.
First we find that kāmā are born of contact:
External sense objects as far as I know are nowhere listed as born of contact, but sankapparago is born of contact since intentions are born of contact.And what is the source of sensual pleasures?
Katamo ca, bhikkhave, kāmānaṁ nidānasambhavo?
Contact is their source.
Phasso, bhikkhave, kāmānaṁ nidānasambhavo.
An explicit listing of kinds of kāmā is also given (i.e. we have an answer to the question: 'Are the kāmaguṇā included in kāmā?" ). Here it is:
There is no listing here of the external sense objects themselves, but instead types of kāmā (plural) are simply given as a list of types of kāmo (singular). Kāmo in singular means desire. Note also that the other 'What is the diversity of X?' statements in this sutta all list examples which are a type of X, so it looks like 'diversity' here is meant in the sense of 'set-membership in X' and not in some other sense (like 'ways to experience X').And what is the diversity of sensual pleasures?
Katamā ca, bhikkhave, kāmānaṁ vemattatā?
The sensual desire for sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and touches are all different.
Añño, bhikkhave, kāmo rūpesu, añño kāmo saddesu, añño kāmo gandhesu, añño kāmo rasesu, añño kāmo phoṭṭhabbesu.
This is called the diversity of sensual pleasures.
Ayaṁ vuccati, bhikkhave, kāmānaṁ vemattatā.
The last part of the section on kāmā is a section which could be interpreted in either way:
If I saw this quote in a different sutta I would interpret this as using kāmā to mean kāmaguṇā, but since it occurs here where there are multiple clear statements that they aren't the same, I don't think that makes sense. Perhaps it's referring to a person desiring and delighting in their own 'passion and desire' for sense objects, something that is possible in the sex drive for example where people may desire to have increased libido.And what is the result of sensual pleasures?
Katamo ca, bhikkhave, kāmānaṁ vipāko?
When one who desires sensual pleasures creates a corresponding life-form, with the attributes of either good or bad deeds—this is called the result of sensual pleasures.
Yaṁ kho, bhikkhave, kāmayamāno tajjaṁ tajjaṁ attabhāvaṁ abhinibbatteti puññabhāgiyaṁ vā apuññabhāgiyaṁ vā, ayaṁ vuccati, bhikkhave, kāmānaṁ vipāko.
Incidentally I do think there are suttas where kāmā must mean the kāmaguṇā (so I personally wouldn't use this sutta alone to claim that the jhana formula is referring to seclusion from sense desires). So it's quite interesting to me how they are explicitly said to not be the same thing in this sutta. Seems kāmā is one of those words that is really context dependent.
Another thing about AN 6.63 is just how odd it is that we are talking about kāmā, then get a definition of kāmaguṇā, and then an explicit explanation that the thing we are supposed to be talking about (kāmā) isn't the kāmaguṇā? Why even list the kāmaguṇā in this sutta at all? It would've made more sense in my opinion to leave out that section altogether, so it seems a bit fishy to me. Perhaps it's just emphasized since there are other cases where the two mean the same thing? Also the "nāmete ariyassa vinaye vuccanti" in the initial prose statement could suggest the Buddha is redefining a commonly used term (kāmā) in his teaching. So this could be one way to explain why other cases exist with kāmā being external sense objects-i.e. that was the common definition, and when speaking to others outside the teaching the Buddha used the common meaning. (This idea could be falsified with a search-can we find an example of kāmā clearly meaning sense desires given to outsiders?)
Those are my thoughts on the somewhat odd discussion of kāmā in AN 6.63.
(Mods-it may or may not be worth moving this post to new dedicated AN 6.63 thread.)
Re: Ven. Anālayo uses circular reasoning, to assert that jhāna is not possible while walking
It is seclusion from kāmā, not kāma. Seclusion from the diverse/beauties in the world, not the lust for them.Coëmgenu wrote: ↑Sat Oct 23, 2021 2:23 am Secluded from the kāma that is saṅkapparāgo. Your assertion that consciousnesses associated with the five rūpa-derived senses are not produced is dependent upon reading kāmā as "the worlds pretty things." It is actually saṅkapparāgo that is removed, because there has been a seclusion from saṅkapparāgo. That is the contrary assertion.
“The teacher willed that this world appear to me
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
Re: Ven. Anālayo uses circular reasoning, to assert that jhāna is not possible while walking
Yes it wouldwaryoffolly wrote: ↑Sat Oct 23, 2021 2:25 am Assuming Sylvester was correct, to translate the way Ceisiwr has it here would contradict the prose passage immediately above as I see it.
If we follow Ven. Anālayo, verse tends to be older whilst prose tends to be commentary on the verse. If so it would be the prose which is likely causing the problem here, and so the translation of Sylverster, some Ancient Theras and myself would be more accurate.It also looks like the verse is meant to serve as a direct elaboration on the prose, so to ignore this prose statement while translating doesn't make sense either in my opinion.
Last edited by Ceisiwr on Sat Oct 23, 2021 2:36 am, edited 2 times in total.
“The teacher willed that this world appear to me
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
Re: Ven. Anālayo uses circular reasoning, to assert that jhāna is not possible while walking
As I've stated before, I don't find the argument that only the plural is used in the jhāna pericope convincing.
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.