Critiques of the Buddhadhamma

[Dhamma Chameleon]

Valiant attempts all round, but without agreeing to some shared basis of reality this discussion is doomed to go around in circles. A beautiful illustration of the problem of critique!

[Sam Vara]

This is a good example of a "deepity" - something that appears to be profound and interesting, but turns out to be trivially true on one level but meaningless on another. https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Deepity

Of course, knowing something means that the thing is "in one's mind"; that's analytically and trivially true. But it's not true in the sense that we can know plenty of things which are external to our minds. We can know that Jupiter exists, for example, or where we have left our keys. These things (both involving "likelihood") are the case independent of our minds, in the much more important sense that Jupiter exists even if someone does know know it, and my keys are where they are even if I forget where I left them.

Are perceptions not part of one's mind? So if you perceive the thing you call Jupiter, is it not in your mind? And how do you really know, without assuming, the moment you forget and not perceive your keys, that they still exist? Yes, if you find them again, they are back. So are the tides, ebbing and flooding.

That's precisely my point - that there are perceptions of things, and that the perceptions might be said to be "in one's mind", but the things themselves are not. My keys exist when not perceived because their continued existence is a more plausible hypothesis than some unknown factor causing them to pop in and out of existence, especially when they can undergo alteration when not perceived.

Well, how I use the term absolute, is that this knowledge is there, even if it is not known. Which is in accordance with your understanding, and, and because, you say you have this absolute knowledge, because you state that you know Jupiter, even without perceiving it.

Knowledge that is not known? That's self-contradictory, and not in accordance with my understanding. Nor do I say I have absolute knowledge, nor do I say that I know Jupiter without perceiving it. So that paragraph is not doing a lot of useful work...

Nibbana has no conditions, so it cannot be known. But if I know this, do I not know it? I cannot answer that.

So how can you know you attained it?

[Sam Vara]

Valiant attempts all round, but without agreeing to some shared basis of reality this discussion is doomed to go around in circles. A beautiful illustration of the problem of critique!

I don't know what "the problem of critique" is, but I consider my thinking to be in a relatively straight line...

[Dhamma Chameleon]

I don't know what "the problem of critique" is, but I consider my thinking to be in a relatively straight line...

The problem of having to share at least some ground rules. It's pointless to argue when that shared base ground isn't there, or when one of the participants' ground is more like quicksand.

Maybe I'm wrong, and it's not pointless. I don't know.

[PeterC86]

Are perceptions not part of one's mind? So if you perceive the thing you call Jupiter, is it not in your mind? And how do you really know, without assuming, the moment you forget and not perceive your keys, that they still exist? Yes, if you find them again, they are back. So are the tides, ebbing and flooding.

That's precisely my point - that there are perceptions of things, and that the perceptions might be said to be "in one's mind", but the things themselves are not. My keys exist when not perceived because their continued existence is a more plausible hypothesis than some unknown factor causing them to pop in and out of existence, especially when they can undergo alteration when not perceived.

I agree.

Well, how I use the term absolute, is that this knowledge is there, even if it is not known. Which is in accordance with your understanding, and, and because, you say you have this absolute knowledge, because you state that you know Jupiter, even without perceiving it.

Knowledge that is not known? That's self-contradictory, and not in accordance with my understanding. Nor do I say I have absolute knowledge, nor do I say that I know Jupiter without perceiving it. So that paragraph is not doing a lot of useful work...

I agree.

Nibbana has no conditions, so it cannot be known. But if I know this, do I not know it? I cannot answer that.

So how can you know you attained it?

I cannot. But if I know this, do I not know it?

[Sam Vara]

Are perceptions not part of one's mind? So if you perceive the thing you call Jupiter, is it not in your mind? And how do you really know, without assuming, the moment you forget and not perceive your keys, that they still exist? Yes, if you find them again, they are back. So are the tides, ebbing and flooding.

That's precisely my point - that there are perceptions of things, and that the perceptions might be said to be "in one's mind", but the things themselves are not. My keys exist when not perceived because their continued existence is a more plausible hypothesis than some unknown factor causing them to pop in and out of existence, especially when they can undergo alteration when not perceived.

I agree.

Well, how I use the term absolute, is that this knowledge is there, even if it is not known. Which is in accordance with your understanding, and, and because, you say you have this absolute knowledge, because you state that you know Jupiter, even without perceiving it.

Knowledge that is not known? That's self-contradictory, and not in accordance with my understanding. Nor do I say I have absolute knowledge, nor do I say that I know Jupiter without perceiving it. So that paragraph is not doing a lot of useful work...

I agree.

Nibbana has no conditions, so it cannot be known. But if I know this, do I not know it? I cannot answer that.

So how can you know you attained it?

I cannot. But if I know this, do I not know it?

So you cannot know you attained nibbāna, but make the point that if you know that you attained nibbāna, then you know it. The second bit is analytically true, but redundant, as the first bit says you cannot know.

[Sam Vara]

I don't know what "the problem of critique" is, but I consider my thinking to be in a relatively straight line...

The problem of having to share at least some ground rules. It's pointless to argue when that shared base ground isn't there, or when one of the participants' ground is more like quicksand.

Maybe I'm wrong, and it's not pointless. I don't know.

I think the shared ground is that nibbāna is real, and that there is the possibility for knowing or attaining it. My point is that the case for PeterC86 having known/attained it is looking weak at the moment.

[PeterC86]

So how can you know you attained it?

I cannot. But if I know this, do I not know it?

So you cannot know you attained nibbāna, but make the point that if you know that you attained nibbāna, then you know it. The second bit is analytically true, but redundant, as the first bit says you cannot know.

I don't see myself making a point. Nibbana is unconditioned, so it cannot be known. But if I know this, do I not know it?

[Sam Vara]

I cannot. But if I know this, do I not know it?

So you cannot know you attained nibbāna, but make the point that if you know that you attained nibbāna, then you know it. The second bit is analytically true, but redundant, as the first bit says you cannot know.

I don't see myself making a point. Nibbana is unconditioned, so it cannot be known. But if I know this, do I not know it?

This is confusing two separate senses of the very broad English verb "to know". Of course, if you believe that nibbāna is unconditioned and therefore not a possible subject of knowledge, then you know that it cannot be known. But anyone and everyone knows this, it's basic deductive logic.

The more interesting point here is that you have said that you cannot know you have attained nibbāna, contrary to the claim in your first post here.

[cappuccino]

Nibbana is unconditioned, so it cannot be known.

rather it can be known


that's the point of Buddhism

[PeterC86]

The more interesting point here is that you have said that you cannot know you have attained nibbāna, contrary to the claim in your first post here.

I said; I cannot. But if I know this, do I not know it?

[PeterC86]

rather it can be known


that's the point of Buddhism

Yes, the point of Buddhism is that it can be known.

[Sam Vara]

The more interesting point here is that you have said that you cannot know you have attained nibbāna, contrary to the claim in your first post here.

I said; I cannot. But if I know this, do I not know it?

Yes, you know that you cannot know that you have attained nibbāna.

[PeterC86]

I said; I cannot. But if I know this, do I not know it?

Yes, you know that you cannot know that you have attained nibbāna.

So through knowing we become ignorance, and through ignorance we become knowing.

https://www.dhammatalks.org/suttas/SN/SN12_23.html

Like the tides of the ocean.

https://www.dhammatalks.org/suttas/SN/SN12_69.html

[Sam Vara]

I said; I cannot. But if I know this, do I not know it?

Yes, you know that you cannot know that you have attained nibbāna.

So through knowing we become ignorance, and through ignorance we become knowing.

https://www.dhammatalks.org/suttas/SN/SN12_23.html

Like the tides of the ocean.

https://www.dhammatalks.org/suttas/SN/SN12_69.html

Sure.

Anyone who thinks that Theravada is a waste of time and wants an alternative route to nibbana is able to read your above posts and decide whether you are likely to provide it.