Where is there a juxtaposition of early dependent origination against its later use as extreme refutation?

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Ceisiwr
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Re: Where is there a juxtaposition of early dependent origination against its later use as extreme refutation?

Post by Ceisiwr »

zan wrote: Sat Jan 22, 2022 10:54 pm
I really don’t understand your issue with this?
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Re: Where is there a juxtaposition of early dependent origination against its later use as extreme refutation?

Post by Rambutan »

zan wrote: Sat Jan 22, 2022 10:54 pm
You and the other user expressed clear incredulity toward the idea that anyone holds the position I was articulating, that's pretty much the same as saying that it is wrong that it is an interpretation that anyone (but me supposedly) holds.
You stated in the first three words that this is ”The contemporary understanding…”
First, such a vague designation alone is meaningless. Whose understanding are you referring to?
It either means simply that some people hold this view, or, as seemingly implied, it is a prevailing view. Either way, one would need to demonstrate how this is a true statement and not merely some frustrated, personal impression of things.

Second, just because there is no evidence that anyone shares your impression (much less that there is evidence validating your impression) doesn’t mean, as you suggest, that your position (about what?) is “wrong”. You simply made an accusation and didn’t back it up with anything.
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Re: Where is there a juxtaposition of early dependent origination against its later use as extreme refutation?

Post by Coëmgenu »

zan wrote: Sat Jan 22, 2022 9:34 pmNagarjuna taught that nibbana doesn't exist, and neither does anything else. Nagarjuna taught that this is explained via dependent origination, which he sees as identical with emptiness.
You are wrongly framing things, just as you wrongly framed the position of the classical tradition when you resorted to DooDoot's contorted logic to defend it. Ven Bodhi's refutation of Madhyamaka is much more germane than DooDoot's routine failures to understand what he is talking about with regards to Madhyamaka.
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
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Re: Where is there a juxtaposition of early dependent origination against its later use as extreme refutation?

Post by SDC »

zan wrote: Sat Jan 22, 2022 10:54 pm ...
The repeated response I get to many of my posts is that supposedly no one on this forum holds the views I refute. Yet this is demonstrably false by simply searching this forum. Also, frequently some users in the very thread where this statement was made confirm that they hold the position I am refuting.
...
Again, I'm sincerely sorry for this verbose blathering, somewhat defensive response.
I suggest you engage directly with those who say these things when they say them, and/or bump the topics you are finding in your search of the forum, so the cast does not seem so broad.

And I am also sincerely sorry for the critique. It comes from a good place, as I've mentioned in the past.
“Life is swept along, short is the life span; no shelters exist for one who has reached old age. Seeing clearly this danger in death, a seeker of peace should drop the world’s bait.” SN 1.3
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Re: Where is there a juxtaposition of early dependent origination against its later use as extreme refutation?

Post by zan »

Before I quit for a long while, I'll at least cap up this thread.

Now, what I was looking for was a concise work that lays out the differences between these two positions. However, there doesn't seem to be any contenders, rather just statements that there is no such thing as the Nagarjuna position that dependent origination teaches that nothing exists, including nibbana, and that this is something that literally only I think (see below for where Nagarjuna states exactly this, which was and is also in the op, and here I've added more relevant quotes). Also, honorable mention to Ontheway for actually answering the thread op request with some really good information! So, if anyone is wondering, and is okay with a lot of reading, the issue can be solved easily by reading the Mulamadhyamakakarika (source for the idea, or at least popularizing the idea that dependent origination is a tool to refute the existence of literally everything, including nibbana), then read the Visuddhimagga section on dependent origination (Vism XIX.12), and the Abhidhammattha Sangaha. Then, to get an idea of whether or not Nagarjuna's interpretation of dependent origination is logically sound, read the paper: Nagarjuna's Masterpiece: Logical, Mystical, Both or Neither? by Stafford L. Betty.

Now, this does not answer the original point of this thread, since it is a huge amount of reading. So, I'll try to sum it up as best I can, while admitting I lack the expertise to do so elegantly, which is why I was looking for a work of a higher standard.

The tl;dr version would be: Theravadins don't focus much, on using dependent origination as a tool to refute everything, and certainly not nibbana, and possibly they don't do this at all in any official capacity, since the official commentarial definition of dhammas affirms their intrinsic nature (see below), which is in direct opposition to the Nagarjuna version of dependent origination, in which literally nothing has intrinsic nature. To reiterate, since it clearly bears repeating: Nibbana ultimately exists for Theravada, and the dhammas do have intrinsic nature, and nibbana ultimately exists as the only permanent dhamma, all of which are the exact thing that is ostensibly utterly, and irrefutably disproven as even possible by the Mulamadhyamakakarika. See below for quotes on this from the Theravada perspective. Also, the Buddha stated that certain things are real, and independent of being known, and exist regardless of whether or not people are aware of them, and whether or not a Buddha has arisen to point them out, like the dhamma and four noble truths (AN 3.136, SN 12.20, SN 56.20, also see below), and all of these are singled out as non existent/empty by Nagarjuna in the Mulamadhyamakakarika, and certainly he wouldn't have allowed them to be mind independent, nor real, as stated by the suttas. Hence, the older Theravada position is entirely incompatible with the Nagarjuna position, which today is the most common, since the majority of Buddhists are Mahayana, and they generally accept Nagarjuna as authoritative.

The paper by Betty concludes that Nagarjuna ultimately self refutes his entire position, and that he is not a philosopher, but rather a mystic, and thus, his teaching on dependent origination is something taken on faith, rather than truly proven by use of logic alone. And, no, just because Nagarjuna openly admitted that his teachings are empty does not escape this problem. Betty explains in the paper (see also Betty's other paper, "Is Nagarjuna a Philosopher?"). Thus, the older, Theravada understanding of dependent origination, where it is mostly focused on the passing of a being through the process of rebirth, rather than trying to refute literally everything, is probably the safest bet, that is, if we don't want to take something like this on faith alone, and especially when the alternative (Nagarjuna's interpretation) entirely self refutes. It is worth mentioning that some, myself included, have dabbled with the idea of fiddling with the meaning of some Theravada word usage in order to wiggle it into being compatible with Nagarjuna. But, since Nagarjuna self refuted, and his entire system is ultimately invalid, is that really wise? Or might we be better off letting Theravada remain independent of Nagarjuna's sinking ship, rather than artificially and subjectively reinterpreting Theravada to say something that it really doesn't? (see also, "Nagarjuna: Master of Paradox, Mystic or Perpetrator of Fallacies?" by Richard Hayes, and, "Did Nagarjuna Really Refute All Philosophical Views" by Richard Robinson).
Dootdoot wrote: Mendicants, these four things are real, not unreal, not otherwise.
“Cattārimāni, bhikkhave, tathāni avitathāni anaññathāni.

What four?
Katamāni cattāri?

This is suffering’ …
‘Idaṃ dukkhan’ti, bhikkhave, tathametaṃ avitathametaṃ anaññathametaṃ;

‘This is the origin of suffering’ …
‘ayaṃ dukkhasamudayo’ti tathametaṃ avitathametaṃ anaññathametaṃ;

‘This is the cessation of suffering’ …
‘ayaṃ dukkhanirodho’ti tathametaṃ avitathametaṃ anaññathametaṃ;

‘This is the practice that leads to the cessation of suffering’ …
‘ayaṃ dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā’ti tathametaṃ avitathametaṃ anaññathametaṃ—

These four things are real, not unreal, not otherwise.
imāni kho, bhikkhave, cattāri tathāni avitathāni anaññathāni.
-SN 56.20

...Buddha-Dhamma is about objective reality or ultimate truth, it appears to ultimately side with "ontology". For example, in AN 3.136 and SN 12.20, it is said the Dhamma is a fixed law that exists whether or not Buddhas arise to perceive and reveal these fixed laws.

Whether or not the 4NTs are known, all people suffer in the exact same way and all people can overcome suffering in the exact same way. In Buddha-Dhamma, there is no scope for "person-centredness". ...
A common argument against relativism suggests that it inherently contradicts, refutes, or stultifies itself: the statement "all is relative" classes either as a relative statement or as an absolute one. If it is relative, then this statement does not rule out absolutes. If the statement is absolute, on the other hand, then it provides an example of an absolute statement, proving that not all truths are relative.
-Wikipedia on Relativism
It is the dhammas alone that possess ultimate reality: determinate existence “from their own side” (sarupato) independent of the minds conceptual processing of the data. Such a conception of the nature of the real seems to be already implicit in the Sutta Pitaka, particularly in the Buddha’s disquisitions on the aggregates, sense bases, elements, dependent arising, etc.,…

Thus by examining the conventional realities with wisdom, we eventually arrive at the objective actualities that lie behind our conceptual constructs. It is these objective actualities – the dhammas, which maintain their intrinsic natures independent of the mind’s constructive functions…

...

...the commentaries consummate the dhamma theory by supplying the formal definition of dhammas as "things which bear their own intrinsic nature" (attano sabhavam dharenti ti dhamma).

...concretely produced matter...possess intrinsic natures and are thus suitable for contemplation and comprehension by insight.

Great seers who are free from craving declare that Nibbana is an
objective state which is deathless, absolutely endless, unconditioned,
and unsurpassed.
Thus as fourfold the Tathagatas reveal the ultimate realities—
consciousness, mental factors, matter, and Nibbana.
-Bhikkhu Bodhi, Acariya Anuruddha, A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, pages 3, 15, 26, 235, 260
Certainly nirvana does not exist as something without dependence.
Nagarjuna, Mulamadhyamakakarika 25.6
there is nothing that arises
-Nagarjuna, Sixty Stanzas, verse 21

Both samsara and nirvana,
Neither of these two exists;

The thorough understanding of cyclic existence
This is referred to as "nirvana"
-Nagarjuna, ibid, verse 6

Those who imputes arising and disintegration
With relation to conditioned things,
They do not understand well the movement
Of the wheel of dependent origination
Nagarjuna, ibid, verse 18

This is transcendence of sorrow
In this very life and one’s task is complete;
If, after the knowledge of truth,
Differentiations occur here,

And even with respect to most subtle things
One imputes originations,
Such an utterly unskilled person does not see
The meaning of dependent origination.
-Nagarjuna, ibid, verse 11-12
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
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Re: Where is there a juxtaposition of early dependent origination against its later use as extreme refutation?

Post by Jack19990101 »

Maybe both sides understand nibbana just the same. Yet, they have very different interpretation on how to conducively teach it.

I think the term 'existence' is an ambiguity. Existence only is directly known when a principle is at the same context.
i.e. A story is talking about a peta only sees dirt even if he is being offered the best meal by a deity. don't remember all details but the gist is it.

Zen talks about non-existence of an existing of gate once he crossed a threshold of sorts.
The gateless gate depicts it very well on some topic such as 'if there is a free will.if there are choices.'

It is not possible to talk about existence without first clarifying the principle or context, or viewport.

Buddha has declared a state not-exist-not-nonexist-neither & neither.
Most of time, we don't knowledge it to a level of resonating. But Buddha, imo, is saying, this is a state i am teaching to knowledge, a state you don't hear it from outside of me.

So we have existence, non existence, and not-exist-not-nonexist-neither & neither. The third one is the transcendent of the first two.

Ajahn once said 'there is no ajahn chah.' Most of us won't think he is nonsensical. we just think he is talking from a level which has transcended identity.

We have 0, and we have 1. But in order to express precise status of a cup of water, we have to use half, semi, almost, 0.8, 90% etc.
How do we expect to simply use two words (existence/non existence) to depict the immeasurably more subtle mental sphere.
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Re: Where is there a juxtaposition of early dependent origination against its later use as extreme refutation?

Post by zan »

I just reread my most recent post on this thread and realized it could be misconstrued to imply that the classical Theravada position only uses dependent origination to describe the rebirth process. I tried to avoid this by saying that it is "mostly focused" on this, but wanted to clear this up in case anyone read it otherwise. What I mean by that, was that the classical texts use dependent origination largely for that purpose (mostly), but I did not intend to imply that they don't also use it to describe other phenomena, which, of course, they do. However, they do not use it as a tool to refute the existence of those very phenomena, and that is the point that sets them entirely aside, and makes them totally incompatible with Nagarjuna, and this type of interpretation of dependent origination. This is, as I said above, because they saw dhammas as bearing their own intrinsic natures, and being ultimate realities, existing independent of the minds conceptual processing (see quotes above), and Nagarjuna's entire point is that these things are totally impossible, and in trying to prove this, he disproved his entire position.

In other words:

Classical Theravada dependent origination: Frequently an explanation of a being passing life to life using the three lives model, also an explanation of mind independent, ultimately existing dhammas that bear their own intrinsic natures, thus, obviously NOT a refutation of dhammas. Also, nibbana ultimately exists in Theravada, and is not dependently originated.

Common understanding of dependent origination (Mahayana, Nagarjuna): explanation that nothing exists whatsoever, including nibbana. A refutation of dhammas. Equates dependent origination with emptiness. Declares that nothing can bear its own intrinsic nature, not even nibbana, which is dependent, and thus does not ultimately exist at all. Self refutes itself out of consideration, and is an invalid position.
DooDoot wrote:
Similarly, the third noble truth is the truth of cessation. But inher-
ently existent things cannot cease. Empty ones can.
"Empty" is wrongly used above and is the ultimate fatal failure of Nagarguna & heresy of Madhyamaka. The word 'empty" is not synonymous with "dependently originated". Buddha-Dhamma is as follows:

A. All things are empty
B. But not all things (for example Nibbana) are dependently originated.
C. Therefore, emptiness does not equal dependent origination.
D. Dependent origination is empty
E. But emptiness is not dependently originated.
F. Therefore, emptiness does not equal dependent origination.
By reason of the cessation of one factor in the twelvefold chain, another successor factor fails to arise. Thus does this entire mass of suffering completely cease.

-MKK 26.12 ibid
If this entire mass of suffering completely ceases, this complete cessation must be an inherently existent thing. If this complete cessation was not an inherently existent thing, it would cease to completely cease and there would be arising again.


Now, let's look at Nagarjuna and Theravada side by side:


Nagarjuna...rejects... that there actually are dharmas. ...there cannot be such things... Not only are the person and other partite things devoid of intrinsic nature and so mere conceptual fictions, the same holds for dharmas as well. This is what it means to say that all things are empty.
Nagarjuna's Middle Way, Mark Siderits, page 7
Compare:
It is the dhammas alone that possess ultimate reality: determinate existence “from their own side” (sarupato) independent of the minds conceptual processing of the data. Such a conception of the nature of the real seems to be already implicit in the Sutta Pitaka, particularly in the Buddha’s disquisitions on the aggregates, sense bases, elements, dependent arising, etc.,…

Thus by examining the conventional realities with wisdom, we eventually arrive at the objective actualities that lie behind our conceptual constructs. It is these objective actualities – the dhammas, which maintain their intrinsic natures independent of the mind’s constructive functions…

...

...the commentaries consummate the dhamma theory by supplying the formal definition of dhammas as "things which bear their own intrinsic nature" (attano sabhavam dharenti ti dhamma).

...concretely produced matter...possess intrinsic natures and are thus suitable for contemplation and comprehension by insight.

Great seers who are free from craving declare that Nibbana is an
objective state which is deathless, absolutely endless, unconditioned,
and unsurpassed.
Thus as fourfold the Tathagatas reveal the ultimate realities—
consciousness, mental factors, matter, and Nibbana.
-Bhikkhu Bodhi, Acariya Anuruddha, A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, pages 3, 15, 26, 235, 260
Doodoot wrote:Mendicants, these four things are real, not unreal, not otherwise.
“Cattārimāni, bhikkhave, tathāni avitathāni anaññathāni.

What four?
Katamāni cattāri?

This is suffering’ …
‘Idaṃ dukkhan’ti, bhikkhave, tathametaṃ avitathametaṃ anaññathametaṃ;

‘This is the origin of suffering’ …
‘ayaṃ dukkhasamudayo’ti tathametaṃ avitathametaṃ anaññathametaṃ;

‘This is the cessation of suffering’ …
‘ayaṃ dukkhanirodho’ti tathametaṃ avitathametaṃ anaññathametaṃ;

‘This is the practice that leads to the cessation of suffering’ …
‘ayaṃ dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā’ti tathametaṃ avitathametaṃ anaññathametaṃ—

These four things are real, not unreal, not otherwise.
imāni kho, bhikkhave, cattāri tathāni avitathāni anaññathāni.
-SN 56.20

...Buddha-Dhamma is about objective reality or ultimate truth, it appears to ultimately side with "ontology". For example, in AN 3.136 and SN 12.20, it is said the Dhamma is a fixed law that exists whether or not Buddhas arise to perceive and reveal these fixed laws.

Whether or not the 4NTs are known, all people suffer in the exact same way and all people can overcome suffering in the exact same way. In Buddha-Dhamma, there is no scope for "person-centredness". ...
Thus, Theravada escapes the fatal flaw of relativism, because they hold that certain things are ultimately existing, and certain things are true, and real. This is while the other dependent origination interpretations that ostensibly refute everything get sucked into their own refutation and become entirely, and irretrievably invalid. And, yet again, just because they frequently agree that their own position is empty, or whatever, does not prevent this, if nothing else, it merely admits this, and asks the listener to accept it as true purely on faith in the mystical Mahayana interpretation of the magical emptiness, Buddha nature, or whatever. In other words, just because someone admits that their position is invalid does not make it valid. To hold such a position as valid would require mindless faith.
A common argument against relativism suggests that it inherently contradicts, refutes, or stultifies itself: the statement "all is relative" classes either as a relative statement or as an absolute one. If it is relative, then this statement does not rule out absolutes. If the statement is absolute, on the other hand, then it provides an example of an absolute statement, proving that not all truths are relative.
-Wikipedia on Relativism
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
Jack19990101
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Re: Where is there a juxtaposition of early dependent origination against its later use as extreme refutation?

Post by Jack19990101 »

Imo, dependent origination is to replace straightforward 'existence' or 'not existence'.
Many times, when Buddha was asked if such such exists, Buddha answered with dependent origination.

Basically, such such comes to exist when its accompanied buddies come to exist. No straightforward yes or no to existence.
In its root, namarupa and vinnana.

With cessation of attachment to body, this sensual/form world cease to be.

But dependent origination doesn't dictate law of space, nothingness, formless consciousness and neither perception nor.
We can not use dependent origination to depict those elements.

imo, to discuss formless consciousness(including limitless consciousness) via dependent origination, is futile.
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Re: Where is there a juxtaposition of early dependent origination against its later use as extreme refutation?

Post by asahi »

Imo Nagarjuna main concern is to stop us from forming all kind of position . The understanding you gain from insight is to release all your grasping . But you are not ready yet . Dependent arising is the grasping . Therefore , hit on it to break free .
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Re: Where is there a juxtaposition of early dependent origination against its later use as extreme refutation?

Post by Rambutan »

cappuccino wrote: Tue Jan 18, 2022 8:48 pm
Coëmgenu wrote: Tue Jan 18, 2022 8:21 pm Dimension
Realm :quote:
“There is that sphere where there is no earth, no water, no fire nor wind; no sphere of infinity of space, of infinity of consciousness, of nothingness or even of neither-perception-nor non-perception; there, there is neither this world nor the other world, neither moon nor sun; this sphere I call neither a coming nor a going nor a staying still, neither a dying nor a reappearance; it has no basis, no evolution and no support: this, just this, is the end of dukkha.”
~ Ud 8.1
Everything on that list is merely some sort of composite.
Dukkha results from clinging to composite phenomena.
The cessation of dukkha, no longer clinging to composite phenomena, is nibbana.

I don’t see where by the word “sphere” refers to a “dimension” or “realm” any more than it refers to some kind of ball shape. “Sphere” refers to a state of mind free from dukkha.

Otherwise, by that description, it would amount to being a “sphere” of total annihilation: (no earth, no water, no fire nor wind; no sphere of infinity of space, of infinity of consciousness, of nothingness or even of neither-perception-nor non-perception) and I am pretty sure you would agree, that’s not what the Nibbana is.
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Re: Where is there a juxtaposition of early dependent origination against its later use as extreme refutation?

Post by Rambutan »

zan wrote: Mon Jan 24, 2022 6:46 pm nibbana ultimately exists in Theravada, and is not dependently originated.
If nibbana is the extinction of dukkha, and the cessation of rebirth, how is it not dependent on them?
If I extinguish a burning log, this is not possible unless there is first a burning log.
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Re: Where is there a juxtaposition of early dependent origination against its later use as extreme refutation?

Post by Rambutan »

Absolutism only exists in contrast relativism, so it only exists in relation to something else. Anything regarded as absolute can only be considered as being absolute rather than as being relative, which in fact makes it relative.
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Re: Where is there a juxtaposition of early dependent origination against its later use as extreme refutation?

Post by Ceisiwr »

zan wrote: Mon Jan 24, 2022 6:46 pm Also, nibbana ultimately exists in Theravada, and is not dependently originated.
Ven. Nāgārjuna doesn't say that nibbāna is dependently originated. You quoted this line from the MMK
Certainly nirvana does not exist as something without dependence.
Nagarjuna, Mulamadhyamakakarika 25.6
but when I look this up I find this

6. If nirvana were existent,
How could nirvana be nondependent?
A nondependent existent
Does not exist anywhere.


The full chapter is here
1. If all this is empty,
Then there is no arising or passing away.
By the relinquishing or ceasing of what
Does one wish nirvana to arise?

2. If all this is nonempty,
Then there is no arising or passing away.
By the relinquishing or ceasing of what
Does one wish nirvana to arise?

3. Unrelinquished, unattained,
Unannihilated, not permanent,
Unarisen, unceased:
This is how nirvana is described.

4. Nirvana is not existent.
It would then have the characteristics of age and death.
There is no existent entity
Without age and death.

5. If nirvana were existent.
Nirvana would be compounded.
A noncompounded existent
Does not exist anywhere.

6. If nirvana were existent,
How could nirvana be nondependent?
A nondependent existent
Does not exist anywhere.

7. If nirvana were not existent,
How could it be appropriate for it to be nonexistent?
Where nirvana is not existent.
It cannot be a nonexistent.

8. If nirvana were not existent,
How could nirvana be nondependent?
Whatever is nondependent
Is not nonexistent.

9. That which comes and goes
Is dependent and changing.
That, when it is not dependent and changing,
Is taught to be nirvana.

10. The teacher has spoken of relinquishing
Becoming and dissolution.
Therefore, it makes sense that
Nirvana is neither existent nor nonexistent.

11. If nirvana were both
Existent and nonexistent,
Passing beyond would, impossibly,
Be both existent and nonexistent.

12. If nirvana were both
Existent and nonexistent,
Nirvana would not be nondependent.
Since it would depend on both of these.

13. How could nirvana
Be both existent and nonexistent?
Nirvana is uncompounded.
Both existents and nonexistents are compounded.

14. How could nirvana
Be both existent and nonexistent?
These two cannot be in the same place.
Like light and darkness.

15. Nirvana is said to be
Neither existent nor nonexistent.
If the existent and the nonexistent were established,
This would be established.

16. If nirvana is
Neither existent nor nonexistent,
Then by whom is it expounded
“Neither existent nor nonexistent”?

17. Having passed into nirvana, the Victorious Conqueror
Is neither said to be existent
Nor said to be nonexistent.
Neither both nor neither are said.

18. So, when the victorious one abides, he
Is neither said to be existent
Nor said to be nonexistent.
Neither both nor neither are said.

19. There is not the slightest difference
Between cyclic existence and nirvana.
There is not the slightest difference
Between nirvana and cyclic existence.

20. Whatever is the limit of nirvana,
That is the limit of cyclic existence.
There is not even the slightest difference between them,
Or even the subtlest thing.

21. Views that after cessation there is a limit, etc.,
And that it is permanent, etc.,
Depend upon nirvana, the final limit,
And the prior limit.

22. Since all existents are empty,
What is finite or infinite?
What is finite and infinite?
What is neither finite nor infinite?

23. What is identical and what is different?
What is permanent and what is impermanent?
What is both permanent and impermanent?
What is neither?

24. The pacification of all objectification
And the pacification of illusion:
No Dharma was taught by the Buddha
At any time, in any place, to any person
https://terebess.hu/english/Nagarjuna.pdf

I don't see your line anywhere?
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Re: Where is there a juxtaposition of early dependent origination against its later use as extreme refutation?

Post by Rambutan »

Nibbana “exists” only in the sense of what it isn’t , and what it isn’t is dukkha (rebirth, samsara, etc).
It’s like, if you put out the fire of a burning house, then the house has reached a state of no more burning. But that state of not being on fire isn’t a “thing”. It’s a “not-thing”.
(Not burning). So, of course it is unconditional, not-dependently arising, in the sense that ‘something which is not what is there cannot have characteristics’. There is no octopus in my bathtub, but that isn’t really quality of the tub. The tub isn’t specifically in an “octopusless” state.
But nibbana is conditional on the sense that it is specifically the condition of non-dukkha.
zan
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Re: Where is there a juxtaposition of early dependent origination against its later use as extreme refutation?

Post by zan »

This author seems adamant in utterly rejecting even the possibility that dependent origination could be interpreted as something to explain all of reality, which, of course, if he is correct, would also completly nullify its wielding by Nagarjuna.

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This essay has for its purpose the simple but fundamental task of establishing what the 12-links formula is about (i.e., the subject matter broached in the canonical primary source texts).  I would now contrast a few of the popular opinions on this matter, taking my motto from Charles Darwin’s Descent of Man: “False facts are highly injurious … for they often endure long; but false views… do little harm, for every one takes a salutary pleasure in proving their falseness…”.

Many of the leading interpretations are pointedly vague.  The influential translator Bhikkhu Bodhi remarks: “In its abstract form the principle of dependent arising is equivalent to the law of the conditioned genesis of phenomena.” (Bodhi, 1980, q.v. exposition, 2nd paragraph)  As anodyne as this may sound, I must repudiate it as a “false fact”: the subject of the doctrine is simply incarnation (inclusive of conception, the development of the embryo, and birth).  While this may extend to include the hatching of snakes and the births of gods and demi-gods (as shown above, 1), the primary concern of the text is human life in its tangible form.  The text is not about the origin of “phenomena” (neither in its dictionary denotation, nor in any other sense of the term I can construe here); I would reject any attempt to broaden the meaning of this particular set of source texts into an abstract statement on epistemology or metaphysics.  The Pali canon contains many discourses concerning the function of the mind and perception, but this isn’t one of them.  A huge bulk of pseudo-philosophical hyperbole written by modern authors must collapse on this simple point: the original text does not broach the subject of the “structural relatedness of phenomena” (as Bodhi puts it, idem. 7th paragraph).

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My conclusion is, simply, that the 12-links formula is unambiguously an ancient tract that was originally written on the subject of the conception and development of the embryo, as a sequence of stages prior to birth; in examining the primary source text, this is as blatant today as it was over two thousand years ago, despite some very interesting misinterpretations that have arisen in the centuries in-between.

-Unpopular facts about one of Buddhist philosophy’s most popular doctrines, Eisel Mazard


It makes sense. Wouldn't it be strange if the Buddha meant it to be Nagarjuna's tool to explain literally everything, but failed to word it in a way that didn't sound like he was talking about the process of rebirth?

This is almost irrelevant to the Theravada approach, which treats it largely as a description of rebirth, and as a tool to refute the soul in relation to a being, and doesn't go in the direction of Nagarjuna at all. However, it serves the original purpose of this thread, which was to juxtapose the earliest understanding with the later.

Further reading.
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
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