Peripheral Awareness

Exploring Theravāda's connections to other paths - what can we learn from other traditions, religions and philosophies?
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pulga
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Peripheral Awareness

Post by pulga »

I find Ajhan Nyanamoli’s emphasis on peripheral awareness to be a very intriguing insight. It brings to mind what phenomenologists, particularly Aron Gurwitsch, refer to as “marginal consciousness”. Below is a precis from his book Marginal Consciousness.
AUTHOR’S INTRODUCTION: THE GENERAL
CHARACTERISTICS OF MARGINAL CONSCIOUSNESS

There is no limit on the marginal data which may be copresent with a theme at any moment in our conscious life. When we are dealing with a
mathematical theorem, for example, items of the most diverse sorts can and do appear within the margin without being integrated into the thematic
field. These include a certain sector of our environment and some of the things which happen to be found there; a nonperceptual knowledge
of those parts of our actual environment which do not happen to be perceived, such as the things behind our back; a more or less distinct
awareness of our embodied existence, e.g., our bodily posture; etc. Furthermore, it may occur to us while we are dealing with the theorem
in question that we have already dealt with it on an earlier occasion and we may, perhaps, remember more or less clearly the circumstances of that
occasion. Finally, thoughts of the most heterogeneous description and with no relation at all to the theme may happen to present themselves,
such as the reminiscence of a musical performance, the expectation of a visit we are to receive, etc.

Some of these marginal items appear in a dim and penumbral way and quickly fade, while others, no less vague and indistinct, are more persistent.
However transitory or persistent these data may be, as long as they do not succeed in diverting us from the theme by forcing attention upon
themselves, they are of no concern at all to the thematic process. It makes not the slightest difference to the theme, either taken in itself with respect to its kernel and substance or taken with respect to its mode of presentation as determined by the positional index, perspective, orientation,
etc., whether these or those marginal items be experienced simultaneously with it or not. While changes in the thematic field affect the mode of presentation of the theme, no alteration in the theme results from changes in the marginal data. From the fact that it is experienced in this perceptual environment rather than another, from the fact that we are sitting rather than walking, from the fact that we do or do not remember having dealt with it previously, etc., no tinge or feature is bestowed upon that which is experienced, taken as it actually appears in our example our mathematical theorem in a certain perspective. In other words, there is no element in the noematic structure of the theme reflecting the copresence of the marginal data which are actually present with it.

The disconnectedness of the marginal data from the theme appears in this complete indifference of the theme with respect to marginal data, a
disconnectedness which derives from the absence of material relevancy between the marginal data on the one hand and the thematic field on
the other. It is due to this indifference that there is no restriction on what marginal data may be copresent with a given theme. The copresence
of marginal data with the theme and the thematic field is only a relation between the mental acts, i.e., the experiences having such matters
as intentional correlates, and this relation consists solely in these acts happening to occur together. In no way does it concern the contents of
these acts, i.e., that which is given through each of them. These contents, though presenting themselves in simultaneous processes of consciousness,
are and remain unrelated to one another, this unrelatedness being another expression for the absence of relevancy, i.e., that there is no reference of
the contents in question to one another. When acts are related in this way, the only effect they might have upon one another is that of interference.
Either the marginal items produce a break in the thematic process or they continue to be copresent without contributing to it or specifying
or qualifying any of its members in any way whatsoever.

The margin, which we have defined as a domain of irrelevance, is also a domain of contingency. This holds for the particular items which actually appear in the margin at a certain moment. Whether these or some other marginal data actually present themselves at a given moment is contingent.The existence of marginal consciousness as such, however, is so far from being contingent as to constitute an a priori necessary condition of consciousness.

In the present investigation we wish to call attention to three sets of data or orders of existence the awareness of which is concomitant with
whatever may be the theme of our mental activity. These three orders are

1. a certain segment of the stream of consciousness,
2. our embodied existence, and
3. a certain sector of our perceptual environment.

Obviously our theme may belong to one of these orders. In that case, we have a concomitant marginal consciousness of the other two orders.
When our theme belongs to none of these three orders, as in the case of the mathematical theorem mentioned above, all three of them are given
in marginal form.
Gurwitsch offers a schema based upon Husserl's concept of the horizon that I think might help some better understand what Ajahn Nyanamoli is describing when he talks of peripheral awareness.
"Dhammā=Ideas. This is the clue to much of the Buddha's teaching." ~ Ven. Ñanavira, Commonplace Book
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DooDoot
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Re: Peripheral Awareness

Post by DooDoot »

Mindfulness done correctly is when the mind is anchored in something. That something must be a thing that is not directly attended to, but instead, has to be a reference point to the attended thing (hence we call it “anchor”). If a thing is not directly attended to but there, we call that thing to be a “background”. It’s a background to a thing we attend (which makes that thing a “foreground”). This is the basic principle of mindfulness, on which we can expand here below.

Thus, something one attends to directly is what a foreground is at the time. It can be anything that is the current object of one’s attention. That thing has manifested, and it is enduring as such. That’s the basic structural property of one’s experience, there is no problem with this. However, if one wants to develop mindfulness, a step further is necessary. That step is developing the peripheral “vision” in regard to that very same foreground object, but without making that peripheral vision the new object by directly attending to it. The Buddha referred to this as “yoniso manasikara”, which is often translated as “proper attention”. Yoniso manasikara is the correct way of attending to the peripheral. Manasikara means “attention”. Yoni means “womb”. So when a thing is present in the front, in the foreground, its peripheral background is that very “womb” the thing has “came from”, so to speak. Yoniso manasikara is womb-attention, or less literally: a peripheral attention

https://www.hillsidehermitage.org/peripheral-awareness/
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pulga
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Re: Peripheral Awareness

Post by pulga »

From Professor P. Sven Arvidson’s excellent book The Sphere of Attention:
The Sphere of Attention is Theme, Context, and Margin

First thing in the morning, I shuffle downstairs to greet the dog and let him outside. He spins a couple times while I unlock the door, then he bounds into the garden. I sit on the stoop to keep an eye on him. What have I attended to in these 30 seconds? How many items have captured my attention, and is there anything invariant in the way this information has been processed?

When something captures our attention, or when we concentrate or pay attention to something, it is presented within a context. There is attention to the dog as focus within the context of the boundary of the yard. I attend to the dog under the perspective and orientation of the boundary of the yard within which he is allowed to roam. So I am conscious of this context, but not in the same way as I focus on the dog. Beyond my concern with the yard, there is a much larger “context” as well. My activity happens within the world in general. I infrequently wonder about this fact; nonetheless this all-encompassing horizon of the world forms a sort of ultimate experiential backdrop for this mundane drama of watching the dog. This all-encompassing world is subtly announced in the margin in the sphere of attention—the house next door, the sky, the birds rustling through the hedge, the hill as it unfolds toward the street. All of these are somewhat removed from my concern with the yard which is the immediate context for the dog, and I hardly pay attention to them, if this means that I focus on them or that they form the immediate context for the focus. Items like the house next door are peripheral, marginal, and they seem to quietly announce a general world as the horizon for what I attend to. What else is marginally presented in this mundane scenario? My corporeity and existence as a temporal being are announced in the same way. For example, the facts that I am sitting, slightly uncomfortable, chilly, etc., and that time is passing are presented marginally.

Working from the center of the sphere of attention to its outer shell, there are three dimensions, each distinct but related to the others in ways that will be shown: thematic attention (attention in the dimension of theme or focus), the context of attention (consciousness in the dimension of thematic context), and the margin of attention (consciousness in the dimension of margin as halo and horizon).

Like the dog in the example, the theme is the focus of attention. It presents more or less unitary content, centrally consolidated and segregated from the background. The theme is attended to within a thematic context and emerges from it. The presentation of content in the thematic context, like the yard for the thematic dog, is consciousness of whatever is materially relevant for the theme. In the margin, we are present peripherally to the streaming in attending, embodied existence, and the environing world, and these orders of existence are ever-present. The margin also has a crucial role in human subjectivity.
Two other concepts that are implicit in the notion of the horizon are the contextual structure of intelligibility and categorial intuition. In Christopher Edwards’ essay on categorial intuition pay close attention to his explanation of the way categorial intuition is founded upon sensual intuition. And that categorial objects themselves found categorial objects of greater complexity.
In his search for the grounds of logic, Husserl aims to undertake such a theoretical analysis. Subsequently, to explain the way that our intuition of categorial objects is related to the workings of sensory perception, he introduces the distinction between a founding and founded act. Specifically, he claims that acts of categorial intuition are founded upon the founding acts of sensuous ‘narrow’ intuition. With regard to the latter, the thing we see is given to us in a straightforward (schlichter) fashion, i.e., our act of perception is directed at a singular thing which is constituted as a meaningful unity “in one blow”. With regard to the former, while the thing is still given ‘in one blow’, it is, nevertheless, constituted by us in “many-rayed fashion in acts of a higher level”. Or, as Husserl otherwise puts it, the objects of an act of sensuous intuition are to be characterised as “objects of the lowest level of possible intuition”, whereas the objects of an act of categorial intuition are to be characterised as “objects of higher levels”. In other words, we intuit categorial objects through particular acts, which are themselves built up out of — or founded upon —a series of ‘lower level’ acts of sensuous intuition. These lower level acts of sensuous intuition make up the ‘founding acts’ upon which our acts of categorial intuition are founded. To put it simply, the object of an act of sensuous intuition does not rest on any other sort of act, while the object of an act of categorial intuition rests on prior acts of sensory intuition. (emphasis added)
The mind is the homing-place or resort of the five bodily faculties, cf. Mahavedalla Sutta MN 43.
"Dhammā=Ideas. This is the clue to much of the Buddha's teaching." ~ Ven. Ñanavira, Commonplace Book
pulga
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Re: Peripheral Awareness

Post by pulga »

The Pali word āpātha shows up in several Suttas. It's usual translated as "field", "range", or "sphere", though Ven. Ñanamoli chose to render it as "horizon" in his manuscript translation of the Majjhima Nikaya:
“If the eye (… mind) in oneself were intact but no external forms (… ideas) came to the horizon and there were no appropriate engagement, then there would be no manifestation of the appropriate class of consciousness. If the eye (…mind) in oneself were intact and external forms (…ideas) came to the horizon, but there were no appropriate engagement, there would be no manifestation of the appropriate class of consciousness. But it is owing to the fact that the eye (…mind) in oneself is intact and that external forms (…ideas) come to the horizon, and that there is the appropriate engagement, then there is the manifestation of the appropriate class of consciousness.

Whatever form in such an entity is included in the form aggregate affected by clinging, any feeling in such an entity is included in the feeling aggregate affected by clinging. Whatever perception in such an entity is included in the perception aggregate affected by clinging. Whatever determinations in such an entity are included in the determinations aggregate affected by clinging. Whatever consciousness in such an entity is included in the consciousness aggregate affected by clinging.

He understands thus, ‘This, it seems, is how there comes to be inclusion, gathering and amassing into these five aggregates affected by clinging. Now this has been said by the Blessed One, “He who sees dependent origination sees the Dhamma; he who sees the Dhamma sees dependent origination.” And these five aggregates affected by clinging are dependently arisen. The zeal for, the reliance on, approval and acceptance of, these five aggregates affected by clinging is the origin of suffering. The removal of zeal and lust, the abandoning of zeal and lust, for them is the cessation of suffering’. And at this point too, friends, much has been done by the bhikkhu. – Mahāhatthipadopama Sutta MN 28
Gurwitsch uses "field" and "horizon" interchangeably. They mean essentially the same thing.
"Dhammā=Ideas. This is the clue to much of the Buddha's teaching." ~ Ven. Ñanavira, Commonplace Book
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