Coëmgenu wrote: ↑Tue Jan 10, 2017 11:48 pm
What does the Fourfold Negation (sometimes called the tetralemma) apply to? What does the Fourfold Negation not apply to?
The Fourfold Negation:
1. X
2. not-X
3. X and not-X
4. not-(X or not-X)
Here are some instances of the Fourfold Negation from the Buddhavacana, which does not systematically appear fully fleshed out at all times, but appear contextually, much like the Twelve Nidānas are not exhaustively explored in every single instance of paṭiccasamuppāda-explanation:
Then the naked ascetic Kassapa said to the Blessed One: “We do not wish to ask Master Gotama much.”
“Then ask what you want, Kassapa.”
“How is it, Master Gotama: is suffering created by oneself?”
“Not so, Kassapa,” the Blessed One said.
“Then, Master Gotama, is suffering created by another?”
“Not so, Kassapa,” the Blessed One said.
“How is it then, Master Gotama: is suffering created both by oneself and by another?”
“Not so, Kassapa,” the Blessed One said.
“Then, Master Gotama, has suffering arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another?”
“Not so, Kassapa,” the Blessed One said.
“How is it then, Master Gotama: is there no suffering?”
“It is not that there is no suffering, Kassapa; there is suffering.”
“Then is it that Master Gotama does not know and see suffering?”
“It is not that I do not know and see suffering, Kassapa. I know suffering, I see suffering.”
“Whether you are asked: ‘How is it, Master Gotama: is suffering created by oneself?’ or ‘Is it created by another?’ or ‘Is it created by both?’ or ‘Is it created by neither?’ in each case you say: ‘Not so, Kassapa.’ When you are asked: ‘How is it then, Master Gotama: is there no suffering?’ you say: ‘It is not that there is no suffering, Kassapa; there is suffering.’ When asked: ‘Then is it that Master Gotama does not know and see suffering?’ you say: ‘It is not that I do not know and see suffering, Kassapa. I know suffering, I see suffering.’ Venerable sir, let the Blessed One explain suffering to me. Let the Blessed One teach me about suffering.”
“Kassapa, if one thinks, ‘The one who acts is the same as the one who experiences the result,’ then one asserts with reference to one existing from the beginning: ‘Suffering is created by oneself.’ When one asserts thus, this amounts to eternalism. But, Kassapa, if one thinks, ‘The one who acts is one, the one who experiences the result is another,’ then one asserts with reference to one stricken by feeling: ‘Suffering is created by another.’ When one asserts thus, this amounts to annihilationism. Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma by the middle:
[here follows an explanation of Dependant Origination]
(SN 12.17)
This instance lacks the third negation (
X and not-X), because it is collapsed into the first and second negations:
“Thus this way of regarding things and the notion ‘I am’ have not vanished in him. As ‘I am’ has not vanished, there takes place a descent of the five faculties—of the eye faculty, the ear faculty, the nose faculty, the tongue faculty, the body faculty. There is, bhikkhus, the mind, there are mental phenomena, there is the element of ignorance. When the uninstructed worldling is contacted by a feeling born of ignorance-contact, ‘I am’ occurs to him; ‘I am this’ occurs to him; ‘I will be’ and ‘I will not be,’ and ‘I will consist of form’ and ‘I will be formless,’ and ‘I will be percipient’ and ‘I will be nonpercipient’ and ‘I will be neither percipient nor nonpercipient’—these occur to him.
“The five faculties remain right there, bhikkhus, but in regard to them the instructed noble disciple abandons ignorance and arouses true knowledge. With the fading away of ignorance and the arising of true knowledge, ‘I am’ does not occur to him; ‘I am this’ does not occur to him; ‘I will be’ and ‘I will not be,’ and ‘I will consist of form’ and ‘I will be formless,’ and ‘I will be percipient’ and ‘I will be nonpercipient’ and ‘I will be neither percipient nor nonpercipient’—these do not occur to him."
(SN 22.47)
There are, monks, some ascetics and Brahmins who are Finitists and Infinitists, and who proclaim the finitude and infinitude of the world on four grounds. What are they?
Here a certain ascetic or Brahmin has by means of effort attained to such a state of concentration that he dwells perceiving the world as infinitude. He thinks: "This world is finite and bounded [...]."
[...]
And what is the second way? [...] He dwells perceiving the world as infinite. He thinks: "This world is infinite and unbounded [...]."
[...]
And what is the third way? [...] He dwells perceiving the world as finite up-and-down, and infinite across. He thinks: "This world is finite and infinite [...]."
[...]
And what is the fourth case? Here a certain ascetic or Brahmin is a logician, a reasoner. Hammering it out by reason, he argues: "This world is neither finite nor infinite [...]."
(DN 1, 2.16-21, Brahmajālasutta, Wrong views 9-12
Here we have an instance of the Fourfold Negation applied to the nature of the knowledge of the Tathāgata. He appears to draw a distinction between "knowing" and "directly knowing":
The Blessed One said this:
“Bhikkhus, in this world with its devas, Māra, and Brahmā, among this population with its ascetics and brahmins, its devas and humans, whatever is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, reached, sought after, examined by the mind—that I know.
“Bhikkhus, in this world with its devas, Māra, and Brahmā, among this population with its ascetics and brahmins, its devas and humans, whatever is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, reached, sought after, examined by the mind—that I have directly known. It has been known by the Tathāgata, but in the Tathāgata it has not been established. (An alternate translation here reads: "but the Tathagata hasn't taken a stance on it")
“Bhikkhus, if I were to say, ‘In this world with its devas … whatever is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, reached, sought after, examined by the mind—that I do not know,’ that would be a falsehood on my part.
6“Bhikkhus, if I were to say, ‘In this world with its devas … whatever is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, reached, sought after, examined by the mind—that I both know and do not know,’ that too would be just the same.
7“Bhikkhus, if I were to say, ‘In this world with its devas … whatever is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, reached, sought after, examined by the mind—that I neither know nor do not know,’ that would be a fault on my part.
(AN 4.24)
In this instance the Fourfold Negation is specified by the Buddha as used to dismiss flawed questions that are irrelevant to the Dhamma:
“These speculative views have been left undeclared by the Blessed One, set aside and rejected by him, namely: ‘the world is eternal’ and ‘the world is not eternal’; ‘the world is finite’ and ‘the world is infinite’; ‘the soul is the same as the body’ and ‘the soul is one thing and the body another’; and ‘after death a Tathāgata exists’ and ‘after death a Tathāgata does not exist’ and ‘after death a Tathāgata both exists and does not exist’ and ‘after death a Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist.’ The Blessed One does not declare these to me, and I do not approve of and accept the fact that he does not declare these to me, so I shall go to the Blessed One and ask him the meaning of this. If he declares to me either ‘the world is eternal’ or ‘the world is not eternal’…or ‘after death a Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist,’ then I will lead the holy life under him; if he does not declare these to me, then I will abandon the training and return to the low life.”
[...]
“Why have I left that undeclared? Because it is unbeneficial, it does not belong to the fundamentals of the holy life, it does not lead to disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to peace, to direct knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nibbāna. That is why I have left it undeclared."
(MN 63)
This instance is interesting because it appears that the Buddha may actually be criticizing
a) the Fourfold Negation itself, or
b) the misapplication of the negations:
'What is the fourth way? Here, an ascetic or Brahmin is dull and stupid. Because of his dullness and stupidity, when he is questioned he resorts to evasive statements and wriggles like an eel:
"If you ask me whether there is another world. But I don't say so. And I don't say otherwise. And I don't say it is not, and I don't not say it is not."
"Is there no other world?..."
"Is there both another world and no other world?...
"Is there neither another world nor no other world?..."
"Are there spontaneously-born beings?..."
"Are there not...?"
"Both...?
"Neither...?"
"Does the Tathagata exist after death? Does he not exist after death? Does he both exist and not exist after death? Does he neither exist nor not exist after death?..."
"If I thought so, I would say so...I don't say so...I don't say it is not."
This is the fourth case.'
(DN 1, 2.27, Brahmajālasutta, Wrong view 16, "Eel-wriggling")